QUOTE: But there has never been a better
time in history to be black in Canada and it’s
time we start acting like it.
time in history to be black in Canada and it’s
time we start acting like it.
ARTICLE: -
Community must confront, change lethal youth violence
RACHELLE M. TURPLE
I was raised in North
Preston and although I’ve been away for some time now and have established
myself in Ontario, Nova Scotia will always be home to me.
I fully respect this is
a sensitive subject and some will find it odd that I’m writing this when I’m so
physically far-removed from the epicentre of the recent tragedies.
But I’m never so far
away from home to not share my honest opinion on the status quo of my home
community and,
ultimately, what I believe it’s
going to take to change it.
With my father, sister
and many other family and friends still residing in North Preston, I have a
selfish and personal interest in the sustainability and safety of the
community.
Some of the people I
love most in the world live “up home” and, unfortunately, I already know how it feels to lose someone to gun violence.
I was 15 in 1992 when we
lost our beloved brother.
He was murdered in a
Toronto nightclub. At the time, I believed those types of tragedies could only
happen in the “big city.” I wish I could still be so naïve.
It’s painful to know my
former home is plagued by the same gun violence that happens here.
When it happens in
Toronto, most times you don’t know the victims personally.
But we’re deeply
disturbed when it happens to someone from the black community in Nova Scotia
because there are fewer degrees of separation between us.
My condolences and
support are extended to each and every family member on all sides of these
incidents.
They are tragically
losing their children to careless acts of violence.
This article is barely a
scratch in the surface of the conversation about work that needs to be done in
this crisis.
The outpouring of
violence is symptomatic of something more insidious working beneath the social
surface in our black communities.
I believe decades of
subjugation and simplistic, bare-bones municipal infrastructure have led us here. We’ve confused having city sewer systems,
city buses and a local police detachment with “progress.”
Working together toward
advancement, development, growth and opportunities for young black Nova
Scotians is progress.
Supporting community
members is progress.
Surviving long enough to
see the positive changes is progress.
Community leadership,
development and political advocacy have to be at the helm of any forward-moving
society, so education, employment and growth can occur.
Security and protection
are also major pillars of society and are integral to progress.
If this lethal violence
continues to escalate, it will result in a generational extinction.
Once the able-bodied
have left the community, or are dead or in jail, North Preston and other black
communities will succumb to complete government control and, inevitably,
gentrification.
We will lose our land.
We will lose our heritage.
If we do not begin to
approach this crisis with a framework of progression, our youth will continue
to stagnate and believe they’ve got nothing to look forward to and, worse,
nothing to lose.
This is largely to blame
for what we see happening now. Our youth are desensitized and apathetic to the
consequences of their actions.
A change of attitude in
the way we parent our children is also needed to turn this around.
We need to re-evaluate
the ways in which we rear and raise our offspring to build a future for them.
We need to re-design our
approaches to discipline and setting healthy boundaries, extracurricular
activities and exposure to mainstream media.
We need to get quiet
with ourselves and be humble to ask the hard questions.
Am I a good parent? Are
my priorities straight? Am I a good example of social responsibility,
self-respect and integrity?
Am I teaching my child
how to show and accept love, care and affection for and from others?
Is my home physically
and emotionally safe? Do I abuse substances that hurt me and, therefore, the
development of my child?
Do I need help? What
could I be doing better? What can I do to improve?
When it comes to family
matters, there will always be challenges. But if we can be the best, healthiest
version of ourselves, it will spill over into our parenting and our children
will benefit from it.
Our communities will
benefit from it. It’s a positive feedback loop.
We need an overhaul
because we cannot afford to lose an entire generation of young black people.
Every time a youth is
murdered, it’s one less person to maintain and build upon our legacy as
indigenous black Canadians.
There is simply no room
in society for violent, antisocial behaviour and deciding to stand up and speak
out against it, regardless of the repercussions, is progress.
I’d rather live in fear
that my convictions and efforts toward progress would get me harmed than be
struck by an unintended bullet.
Get involved. It takes
an entire village to raise a child, but it only takes a passionate effort to
improve the social conditions and to spark progress within the village.
