POPULATION AND STATISTICS
SUMMARY: Revision 2009
By 2005, the population of the Middle East and North Africa
accounts for 386 million. The growth rates are diminishing in North
Africa but remain very high in some areas. Globally, we can expect 585
million in 2030. Despite some very good assets (Oil and Gas), the GNI only
attains 910 $Billion with an average income per capita of $2,360 in
2004. Thanks to the expected rise of the crude oil price until 2015,
it would attain 1,710 $Billion in 2030. On the other hand, terrorism,
external and civil wars, and a western containment policy could result in a
global fall of the GNI.
Our diagnosis shows that the present
Arab civilization is suffering a serious mental disease. It looks like schizophrenia:
The subject nurtures a world vision that does not correspond to the reality. As
a result, when he acts according to his dreams, he does not perform any result.
Indeed the Arab world nurtures a wrong vision of religion and history and as
a result only encounters humiliating failures.
Clearly, the Middle East and North
Africa will remain the world black sheep until 2030 (Terrorism, fanaticism, Grand corruption, dictatorships,
Illegal immigration, proliferation and constant threat for the civilized
world). In such a context, it is fruitless to make recommendations. The road to
democracy should imply a complete reeducation ( And notably a reform of Islam)
similar to the denazification process which was implemented in Germany by the
end of World War 2. Such a process had a meaning in Germany because this
country was a great civilization. On the contrary, we do not think that the Middle
East and North Africa merit endless wars and the losses of brave soldiers. We
have better to adopt a containment policy : Go to the new war.
Warning: Go to Standards
of quality about the sources of tables and
stats: Economic stats-World Bank: www.worldbank.org/data. Population stats: UN: www.un.org/esa/.
1-DIAGNOSIS
Firstly, let us examine the region:
Geography, population, economy, and political situation. This examination
shows that the greater Middle East benefits of some good assets. Unfortunately,
they are badly managed.
11-Geography: Space, sea and sun
The Greater Middle East accounts for
21 countries: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt,
Sudan, Israel, West Bank, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Emirates, Bahrain,
Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Iran .
The region represents 13,500
square kilometers (USA: 9,269; Europe- 25 Countries: 4,150). The Atlantic
ocean, Mediterranean sea, Black sea, Red sea, Arabian sea surround it. Large
gulfs such as Aden, Persian, and Oman gulfs favor the communications: No
comparisons with compact continents such as Africa or South America.
The region is composed with deserts
and very fertile regions such as the Nile valley, the fertile crescent ( Jordan
river, Tigres and Euphrates rivers), and the south west of the Arabian
peninsula ( "Arabia Felix " in Latin). What is more, the ground
contains some huge natural resources (Oil an gas).
It is obviously a good implementation
for human. As a result, Civilization began in this region as far as 5000 years
BCE with Sumerians and Egypt. By this time, Europe was covered by
forests with marshes. A rainy climate required clothes and housing against the
cold. Indeed, the European assets were very poor compared to the middle eastern
Eden! Consider the next map:
DRAWING 1
Clearly, the populations of the
Middle East have inherited of very good assets: What have they done with them?
12-Population
By 2005, the population accounts for 386 million. The
growth rates are diminishing in North Africa but remain very high in some
areas: Yemen (21 million in 2005) will have 144 million by 2100! (More
than Russia!). Globally, we can expect 585 million inhabitants in 2030. Go
to world population prospects
Only two nations exceed 50 millions (
Egypt: 65, Iran: 65 ). People concentrate in towns: Cairo designed for 100,000
reaches 15 million. The entire region is more urbanized than Asia or Africa. In
the past, towns were inhabited by educated elite and religious minorities. The
rush of illiterate peasants is changing this fact. As these illiterates have a
very high growth rate, their increasing number in towns tends to make urban
control a key for the future
People worship mainly Islam divided
into Sunnis and Shiites. Jews and Christians are also present ( Israel,
Lebanon, Iraq, Syria). Arabic, Berber, Parsi ( Iran) Hebrew (Israel) are the
main languages in use. The elite speaks fluent English and French in North
Africa.
The quality of education is bad.
In the Arab world, 65 million adults are illiterate (Two-thirds of them women).
Only 0.6% of the population uses the Internet, and 1.2% have personal
computers. The UNDP reports about the Arab world notes a shortage of new writing.
For example, in the 1,000 years since the reign of the Caliph Mamoun, the
Arabs have translated as many books as Spain translates in one year: Indeed,
it's a very humiliating figure!
13-Economy
In spite of large resources, the
economy remains fragile. Of course, the
region is not monolithic and we have to be careful with generalizations: For
example, the economic situation is different according to the oil fields
situation.
However, we may posit that most of
the countries benefit of oil exploitation. Of course, oil and gas represent
huge economic assets in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states: 65% of the world
proven oil reserves are located in this area and the average life of Saudi
reserves is about 50 years ( However, many oil fields are yet depleted ). On
the other hand, beside Saudi Arabia and the gulf States, many countries also
benefit of oil : Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, Iran and new oil fields could be
drilled in the future ( Notably in Sudan ). What is more, the Gulf and Caspian
oil is exported through countries deprived of large oil resources such as
Syria. In spite of our wish to avoid stereotypes and generalizations, it is
clear that most countries benefit of good economic assets in connection with
energy. Unfortunately, they have badly managed these resources.
Despite these assets, the global GNI
only attains 910 $Billion in 2004. The unemployment rate is about 30%.
As a result, the region is the theater of migrations to towns, oil
States, and finally Europe. Of course, there are strong disparities: Four
countries, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia reach a GDP superior to $100
Billion. Since the population is growing , the GDP per capita slowly increases:
The average income per capita attains $2,360 in 2004.
In fact, these stats include Israel.
With only 20,000 square kilometers and 7 million people, Israel gets 13% of the
global GNI! ( A second humiliating figure! ) Consider the next drawing (
Population in Million, GNI in $Billion, GNI per capita in $ ):
DRAWING 2
Region ------------Population-----GNI:2004----Income
per Capita
Israel------------------7-------------120-------------17,140
Middle East and NA---379------------ 790--------------2,080
Middle East and NA---379------------ 790--------------2,080
Total----------------386------------
910--------------2,360
How can we explain this situation?
Jews are Semitic like Arabs. In old time, they were nomadic like Arabs. Jews
have suffered not only of the colonization but also of the Shoah. Nevertheless,
there are some great differences between Jews and Arabs: Religion,
education, democracy and more largely cultural habits. A close
investigation about these topics will allow us to understand the Middle East
situation.
What is more, the region suffers three
vulnerabilities: Firstly, the fresh water resources per
capita are very low compared to East Asia and Europe. Desalinization plants are
yet extensively used in the Gulf States. Secondly, the region is more
and more dependent for food. Some countries import 50% of the food
stuff. Thirdly, Since scientific advances and technical progress are
weak ( Except in Israel) the region only relies on West for drugs and other
vital goods. For example, the % of high technology in manufactured exports is
the lowest in the world with Sub Saharan Africa ( About 2% between 1999 and
2003 ): A third humiliating feature!
14-Political situation
Among these countries, there are only
two democracies: Israel and Iraq (With many reservations regarding Iraq ).
Clearly, this is a second trauma. With black Africa, the Middle East is the
least democratic region in the world: In Iran and Saudi Arabia, recent
elections resulted in islamic success. Only Jordan and the gulf States seem
eager to engage real reforms.
The region is a permanent theater for
wars, guerrillas, and finally terrorism. Military expenditures share an average
of 7% of the global GDP and dissipate money which could be used for
improving education. The region is the main source of terrorism and
proliferation. Clearly, the Middle East and North Africa will remain the
world black sheep until 2030 and a constant threat for the civilized world:
In a near future, every European capital will be within range of ballistic
missiles based in the Middle East.
15-Prospect 2030
The population is expected to reach 585
million inhabitants in 2030. Regarding the Economy and thanks to oil
prices, the GNI has grown on an average of 4% over the five last years.
Since, we expect a slow down of oil prices between 2015 and 2030 we
cannot rely on the present stats to extrapolate the future trend. Moreover, the
main regional driver is the islamic surge that will result in more and more
internal or international wars. According to these these facts, our prediction
relies on a yearly growth rate of 4% for the period 2005-2015 , 2% for
2016-2020 and 0% for 2021 -2030 ( 1%). Consider the next drawing ( Population
in Million, GNI in $Billion, GNI per capita in $ ):
DRAWING 3
Region --------------Population----GNI:2030----Income
per Capita
Israel-------------------10------------228------------
22,800
Middle East and NA-----575-----------1,482------------2,580
Middle East and NA-----575-----------1,482------------2,580
Total------------------585-----------1,710------------2,925
Without Israel, the GNI would attain
1,482 $Billion and the income per capita 2,580 in 2030 instead of 2,080 in 2004
. Moreover, the two most backward
countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will be the main economic powers. Since the
oil power is expected to vanish by 2040, it means that the Middle East could
enter by that time in a new middle ages. However, this prospect is beyond the
frame of our study.
2-GLOBAL SCHIZOPHRENIA
In his famous essay "Civilization
and its Discontents", Freud posits that the development of
civilization has a similarity to the development of the individual. Indeed, we
may be justified in reaching the diagnosis that some epochs of some
civilizations have become neurotic.
Although we do not follow all the
Freud's theories, we can state that the present Middle East civilization is
suffering a serious mental disease. It looks like schizophrenia. It means
that the mind is dissociated: The subject nurtures a world vision that does not
correspond to the reality. As a result, when he acts according to his dreams,
he does not perform any result. Then, he thinks that other people are
responsible of the failure and are plotting against him. Finally he rushes in
anger and become dangerous. Look at the next drawing.
DRAWING 4
The first step of a neurotic process
is the acquisition of a very specific identity. When a person does not behave
like others, you usually observe that she is not normal. Of course, every
civilization has its own identity but when it differs by far from the others,
it could mean that there is a problem.
What is more, in a globalized world,
people and habits tend to be more and more closer. Even in black Africa, and
notably in the big towns, many things are common with Europe. It's the same in
Latin America or in Asia. On the contrary, while traveling in the Middle East,
you never feel comfortable. Wherever you are, in Morocco or 5000 kilometers
away in Saudi Arabia, you experience that you are really a foreigner because Islam
has produced a very strange civilization.
21-Strange facts
Among the strange facts that I have
observed by visiting about sixteen countries of the region, the most
significant is the women condition. It means that sexuality is more
restrained than in other regions due to the major role of religion.
Many women are veiled and hidden. You
do not see that in other continents. It means that half of the population looks
like a second class citizens. Polygamy is another specific fact: Old men can
repudiate their old spouses and married very young girls. Young men and girls
have few opportunity to get sex. Virginity remains a taboo. Go to gender.
Women condition is not the sole
difference. Slavery still exists in some Arab countries. I met poor
black slaves in Mauritania. They asked me drugs because they were deprived of
any health support. On the border of Sahara, Tuareg tribes still have domestic
black slaves. In Sudan, northern Arabs routinely enslave black Christians.
People are more addicted to religion
than in other areas. They are praying five times a day.
Alcohol and pork are strictly forbidden in many countries. In some local
places, you will hardly find any toilet papers. Even in big towns, many people
are eating with their hands, not because they cannot afford to buy forks or
spoons but just because they are good Muslims.
People in the streets look
often angry or disdainful. You have better to avoid any conversation because
they quickly rush in anger and you can enter in serious troubles if you do not
agree with them. Regarding the elite and its hospitality, it's mainly a fairy
tale. People are very kind as long as you say that their civilization is the
highest. When you do not behave like an admirer, they may become rude and
impolite. On the contrary, you feel at home when you meet with Christians
Maronites or Jews. According to our usual standards, Israel looks like the
sole civilized country in the entire region.
Finally, all these facts correspond
to a vision that relies on a dream associating both Islam and the Arab history.
It means that many people are unable to apprehend the real world. In fact, they
live in two worlds : The real world that surrounds them and a dead world that
only exists in their minds. It is the beginning of the schizophrenia! The
next video shows how this schizophrenia is perceived by the western world.
22-Religion.
You will not find any people in Japan
eager to come back to the feudal society. In Latin America, no people expect to
restore the Maya or Inca civilization. Even in Africa, there is no people
wanting to re-establish human sacrifices. Indeed, the Middle East and North
Africa is the only region in the world where many people aim to come back to
the Bedouin society of the seventh century!
This society was based on a close
link between the religion and the common law: The Sharia'a. Of course, the
Sharia'a has nothing to do with human rights, democracy, freedom, and
emancipation of women. One could object that at their early beginning, all the
religions were stranger to any civilized way of life. However, they have
reformed themselves and evolved in accordance with the progress of the society.
The surprising fact is that Islam has not evolved. Its early primitive
conceptions have been prominent through most Islamic history and remains until
today applied in some countries such as Sudan, Saudi Arabia or Iran (in its
Shiite version).
In fact, every reform failed. As in
other regions of the world, the enlightenment in Europe brought to the Middle
East new ideas. By 1850, some Ottoman sultans tended to modernize the society
but finally the obscurantism won. For example, abolition of slavery was seen by
the Bedouin tribes as a profound injustice. The next sultan abolished all the
reforms and preached a genuine pan-islamism. As a result religious minorities
were slaughtered notably in Armenia and Syria.
During the same time, the attempt to
reform Islam began in central Asia. It was called Jadidism. Instead of
treating the words of Muhammad in their literacy, the jadidists asked
themselves what the prophet would say now if he was living today. Unfortunately,
the jadidists were crushed by the soviets in the 1920th.
Finally, after the fall of the
Ottoman empire, Ataturk abolished Sharia'a, veil and all Muslim habits
in Turkey. He associated religion to obscurantism but he met a strong
resistance in Anatolia and his ideas hardly extended in the former provinces of
the empire.
The Arab nationalism tried to
follow this path (Notably in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq and Syria) but its global
failure opened the place for the Islamic counter revolution: Thanks to oil
money, the Bedouin tribes of Arabia expanded their traditional Wahhabism.
Finally, all these events culminated with the Iranian revolution ( a Shiite
version of the Wahhabism).
However, many muslims, notably in
black Africa, only apply religion as a social habit like the Christians in
western countries. It means that the importance of the religion is specific
to the Arab World (And also to Turkey and Iran which are not arab
countries). It is due to a close link associating religion and history.
What's more, religion is more and more linked to politics: Look at the next
video.
23-History
In Europe or in America, we say
currently "that's history". It means that old stories do not impact
the present world : Technical progress has increased so much that it is better
to study economic figures rather than history for understanding the real world.
On the contrary, in the Middle East and North Africa, people are fascinated
by facts dating as far as the seventh century!
Many Middle eastern people think that
their destiny is to bring the God Truth to the infidels and that their entire
history is the accomplishment of God will. Consequently, this history
becomes a part of the religion. To back up this idea, they believe that their
past history was the highest civilization that the world had ever known. In
fact, this "highest civilization" had never existed except in their
minds.
In the Antiquity, the Middle East was
a civilization of ports and trading centers scattered all around the
Mediterranean. Phoenicians were in North Africa with Cartage. Greeks expanded
on the actual Turkey called the "Great Greece". Then, all the region
fell under the Roman rule (65 BCE) without changing its habits and culture.
With the divide of the Roman empire,
the Middle East belonged to the Eastern Roman empire headed in Byzantium
(Istanbul to day). The golden age of the Middle East took place during this
period and ended with the Arab conquest. It was a Greek civilization with a
very bright culture. Christianity was not depending of Rome and many churches
or philosophical schools flourished. This Greek culture gathered people coming
from every part of the Mediterranean with different languages such as Araméen,
Greek, Latin, Hebrew and so on. People were mixed in great towns such as Alexandria
devoted to culture and business. When you are visiting these countries, you can
observe that the most monumental past accomplishments are coming up from the
Roman and Byzantine period (Leptis Magna in Libya, Jerash in Jordan or are due
to old civilizations such as in Egypt).
Then, the Arab conquerors coming from
their desert rushed in these cities by the seventh century. It is said that a
great civilization began! Just think: How imagine that some Bedouin warriors
could add new intellectual values to the Byzantine civilization? In fact,
during the first period of conquest, the caliphs did not disturb the existing
Greek or Jew populations. Jews notably took a very important place in high
office, arts, philosophy. It can be said that this first period had been
mainly a Judeo Arab civilization. Nevertheless, very few additions were
brought to the legacy inherited of byzantium: Paper was discovered in China,
the famous Arab numbers were coming from India and Avicenne or Averroés were
just bright translators of Aristotle.
Finally,the Arab civilization was
completely destroyed by islamised people coming from the north and notably Tamerlane.
The caliph in Baghdad was beheaded and the Mongol rule lasted over for two
century. With the departure of Mongols, the Middle East scattered in many
kingdoms until the beginning of the ottoman conquest. Then the Arab
civilization fell in a constant decline and became under the Turkish rule quite
immobile until today.
Ottomans were coming from central
Asia. They appeared in Anatolia. From 1430 to 1650, they extended their
conquests to the Balkans and the Middle East. In fact, the ottoman empire took
part in the rivalries in Europe and benefited of alliances with France or
Russia according to the circumstances. From 1650 to its end in 1918, it
declined and was threatened by the minorities both in Balkans and in its Arab
provinces which were perceived in Europe as a cause of piracy. In St john
cathedral in Malta, you can see the graves of all the gentlemen coming
from Provence, Spain or England and who devoted their life to the protection of
the Christendom against the piracy. It only ended with the colonization of
North Africa by the French. Look at the next drawing:
DRAWING 5
Islamic civilization (green curve)
has just taken place within the Byzantine empire and the rise of the European
civilization (blue curve). Of course during this period, anybody can agree that
the Middle East civilization was brighter than the western Europe stormed by
the fall of the Roman empire.
Despite the fall of Constantinople
and the end of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the crossing point took place
by 1500: The vessels going to India through the Cap bypassed the Middle
East and the moors were expelled from Spain. In 1683, the ottomans suffered a
dreadful defeat in attacking Vienna and one century later, Bonaparte was able
to conquer Egypt. Of course, the gap widened with the industrial revolution.
We can conclude: In the history,
there had been a Greek miracle. There had not been any Arab miracle except in
the mind of the contemporary middle eastern population.
Since the present decline cannot be
hidden, the Islamic propaganda presents it as a revenge of Satan due to the
actions of the West. In accordance, all the past painful events are
attributed to the West in order to enforce the association with Satan: For
example, the Islamic propaganda never recalls some facts such as the execution
of the caliph by Tamerlane!
The Crusades provide us with a
good example of this distortion between the today mental representations and
the historical facts. As Bernard Lewis quotes it, crusades are today a
key element in the Muslim discourse (notably Bin Laden with his war against the
crusaders!). In fact the capture of Jerusalem in 1099 just aroused little
interest in the region and the crusaders established cities and fortress which
lasted over 200 years without much troubles. For example, Reynolds of
Chatillon' Keral castle is one of the most imposing monument that you can visit
in Jordan today ( Funnily, Chatillon is the name of an outskirts of Paris).
Likely, the victory of Saladin and
the capture of Jerusalem in 1187 is today a topic constantly developed by Arab
leaders but they forget that the same Saladin ceded Jerusalem to the German
emperor, in 1229! Today the crusades appear as a major offence for Muslim
but in reality, it was only perceived with a benign neglect by the time of
Saladin.
Another distortion is related to the
Andalusian myth. Arab occupation is presented like an
example of a tolerant and peaceful Islam. In fact Jews and Christians endured
many suffering. This myth is mainly propagated by some European scholars
according to the Eurabia scheme. As a result, terrorists in
Madrid seek revenge not just for spanish troops in Iraq but also for the loss
of Andalucia half a thousand years ago! You may note that the name of the main
avenue in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) is " Andalucia"!
24-Constant failure
The fact to have the mind poisoned by
phantasms can only conduct to failures in the real world. In every domain, the
recent history of the Middle East and North Africa is a constant series of
setbacks.
1-People and their leaders constantly
chose the wrong camp. The ottoman empire joined Germany
during World War 1 and as a result was completely dismantled. However, we must
point that the Arab revolt led by Lawrence fought against the ottoman sultan
who was also by this time the caliph. Bin Laden often refers to the abolishment
of the Caliphate as a painful event. Prisoner of his own schizophrenia, he just
forgets that his fellows Arabs Bedouins contributed to the fall of the
Caliphate in combating the ottoman empire.
Before and during World War 2, Arab
and Muslim movements joined the nazi camp. Created in 1928, the Muslim
Brotherhood supported Germany and further the grand Mufti of Jerusalem
campaigned for the extermination of Jews. In Morocco, the king encouraged
people to enroll in the Franco army backed up by Germany and Italy. In the
Balkans, Muslims enrolled themselves in the waffen SS. Finally in Chechen,
people favored Germany and as a result Stalin deported massively the
population. Regarding these facts, look at the next video:
After the fall of their Nazi
protector, many countries chose the soviet protection or campaigned for the non
aligned movement. Arab nationalism became also an Arab socialism well
implemented in youth, universities and intellectuals.
2-The Arab socialism led to a global
failure in economics. Most of the middle class in the
1920-1950 was composed by national or religious minorities: Armenians, Greeks,
Christian maronites, Copts, Jews or Arabs having roots in the West. The Arab
socialism destroyed this class who was supposed to support
"Imperialism". In Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, the military
replaced this old middle class and began to implement statal companies with the
same bad results as in black Africa.
3-The quest for a political unity
with pan-arabism also failed.
Among the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, very few have an
historical background: Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Iran. The other States
are more recent or have been drawn up by the colonization or the mandatory
powers. It means that State borders do not take in account population and
history just like in black Africa. Consequently, it was a valuable purpose to
seek for a greater unity. However, each attempt turned to be a failure (unity
between Egypt and Syria, unity of Egypt and Libya, the great Magreb, and so
on).
4-Finally, the Arab nations have waged
many wars and regularly lost them in an humiliating way: In 1947, 1967, 1978, Arab States against Israel. In 1991
and 2003, Iraq against the western coalition. They warred also one against each
other. For example, the Iran-Iraq war caused heavy casualties and lasted eight
years. What is more, populations are until today the main victims of the
fundamentalist surge notably in Algeria, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon.
The failure of the Arab nationalism
led to an outdated alternative: Islam as a global solution.
25-Anger and crisis.
Schizophrenia is a progressive
illness. When the subject registers failures, he does not question his false
vision. He thinks that other people are responsible of the failure and are
plotting against him. Finally, he rushes in anger and becomes dangerous.
Obviously, this dangerous stage of
the illness has been reached with the jihadism which goes side by side with a terrific anti-Semitism
that we had not known since the nazism (go to New war. ). It is easy to understand why.
When rulers and populations are contemplating the reality, they immediately
perceive the astonishing success of Israel: Report to anti semitism. Consequently, the Jewish State is the mirror of all their
failures. As a result, they think that the Jews are responsible of their
unfortunate destiny and it's the beginning of a mad process that gets its
climax with the Bin Laden enterprise.
However, this fact is not sufficient
and we have to investigate another psychoanalytical aspect that turns constant
failure to high aggression. Today, sexuality is liberated in western countries.
In the same time, in response to this liberation, sex repression is more and
more severe in the Middle East and this phenomenon corresponds to the
fundamentalist surge. As a result another primal instinct is growing: Aggression
and it's turned against the western societies that are compared to the
devil due to their sex liberation. Consider the next drawing:
DRAWING 6
We can assume that during the 19th,
hostility against the West was not so high because sexuality was, by this time,
equally repressed in the two civilizations. Since we do not want to change our
own sex habits, it means that the only solution should be a sex liberation in
the Middle East. How could we impose it? We may impose democracy but it's
impossible to change people habits? May we expect an inner reform? It's not
obvious because more our sexuality is liberated in the West, more Islam has
to restrain sexuality in its own field and consequently more the aggression
increases. You can observe the proof of that vicious circle: Muslim women
are more and more veiled including among migrants inhabiting western countries.
I have to underline this point
because, unfortunately, it could lead to a real clash of civilizations! We
must underline that the UNDP report published in 2003 confirms the present
diagnosis. Go to: http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/english2003.html
3-OBJECTIVE CAUSES
The global schizophrenia is a major
cause of the present situation. What is more, it has been supported by three
objective reasons: The false promises to Hussein , the western benign
neglect for the rise of dictatorships and finally the western responsibility in
the surge of a new devil that has boosted the schizophrenia: Saudi Arabia.
31-False promises
While the ottoman empire was
weakening, the French and American revolutions developed new ideas: Freedom,
democracy, and self determination of peoples. In entire Europe with the end of
the authoritarian society (See global history) religious or national minorities were
eager to get their independence and this situation led to World War 1.
311-World War 1
This self determination concept
reaffirmed by US President Wilson, had three consequences: Firstly,
peoples with same language and cultural habits, separated by feudal and
artificial boundaries, should be allowed to unit themselves such as in Italy
and in Germany. Secondly, minorities included in large empire should get
their independence over their own territory. Thirdly, minorities diluted
among other populations should be protected or allowed to join their homeland.
The Austrian and Ottoman empire based on a pluri ethnic scheme were mainly
concerned by the second and third objectives: Minorities of the Balkans won their
independence both from Austria and the Ottomans. The problem of diluted
minorities (Muslims in Greece and Christians in Turkey) was solved through a
general exchange of populations. Unfortunately, these principles were
profoundly distorted in the Middle East.
During the war, the Arabs led by
Hussein and Lawrence joined the British against the ottomans. According to the
self determination and minorities principle, the British promised Hussein to
unify the Arab provinces of the ottoman empire in a single Arab kingdom
including the Hedjaz with the holy places of Mecca and Medina, and the fertile
crescent depending of cities of Damascus and Baghdad. They also promised a Kurdish
State. Finally, and in accordance to their principles, they promised the Jews
an homeland.
With the victory, the allies forgot
their promises. Instead of an unified Arab kingdom, they created two Mandatory
(French and British) corresponding to Syria and Lebanon (French) and to Iraq
and Palestine (British). The creation of a kurdish State by the treaty of
Sevres never entered in application. Finally the only realized promise was the
creation of the Jew homeland in the area under British mandatory.
Despite the fact that the return of
Jews to their homeland was a legitimate application of the minority principle,
the Arabs never accepted it. It was the beginning of a century war regarding
27,000 square kilometers!
312-World War 2
The end of World War 2 and the wave
of independences offered a new opportunity to solve the minorities problems.
Massive exchange of populations took place in Europe and India with the
creation of an Islamic state of Pakistan. In the Middle East, things were only
going worst.
In 1948, the Arab States attacked
the Jewish State in order to destroy it. They were defeated. As a result,
many Arabs (about 765,000) who joined the aggression were fleeing from their
home. On the other hand, 865,000 Jews living in Muslims countries were suddenly
expelled with spoliation. Of course they were welcomed in Israel. On the contrary,
the Arabs States did not greet the Arabs refugees who were gathered in camps. Since
this time, these refugees have been a permanent cause of violence and terrorism.
Later, problems were aggravated with
the destruction of the Christian Lebanon State by the Palestinian gangs.
As a result Syria took over the control of Lebanon with the complicity of the
great powers. On the other hand, the kurdish question remained unsolved.
Likely, the Shiite minority in Iraq was constantly oppressed just like Berbers
in North Africa and Christians in Sudan.
It means that the minorities problem
remains unsolved and is a constant source of unrest and anger until today.
32-Benign neglect for dictatorships
As we have said, in the 1920-1950,
there was a large middle class that ruled the different countries through
moderate monarchies. Many of these people were eager to benefit of freedom,
modern science and democracy. Clearly they agreed with the western ideas.
Moreover, we have to recall that the ottoman empire had been dismantled to
enforce self determination and democracy according to Wilson principles.
Surprisingly, after the
independence's, the western countries used to accommodate with wrong regimes
based on the one party dictatorship. The cold war was the motive (just like in
Latin America and Africa) but the middle class saw that as a treachery: The
western governments supported rulers that they would not tolerate in their own
countries. The middle class (often educated in Europe and sharing the same
standards) experienced the situation like a real humiliation.
As we have previously quoted it, the
military and socialist dictatorships crushed the middle class mainly composed
of religious or national minorities. Today, despite privatization and
globalization, this old merchant middle class represents few people. It has
been replaced by an oil business class based on corruption and proximity to the
rulers. What is more, the entire middle class is submerged in towns by all the
illiterate and fanatical migrants coming from nomadic tribes.
Two painful events illustrate the
western responsibilities. Lebanon with its Christian merchant community
was a pillar of democracy in the region. Stormed by Palestinian gangs, the
country was finally abandoned by the West. Christians were obliged to call for
the protection of Syria! The second event is relative to Iran. The Shah
was engaging his country towards modernization through a constant struggle
against obscurantism. I visited Teheran in 1963 and I can testify that people
and women were clothed and behaved just like in Paris. Despite this fact, we
gave facilities to Khomeini and he took over Iran. We know the result: All the
way to the seventh century! Just look at the next video!
The middle class anger is not due to
schizophrenia. It relies on real facts. It means that we have dissipated a
precious card: The implementation of democracy would have been easier in the
1920-1950 than today.
33-Creation of a devil.
The radical Islam that we are
experiencing today has never existed over a long period or a large territory.
Sometimes in the history, there were some surge such as the Mahdi in
Sudan (I saw in Khartoum the letter he sent to Queen Victoria asking her to
convert to Islam. It sounds like Bin Laden literature!). In general, these surges
of madness were quickly destroyed by the caliphs.
The present radical Islam began in
1749 with the alliance of Abdel Wahab with the chief of some nomadic tribes
scattered in central Arabia. Abdel Wahab preached the return to a very
primitive Islam: It was just a sect among other in the Middle East but thanks
to his alliance with the Saudi, the Wahhabism extended its influence in
Arabia.
In the 19th century, the wahhabist
tribes attacked the Shiites in Mesopotamia (actual Iraq) and devastated Kerbala.
The sultan of Egypt thought that it was too much and defeated the wahhabists,
executed the chief of the Saudi dynasty, poisoned all the wells in central
Arabia and stormed their scarce camps. As a result the wahhabist remained
peaceful in their desert until 1922.
By this time, while the British Arab
office in Cairo promised Hussein an unified Arab kingdom including the Hedjaz,
the British Indian office in Delhi was pushing the Saudi ambitions over the
entire Arabia! As a result, in 1922, the Wahhabists attacked the Hedjaz which
was ruled by Hussein and conquered the holy places of Mecca and Medina. Then,
with the agreement of the British, they founded the Saudi Arabia kingdom and
they became the guardian of the holy places. Wahhabism was empowered in a large
state. At the end of World War 2, the US concluded an alliance with the
Saudi State and its huge oil reserves.
Then, the Wahhabism and the Saudi
family implemented a fanatical society certainly more inclined to backwardness
than all the previous societies in the Middle Eastern civilization. Wahhabism hates modernity, capitalism, human rights,
democracy, science and knowledge. In 1978, with the take over of Khomeini over
Iran, they feared the Shiite revenge (Recall you the devastation of kerbala,
the holy place of the Shiite) and they began to expand Wahhabism all over the
Muslim world from Morocco and west Africa to Indonesia. Thanks to oil, they
used money to corrupt and implement Islamic regimes or Islamic opposition in an
increasing number of countries.
Despite its backwardness, this regime
has been constantly backed up by the West. In counterpart, Saudi Arabia regulated oil prices. What is more,
it helped the freedom fighters in Afghanistan against the soviet army with
western applaud.
We do not say that Saudi Arabia is
the main cause of the terrorism. Many radical Islamic groups do not depend of
Wahhabism (Of course, Shiite organizations such as hezbollah). However, we may
say that the Wahhabism,( just like Khomeini) is a booster. Anyway, we are today
paying high prices for the support we gave to the creation of Saudi Arabia!
34-Conclusion: Emergence of jihadism.
In conclusion, the global
schizophrenia and some objective causes are the background of the jihadist
emergence. However, it's just a background and not the immediate cause. In our
opinion, the immediate cause is the globalization of freedom following the fall
of Berlin wall. Most of the rulers fear to lost their grip on the people and
instead of combating the schizophrenia, they boost it through education and
media's. What is more, they secretly support the Al Qaida network.
Many scholars say that the
dictatorships such as Iraq or Syria are not fundamentalists: Consequently, it
should be unfair to link these States to the Jihadism. These scholars are
mistaking because they focus only on religion. In fact, the jihadist
ideology is a mixture of religion and history. Consequently, the no
fundamentalist countries can share this global ideology and notably the will to
strike western countries: They must fight democracy in order to maintain
their own dictatorship. It's just a question of surviving.
4-ROAD MAP
Due to this global situation, many
strategic think tanks do not expect that a simple application of democracy
could solve the problems of the region. Moreover, many indicators show that
radical Islamism is spreading over the populations. The election of a
fundamentalist leader in Iran means that it is fruitless to export democracy to
people who are not prepared to adopt it. Clearly, populations seem happy
with their backward civilization.
In such a context, our
recommendations are only addressed to the few liberal forces that are still
existing in the region. We focus on
three preliminary tasks .
41-Minorities problems
The first task should be to settle
all the minorities problems that have poisoned the region since the fall of the
Ottoman empire and the treaty of Sevres.