The hardest things to do
and the right things to do are usually the same things.
Trust that I realize
it’s easy for me to say all of this from beyond community borders. But any of you who know me personally also
know that if I was there, I’d be the first to speak up and get involved in
action for improvement. I’d be the first to demonstrate and support leadership
and partnership toward progress.
It’s not lost on me that
I’m writing this article from my cozy bedroom just outside of Toronto, far
removed from the thick of it all.
But there has never been
a better time in history to be black in Canada and it’s time we start acting
like it.
Rachelle M. Turple is a
writer who grew up in North Preston and now lives in Brampton, Ont. She blogs
atBlackLit101.com.
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F**KING BLACK ON BLACK GANG WARS-u kill r kids-
Tyler Richards’ associate had North Preston’s
Finest connection
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CHRONICLE HERALD – EDITORIAO 26 April
2016
HOMICIDES IN HALIFAX
Taking on guns-rule
Halifax has a
serious violence problem related to guns, young guys and the drug culture.
More serious than
in most other Canadian cities. More like many American inner cities, with their
cult of guns and their culture of gang-fodder violence. Young men settling
scores, chasing status and killing each other with guns.
That message was
delivered two years ago in a review by criminologist Don Clairmont of his 2008
report into Halifax violence and public safety.
Looking at how
violent crime in the city had changed over six years, he found violence related
to conventional crime, swarming and the bar scene (problems that prompted his
first report) had declined significantly since 2008.
But gun violence
involving young men in the “drug milieu” had risen dramatically. It had pushed
homicides and attempted homicides to all-time highs in HRM.
Drug dealing, the
report found, had become the rationale for marginalized young men to get guns,
the means of paying for them and the subculture in which gun violence is not
just about turf and money, but is used to settle personal grievances. The
report found these attitudes were “now prevalent in HRM among both whites and
blacks in the illicit drug business” and agreed with U.S. studies that “the key
is getting at the marginality, the zero-level social status that translates into
a violent quest for ‘respect’.”
These concerns are
all-too present now as Haligonians cope with a wave of gun violence in the last
week: three young men killed and one badly wounded in the course of three
shootings — in the West End, on Gottingen Street and in North Preston. Police
say three of the men knew each other. One was facing trafficking charges. But
investigators have not linked the shootings and have not said there is a
connection with drugs.
But there clearly
is a connection to a growing and dangerous gun culture in Halifax. So it was
important that hundreds of people joined a march Sunday to say they won’t stand
for this escalation of violence, to recognize it as a city-wide issue and to
commit to working with police to make Halifax safer. There are no quick
solutions here, but a key to any progress is a public that stands up to the
guns-rule cult by demanding safer streets and by providing information to
police that makes safer streets possible.
The 2014 report
found gun violence marked Halifax as one of the more dangerous cities in
Canada. This was happening in spite of good police programs to disrupt the
supply of firearms and to provide rewards, like cameras, for turning in guns.
It saw hope in police-community programs to work with vulnerable neighbourhoods
to disrupt patterns and attitudes of violence. We need more of those. But
people who have information to take guns and gunmen off our streets also need
to give it to police.
--------------------------
UPDATE APRIL 25 2016- NOVA SCOTIA CANADA
KEEP THE PEACE, STOP THE VIOLENCE
Hundreds attend anti-violence march
Police looking into connections between series of violent deaths
THE CANADIAN PRESS
Hundreds of people chanting “Keep the Peace, Stop the Violence”
marched through downtown Halifax Sunday afternoon to protest the
violence that has led to a series of shooting deaths in the city.
The demonstration attracted a wide cross-section of people, from
toddlers to seniors, police officials and politicians, Mayor Mike
Savage, Chief Jean-Michel Blais and Nova Scotia Justice Minister Diana
Whalen.
Organizer Quentrel Provo said the idea was to show that people have had enough of gun-related violence in the city.
“I know marching isn’t going to stop the violence,” Provo said in an
interview before the march. “But we want to make a statement that we are not going to stand for this violence that is happening in our city.”
The rally began at 4 p.m. at the corner of Novalea and Duffus streets.