Such a reshaping could cure one of the objective causes of the present
situation. The minorities problems are related to the Kurdish, the
Palestinians, the Christians both in Lebanon and Iraq, the black people of
Sudan, the berbers and the Tuaregs.
In fact , we do not expect many
progress before 2030. Firstly, Turkey
will oppose the creation of a Kurdish State. Secondly, Since Muslims and
Christians cannot cohabit anymore, the creation of a Christian Lebanon entity
could welcome the Christians populations coming from Syria and Iraq (about
600,000 people). Unfortunately, we do not see the feasibility of this project. Thirdly,
we do not expect an issue to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the short run.
We do not believe in the present road map and in the sustainability of two
opposed States on a so tiny territory. Fourth, there are none short
terms prospects for the black people, the Berbers and the Tuaregs in Northern
Africa.
In 2030, all these problems will
remain as hot as today.
42-Promote education
There is no doubt that in the long
term the progress towards democracy will depend on the progress in education. Go to global
learning process. In the past, educated people were coming from
religious or national minorities in towns. Today, mass education has increased
but paradoxically it has enforced obscurantism notably among young people. It's
always a strange feeling to listen the cranky discourses of some students on
the universities campus! They have none logic nor ethical principles. This
situation is due to the education content.
Most of media and education channels
are constantly developing propaganda and false interpretation of history. For
example, in Saudi Arabia, pupils are learning that Jews are just like monkeys
and porks! Everywhere, education in economics is completely biased. What is
more, the fundamentalists have succeeded in extending in continental Europe
their false history about the superiority of Muslim civilization. Let's suppose
that in the 1930, free nations had accepted to teach Aryan superiority in
schools! It means that the present education both in Europe and in Muslim
countries is pure propaganda. Go to European constitution.
43-Organizing democracy
The implementing of democracy will
not be an easy business!
Democracy needs democrats! Of course,
many Muslims live today in democratic societies but most of them such as in
Senegal or Mali are not part of Middle East and North Africa. As we have said,
the problem is not solely Islam but the mixture of Islam and false history that
is specific to the region. For example, the arab and turkish communities in
Europe seem more and more influenced by radical Islam. It means that there are
few democratic feelings among the populations.
For example, let 'us suppose that the
democracy is implemented in Saudi Arabia. What happens if Bin Laden is elected
as President through free elections? It
means that democratization implies great risks and should be carefully
prepared.
Firstly, we must state that the Sharia'a cannot be the source of
law. Democracy is by itself an universal rule of game. When you play football,
you observe universal rules of games. You do not replace them by the rules of
Islam. In the other hand, people playing the same rules of game can have
different inspirations coming from their values: Islamic, Christian, Jewish
values. The rules of game must be apart of any religion. Of course, any State
may declare that its main religion is Islam but Islam cannot be the source of
law.
Secondly, the middle class (Merchants, Chambers of commerce and so
on) must immediately replace the warlords, their soldiers, their scholars and
their civil servants. Liberal reforms in the economic domains could improve the
middle class bargaining power. Merchants and entrepreneurs are a better
guarantee for the democratic process than the intellectuals coming from fake
universities.
Thirdly, human rights must appear at the first place on the
political agenda. Everywhere, women rights must be implemented with the civil
equality, the abolishment of polygamy, and so on. It means that the
Ataturk reforms have to be extended to the entire region.
Fourth, since the oil provides the region with sufficient inner
resources, the oil money should be used to develop the large open spaces in the
southern areas of the entire region. Young people should have better to go
southward to developing these areas rather than migrating to the European
crowded cities.
44-Alternative solution
Anyway, all these measures may be
ineffective. For example, despite the liberal reforms implemented in Morocco,
we must take notice that the killers of 200 Spanish were Moroccan. We must also
observe that many Moroccan students said that Jews and Americans were the
authors of the strike in Madrid! By the same token, most of muslim movements on
the Internet try to propagate the idea that the London strikes were caused by
the Mossad or the CIA. It means that the global schizophrenia will not end
to morrow.
The road to democracy should imply a
complete reeducation ( And notably a reform of Islam) similar to the
denazification process which was implemented in Germany by the end of World War
2. Such a process had a meaning in Germany because this country was a great
civilization. On the contrary, we do not think that the Middle East and North
Africa merit endless wars and the losses of brave soldiers. We have better
to adopt a containment policy and to let the populations going back to the
seventh century : Go to the new war.
Hot comments!
Do you agree? Do you not agree? Send
your comments.
Click Here
This article is an authentic insight
into the present and coming problems with Islam and globally confirms what is
said above about schizophrenia.
The psychology behind suicide
bombings.
By Pierre Rehov, documentary filmmaker
By Pierre Rehov, documentary filmmaker
On July 15, MSNBC's
"Connected" program discussed the 7/7 London attacks. One of the
guests was Pierre Rehov, a French filmmaker who has filmed six
documentaries on the intifada by going undercover in the Palestinian areas.
documentaries on the intifada by going undercover in the Palestinian areas.
Pierre's upcoming film, "Suicide
Killers," is based on interviews that he conducted with the families of
suicide bombers and would-be bombers in
an attempt to find out why they do it. Pierre agreed to a request for a Q&A interview here about his work on the new film. Many thanks to Dean Draznin and Arlyn Riskind for helping to arrange this special interview.
an attempt to find out why they do it. Pierre agreed to a request for a Q&A interview here about his work on the new film. Many thanks to Dean Draznin and Arlyn Riskind for helping to arrange this special interview.
What inspired you to produce
"Suicide Killers," your seventh film?
I started working with victims of
suicide attacks to make a film on PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) when I
became fascinated with the personalities of those who had committed those
crimes, as they were described again and again by their victims. Especially the
fact that suicide bombers are all smiling one second before they blow
themselves up.
Why is this film especially
important?
People don't understand the
devastating culture behind this unbelievable phenomenon. My film is not
politically correct because it addresses the real
problem-showing the real face of Islam. It points the finger against a culture of hatred in which the uneducated are brainwashed to a level where their
only solution in life becomes to kill themselves and kill others in the name of a God whose word, as transmitted by other men, has became their only
certitude.
problem-showing the real face of Islam. It points the finger against a culture of hatred in which the uneducated are brainwashed to a level where their
only solution in life becomes to kill themselves and kill others in the name of a God whose word, as transmitted by other men, has became their only
certitude.
What insights did you gain from
making this film? What do you know that other experts do not know?
I came to the conclusion that we
are facing a neurosis at the level of an entire civilization. Most
neuroses have in common a dramatic event, generally linked to an unacceptable
sexual behavior. In this case, we are talking of kids living all their lives in
pure frustration, with no opportunity
to experience sex, love, tenderness or even understanding from the opposite sex. The separation between men and women in Islam is absolute. So is
contempt toward women, who are totally dominated by men. This leads to a situation of pure anxiety, in which normal behavior is not possible. It is no
coincidence that suicide killers are mostly young men dominated subconsciously by an overwhelming libido that they not only cannot satisfy but are afraid of, as if it is the work of the devil. Since Islam describes heaven as a place where everything on earth will finally be allowed, and promises 72
virgins to those frustrated kids, killing others and killing themselves to reach this redemption becomes their only solution.
to experience sex, love, tenderness or even understanding from the opposite sex. The separation between men and women in Islam is absolute. So is
contempt toward women, who are totally dominated by men. This leads to a situation of pure anxiety, in which normal behavior is not possible. It is no
coincidence that suicide killers are mostly young men dominated subconsciously by an overwhelming libido that they not only cannot satisfy but are afraid of, as if it is the work of the devil. Since Islam describes heaven as a place where everything on earth will finally be allowed, and promises 72
virgins to those frustrated kids, killing others and killing themselves to reach this redemption becomes their only solution.
What was it like to interview
would-be suicide bombers, their families and survivors of suicide bombings?
It was a fascinating and a terrifying
experience. You are dealing with seemingly normal people with very nice manners
who have their own logic, which to a certain extent can make sense since they
are so convinced that what they say is true. It is like dealing with pure
craziness, like interviewing
people in an asylum, since what they say, is for them, the absolute truth. I hear a mother saying "Thank God, my son is dead." Her son had became a
shaheed, a martyr, which for her was a greater source of pride than if he had became an engineer, a doctor or a winner of the Nobel Prize. This system
of values works completely backwards since their interpretation of Islam worships death much more than life. You are facing people whose only dream,
only achievement is to fulfill what they believe to be their destiny, namely to be a shaheed or the family of a shaheed.They don't see the innocent being killed, they only see the impure that they have to destroy.
people in an asylum, since what they say, is for them, the absolute truth. I hear a mother saying "Thank God, my son is dead." Her son had became a
shaheed, a martyr, which for her was a greater source of pride than if he had became an engineer, a doctor or a winner of the Nobel Prize. This system
of values works completely backwards since their interpretation of Islam worships death much more than life. You are facing people whose only dream,
only achievement is to fulfill what they believe to be their destiny, namely to be a shaheed or the family of a shaheed.They don't see the innocent being killed, they only see the impure that they have to destroy.
You say suicide bombers experience a
moment of absolute power, beyond punishment. Is death the ultimate power?
Not death as an end, but death as a
door open to the after life. They are seeking the reward that God has promised
them. They work for God, the ultimate authority, above all human laws. They
therefore experience this single delusional second of absolute power, where
nothing bad can ever happen to them, since they become God's sword.
Is there a suicide bomber personality
profile? Describe the psychopathology.
Generally kids between 15 and 25
bearing a lot of complexes, generally inferiority complexes. They must have
been fed with religion. They usually have a lack of developed personality.
Usually they are impressionable idealists. In the western world they would
easily have become drug addicts, but not
criminals. Interestingly, they are not criminals since they don't see good and evil the same way that we do. If they had been raised in an Occidental
culture, they would have hated violence. But they constantly battle against their own death anxiety. The only solution to this deep-seated pathology is
to be willing to die and be rewarded in the after life in Paradise.
criminals. Interestingly, they are not criminals since they don't see good and evil the same way that we do. If they had been raised in an Occidental
culture, they would have hated violence. But they constantly battle against their own death anxiety. The only solution to this deep-seated pathology is
to be willing to die and be rewarded in the after life in Paradise.
Are suicide bombers principally
motivated by religious conviction?
Yes, it is their only conviction.
They don't act to gain a territory or to find freedom or even dignity. They
only follow Allah, the supreme judge,
and what He tells them to do.
and what He tells them to do.
Do all Muslims interpret jihad and
martyrdom in the same way?
All Muslim believers believe that,
ultimately, Islam will prevail on earth. They believe this is the only true
religion and there is no room, in their mind, for interpretation. The main
difference between moderate Muslims and extremists is that moderate Muslims
don't think they will see the absolute victory of Islam during their life time,
therefore they respect other beliefs. The extremists
believe that the fulfillment of the Prophecy of Islam and ruling the entire world as described in the Koran, is for today. Each victory of Bin Laden convinces 20 million moderate Muslims to become extremists.
believe that the fulfillment of the Prophecy of Islam and ruling the entire world as described in the Koran, is for today. Each victory of Bin Laden convinces 20 million moderate Muslims to become extremists.
Describe the culture that
manufactures suicide bombers.
Oppression, lack of freedom, brain
washing, organized poverty, placing God in charge of daily life, total
separation between men and women, forbidding sex, giving women no power
whatsoever, and placing men in charge of family honor, which is mainly
connected to their women's behavior.
What socio-economic forces support
the perpetuation of suicide bombings?
Muslim charity is usually a cover for
supporting terrorist organizations. But one has also to look at countries like
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran,
which are also supporting the same organizations through different networks. The ironic thing in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers is that most of
the money comes through financial support from the Occidental world, donated to a culture that utterly hates and rejects the West (mainly symbolized by Israel).
which are also supporting the same organizations through different networks. The ironic thing in the case of Palestinian suicide bombers is that most of
the money comes through financial support from the Occidental world, donated to a culture that utterly hates and rejects the West (mainly symbolized by Israel).
Is there a financial support network
for the families of the suicide bombers? If so, who is paying them and how does
that affect the decision?
There used to be a financial
incentive in the days of Saddam Hussein ($25,000 per family) and Yasser Arafat
(smaller amounts), but these days are gone.
It is a mistake to believe that these families would sacrifice their children for money. Although, the children themselves who are very attached to their
families, might find in this financial support another reason to become suicide bombers. It is like buying a life insurance policy and then committing
suicide.
It is a mistake to believe that these families would sacrifice their children for money. Although, the children themselves who are very attached to their
families, might find in this financial support another reason to become suicide bombers. It is like buying a life insurance policy and then committing
suicide.
Why are so many suicide bombers young
men?
As discussed above, libido is
paramount. Also ego, because this is a sure way to become a hero. The shaheeds
are the cowboys or the firemen of Islam.
Shaheed is a positively reinforced value in this culture. And what kid has never dreamed of becoming a cowboy or a fireman?
Shaheed is a positively reinforced value in this culture. And what kid has never dreamed of becoming a cowboy or a fireman?
What role does the U.N. play in the
terrorist equation?
The UN is in the hands of Arab
countries and third world or ex-communists countries. Their hands are tied. The
UN has condemned Israel more than any
other country in the world, including the regime of Castro, Idi Amin or Kaddahfi.By behaving this way, the UN leaves a door open by not openly condemning terrorist organizations. In addition, through UNRWA, the UN is directly tied to terror organizations such as Hamas, representing 65 percent of their apparatus in the so-called Palestinian refugee camps. As a support to Arab countries, the UN has maintained Palestinians in camps with the hope to "return" into Israel for more than 50 years, therefore making it impossible to
settle those populations, which still live in deplorable conditions. Four-hundred million dollars are spent every year, mainly financed by U.S. taxes, to support 23,000 employees of UNRWA, many of whom belong to terrorist organizations (see Congressman Eric Cantor on this subject, and in my film "Hostages of Hatred").
other country in the world, including the regime of Castro, Idi Amin or Kaddahfi.By behaving this way, the UN leaves a door open by not openly condemning terrorist organizations. In addition, through UNRWA, the UN is directly tied to terror organizations such as Hamas, representing 65 percent of their apparatus in the so-called Palestinian refugee camps. As a support to Arab countries, the UN has maintained Palestinians in camps with the hope to "return" into Israel for more than 50 years, therefore making it impossible to
settle those populations, which still live in deplorable conditions. Four-hundred million dollars are spent every year, mainly financed by U.S. taxes, to support 23,000 employees of UNRWA, many of whom belong to terrorist organizations (see Congressman Eric Cantor on this subject, and in my film "Hostages of Hatred").
You say that a suicide bomber is a
'stupid bomb and a smart bomb' simultaneously. Explain what you mean.
Unlike an electronic device, a
suicide killer has until the last second the capacity to change his mind. In
reality, he is nothing but a platform
representing interests which are not his, but he doesn't know it.
representing interests which are not his, but he doesn't know it.
How can we put an end to the madness
of suicide bombings and terrorism in general?
Stop being politically correct and
stop believing that this culture is a victim of ours. Radical Islamism today is
nothing but a new form of Nazism. Nobody was trying to justify or excuse Hitler
in the 1930s. We had to defeat him in order to make peace one day with the
German people.
Are these men traveling outside their
native areas in large numbers? Based on your research, would you predict that
we are beginning to see a new wave of suicide bombings outside the Middle East?
Every successful terror attack is
considered a victory by the radical Islamists. Everywhere Islam is expands
there is regional conflict. Right now,
their are thousands of candidates for martyrdom lining up in training camps in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Inside Europe, hundreds of illegal mosques
are preparing the next step of brain washing to lost young men who cannot find a satisfying identity in the Occidental world. Israel is much more prepared
for this than the rest of the world will ever be. Yes, there will be more suicide killings in Europe and the U.S. Sadly, this is only the beginning.
their are thousands of candidates for martyrdom lining up in training camps in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Pakistan. Inside Europe, hundreds of illegal mosques
are preparing the next step of brain washing to lost young men who cannot find a satisfying identity in the Occidental world. Israel is much more prepared
for this than the rest of the world will ever be. Yes, there will be more suicide killings in Europe and the U.S. Sadly, this is only the beginning.
Best links-Click below
Go to our World Country
guide dedicated to small business.
www.rand.org : Go to the recent
study"How West can counter Radical Islam"
www.nixoncenter.org : Fresh information's
about Iran and the black sea security agenda.
www.hudson.org : Go to a fascinating survey
by Laurent Murawiec..
www.washingtoninstitute.org
: One of the best Think tank about the Middle East.
-------------------
/url?q=http://www.youtube.com/watch%3Fv%3DGHxcQgDM1nY&sa=U&ei=pmxzVLaKBIaNyATw14GQCQ&ved=0CEUQuAIwCVAB&usg=AFQjCNEnmpTjkMeTcsk3bj0R7jt7RCY7YQ
► 58:44 www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHxcQgDM1nY23
Jan 2014 - 59 min - Uploaded by Steve Silva
Israel : The Real History of Israel's Origins (Full Documentary) . 2013 2014 This documentary ...
► 58:44 www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHxcQgDM1nY23
Jan 2014 - 59 min - Uploaded by Steve SilvaIsrael : The Real History of Israel's Origins (Full Documentary) . 2013 2014 This documentary ...
-------------
www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east - Cached5 May 2014 ... People started
farming here in 9000 BC, and by around 2500 BC ... How the
Middle East gave Europe religion, three times ... AD — they managed to conquer
the entire Middle East, North Africa, Persia, and parts of southern Europe. ... until
it began declining in the mid-1800s, collapsed after World War I, ...
Middle East gave Europe religion, three times ... AD — they managed to conquer
the entire Middle East, North Africa, Persia, and parts of southern Europe. ... until
it began declining in the mid-1800s, collapsed after World War I, ...
-----------------
The
Rise Of Civilization In The Middle East And Africa
Edited
By: Robert Guisepi
Date:
1998
Introduction
The
first full civilization emerged by 3500 B.C. in the Tigris-Euphrates
valley
in the Middle East. Relatively soon thereafter civilization developed
along
the Nile in Egypt, and later spread to other parts of the Middle East
and
one region in Africa. The advent of civilization provided a framework for
most
of the developments in world history. Additionally, the specific early
civilizations
that arose in the Middle East and Africa had several distinctive
features,
in political structure and cultural tone, for example. These
features
secured the evolution of these societies until the partial eclipse of
the
river-valley civilizations after about 1000 B.C. The early civilizations
in
the Middle East and North Africa served as generators of a number of
separate
and durable civilization traditions, which can still be found in
civilizations
around the Mediterranean, in parts of Europe, and even across
the
Atlantic.
Both
of these early civilizations formed around major rivers - the Tigris
and
Euphrates in Mesopotamia and the Nile in northeastern Africa. Explaining
how
civilizations emerged in the Middle East and then Africa requires a
reminder
of the conditions that contributed to change after 4000 B.C. and a
more
precise definition of civilization. Once that is done, we can turn to the
characteristics
of Mesopotamian civilization, from its origins around 3500
B.C.
until it experienced an important period of disunity around 1000 B.C.
Next
comes Egypt, the world's second civilization in time, which again can be
traced
until about 1000 B.C. The two early civilizations had very different
cultures
and political structures reflecting their very separate origins. By
1000
B.C. both of these two early civilizations produced offshoots in eastern
Africa,
southern Europe, and additional centers in the Middle East. These
smaller
centers of civilization made important contributions of their own, for
example,
the monotheistic religion created among the Jewish people in
Palestine.
Early
Civilization In Mesopotamia
Even
the technological innovations that shaped the context for the rise
of
civilization took many centuries to win full impact. Soon after 4000 B.C.
however,
conditions were ripe for a final set of changes that constituted the
arrival
of civilization. These changes were based on the use of economic
surplus
and the growing needs of a coordinated regional network of villages.
The
Sumerians
The
scene for the first civilization was the northeastern section of what
we
today call the Middle East, along the great rivers that led to the Persian
Gulf.
The agents were a newly-arrived people called the Sumerians.
The
first civilization developed in a part of the Middle East slightly
south
of the hilly country in which the first agricultural villages had
emerged
several thousand years earlier. Between the northern hills and the
deserts
of the Arabian peninsula, running from the eastern Mediterranean coast
to
the fall plain of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, lies a large swath of
arable
land called the Fertile Crescent. The rivers rise in the spring,
depositing
immensely fertile soil. Rainfall was scant in the region, so as
population
pressure increased, farming communities began to find ways to tame
and
use the rivers through irrigation ditches. Construction of the ditches
required
improved tools that were not available much before 4000 B.C., and
from
that point onward developments in the region were swift. Irrigation plus
the
fertility of the Tigris-Euphrates region generated substantial food
surpluses
promoting population growth and village expansion, as well as
increasing
trade and specialization. The region was vulnerable in one respect:
It
was so flat that it was open to frequent invasion.
By
3500 B.C. farmers in Mesopotamia, as the Tigris-Euphrates region is
also
called, were benefiting not only from rich agriculture, but also from
flourishing
pottery and obsidian tool production. The wheel had been
introduced,
and community coordination was steadily improving to support the
irrigation
network.
The
final boost toward establishing civilization was provided by the
Sumerians,
a people who had migrated into the area from the north around 4000
B.C.
They settled in an area of about 700 square miles where they mixed with
other
local races in a pattern of cultural mingling that has remained
characteristic
of the region. Sumerian culture early developed important
religious
values with centers of pilgrimage and worship. Well before 3000 B.C.
many
of these centers were provided with elaborately decorated temples, built
with
mud brick. Sumerians were impressed with the power of grim gods who
ultimately
controlled human destiny.
Sumerian
Culture And Politics
Into
this rich economy and culture writing - the most important invention
between
the advent of agriculture and the age of the steam engine - was
introduced
around 3500 B.C. The Sumerian invention of writing was probably
rather
sudden, based on new needs for commercial, property, and political
records
including a celebration of the deeds of proud local kings. Writing was
preceded
by the invention of clay cylinder seals, on which little pictures of
objects
could be recorded. The earliest Sumerian writing simply evolved from
these
pictures baked on clay tablets, which were turned into symbols and
gradually
transformed into phonetic elements. The early Sumerian alphabet -
set
of symbols representing sounds - may have had as many as 2000 symbols
derived
from the early pictures. Before long writers began to use more
abstract
symbols to represent sounds which allowed Sumerians and their
successors
to reduce the alphabet to about 300 symbols. Sumerian writers used
a
wedge-shaped stick to impress the symbols on clay tablets. The resulting
writing
is called cuneiform, meaning "wedge shaped," and it was used for
several
thousand years in the Middle East for many different languages.
Cuneiform
writing was difficult to learn, so specialized scribes monopolized
most
of it, but the Sumerians in fact believed that every object in nature
should
have a separate name to assure its place in the universe; knowing the
name
gave a person some power over the object. Writing, in other words,
quickly
took on essentially religious purposes, allowing people to impose an
abstract
order over nature and the social world.
Sumerian
civilization lasted intact until about 2000 B.C. Its political
organization
was based on tightly organized city-states, where the
agricultural
hinterland was ruled by an urban-based king who claimed great
authority.
In some cases local councils advised the king. One of the functions
of
Sumerian states was to define boundaries, unlike the less formal
territories
of precivilized villages in the region. The government helped
regulate
religion and enforce its duties. It also provided a system of courts
for
justice. Kings were originally war leaders whose leadership of a trained
army
in defense and war remained vital in Sumerian politics where fighting
loomed
large. Kings, the noble class, and the priesthood controlled
considerable
land. Slaves, conquered in wars with nearby tribes, were used to
work
this land.
Sumerian
political and social organization set up traditions that would
long
endure in this region. City-state government established a tradition of
regional
rule, that would often be overlaid by larger empires but would
frequently
return as the principal organizational form. The reliance on slaves
was
maintained in the economy of many successor civilizations. Use of slaves
along
with the lack of natural barriers to invasion help explain recurrent
warfare,
for war was often needed to supply labor. At the same time, slavery
in
the Middle Eastern tradition was a variable condition, and many slaves were
able
to earn their own keep and even buy their freedom.
The
Sumerians, aided by regional political stability and the use of
writing,
added to their region's economic prosperity. Agriculture gained as
farmers
learned how to cultivate date trees, onions, and garlic. Oxen were
used
to pull plows, donkeys to carry goods. Wheeled carts helped transport
goods
as well. The Sumerians introduced the use of fertilizer and adopted
silver
as a means of exchange for buying and selling. Major cities expanded -
one
city reached a population of over 70,000 - with substantial housing units
in
rows of flat-roofed, mud-brick shops and apartments. More commonly, cities
contained
as many as 10,000 people. The Sumerians improved the potter's wheel,
which
expanded the production of pottery. Because of the skill level and
commercial
importance involved, men began to take the trade away from women.
The
Sumerians also invented glass. Trade expanded to the lower Persian Gulf
and
to the western portion of the Middle East along the Mediterranean. By 2000
B.C.
the Sumerians had trading contacts with India.
The
Sumerians also steadily elaborated their culture, again using writing
to
advance earlier forms. By about 2000 B.C. they managed to write down the
world's
oldest story, the Gilgamesh epic, which went back at least to the 7th
millennium
B.C. in oral form. Gilgamesh, a real person who had ruled a
city-state,
became the first hero in world literature. The epic describes a
great
flood that obliterated humankind except for a favored family who
survived
by building an ark and producing descendants who formed a new race of
people.
The overall tone of the epic and of Sumerian culture (perhaps
reflecting
the frequently disastrous floods of the region) was somber.
Gilgamesh
does great deeds but constantly bumps up against the iron laws of
the
gods, ensuring human failure as the gods triumph in the end.
The
heroes, the wise men, like the new moon have their
waxing
and waning. Men will say, "Who has ever ruled with
might
and with power like Gilgamesh?" As in the dark month,
the
month of shadows; so with-out him there is no light.
O
Gilgamesh, this was the meaning of your dream. You were
given
the kingship, such was your destiny; everlasting life
was
not your destiny . . . Gilgamesh, why do you search? The
life
you seek you will never find. When the gods created the
world,
they made death a part of human fate.
Along
with early literature, Sumerian art developed steadily. Statues and
painted
frescoes adorned the temples of the gods, and statues of the gods
decorated
individual homes. Sumerian science aided a complex agricultural
society,
as people sought to learn more about the movement of the sun and
stars
- thus founding the science of astronomy - and to improve their
mathematical
knowledge. The Sumerians employed a system of numbers based on
units
of 12, 60, and 360, which we still use in calculations involving circles
and
hours. They also introduced specific systems, such as charts of major
constellations,
that have been used for 5000 years in the Middle East and
through
later imitation in India and Europe. In other words, Sumerians and
their
successors in Mesopotamia created patterns of observation and abstract
thought
about nature on which a number of later societies, including our own,
still
rely.
Religion
played a vital role in Sumerian culture and politics. Gods were
associated
with various forces of nature. At the same time gods were seen as
having
a human form and many of humanity's more disagreeable characteristics.
Thus
the gods often quarreled and used their power in selfish and childish
ways
- which made for interesting stories but also created a fear that the
gods
might make life difficult and hard to control. The gloomy cast of
Sumerian
religious ideas also included an afterlife of suffering - an original
version
of the concept of hell. Because gods were believed to regulate natural
forces
such as flooding in a region where nature was often harsh and
unpredictable,
they were more feared than loved. Priests played a central role
because
of their responsibility for placating the gods through proper prayers,
sacrifices,
and magic. Priests became full-time specialists, running the
temples
and also performing the astronomical calculations necessary to run the
irrigation
systems. Each city had a patron god, and erected impressive shrines
to
please and honor this god and other deities. Massive towers, called
ziggurats,
formed the monumental architecture for this civilization. Prayers
and
offerings to prevent floods as well as to protect good health were a vital
part
of Sumerian life. Sumerian ideas about the divine force behind and within
natural
objects - in rivers, trees, and mountains - were common among
agricultural
peoples. A religion of this sort is known as animism. More
specifically,
Sumerian religious notions, notably their ideas about the
creation
of the earth by the gods from a chaos of water and about divine
punishment
of humans through floods, continue to have force in Jewish,
Christian,
and Muslim cultures, all of which were born much later in the
Middle
East.
Sumerian
activities in trade and war spread beyond the regional limits of
the
civilization in the Middle East. The adoption of portions of the Gilgamesh
tale
in later literature such as the Jewish Bible developed well to the west
of
Sumer. Even after Sumer itself collapsed, the Sumerian language was still
used
in religious schools and temples, showing the power of this early culture
and
its decidedly religious emphasis.
What
Civilization Meant
The
emergence of the world's first civilization in Sumer brought to
fruition
the key features of this form of organization. Sumerian society
certainly
met the basic criterion of civilization in that it built on fairly
regular
economic surpluses. Sumerian farmers produced enough that they could
be
taxed in order to support a small but crucial number of priests and
government
officials. They produced enough to allow some trade and
specialization,
thus encouraging groups of artisans and merchants who did not
farm.
The Sumerian economy also stretched out along the great irrigation
systems
of the Tigris-Euphrates. One of the tasks of regional government was
to
elaborate and maintain these systems: regional coordination was thus a
vital
feature.
The
advent of civilization in Sumer also involved additional innovations
building
on the key features of surplus and coordination: the creation of
cities
beyond the scope of individual centers, such as Jericho, where at least
several
thousand people lived and considerable specialization developed; and
the
invention of writing. While these innovations were not found in all
civilizations,
they were vital in Sumer and other early centers such as Egypt
and
the Indus River.
The
Importance Of Cities
In
Middle-Eastern agricultural civilization (all civilizations were
fundamentally
agricultural until about 200 years ago), most people did not
live
in cities. The cities that existed were crucial, however, because they
amassed
wealth and power; allowed relatively easy exchange of ideas,
encouraging
intellectual and artistic changes; and promoted further
specialization
in manufacture and trade. Early Middle-Eastern cities radiated
considerable
influence and power into surrounding countrysides. Cities also
relied
on broader attributes of civilization, the most notable being
relatively
extensive trade and political organization. Cities could not be
founded
until the Middle East produced a significant agricultural surplus
above
what farmer families needed to live on and had groups - merchants - to
organize
trade that brought food to the city and carried urban-made goods to
the
countryside and other cities. Cities could not be founded until there was
a
sufficiently solid political organization - a government, with some
recognized
legitimacy, and some full-time officials - that could run essential
urban
services, such as a court system for disputes, and help regulate the
relationship
between cities and the countryside.
Saying
that early Middle-Eastern civilizations were based on cities,
then,
even when most people remained in the countryside as agricultural
producers,
is partly saying that civirizations had generated more elaborate
trade
and political structures than initial agricultural societies had
managed.
This helps explain, also, why civilizations generally covered a
fairly
wide area, breaking out of the localism that described the economics
and
political activities of the initial agricultural communities.
The
Importance Of Writing
The
second key ingredient that emerged in the Middle East after 4000 B.C.
was
the invention of writing. Some historians and anthropologists urge against
focusing
too much on the development of writing, because concentrating only on
this
aspect, albeit important, can leave out some civilizations, such as the
civilization
of the Incas in the Andes region of South America, that produced
significant
political forms without this intellectual tool. We now appreciate
the
sophistication societies can attain without writing, and rate the division
of
early human activities between hunting and gathering and agriculture as
more
fundamental than the invention of writing.
Writing
was a genuinely important development even so. Societies with
writing
can organize more elaborate records including the lists essential for
effective
taxation. Writing is a precondition for most formal bureaucracies
which
depend on standardized communication and the ability to maintain some
documentation.
Societies with writing can also organize a more elaborate
intellectual
life because of their ability to record data and build on past,
written
wisdom. For example, it is no accident that with writing many early
civilizations
began to generate more formal scientific knowledge. Societies
before
the development of writing typically depended on poetic sagas to convey
their
value systems, with the poetry designed to aid in memorization. With
writing,
the importance of sagas such as Gilgamesh might at first have
continued
but usually the diversity of cultural expressions soon increased
with
other kinds of literature supplementing the long, rhymed epics. Some
experts
argue that the very fact of becoming literate changes the way people
think
- encouraging a greater sense that the world can be understood by
organized
human inquiry as opposed to a belief in whimsical magical spirits.
Writing,
in other words, can produce more abstract religious thinking and also
secular
thinking that seeks to describe nature and human affairs in
nonreligious
terms.
Writing,
like the existence of cities, certainly helps explain how
civilizations
could develop more extensive trading and political systems than
those
of most earlier agricultural societies. As a basis for even small
bureaucracies
- and as a basis of record-keeping for merchant dealings beyond
purely
personal contacts - writing played a considerable role in extending the
geographical
range of key civilizations and in developing new forms of
economic
and political organization. It is vital to recognize, however, that
the
advent of writing in the early history of civilizations also created new
divisions
within the population, for only a small minority of people - mainly
priests,
scribes, and a few merchants - had time to master writing skills.
Kush
And The Eastern Mediterranean
Toward
the end of the early civilization period, a number of partially
separate
civilization centers sprang up on the fringes of the civilized world
in
Africa and the Middle East, extending also into parts of southern Europe.
These
centers built heavily on the achievements of the great early centers.
They
resulted from the expansion efforts of these centers, as in the Egyptian
push
southward during the New Kingdom period and from new organizational
problems
within the chief centers themselves; in the Middle East, separate
societies
emerged during the chaotic centuries following the collapse of the
Hittite
empire.