“We want all the kids to march out front,” Provo said before the march
began, adding that the youth are the future of the community.
The route passed both a murder scene and the police station on its way
to the Grand Parade. “We are going to take back our streets along the
way,” Provo said to resounding applause at the beginning of the march.
The event followed Saturday’s
CONTINUED ON A3
Marchers make their way through
Halifax to the Grand Parade to take back the streets during the march
against violence on Sunday.
FROM PAGE A1: MARCH
discovery of the body of
20-year-old Daverico Downey in the nearby community of North Preston.
Downey’s death was the third violent fatality within the last week in
the Halifax area.
Last
Sunday, the body of former St. Francis Xavier University basketball
star Tyler Richards was found in a Cook Avenue home, while 23-year-old
Naricho Clayton of Dartmouth was shot dead on Gottingen Street on
Tuesday. Richards’ funeral was held on Saturday. All three homicides are
under investigation by the Homicide Unit of the Integrated Criminal
Investigation Division, which is looking into possible ties between the
shootings.
The march began with roughly 100 people, and slowly grew. Marchers returned chants from an organizer holding a megaphone.
At one point an organizer called for a moment of silence. “A young
blood lost his life right where we are standing right now,” referring to
the the shooting Tuesday of Naricho Clayton.
The crowd marched uphill and passed Halifax Regional Police
headquarters. “They need us to be with them and not against them,” the
same speaker said through the megaphone.
“We can’t put this on police,” Provo said in an interview prior to the
march. “A reason why a lot of these crimes continue to happen is we
have a no-snitch policy and everyone being silent — we’ve got to do our
part and start to speak out and stand up.”
At the Grand Parade, Mayor Mike Savage spoke, saying the city can’t
afford to lose its young people to senseless violence and it’s up to
everyone to ensure opportunities are created so that young people have
options.
“We are not going to go on seeing young people’s lives snuffed out for no good reason,” he said.
Police chief Jean-Michel Blais said: “Our city isn’t just Gottingen
Street, it isn’t Cook Street, it isn’t Downey Street. Our community is
everywhere here in HRM.” He said by simply showing up, the community has
started a conversation.
Ceasefire Halifax also attended Sunday’s march.
— With The Chronicle Herald
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NOVA SCOTIA- ‘This is NOT a blame the police thing’ –
Hundreds of people attend anti-violence march in Halifax
-----------
---------------
#blackonblack - Lord Have Mercy
Tyler Richards’ father,
brother brought up on gun charges following murder
---------------
Hundreds march for peace in Halifax after rash of homicides
Starting at Duffus Street and Novalea Drive, and ending at Grand Parade, message was simple: put down the guns.
- Updated: Man found dead in North Preston after report of shots fired
- Police identify homicide victim from Gottingen Street shooting, look for specific suspect
- 'We will be out there in full force:' Halifax police offer reassurance after second homicide in three days
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BLOGGED:
Canada Military news -4 #KAYLINDIGGS #blacklivesmatter - black on black youth violence -part of CeaseFireHalifax (CeaseFireChicago Model) - is bringing pride and impressive skills 2 our youth in need in Nova Scotia- Check out all the programs on settling violence and turning our youngfolks lives around- because our kids matter- thank u this is awesome news- August 21- I'm Asking 4 Help Now-Why won't u help me???? - Homelessness in Canada of Youth- We must get back 2 basics/Thank u Jesus- Devon Downey turns himself in and confesses- thank u
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Sweet Jesus, Mother Mary and Joseph..this blackonblack
gangwars is killing our young and beautiful- #alllivesmatter
Halifax police continue to investigate murder of Nathan Cross
The 21-year-old North Preston man was killed on April 24, 2011
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Nova Scotia #blackonblack
gang violence- O Lord Slain young men Richards, Clayton knew each other http://herald.ca/WcU#.VxpEbLu6VhM.twitter … @chronicleherald
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Nova Scotia's Heartbreak #alllivesmatter
A look at the six homicide victims so far this year in Halifax http://herald.ca/Wch#.VxpD83-Akjc.twitter …
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NOVA SCOTIANS-pls take part- Activist #QuentrelProvo
to host anti-violence march in Halifax on Sunday http://herald.ca/WS4#.VxpDlXiD4wQ.twitter …
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Let's git r done Nova Scotia- Activist Quentrel Provo to
host anti-violence march in Halifax on Sunday http://herald.ca/WS4#.VxkZwAR1Lwk.twitter …
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over 6 young black youth murdered in black on black gang
killings -WTF Nova Scotia???