Kush
And Axum: Civilization Spreads In Africa
The
kingdom of Kush sprang up along the upper (southern) reaches of the
Nile.
Kush was the first African state other than Egypt of which there is
record.
This was a state on the frontiers of Egyptian activity, where Egyptian
garrisons
had been stationed from time to time. By 1000 B.C. it emerged as an
independent
political unit, though strongly influenced by Egyptian forms. By
730
B.C., as Egypt declined, Kush was strong enough to conquer its northern
neighbor
and rule it for several centuries, though this conquest was soon
ended
by Assyrian invasion from the Middle East. After this point the Kushites
began
to push their frontiers farther south, gaining a more diverse African
population
and weakening the Egyptian influence. It was at this point that the
new
capital was established at Meroe. Kushites became skilled in iron use and
had
access to substantial African ore and fuel. The use of iron tools extended
the
area that could be brought into agriculture. Kush formed a key center of
metal
technology in the ancient world, as a basis of both military and
economic
strength.
Kushites
developed a form of writing derived from Egyptian hieroglyphics
(and
which has not yet been fully deciphered). They established a number of
significant
cities. Their political organization, also derived from Egypt,
emphasized
a strong monarchy with elaborate ceremonies based on the belief
that
the king was a god. Kushite economic influence extended widely in
sub-Saharan
Africa. Extensive trade was conducted with people to the west, and
this
trade may have brought knowledge of iron making to much of the rest of
Africa.
The greatest period of the kingdom at Meroe, where activities centered
from
the early 6th century onward, lasted from about 250 B.C. to A.D. 50. By
this
time the kingdom served as a channel for African goods - animal skins,
ebony
and ivory, gold and slaves - into the commerce of the Middle East and
the
Mediterranean. Many monuments were built during these centuries, including
huge
royal pyramids and an elaborate palace in Meroe. Much fine pottery and
jewelry
were produced. Meroe began to decline from about A.D. 100 onward and
was
defeated by a kingdom to the south, Axum, around A.D. 300. Prosperity and
extensive
political and economic activity did not end in this region, but
extended
into the formation of a kingdom in present-day Ethiopia.
The
outreach of Kush is not entirely clear beyond its trading network set
up
with neighboring regions. Whether African peoples outside the Upper Nile
region
learned much from Kush about political forms is unknown. Certainly
there
was little imitation of its writing, and the region of Kush and Ethiopia
would
long remain somewhat isolated from the wider stream of African history.
Nevertheless,
the formation of a separate society stretching below the eastern
Sahara
was an important step in setting the bases for technological and
economic
change throughout much of upper Africa. Though its achievements flow
less
fully into later African development, Kush holds for Africa what Sumer
achieved
for the Middle East - it set a wider process of civilization in
motion.
The
Mediterranean Region
Smaller
centers in the Middle East began to spring up after about 1500
B.C.
Though dependent on the larger Mesopotamian culture for many features,
these
centers added important new ingredients and in some cases also extended
the
hold of civilization westward to the Asian coast of the Mediterranean. The
smaller
cultures also added to the diversity of the Middle East, creating a
varied
array of identities that would continue to mark the region even under
the
impetus of later empires, such as Rome, or the sweeping religion of Islam.
Several
of these smaller cultures proved immensely durable and would influence
other
parts of the world as well.
The
Jews
The
most important of the smaller Middle Eastern groups were the Jews,
who
gave the world one of its most influential religions. The Jews were a
Semitic
people (a population group that also includes the Arabs). They were
influenced
by Babylonian civilization but also marked by a period of
enslavement
in Egypt. They settled in the southeast corner of the
Mediterranean
around 1600 B.C., probably migrating from Mesopotamia. Some
moved
into Egypt where they were treated as a subject people. In the 13th
century
B.C., Moses led these Jews to Palestine, in search of a homeland
promised
by the Jewish God, Yahweh. This was later held to be the central
development
in Jewish history. The Jews began at this point to emerge as a
people
with a self-conscious culture and some political identity. At most
points,
however, the Jewish state was small and relatively weak, retaining
independence
only while other parts of the Middle East were disorganized. A
few
Jewish kings were able to unify their people, but at many points the Jews
were
divided into separate regional states. Most of Palestine came under
foreign
(initially Assyrian) domination from 722 B.C. onward, but the Jews
were
able to maintain their cultural identity and key religious traditions.
Monotheism
The
distinctive achievement of the Jews was the development of a strong
monotheistic
religion. Early Jewish leaders probably emphasized a particularly
strong,
creator god as the most powerful of many divinities - a hierarchy not
uncommon
in animism - but this encouraged a focus on the father God for prayer
and
loyalty. By the time of Moses, Jews were urged increasingly to abandon
worship
of all other gods and to receive from Yahweh the Torah (a holy Law),
the
keeping of which would assure divine protection and guidance. From this
point
onward Jews regarded themselves as a chosen people under God's special
guidance.
As Jewish politics deteriorated due to increasing foreign pressure,
prophets
sprang up to call Jews back to faithful observance of God's laws. By
the
9th century B.C. some religious ideas and the history of the Jews began to
be
written down in what would become the Jewish Bible (the Old Testament of
the
Christian Bible).
Besides
the emphasis on a single God, Jewish religion had two important
features.
First was the idea of an overall divine plan. God guided Jewish
history,
and when disasters came they constituted punishment for failures to
live
up to divine laws. Second was the concept of a divinely organized
morality.
The Jewish God demanded not empty sacrifices or selfish prayers, but
righteous
behavior. God, though severe, was ultimately merciful and would help
the
Jews to regain morality. This system was not only monotheistic but also
intensely
ethical; God was actively concerned with the doings of people and so
enjoined
good behavior. By the 2d century B.C., these concepts were clearly
spelled
out in the Torah and the other writings that were formed into the Old
Testament
of the Bible. By their emphasis on a written religion the Jews were
able
to retain their identity under foreign rule and even under outright
dispersion
from their Mediterranean homeland.
The
impact of Jewish religion beyond the Jewish people was complex. The
Jews
saw God's guidance in all of human history, and not simply their own.
Ultimately
all peoples would be led to God. But God's special pact was with
the
Jews, and there was little premium placed on missionary activity or
converting
others to the faith. This limitation helps explain the intensity
and
durability of the Jewish faith; it also kept the Jewish people a minority
within
the Middle East though at various points substantial conversions to
Judaism
did spread the religion somewhat more widely. Jewish monotheism,
though
a landmark in world religious history, is noteworthy for sustaining a
distinctive
Jewish culture to our own day, not for immediately altering a
wider
religious map.
Yet
the elaboration of monotheism had a wide significance. In Jewish
hands
the concept of God became less humanlike, more abstract - a basic change
not
only in religion but in overall outlook. Yahweh had a power and a planning
quality
far different from the attributes of the traditional gods of the
Middle
East or Egypt. The gods, particularly in Mesopotamia, were whimsical
and
capricious; Yahweh was orderly and just, and individuals could know what
to
expect if they adhered to God's rules. The link to ethical conduct and
moral
behavior was also central. Religion for the Jews was a system of life,
not
merely a set of rituals and ceremonies. The full impact of this religious
transformation
on Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilization would come
only
later, when Jewish ideas were taken up by the proselytizing faiths of
Christianity
and Islam. But the basic concept formed one of the legacies of
the
twilight period from the first great civilizations to the new cultures
that
would soon arise in their place.
The
Minoans
The
Jews were not alone among the distinct societies popping up in the
eastern
Mediterranean. Around 1600 B.C. a civilized society developed on the
island
of Crete. This Minoan society traded widely with both Mesopotamia and
Egypt,
and probably acquired many of its civilized characteristics from this
exchange.
Minoan society, for example, copied Egyptian architectural forms and
mathematics,
though it developed important new artistic styles in the colossal
palace
built in the capital city, Knossos. The alphabet, too, was adapted from
Egypt.
Political structures similar to those of Egypt or the Mesopotamian
empires
emphasized elaborate bureaucratic con- trols, complete with massive
record
keeping, under a powerful monarch. Minoan navies at various points
conquered
parts of the mainland of Greece, eventually leading to the
establishment
of the first civilization there. Centered particularly in the
kingdom
of Mycenae, this early Greek civilization developed considerable
capacity
for monumental building, and also conducted important wars with
city-states
in the Middle East, including the famous conflict with Troy.
Civilizations
in Crete and in Greece were overturned by a wave of
Indo-European
invasions, culminating around 1000 B.C., that temporarily
reduced
the capacities of these societies to maintain elaborate art or
writing,
or extensive political or economic organizations. While the
civilization
that would arise later, to form classical Greece, had somewhat
separate
origins, it would build extensively on the memories of this first
civilized
society and on its roots in Egyptian and Mesopotamian achievements.
The
Phoenicians
Another
distinct society grew up in the Middle East itself, in what is
now
the nation of Lebanon. Around 2000 B.C. a people called the Phoenicians
settled
on the Mediterranean coast. Like the Minoans, they quickly turned to
seafaring
because their agricultural hinterland was not extensive. The
Phoenicians
used their elaborate trading contacts to gain knowledge from the
major
civilization centers, and then in several key cases improved upon what
they
learned. Around 1300 B.C. they devised a much simplified alphabet based
on
the Mesopotamian cuneiform. The Phoenician alphabet had only 22 letters,
and
so was learned relatively easily. It served as ancestor to the Greek and
Latin
lettering systems. The Phoenicians also upgraded the Egyptian numbering
system.
The
Phoenicians were, however, a merchant people, not vested in extensive
cultural
achievements. They advanced manufacturing techniques in several
areas,
particularly the production of dyes for cloth. Above all, for
commercial
purposes, they dispersed and set up colonies at a number of points
along
the Mediterranean. They benefited from the growing weakness of Egypt and
the
earlier collapse of Minoan society and its Greek successor, for there were
few
competitors for influence in the Mediterranean by 1000 B.C. Phoenician
sailors
moved steadily westward, setting up a major trading city on the coast
of
North Africa at Carthage, and lesser centers in Italy, Spain, and southern
France.
The Phoenicians even traded along the Atlantic coast of Europe,
reaching
Britain where they sought a supply of tin. Ultimately Phoenicia
collapsed
in the wake of the Assyrian invasions of the Middle East, though
several
of the colonial cities long survived.
The
End Of The Early Civilization Period
The
proliferation of spin-off civilizations brought important innovations
within
the framework set by the achievements of the great progenitors in
Mesopotamia
and Egypt. The simplified alphabet, the major cultural shift
described
by the first great monotheistic system, and a number of quite
practical
improvements - the introduction by another Mediterranean coastal
peoples,
the Lydians, of coined money - considerably advanced the level of
civilization
itself. The spread of civilization into Kush and into some
European
portions of the Mediterranean, fed by deliberate expansion and
growing
trade, also set the basis for the development of major civilization
centers
beyond the original core. By 1000 B.C. the civilization zone initially
established
by separate developments in Mesopotamia and Egypt had fanned out
widely,
sketching the basis for later societies in the Middle East, Africa,
and
parts of Europe.
No
sharp line divides the long early phase of the development of
civilization
in the Middle East and North Africa from the next, classical
period;
there was no total overturning by invasion, as would characterize the
first
civilization in India. Developments such as the spread of the Kushite
kingdom,
the survival of the Egyptian kingdom, or the elaboration of the
Jewish
religion continued well into the final centuries B.C. Successive
empires
in the Middle East would revive or preserve many features of the
Mesopotamian
pattern.
Around
1000 B.C., and for several centuries thereafter, there was a
somewhat
pervasive pause in the development of civilizations in this general
region.
The pause did not disrupt the Phoenician or Kushite expansion on the
fringes,
nor did it shatter all civilized forms. But Mesopotamia did undergo
an
unusual several-century span in which regional city-states and considerable
internal
warfare brought political chaos. Egyptian politics were also
deteriorating.
Early civilizations in Greece were overwhelmed (almost as
completely
as their counterpart in India) by waves of invasions by
Indo-Europeans
from eastern Europe. These invasions for a time reduced
politics
to essentially tribal levels and virtually destroyed cultural
activities
that depended on writing or elaborate workmanship.
The
waves of Indo-European invasion form the clearest breaking point.
These
invaders were hunters and herders initially from central Asia, who
pressed
into western Asia and Europe in successive waves. The Hittites were an
Indo-European
people capable of assimilating Mesopotamian values to the extent
of
setting up a major empire. They also pushed back the Egyptian sphere of
influence,
launching the decline of the New Kingdom and also freeing up the
southeastern
Mediterranean corner for the rise of smaller states such as the
Jewish
kingdom. But by 1200 B.C. the Hittites were swept away by another
invading
force of Indo-Europeans (the same group that interrupted civilization
in
Greece).
The
Indo-Europeans, beginning with the Hittites, introduced iron use
which
gave rise to more powerful weaponry and the possibility of
geographically
more extensive empires based on military power. The first group
to
exploit this new weaponry were the Assyrians, who began a pattern of
conquest
from their base along the Tigris River. By 665 B.C. they had
conquered
the whole of the civilized Middle East down to the Persian Gulf as
well
as Egypt. This was a cruel people, eager to terrorize their enemies. The
Assyrians
used iron, a strong and widely available metal, to arm more men more
cheaply
than societies relying on bronze were able to do. Their empire was
unprecedentedly
large and also unusually systematic as they collected tribute,
assimilated
diverse cultural achievements, and even moved whole peoples (as
they
did the Jews) in order to maintain control. The Assyrian state was not
long
lived. By 612 B.C. it fell to a combination of pressures from invading
frontier
tribes and internal revolt. A number of smaller successor kingdoms
followed,
until another great eastern empire, the Persian, arose in 539 B.C.
The
key points are these: The characteristic boundaries of the early
civilizations
that had lasted so long amid a relatively slow pace of change
were
beginning to yield. Invading peoples brought new ideas. The
Indo-Europeans,
for example, ignored the Mesopotamian or Egyptian beliefs
about
the divine attributes of kings. Rather, kings were selected by councils
formed
by nobles and the army. Also, where Indo-European culture took deep
root,
as in Greece, political patterns would begin to diverge from those set
in
the earlier civilizations of the region. Geographical boundaries were
shifting
too. Egypt faded as a major independent actor, while the Middle East
was
open to new empires with greater unifying potential than ever before; and
new
centers of vitality were beginning to be sketched in Africa and along the
European
coast of the Mediterranean.
The
stage was beginning to be shaped for the emergence of a new set of
civilizations,
such as in Persia and Greece, that would build on earlier
precedents
in many ways but advance new cultural and political forms. Based on
the
new military technology brought by iron and on steady improvements in
shipping,
these new civilizations would reach out to wider regions than the
early
civilizations had usually managed. More extensive civilization zones and
new
cultural and political principles, though both prepared by developments in
the
early civilization period, would define the era of classical civilizations
in
the Middle East and Mediterranean that began to emerge by about 800 B.C.
with
the recovery of civilization in Greece and, soon, the rise of the great
Persian
empire.
Civilization:
Drawbacks And Limits
Because
civilizations are by definition well organized compared to the
societies
that preceded them, it is not surprising that almost all history is
about
what has happened to civilized societies. We know most about such
societies,
and we are likely to be particularly impressed by their great art
or
powerful rulers. It is also true that civilizations tended to be far more
populous
than noncivilized societies. Because civilizations depend on some
trade,
they allow greater specialization that increases productivity and
sustenance
of larger populations. Their political structure allows whole
regions
or even a number of regions to be unified. But the history of
civilization
does not embrace everybody. In the days of the river-valley
civilizations,
even long after Sumer, most inhabited parts of the world were
not
in the civilization orbit.
There
is inevitable confusion between defining a society as a
civilization
and assuming that civilization produces a monopoly on higher
values
and controlled behavior. In the first place, civilization brings losses
as
well as gains. As the Middle East moved toward civilization, distinctions
based
on social class and wealth increased. This was clearly the case in
Sumer,
where social structure ranged from slaves, who were treated as
property,
to powerful kings and priests. Civilizations typically have firmer
class
or caste divisions and greater separations between ruler and ruled than
"simpler"
societies. Civilizations also often create greater inequality
between
men and women than noncivilized societies do. Many early
civilizations,
including those of the Middle East, went to considerable pains
to
organize the inferiority of women on a more structured basis than ever
before,
treating women as the property of fathers or husbands. Finally, as
Sigmund
Freud noted, civilizations impose a host of restraints on people in
order
to keep them organized in a complex social unit. Such restraints can
create
a great deal of personal tension and even mental illness.
"Civilization,"
then, should not be taken as a synonym for "a `good' or
`progressive'
society."
Furthermore,
people in noncivilized societies may be exceptionally well
regulated
and possessed of interesting, important culture. They are not
"merely"
barbarians or uncouth wild men. Some societies that were most eager
to
repress anger and aggression in human dealings, such as several Eskimo
groups,
were not part of a civilization until recently. In contrast, many
civilized
societies produce a great deal of aggressive behavior and build
warlike
qualities into their list of virtues. While some noncivilized
societies
treat old people cruelly, others display respect and veneration. A
civilized
society does not invariably enhance the human capacity for
restrained,
polite behavior or an interest in the higher values of life.
Civilizations
do not even clearly promote greater human happiness.
The
development of civilization continued the process of enhancing human
capacity
for technological and political organization, and the production of
increasingly
elaborate and diverse artistic and intellectual forms. In this
quite
restricted sense, the term has meaning and legitimately commands the
attention
of most historians. Because of the power and splendor civilizations
could
provide, they did tend to spread as other societies came under their
influence
or deliberately tried to imitate their achievements. Early
civilizations,
however, spread slowly because many peoples had no contact with
them
and because their disadvantages, such as greater social inequality, might
be
repellent. Thus the initial advent of civilization, while an important
historical
milestone, came in clearly circumscribed regions like the
Tigris-Euphrates
valley. The history of early civilization focuses attention
on
the generation of the first forms of civilized activity - writing and city
administration
- and on the construction of linkages in medium-sized
geographical
units.
The
Course Of Mesopotamian Civilization: A Series Of Conquests
The
general characteristics of civilization, from economic surplus to
writing,
cities, and social inequality, are vital, but must be combined with
the
specific qualities of particular civilizations such as those of
Mesopotamia,
where writing was of a certain style; social organization was
distinctive,
for example, in the power of priests; and overall culture had
some
special qualities.
A
key ingredient of Mesopotamian civilization was frequent instability as
one
ruling people gave way to another invading force. The Sumerians,
themselves
invaders of the fertile river valleys, did not set up a
sufficiently
strong and united political force to withstand pressures from
outside,
particularly when other peoples of the Middle East began to copy key
achievements,
such as the formation of cities.
Later
Mesopotamian Empires
Shortly
after 2400 B.C. a king from a non-Sumerian city, Akkad, conquered
the
Sumerian city-states and inaugurated an Akkadian Empire. This empire soon
sent
troops as far as Egypt and Ethiopia. The initial Akkadian ruler, Sargon
I,
the first clearly identified individual in world history, set up a unified
empire
integrating the city-states into a whole, and added to Sumerian art a
new
style marked by the theme of royal victory. Professional military
organization
expanded since Sargon maintained a force of 5400 troops.
Extensive
tax revenues were needed to support his operations. The Akkadians
were
the first people to use writing for more than commercial and temple
records,
producing a number of literary works. The Akkadian empire, however,
lasted
only about 200 years, and then it was overthrown by another invading
force.
Sumerian regional states reappeared, in what turned out to be the final
phase
of this particular civilization. It was then that the Epic of Gilgamesh
was
written. By this time, around 2000 B.C., kingdoms were springing up in
various
parts of the Middle East, while new invading groups, including Indo-
European
tribes that came from the Balkans in southeastern Europe, added to
the
region's confusion. A civilization derived from Sumerian culture spread
more
widely in the Middle East, though political unity was rarely achieved in
the
expanded setting.
Another
new empire arose around 1800 B.C., for the first time unifying
the
whole of Mesopotamia. This Babylonian Empire was headed by Hammurabi, one
of
the great rulers of early civilized history. Hammurabi set up an extensive
network
of officials and judges, while maintaining a separate priesthood. He
also
codified the laws of the region, to deal with a number of criminal,
property,
and family issues. Large cities testified to the wealth and power of
this
new empire. At the same time, Sumerian cultural traditions were
maintained
and elaborated. The famous Hammurabic code thus was built on
earlier
codifications by Sumerian kings.
A
Babylonian poem testified to the continued sobriety of the dominant
culture:
"I look about me and see only evil. My troubles grow and I cannot
find
justice. I have prayed to the gods and sacrificed, but who can understand
the
gods in heaven? Who knows what they plan for us? Who has ever been able to
understand
a god's conduct?"
Finally,
Babylonian scientists extended the Sumerian work in astronomy
and
mathematics. Scholars were able to predict lunar eclipses and trace the
paths
of some of the planets. Babylonians also worked out mathematical tables
and
an algebraic geometry of great practical utility. The modern 60-minute
hour
and 360-degree circle are heritages of the Babylonian system of
measurement.
The study of astronogy is another Babylonian legacy.
Indeed,
of all the successors of the Sumerians, the Babylonians
constructed
the most elaborate culture, though their rule was not long-lived.
The
Babylonians expanded commerce and a common cultural zone, both based on
growing
use of cuneiform writing and a shared language. During the empire
itself,
new government strength showed both in the extensive legal system and
in
the opulent public buildings and royal palaces. The hanging gardens of one
king
dazzled visitors from the entire region.
The
Babylonian empire fell by about 1600 B.C. An invading Hittite people,
pressing
in from central Asia, adapted the Sumerian cuneiform script to their
own
Indo-European language and set up an empire of their own. The Hittites
soon
yielded, and a series of smaller kingdoms disputed the region for several
centuries,
between about 1200 and 900 B.C. This period allowed a number of
regional
cultures, such as the Hebrew and the Phoenician, to develop greater
autonomy,
thus adding to the diversity and the achievements of the Middle
East.
Then, after about 900 B.C., another series of empires began in the
Middle
East, including the Assyrian Empire and later the Persian Empire based
on
invasions of new groups from central Asia. These new invaders had mastered
the
production of iron weapons and also used horses and chariots in fighting,
sketching
a new framework for the development of empires and a new chapter in
the
history of the Middle East and of civilization more generally.
[See
Head Of Sargon: This bronze head of Sargon, founder of the Akkadian
dynasty,
dates from about 2350 B.C. The elaborate metalwork displays the
artistic
talent acquired by leading craftsmen.]
Document:
Hammurabi's Law Code
Hammurabi,
as king of Babylon, united Mesopotamia under his rule from
about
1800 to 1750 B.C. His law code, the earliest such compilation still in
existence,
was discovered on a stone slab in Iran in A.D. 1901. Not a
systematic
presentation, it was a collection of exemplary cases designed to
set
general standards of justice. The code provides vital insights into the
nature
of social relations and family structure in this ancient civilization.
Examples
of the Hammurabic code follow:
When
Marduk commanded me to give justice to the people of the land and to
let
[them] have [good] governance, I set forth truth and justice throughout
the
land [and] prospered the people.
At
that time:
If
a man has accused a man and has charged him with manslaughter and then has
not
proved [it against] him, his accuser shall be put to death.
If
a man has charged a man with sorcery and then has not proved [it against]
him,
he who is charged with the sorcery shall go to the holy river; he shall
leap
into the holy river and, if the holy river overwhelms him, his accuser
shall
take and keep his house; if the holy river proves that man clear [of the
offense]
and he comes back safe, he who has charged him with sorcery shall be
put
to death; he who leapt into the holy river shall take and keep the house
of
his accuser.
If
a man has come forward in a case to bear witness to a felony and then has
not
proved the statement that he has made, if that case [is] a capital one,
that
man shall be put to death.
If
he has come forward to bear witness to [a claim for] corn or money, he
shall
remain liable for the penalty for that suit.
If
a judge has tried a suit, given a decision, caused a sealed tablet to be
executed,
[and] thereafter varies his judgment, they shall convict that judge
of
varying [his] judgment and he shall pay twelve-fold the claim in that suit;
then
they shall remove him from his place on the bench of judges in the
assembly,
and he shall not [again] sit in judgment with the judges.
If
a free person helps a slave to escape, the free person will be put to
death.
If
a man has committed robbery and is caught, that man shall be put to death.
If
the robber is not caught, the man who has been robbed shall formally
declare
whatever he has lost before a god, and the city and the mayor in whose
territory
or district the robbery has been committed shall replace whatever he
has
lost for him.
If
[it is] the life [of the owner that is lost], the city or the mayor shall
pay
one maneh of silver to his kinsfolk.
If
a person owes money and Adad [the river god] has flooded the person's
field,
the person will not give any grain [tax] or pay any interest in that
year.
If
a person is too lazy to make the dike of his field strong and there is a
break
in the dike and water destroys his own farmland, that person will make
good
the grain [tax] that is destroyed.
If
a merchant increases interest beyond that set by the king and collects it,
that
merchant will lose what was lent.
If
a trader borrows money from a merchant and then denies the fact, that
merchant
in the presence of god and witnesses will prove the trader borrowed
the
money and the trader will pay the merchant three times the amount
borrowed.
If
the husband of a married lady has accused her but she is not caught lying
with
another man, she shall take an oath by the life of a god and return to
her
house.
If
a man takes himself off and there is not the [necessary] maintenance in his
house,
his wife [so long as] her [husband is delayed], shall keep [herself
chaste;
she shall not] enter [another man's house].
If
that woman has not kept herself chaste but enters another man's house, they
shall
convict that woman and cast her into the water.
If
a son strikes his father, they shall cut off his forehand.
If
a man has put out the eye of a free man, they shall put out his eye.
If
he breaks the bone of a [free] man, they shall break his bone.
If
he puts out the eye of a villain or breaks the bone of a villain, he shall
pay
1 maneh of silver.
If
he puts out the eye of a [free] man's slave or breaks the bone of a [free]
man's
slave, he shall pay half his price.
If
a man knocks out the tooth of a [free] man equal [in rank] to him[self],
they
shall knock out his tooth.
If
he knocks out the tooth of a villain, he shall pay 1/3 maneh of silver.
If
a man strikes the cheek of a [free] man who is superior [in rank] to
him[self],
he shall be beaten with 60 stripes with a whip of ox-hide in the
assembly.
If
the man strikes the cheek of a free man equal to him[self in rank], he
shall
pay 1 maneh of silver.
If
a villain strikes the cheek of a villain, he shall pay 10 shekels of
silver.
If
the slave of a [free] man strikes the cheek of a free man, they shall cut
off
his ear.
-----------------
Would the World Be Better Off Without Religion? A
Skeptic’s Guide to the Debate
·Scott O. Lilienfeld and Rachel Ammirati
The
widespread assertion that the world would be better off without religion is a
reasonable hypothesis. Yet data suggest that skeptics should attach no more
than a modest level of probability to it.
If
you Googled the question constituting the title of this article—or minor
variants of it—as the first author of this article did on Christmas Day of
2013, you’d end up with more than 650,000 hits. This high number attests to the
keen public interest generated by this age-old question. Indeed, few topics
have generated more impassioned discussion among religious believers and skeptics
alike. For example, in 2007, the British organization Intelligence-Squared
hosted a lively debate on the proposition that “We’d be better off without
religion,” with proponents of the motion—Richard Dawkins, A.C. Grayling, and
Christopher Hitchens—squaring off against the opponents Julia Neuberger,
Professor Roger Scruton, and Nigel Spivey. Over the past decade, a seemingly
never-ending parade of books and articles have tackled “the question,” as we
dub it, from various angles; entering the phrase “better off without religion”
into an Amazon.com book search yields over 130 results.
Arguably,
what is most striking about responses to the question by many prominent
partisans on both sides is their extremely high level of confidence in the
answer. For example, in a 2011 interview with Slate magazine, author and
political commentator Dinesh D’Souza opined that “For a truly secular society,
we should look to Stalin’s Russia or Mao’s China. But that’s the tip of the
iceberg … The result [of these societies] has inevitably been repression,
totalitarianism, persecution of the churches, and just a miserable society”
(Weingarten 2011). Turning to the opposing side, in an interview with
journalist Laura Sheahen (2007), evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins
embraced the unequivocal position that the world would be a far better place
without belief in God, contending that religion increases the chances of war
and political discord. Sheahen asked him, “If you had to make a case for
religion—one positive, if minor, thing religion has done, what would it be?”
Dawkins responded, “It’s true that some kind, nice, sympathetic people are also
religious, and they might say that their kindness is motivated by religion. But
equally kind people are often not religious. I really don’t think I can
think of anything; I really can’t.” (emphasis added; http://salmonriver.com/environment/dawkinsinterview.html).
Later, in a 2013 interview with CNN, Dawkins maintained, “The very idea that we
get a moral compass from religion is horrible” (Prager 2013).
In
this article, we address the overarching question of whether high levels of
certitude are warranted among partisans of either position. In the interest of
full disclosure, both authors of this article are atheists. At the same time,
we have become concerned by what appears to be unjustified dogmatism by both
religious skeptics and believers in discussions concerning an exceedingly
complex and multifaceted question. Therefore, we attempt to demonstrate that
(a) scientific data bearing indirectly on the question have routinely been
neglected by many individuals on both sides of the debate; (b) such data,
although informative, do not permit anything approaching conclusive answers to
the question of whether religion makes the world a better or worse place. At
the same time, such data cast serious doubt on broad-brush contentions (e.g.,
Dawkins 2006) that religion is usually or always associated with a heightened
risk of immoral behavior, including violence. Hence, we view our article as a
modest call for greater epistemic humility on the part of ardent defenders of
both positions.
Is
the Question Even Answerable?
In
practice, the question posed here is probably not answerable with certainty
because a genuine experimental test of the question is impossible. For both
pragmatic and ethical reasons, we could never randomly assign individuals to a
condition in which they were raised in a religious environment and randomly
assign others to be raised in a nonreligious environment, all the while
ensuring that all participants in this fanciful Gedanken experiment
experienced little or no contact with the contrasting worldview. Putting it
differently, we will almost certainly never know the hypothetical
counterfactual (Dawes 1994) to the question posed at the article’s outset;
by “hypothetical counterfactual,” we mean the outcome that would have resulted
had the world, or a large chunk of it, never been exposed to religion. That is
not to say, however, that circumstantial scientific data cannot inform the
question or adjust a rational individual’s assignment of probability to its
answer.
Moreover,
the question as commonly phrased (“Would the world be better off without
religion?”) is probably not strictly answerable with scientific data because
the word better necessarily entails a series of value judgments.
Reasonable people will surely disagree on what would make the world a better
place. Would the world be “better” with more political conservatism, invasive
animal research, modern art, McDonald’s hamburgers, or Justin Biebers? The
answers to these queries are matters of personal preference and lie outside the
boundaries of science (although we would dispute the rationality of readers who
reply “yes” to the last option). Nevertheless, when scholars have pondered
whether the world would be better off without religion, the lion’s share have
almost always referred, either implicitly or explicitly, to a world that is
more humane—one in which people treat each other kindly. For provisional
research purposes, we can operationalize this propensity roughly in terms of
lower rates of aggression and higher rates of altruism. In this article, we
therefore address the more tangible question of whether a world devoid of
religion would witness (a) lower levels of criminal and antisocial behavior1,
including violence, and (b) higher levels of prosocial (altruistic) behavior
than a world with religion.
It
should perhaps go without saying that the question of whether the world would
be better off without religion has no logical bearing on the ontological
question of God’s existence. It is entirely possible to maintain that (a) God
does not exist, but belief in God makes the world a more humane place on balance,
or (b) God does exist, but belief in God makes the world a less humane place on
balance. Indeed, a group of scholars who are sometimes encompassed under the
rubric of Atheism 3.0 have recently lobbied for (a). They maintain that
although there is no God, belief in God makes the world a kinder and gentler
place (e.g., Sheiman 2009).
In
any case, it should be beyond dispute that the question of God’s existence is
logically and factually independent of the question of whether belief in God’s
existence is beneficial for the human species. Nevertheless, it is all too easy
to conflate these two questions, and we suspect that many partisans on both
sides of the debate have done so, at least implicitly. If one concludes that
belief in God is rational, one may be tempted to assume that belief in God
would make the world a better place; conversely, if one concludes that belief
in God is irrational, one may be tempted to assume that belief in God would
make the world a worse place. At the risk of adding yet another logical fallacy
to lengthy lists of such fallacies (e.g., Bennett 2012), we term this the argument
from existence/nonexistence fallacy.2 In essence, this fallacy
is the inverse of the familiar “argument from adverse consequences fallacy”
(see Sagan 1995), in which one erroneously reasons backward from the adverse
effects of a belief to gauge this belief’s veracity (e.g., “Lack of belief in
God has negative consequences, so therefore God exists”). In contrast, the
individual committing the argument from the existence/nonexistence fallacy
incorrectly presumes that accurate beliefs regarding the existence of an entity
(e.g., God) will always or usually lead to more salutary real-world outcomes.
Yet, as the psychological literature on positive illusions suggests (Taylor and
Brown 1988; but see Colvin and Block 1994, for a dissenting view), inaccurate
beliefs may in some cases be tied to more adaptive outcomes, including higher
levels of well-being and more satisfying interpersonal relationships.