We will be out there in full force:' Halifax police offer reassurance after second homicide in three days
Deputy chief says police hoping 'cooler heads prevail' and to see no more gun violence
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WTF? #blackonblack
killings must stop- #BlackLivesMatter
Hfx police invest link btween Gottingen-west-end shootings http://herald.ca/W5k#.VxkWebgZphg.twitter …
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CANADA- TORONTO- what is with #blackonblack gangs-Why so
many #canadagangwars where 2 many innocents get hurt and killed- we are a
democracy- with freedom, liberty and democratic rules of law for each and
all... imho - OUR #firstresponders must b sick of this
sheeeet- lower crime rate for petty crap
- but extremely violent gangs sucks the life out of our first on the scene 2
deal with this creepy horrid mess... come on Canada... our troops died to give
us a beautiful...free...equality nation... pls... imho
Toronto man shot to death after attending
memorial for murdered friend: police
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Why Don't Black People Protest 'Black-on-Black Violence'?
A year
after his death, the memory of 9-year-old Devin Elliott and other victims of
violence in Saginaw continues to motivate residents to take back their streets,
the Rev. Larry D. Camel says.
"We're
not going to tolerate kids getting killed in our streets any longer," said
Camel, co-founder of faith-based anti-violence community organization
Parishioners on Patrol. Camel said he hopes at least 500 people participate in
a second Stop the Violence March at 10 a.m. Saturday in Saginaw.
Last
fall, Parishioners on Patrol organized a Stop the Violence rally and march that
attracted 150 people, a response to 22 shootings in Saginaw resulting in three
deaths.
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Call Us: 1-800-222-TIPS (8477)
End Gang Life
Feb 5, 2016
A
gang is an organized group of three or more, that as one of its main
purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or
more serious offences, that, if committed, would likely result in the
direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial
benefit, by the group or by any one of the persons who constitute the
group.
However, with globalization and increasingly multi-cultural
communities, organized crime is now best understood as small, loosely
structured and often multi-ethnic networks that adapt quickly to any
pressures or changes in the criminal or legitimate marketplaces. These
networks re-group, merge or disband on a regular basis due to law
enforcement intervention, competition, and other pressures within the
marketplace. The total number of reported groups in Canada has
fluctuated between approximately 600 to well over 900 within the past
five years. This fluctuation is largely reflective of improved reporting
processes and a shift in collecting information on organized crime in
Canada.
The Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit of BC is a provincial
anti-gang unit. It is mandated to take on organized crime and gang
violence in BC. Their number one priority is to ensure public safety
through well-structured strategies that focus on the disruption of gang
and organized crime violence.
Their website, www.endganglife.ca contains a multitude of resources on gangs and the effect of gangs on our youth.
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Crime and justice
The nature and extent of crime and the administration of criminal and civil justice in Canada. These statistics come within the scope of the following five objectives of the justice system: Show more...
===============
-------------------
Organized Crime
Organized Crime is defined in the Criminal
Code of Canada as a group of three or more people whose purpose is the
commission of one or more serious offences that would "likely result in
the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a
financial benefit, by the group."
Organized Crime is defined in the Criminal Code
of Canada as a group of three or more people whose purpose is the
commission of one or more serious offences that would "likely result in
the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a
financial benefit, by the group." But perhaps a more succinct definition
was given by a former United States mob boss who described it as "just a
bunch of people getting together to take all the money they can from
all the suckers they can."
For a long time many scholars did not believe organized crime was highly structured, or capable of sophisticated operations. All this changed because of the revelations of the U.S. Senate "Valachi" hearings in 1963 (named after the chief witness, Mafia member Joe Valachi); because of the documentary evidence from police wiretaps in the 1970s, which allowed police to listen to Mafia leaders discussing their hierarchy and operations in the U.S. and Canada; and because of the creation of the American Witness Protection Program, in which Mafia defectors and informers could build a new life and protect themselves by working with the police and prosecutors.