The
Neglect of Research Evidence
Surprisingly,
the extensive body of social science data bearing on the links between religion
and both moral and immoral behavior have typically gone unmentioned in public
discussions regarding the merits or demerits of religion. Two high-profile
examples from religious skeptics are especially striking. In his 447-page book,
Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, philosopher and
prominent atheist Daniel Dennett (2006) devotes at most two pages (pp. 279–280)
to the question of whether religion helps to makes people more moral,
dismissing it peremptorily:
I
have uncovered no evidence to support the claim that people, religious or not,
who don’t [emphasis in original] believe in reward or heaven and/or
punishment in hell are more likely to kill, rape, rob or break their promises
than people who do. The prison population in the United States shows Catholics,
Protestants, Jews, Muslims and others—including those with no religious
affiliation —are represented about as they are in the general population. (p.
279)
Later,
Dennett quips that
. . .
Nothing approaching a settled consensus among researchers has been achieved,
but one thing we can be sure of is that if [emphasis in original] there
is a significant positive relationship between moral behavior and religious
affiliation, practice, or belief, it will soon be discovered, since so many
religious organizations are eager to confirm their demonstration underlines the
suspicion that it just isn’t so. (p. 280)
For
unclear reasons, Dennett neglects to review several dozen studies and at least
two large-scale reviews bearing directly on this question (Baier and Wright
2001; Ellis 1985), including substantial bodies of data on the relation between
religious belief and criminal behavior, which we examine in the following
section.
Similarly,
in his 405-page book, The God Delusion, Dawkins (2006) devotes
approximately two pages (pp. 229–230) to this question. Dawkins approvingly
cites Dennett’s aforementioned conclusions and refers only in passing to
correlational data on the relation between religion and morality. Without
citing any references to the substantial psychological and sociological
literature on the topic, Dawkins maintains that “such research evidence as
there is certainly doesn’t support the common view that religion is positively
correlated with morality” (p. 229). Instead, on the same page, Dawkins cites
only one observation, from neuroscientist Sam Harris (2006), that U.S. states
that tend to be more socially conservative (and that are also characterized by
higher levels of religiosity) are marked by higher levels of violent crime. We
agree with Dawkins and Harris that such data may inform the debate.
Nonetheless, these findings are difficult to interpret in view of the “ecological
fallacy,” the error of drawing inferences regarding individual-level
associations (in this case, the relation between religion and violence) from
population-level data. It is well-established that this fallacy often
(Piantadosi et al. 1988), although by no means always (Schwartz 1994), results
in erroneous conclusions regarding the relation between two variables. 3
Because more informative data derive from examinations of the associations
between religion and criminal behavior at the individual level, we examine such
data next.
Correlational
Data
Does
religion make good people behave badly? When approaching this question, it is
all too easy to “cherry-pick” historical instances in which religion, or the
lack thereof, is tied to violent, even horrific, acts. Unquestionably, some of
the world’s greatest atrocities have been perpetrated in the name of religion.
In the opening pages of The God Delusion, Dawkins (2006) recites a
plethora of examples:
Imagine,
with John Lennon, a world with no religion. Imagine no suicide bombers, no
9/11, no 7/7, no Crusades, no witch-hunts, no Gunpowder Plot, no Indian
partition, no Israeli/Palestinian wars, no Serb/Croat/Muslim massacres, no
persecution of Jews as “Christ-killers,” no Northern Ireland “troubles”… Imagine
no Taliban to blow up ancient statues, no public beheadings of blasphemers, no
flogging of female skin for the crime of showing an inch of it. (pp. 1–2)
The
difficulty with this line of reasoning becomes evident, however, when
considering an at least equally lengthy list of historical counterexamples.
Even setting aside the contentious question of whether Hitler was inspired by
religious doctrine, a topic that falls outside of our expertise to evaluate
(see Dawkins 2006 and Evans 2007 for discussions), one can just as readily
invoke scores of cases of heinous nonreligious violence on a grand scale. For
example, radio–talk show host and political columnist Dennis Prager (2011)
contends that “. . . far more people have been murdered—not to mention enslaved
and tortured—by secular anti-religious regimes than by all God-based groups in
history.” In support of this contention, he cites Mao Tse-tung’s murder of
between forty and seventy million people, Stalin’s murder of at least twenty
million of his own citizens, Pol Pot’s murder of approximately one in four
Cambodians, the North Korean regime’s slaughter of millions of its citizens,
among numerous other examples. It is safe to say that extremism of many kinds,
religious or not, can predispose to large-scale violence, especially when
conjoined with the deeply entrenched belief that one’s enemies are not merely
mistaken but deeply evil (Lilienfeld et al. 2009). Whether religious belief
makes such hate-fueled aggression more or less likely on average is far from
clear.
Indeed,
the question of whether religion increases or decreases the risk of genocidal
and other large-scale violence may never be answered to our satisfaction.
Nevertheless, the more circumscribed question of whether belief in God
specifically, and religiosity more generally, are correlated—statistically
associated—with criminal and antisocial behavior, including violence, has been
investigated in dozens of studies.
The
results of a few early investigations suggested little or no relation between
religiosity and crime (e.g., Hirschi and Stark 1969). In contrast, more recent
studies, as well as meta-analyses (quantitative syntheses) of the literature,
have converged on a consistent conclusion: belief in God bears a statistically
significant, albeit relatively weak, association with lower levels of criminal
and antisocial behavior, including physical aggression toward others (a
statistically significant finding is one that would be extremely unlikely to be
observed if the null hypothesis of a zero correlation between the variables
were true). For example, in a meta-analysis of sixty studies that yielded
seventy-nine correlations, Baier and Wright (2001) found a statistically
significant, but weak, negative correlation (r=-.12) between religiosity
and crime (correlations range from -1.0 to +1.0, and a correlation with an
absolute value of .1 is typically regarded as weak in magnitude). Notably, all
seventy-nine correlations were negative, although most fell in the range of
-.05 to -.20. These findings run counter to Dennett’s (2006) claim, seconded by
Dawkins (2006), that there is no statistical association between
religiosity and criminality.
Still,
this link appears to be qualified by other variables. The results of several
studies suggest that the correlation between religiosity and crime is moderated
by attendance at churches or other places of worship, with more frequent
attenders being at especially low risk for crime (Ellis 1985; Good and
Willoughby 2006). In addition, the diminished risk for aggression and
antisocial behavior appears to be more closely associated with intrinsic
religiosity, in which individuals view religion as personally important for its
own sake (e.g., “I try hard to live all of my life according to my religious
beliefs”) than with extrinsic religiosity, in which individuals view religion
as a means to a personal end (e.g., “The primary purpose of prayer is to gain
relief and protection”) (Bouchard et al. 1999).
More
generally, religiosity is moderately and positively associated with
self-control, a trait closely tied to impulse control; again, this association
is especially pronounced for people with high levels of intrinsic religiosity
(McCullough and Willoughby 2009). In work from our laboratory recently
submitted for publication (Lilienfeld et al. 2014), we even found a slight but
statistically significant tendency for religious nonbelievers (including
professed atheists and agnostics) to report higher levels of certain traits
relevant to psychopathic personality (psychopathy), especially weak impulse
control and lack of empathy, relative to religious believers. Needless to say,
however, the weak magnitude of these associations in no way implies that most
atheists are psychopathic, let alone psychopaths.
Other
correlational data point to a consistent association between religion and
prosocial behavior. For example, in a meta-analysis of forty studies of
adolescents, religiosity was moderately and positively associated with
prosocial behaviors, such as volunteer work, altruistic acts, and empathic
concern toward others (Cheung and Yeung 2011). Broadly mirroring other findings
on the intrinsic-extrinsic religiosity distinction, the relation between
religiosity and prosocial behavior was most marked for participants with high
levels of private (rather than public) religious participation, such as
individuals who pray when alone.
In a
study of high-school students, Furrow and colleagues (2004) similarly found a
strong association between religiosity and prosocial interests, including
empathy and a sense of responsibility toward others. Most, although not all,
investigators (e.g., Kohlberg 1981) have also reported positive correlations
between individuals’ religiosity and their level of moral reasoning (Ellis and
Peterson 1996), meaning that more religious individuals tend to reason in
slightly more sophisticated ways about moral problems compared with
nonreligious individuals (although moral reasoning and moral behavior tend to
be only moderately correlated; e.g., Stams et al. 2006). Still other
investigators have found that unconsciously priming participants by asking them
to unscramble sentences containing words relevant to religion (e.g., God,
sacred) makes them more financially generous to other subjects compared with
unprimed participants (Shariff and Norenzayan 2007). The extent to which these
laboratory findings can be generalized to real-world altruism remains to be
seen, however.
Scholars
have proposed numerous causal explanations for the link between religion and
moral behavior (see Baier and Wright 2001 for a review). Among these hypotheses
are that (a) fear of God’s wrath in the afterlife makes believers refrain from
unethical actions (the so-called “hellfire hypothesis”); (b) consistent with
the generally accepted etymology of the word religion as reflecting
“tying together,” religious beliefs bind individuals more closely to
communities, families, and others (social control theory); and (c) religious
beliefs foster shame and guilt regarding unethical actions, thereby deterring
people from engaging in them (rational choice theory). At the risk of
oversimplifying an exceedingly large and complex body of literature, we can
conclude that there is no definitive or even especially compelling evidence for
any of these explanations, although none has been falsified. For example, in a
study of 2,616 twins, Kendler and colleagues (2003) reported that a set of
items reflecting belief in God as a punitive judge of one’s actions was
significantly and negatively associated with risk for drinking and drug
problems but was not significantly associated with risk for disorders
associated with antisocial behavior, thereby offering inconsistent support for
the hellfire hypothesis. The authors did find, however, a negative association
between general religiosity and antisocial behavior disorders, corroborating
the other correlational findings reviewed here.
Caveats
Although
extant correlational data are broadly consistent in demonstrating a statistical
association between religious belief and (a) decreased levels of antisocial and
criminal behavior and (b) heightened levels of prosocial behavior, such
findings do not and cannot demonstrate causality (Galen 2012). As statisticians
remind us, correlation does not by itself imply causation. Hence, the
aforementioned hypotheses regarding the causal effect of religion on moral
behavior may be explanations in search of a phenomenon. Authors who interpret
these correlational data as demonstrating “the effect of religion on crime”
(e.g., Baier and Wright 2001, 3) are therefore going well beyond the available
evidence. Moreover, these findings leave us with the at least equally complex
question of whether we can generalize from individual-level correlations
between religion and crime to the broader implications of religion for society
as a whole.
Although
the correlational data are consistent with a potential causal influence
of religion on moral behavior, many other explanations are possible. For
example, what statisticians term the causal arrow could be reversed:
higher levels of moral behavior might contribute to higher levels of
religiosity. Longitudinal studies, which track participants over time, may
eventually help to adjudicate between these competing hypotheses. The quite
limited longitudinal data available thus far are mixed, with some studies
finding that changes in people’s religiosity predict a lower risk of future
delinquency and vice-versa (thereby suggesting a bidirectional relation), but
with others finding no association in either direction (Eisenberg et al. 2011).
In addition, much of the prosocial behavior exhibited by religious individuals
is directed toward other religious individuals, so this behavior could partly
reflect what psychologists call “in-group bias (Galen 2012).
Alternatively,
one or more “third variables,” such as personality traits, could be responsible
for the statistical association. For example, religiosity tends to be
moderately associated with high levels of agreeableness and conscientiousness
(Lodi-Smith and Roberts 2007; McCullough and Willoughby 2009). The literature
already reviewed linking religiosity with self-control is consistent with this
possibility, as conscientiousness is strongly associated with self-control.
Therefore, religiosity per se may not contribute directly to higher
levels of moral behavior; instead, religiosity may merely be a proxy for
personality traits that are themselves related to morality. Indeed, twin data
indicate that at least some of the association between religiosity and altruism
is in part genetically mediated, meaning that some of the same genes that
predispose to religiosity predispose to prosocial behavior (Koenig et al.
2007). These genes may contribute to personality traits that boost the chances
of both religiosity and prosocial behavior, although this hypothesis awaits
future research.
Another
hypothesis is that devout and steadfast adherence to any meaningful worldview,
rather than a religious worldview per se, is the genuine causal factor.
As noted earlier, research points to a robust negative correlation between
attendance at religious services and risk for crime. For example, it is
possible that one would observe a comparably high correlation among atheists
who are regular attendees at meetings of secular humanists. This intriguing
hypothesis similarly warrants systematic investigation.
Moreover,
even setting aside the crucial issue of causality, the reported correlations
are almost always weak or at most moderate in magnitude. Hence, if there is a
causal relation between religion and morality, it is most likely either (a)
modest in size or (b) large in size but suppressed statistically (masked) by
undetermined variables. The middling correlations also tell us that many
religious individuals engage in high levels of immoral behavior, and that many
nonreligious individuals engage in high levels of moral behavior, a point
acknowledged by political and religious commentator Dennis Prager (2013): “None
of this [the assertion that God informs morality] means that only believers in
God can be good or that atheists cannot be good. There are bad believers and
there are good atheists.” Furthermore, we are unaware of any data indicating
that the relation between religiosity and morality takes the form of a
threshold effect, whereby a “critical” level of religiosity is needed to be
moral. Hence, we can safely answer a different—and widely asked—question
with a high level of certainty: “Does one need religion to be moral?” The correlational
data permit as close to a definitive answer as one can probably achieve in
social science: No. Many nonreligious people clearly exhibit high levels of
moral behavior and thinking.
Religion
as a Protective Factor against Immoral Behavior
Arguably,
somewhat more compelling evidence for a potential causal role for religion in
moral behavior derives from studies on the potential protective effects
of religion on antisocial behavior. In these designs, investigators typically
examine individuals at elevated risk for immoral actions, such as those who
possess high levels of personality traits (such as impulsivity) that increase
risk for such actions, or those reared in high-crime areas. The hypothesis
tested in such studies is what researchers term a statistical interaction,
which mathematically is a multiplicative rather than additive effect. In more
concrete terms, investigators are testing the hypothesis that religion is
especially likely to attenuate the risk of antisocial behavior among
individuals who are most predisposed to it. This hypothesis carries a certain
surface plausibility. Most individuals may not need religion to behave
morally, but certain individuals—namely, those with potent dispositional or
sociocultural predispositions—may need religion as a buffer of “line of last
defense” against their antisocial propensities. These may be the very people
for whom a moral compass offered by religion is necessary, or at least helpful.
Regrettably,
this important hypothesis has been examined in only a handful of studies.
Still, the admittedly limited findings are reasonably, although not entirely
(Desmond et al. 2013), consistent. In many cases, religious belief appears to
play a protective role against antisocial behavior among high-risk individuals.
For example, in a study of young adolescents (average age of thirteen), Laird
and colleagues (2011) found that the importance of religion to participants was
related to a lower risk of rule-breaking behavior, including physical
aggression. Notably, this decreased risk was highest among adolescents with low
levels of impulse control. Similarly, in a large-sample study of adolescents,
investigators found that high levels of religiosity exerted a buffering effect
on the risk of alcohol and illicit drug use following negative life events
(Wills et al. 2003; see also Bodford and Hussong 2013). In still another study
of adolescents and young adults involved in gangs in El Salvador, Salas-Wright
and colleagues (2013) reported that both religious coping and spirituality
(especially the latter) were tied to lower rates of certain delinquent
behaviors, including carrying a weapon, vandalism, and theft. Still, because
the authors did not directly test a statistical interaction between risk-status
(such as weak versus strong impulse control) and religiosity, the existence of
a protective effect in this study can only be inferred indirectly.
Caveats
The
results of protective studies are sparse but provocative, and they raise the
possibility that religious belief buffers high-risk individuals, such as those
who are especially impulsive, against antisocial behavior. Still, as in the
case of correlational studies, we cannot be certain that the findings reflect a
genuine causal effect of religiosity on diminished risk for antisocial
behavior. The apparent protective effect of religion on high-risk individuals
could again reflect the indirect effect of unmeasured third variables, such as
conscientiousness or devotion to a broader worldview, that are themselves
correlated with religiosity. In future research, investigators should
incorporate measures of such variables to test rival hypotheses for the
buffering effect.
Conclusions
The
widely advanced hypothesis that the world would be “better”—more humane—without
religion is entirely reasonable, and it should continue to be debated by
thoughtful scholars. Contrary to the forceful assertions of some prominent
atheist authors (e.g., Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006), however, the data
consistently point to a negative association between religiosity and criminal
behavior and a positive association between religiosity and prosocial behavior.
Both relations are modest in magnitude and ambiguous with respect to causation.
At the same time, they cannot be ignored by partisans on either side of the
discussion.
Our
bottom-line conclusion is straightforward: any individuals who attach an
extremely high level of probability to the answer to the question we have posed
are placing opinions over evidence. Blanket assertions by advocates of either position
can most charitably be described as scientifically premature. As in all
scientific debates, humility in the face of equivocal data should be the
watchword.
Moreover,
we urge caution in “arguing by example,” as many influential scholars have done
when addressing this question. One can readily generate compelling historical
evidence that seemingly supports the hypothesis that religion makes the world
more dangerous (e.g., Dawkins 2006), as well as equally compelling historical
evidence that seemingly refutes it (e.g., Prager 2013). One might well suspect
that there is some truth to both positions, and that religion may sometimes be
a force for good and sometimes a force for evil, depending on the specific
religious beliefs, specific individuals, and specific historical contexts
involved.
In
evaluating many of the debates concerning this question in the popular media,
it is difficult not to be struck by the frequent neglect of the substantial
scientific data bearing on it. Neither side has been immune from this tendency.
For example, in a piece on the Huffington Post blog posted in December
of 2013, pastor Rick Henderson wrote, “There is no morally good atheist,
because [according to the atheist world view] there really is no objective
morality” (Henderson 2013). Yet this assertion is contradicted by the
correlational data we have reviewed, which demonstrate that many nonbelievers
engage in high levels of moral behavior.
On
the flip side of the coin, take Nobel Prize–winning physicist Steven Weinberg’s
1999 assertion, endorsed by Dawkins (2006, p. 249), that “With or without
religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing
evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion” (see
Lindner 2005). This proposition runs counter to an enormous body of social
psychological data demonstrating that many, if not most, good people can be led
to perform unethical acts with no religious coercion. For example, in the
classic obedience studies of Stanley Milgram (1963; see Burger 2009 for a more
recent replication), large proportions of participants were induced by an
“experimenter” in a white lab coat (who was actually a confederate of
Milgram’s) to deliver what they believed to be powerful and potentially deadly
electric shocks to another innocent “participant” (who was another confederate
of Milgram’s). In this study, nary a hint of religious influence was invoked.
The purported experimenter carried the banner of the authority of science, not
of religion. Interestingly, in the lone study to our knowledge to examine
religiosity in the context of the Milgram paradigm, Bock and Warren (1972)4
found that both extreme religious nonbelievers and extreme religious believers
were the least likely to comply with the experimenter’s demands to administer
shocks; for reasons that are unclear, moderate believers were the most likely.
Still, even the small number of nonbelievers delivered more than their share of
shocks.
The
Bock and Warren study, although limited in size (thirty participants in total),
reminds us of how complicated the association between religiosity and moral
(and immoral) behavior is likely to be. This link stubbornly resists reduction
to simple formulas, probably because it is contingent on a host of still undiscovered
factors. In addition, if the results of Bock and Warren’s investigation are
replicable, they would imply that the relation between religiosity and moral
behavior may be sometimes curvilinear or “dose-dependent,” further confounding
facile efforts to equate religiosity in general with either prosocial or
antisocial behavior (Galen 2012).
Some
nonbelievers may react to this debate by staking out an alternative position:
as scientific thinkers and skeptics, we should be seeking the truth, the
consequences be damned. From this perspective, if God does not exist, we should
be discouraging uncritical acceptance of religious tenets regardless of whether
they exert beneficial or detrimental long-term effects on society. Knowledge,
Sir Francis Bacon asserted, is power. In our view, this position is both
intellectually consistent and intellectually honest, and we see merit in it. At
the same time, advocates of this position need to be forthright in
acknowledging that it may entail unknown risks that need to be weighed in
public discussions of the value of religion to society.
Other
thoughtful readers may object to our article on the grounds that the very
question as we and others have framed it is woefully simplistic. According to
one frequently cited estimate, there are approximately 4,200 religions in the
world (Dekker 2009), with countless subtle differences within many of these
belief systems. And surely, individuals apprehend and apply the religious
tenets of their chosen faiths in a seemingly endless variety of ways. Making
matters more complicated, cultures differ with regard to what behaviors they
regard as moral or immoral. For example, although virtually all individuals in
all cultures agree that theft and murder should be prohibited, there are
sizeable differences of opinion when it comes to certain other activities, such
as homosexuality, abortion, and open government protests (Wilson and Herrnstein
1985). Hence, the objection continues, attempting to answer the question of
whether “religion in general” makes society “better in general” is a fool’s
errand.
The
point is well taken, and indeed, to the extent that the aforementioned caveats
are legitimate, and we suspect that they are, they are all the more reason to
insist on humility and circumspection in our claims. Most scientific
assertions, especially those in the “softer” sciences of psychology, sociology,
and cultural anthropology, possess boundary conditions (Meehl 1978), and it
seems implausible that the presence or absence of all religious beliefs would
yield similar effects on all societies across all historical periods.
In
the meantime, as the debate continues, we exhort readers to emulate the
epistemic modesty of our Emory University colleague, primatologist Frans de
Waal (2013), who addressed this question with the thoughtful uncertainty that
it richly deserves:
I’m
struggling with whether we need religion. . . . Personally I think we can be
moral without religion because we probably had morality long before the current
religions came along . . . so I am optimistic that religion is not strictly
needed. But I cannot be a hundred percent sure because we’ve never really
tried—there is no human society where religion is totally absent so we really
have never tried this experiment.
Acknowledgments
The
authors thank Frans de Waal, Lori Marino, Susan Himes, and Bill Hendrick for
their helpful comments on previous drafts of this manuscript.
Notes
1.
The term antisocial, which means “against society,” should not be
confused with asocial, which means “apart” from society. The antisocial
person engages in behaviors that harm others, such as criminal acts, whereas
the asocial person prefers to have little to do with others.
2.
In some cases, this fallacy may stem from a “representativeness heuristic,” the
tendency to presume that “like goes with like” (Kahneman 2011; see also
Gilovich and Savitsky’s 1996 article in Skeptical Inquirer). Individuals who
perceive that a belief, such as belief in God, reflects a rational judgment may
assume that this belief goes along with other positive things, such as more
humane treatment of others, and vice versa for people who perceive a belief to
be irrational.
3.
One widely cited example of the ecological fallacy derives from the work of
Robinson (1950), who identified a high correlation between being foreign-born
(versus being U.S.-born) and literacy across the then-forty-eight U.S. states.
Yet, when Robinson examined this association at the individual level, the
actual correlation was not only much weaker but in the opposite direction:
people born in the U.S. had higher levels of literacy. The reason for the
fallacious ecological correlation was migration: recent immigrants to the U.S.
tended to move to states with higher levels of literacy. That said, an
ecological study of crime rates across thirteen nations yielded only mixed
support for the Harris/Dawkins hypothesis: countries with higher levels of
religiosity tended to exhibit lower levels of property (but not violent) crime
(Ellis and Peterson 1996).
4.
In an interesting bit of trivia, the study’s second author, Neil Clark Warren,
later went on to found the religiously inspired online dating site,
eHarmony.com.
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Scott
O. Lilienfeld and Rachel Ammirati
Scott
O. Lilienfeld,
PhD, is a professor of psychology at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, and
a CSI Fellow.
Rachel
Ammirati,
PhD, is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Psychiatry at Emory
University.
-------------
FIRST
PEOPLES BEFORE EUROPEAN CONTACT
Canada's
First Nations: An Introduction
Historical
Overview
Canada's
First Nations have been in the country we now call Canada for at least 12,000
years, perhaps much longer.
For
almost all that time, they survived very well in a harsh environment, making
everything they needed without polluting the water, or air, and without
destroying the land or decimating the animal populations.
Each
First Nation had self-government and recognized the sovereignty of other First
Nations. They all developed unique systems of government, and complex material
cultures (tools, clothing, shelter, transportation, etc.)
Most
First Nations of Canada lived mainly from hunting and fishing. They migrated
seasonally to get food. They did not wander aimlessly.
They
moved their camps from season to season to specific places and areas where they
knew there would be food. In one season, they would hunt large animals; in
another they would fish; in the fall they would gather berries, and so on.
The
only farming people were the Iroquois and Hurons, and related tribes, in what
is now southern Ontario.
The
Sacred Circle of Life
Seasonal
migration was a continuous pattern, with each group following the same pattern
each year, according to to the natural cycles of the plants and animals.
Members
of each clan usually came together in a big gathering at least once a year.
Because
the regular seasonal pattern of life and movement of the animals and people was
a continuous pattern, like a circle with no beginning and no end, the circle
became a sacred symbol for First Nations people, the circle of life and
renewal.
image
The
Sacred Circle of Life
Represented here on a drum. (Image from www.blessingways.net)
Major
Migrations
There
have been many large scale migrations across North America over time because of
climate changes, epidemics, changes in the migration routes of animals, one
group expanding into another's territories, victory and defeat in warfare, and
many other reasons.
These
large scale movements are not the same as the seasonal migrations to follow
food sources.
Trade
First
Peoples had many well established trading patterns and trade alliances
throughout North America.
Archaeologists
have found plenty of evidence of early trade of items such as pottery, silver,
and copper tools.
Complex
Cultures
Canada's
First Peoples developed complex cultures and lived in harmony with their
environment. Everything they had was made from the land around them and its
plants and animals - food, clothes, shelter, wood, tools, weapons, dyes,
decoration, musical instruments, and ceremonial artifacts.
First
Nations people created several distinct cultures, each based on adaptation to a
different Canadian environment.
Each
cultural group was made up of several nations with similarities in language,
social structure, and similar ways of making a living from the environment they
lived in.
Each
group of people developed distinctive housing, tools, clothing, transportation,
tools, and weapons, and ceremonies, and had their own stories about their
origins, and how to interpret the world around them.
They
used many kinds of medicines from plants. Many of the medicines we use today
are based on First Nations knowledge of the healing qualities of certain
plants.
Government
Canada's
First Nations all had complex social systems, with several levels of government
based on the family, the band or clan, and the nation or tribe.
Their
leaders, or Chiefs, were chosen in different ways, but were always people who
had special leadership qualities that brought them respect from their people.
In
most First Nations, a council of elders advised the Chief, and decisions were
made by consensus, which means that the council would discuss a matter of
importance, and then would make a decision that the majority agreed on.
First
Nations recognized each other as sovereign nations, and made friendship
treaties, or military alliances with each other. Some nations were traditional
enemies, and went through periods of war or peace.
Buffalo
Bulls Backfat/ Painter - George Catlin
Religion
First
Nations people were very religious, and respectful of the Great Spirit, and
other spirits that they believe inhabited the land and animals all around them.
First
Nations people were taught, from the time they were very young, to respect and
give thanks to the animals, birds, plants, and the land and water that gave
them all the things that they depended on to stay alive.
Oral
Tradition
First
Nations people did not have a writing system based on an alphabet, but they had
a strong oral tradition. That means that knowledge of events or matters of historic importance was preserved by passing
information from person to person, and generation to generation.
There
were usually specific people in the tribe or band who knew their whole history,
and related these events to others at special gatherings. Tales of important
events were told and retold around the campfire, as stories are told
everywhere.
First
Nations also had various ways of recording events, to trigger the memory of
those relating the events. For example, wampum belts had pictures woven into them
to tell a story. Drawings on bark or hide preserved the record of events.
In
recent years, many First Nations people have been collecting these old stories
from elders, and preserving them on tape, and writing them down.
Legends
and Stories
Like every
human culture in the world, Canada's First Peoples have stories to explain the
origins of the earth and its animals and people.
First
Peoples' creation stories often contain references to specific landmarks, such
as mountains or lakes, that give us good information about the areas that a
group of people lived in, and the routes they followed as they migrated over
the centuries to the areas they now live in.
Canada's
First Peoples also have many other wonderful stories and legends about real or
imaginary characters and settings, just as every group of people on earth do.
These
stories were not written down, but were passed on through their oral tradition.
Stories were told over and over, and everyone learned them. Children grew up,
and passed the stories onto their children.
Stories
among First Nations peoples serve the same purpose as stories do for other
cultures all over the world.
They
entertain, they teach listeners how to deal with the world around them, they
teach people about good and evil, about bravery and cowardice; they make
listeners think about the consequences of their behavior; they scare children
with spooky stories so they do not wander away from home, and so on.
CANADA'S
FIRST PEOPLES B4 CONTACT- maps and history
------------
Religion
in Colonial America
By
Lawanda Brewer, Heather Jaques, Ranada Jones, Joshua King
Students,
University of North Carolina at Pembroke, 2001
Many
people came to America to search for religious freedom. Their hope was to escape the religious
persecution they were facing in their countries. The one thing they did not want to do was to
establish a church like the Church of England.
The colonists wanted a chance to worship freely and have an opportunity
to choose which religion they wanted to take part in. Upon arriving in America (the Pilgrims being
the first to arrive in 1620), the journey began for the search of the
"perfect" religion that could satisfy the needs of the people.
Many
religious groups (such as the Quakers and Puritans) formed the first 13
colonies on the basis of their religious beliefs. Although the plan was to escape persecution,
there was actually some amount of persecution happening in the colonies. One example of this persecution would be with
the Puritans. The Puritans wanted
everyone to worship in the Puritan way.
In order to ensure that Puritanism dominated the colonies,
nonconformists were fined, banished, whipped, and even imprisoned for not
conforming to the way of the Puritans.
Eventually this persecution was ended and other religions began to
appear.
The
Anglicans were already established in most of the colonies and were even part
of the group of people that were "persecuted" by the Puritans. However, after the dispersement of the
Puritans, the number of other religions in the colonies began to increase. Baptists appeared in a majority of the
colonies, Roman Catholics and Protestants organized in Maryland and even some
German religions surfaced in a few of the colonies. Later came the Lutherans, who formed in the German
communities in Pennsylvania, and the Presbyterians, who even had an appearance
in the Massachusetts Proposals of 1705.
Religious
diversity had become a dominant part of
colonial life. The colonies were a
patchwork of religiously diverse communities and, as a result, the population
of America increased quickly. People from all over the world wanted the freedom
that was found in America and they began to move their homelands to
America. Groups such as the Scotch-Irish
were among the first to begin that emigration to America. As a result, religious persecution was
beginning to diminish and religious freedom began to replace it.
Religion
also became a dominant part of American politics. The Cambridge Platform was established in the
1640's. This document was a part of the
Puritan theology and adopted the Westminister Confession. Then, in 1649, the Act Concerning Religion
was enacted. This act has even been
considered one of the greatest additions to the freedom of religion in
America. Later political documents
included the Massachusetts Proposals and the Adopting Act of 1729. The Bill of Rights added to religious freedom
with the First Amendment.
Eventually,
the issue of church and state became a topic of debate. According to Clifton Olmstead, author of
History of Religion in United States, the separation of church and state was
completed by the Constitution in 1777 (214).
There were numerous groups of people who disagreed with the separation. Some even thought that it would have no
effect on the growth of religion in the United States. Olmstead quotes a Congregationalist minister
about his idea of the separation:
"It was as dark a day as ever I saw. The odium thrown upon the ministry was
inconceivable. The injury done to the
cause of Christ, as we then supposed, was irreparable. For several days I suffered what no tongue
can tell for the best thing that ever happened to the State of
Connecticut. It cut the churches loose
from dependence on state support. It
threw them wholly on their own resources and on God. . . .They say ministers
have lost their influence; the fact is, they have gained. By voluntary efforts, societies, missions,
and revivals, they exert a deeper influence than ever they could by queues and
shoe buckles, and cocked hats and gold-headed canes"(215).
Overall,
religion was an important aspect in the colonization of America. It became a dominant part of the lives of the
colonists and continued to grow over the years.
Events such as the Salem Witchcraft Trials of the 1690's and the Great
Awakening of the 1730's only increased the influence of religion in
America. America had become a refuge for
those who wanted religious freedom and became a home to the many people that
had the chance to improve their lives.
Works
Cited
Olmstead, Clifton E. History of Religion in
the University
------------
FUTURE OF MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA
"In
many Middle Eastern countries, poverty is deep and it is spreading, women lack
rights and are denied schooling. Whole societies remain stagnant while the
world moves ahead. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom
does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and
violence ready for export."
--- George.W.Bush---
--- George.W.Bush---
----------------
www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-the-middle-east - Cached
5 May 2014 ... People started farming here in 9000
BC, and by around 2500 BC ... How the Middle East gave Europe religion, three times ... AD — they managed
to conquer the entire Middle East,
North Africa, Persia, and parts of southern Europe. ... until it began declining in the
mid-1800s, collapsed after World War I, ...
 |
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHxcQgDM1nY23
Jan 2014 - 59
min - Uploaded
by Steve Silva
Israel : The Real History of Israel's Origins (Full Documentary) . 2013 2014 This documentary ... |
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