Only in the 1970s did the existence of a highly organized criminal network in Canada become known to the public – thanks to various court cases as well as Québec inquiries into the Mafia, the widely publicized report of the Waisberg Commission into construction violence in Ontario, and a series of mob killings in Montréal..
The joint committee calculated that organized crime revenue came from pornography, prostitution, bookmaking, gaming houses, illegal lotteries and other gambling, as well as loan sharking and extortion. These and other activities such as white collar crime (insurance and construction fraud and illegal bankruptcy), arson, bank robbery, motor vehicle theft, computer crime and counterfeit in credit cards, made up about $10 billion in organized crime revenues. Narcotics accounted for the other $10 billion.
Organized crime provides illegal services desired by some members of the general public, such as gambling, prostitution, and contraband alcohol and tobacco sales. In every large Canadian city, local bookmakers used to be involved in organized crime through an elaborate system established to protect the individual bookie from large losses. Today organized crime provides many underground sports betting and illicit card game operations.
Other organized crime activities are not fuelled as much by public demand. They involve the importation and distribution of harder drugs such as heroin, Internet and credit card fraud, and murder and extortion. Other activities that aid and abet organized crime include the ongoing corruption of public officials and the "laundering" of the proceeds of criminal activities.
One of the simplest ways to "launder" money is to engage in activities in which there is a constant flow of cash, such as slot machines and gambling. If the owner of a gambling casino claims to have taken in $1 million when he has actually taken in only $100 000 -- to which has been added $900 000 of illegally obtained money -- it is almost impossible to demonstrate that the $1 million was not procured in the normal course of business. Neighbourhood coin laundries have also been popular ways of laundering organized crime money in Canada.
Without corruption, organized crime groups would find it difficult to exist. The efforts of organized crime members to corrupt police, judges, politicians, lawyers, and government and civilian officials are probably more harmful to society than any other organized crime activity.
Scholars do not agree on the origin of the term "Mafia," referring to the original organization in Sicily. However, the word “Mafia” was used as early as 1880 by Sicilian scholar Giuseppe Alongi, in his book La Mafia, Fattori, Manifestazioni, reprinted in 1904 and again in 1977. According to the Québec Organized Crime Commission's report of 1977, the term Mafia describes, "a state of mind, a feeling of pride, a philosophy of life and a style of behaviour.” The mark of a known and respected man, it derives from the Sicilian adjective 'mafiusu,' which was used widely since the 19thcentury to describe magnificent or perfect people."
Joe Bonanno, a Mafia don, describes the term in his memoirs: "Mafia is a process, not a thing. Mafia is a form of clan co-operation to which its individual members pledge lifelong loyalty. Friendship connections, family ties, trust, loyalty, obedience – this was the 'glue' that held us together."
The Mafia was exported and adapted to North America by a small group of Italian immigrants, mostly from Sicily and Calabria. In Sicily, and later in the U.S. and Canada, 'Mafia' came to refer to an organized international body of criminals of Sicilian origin, known as Cosa Nostra, but it is now applied to the dominant force in organized crime – the largely Sicilian and Calabrian organized crime "families." These families are held together by a code emphasizing respect for senior family members; by the structure or hierarchy of the family; and by an initiation rite or ceremony.
Although Italian crime families have been active in Canada since the early 1900s, they now operate in much more clearly structured and defined areas acceptable to other mafia families in the U.S. and Canada. More recently new N'drangheta cells of the Calabrian Mafia have emigrated to Canada after coming under intense pressure by Italian authorities in the early 2000s. Many of these newly arrived Mafiosi went to work with older, established Mafia figures, settling in the greater Montréal, Toronto and Hamilton areas. Though located mainly in the major cities, family members tend to gravitate to where wealth moves; in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some moved westward, following the movement of business to British Columbia and Alberta. Vancouver has had serious Mafia infiltration over the years as well as a more obvious biker and Asian crime presence.
Toronto Mafia
In Toronto until the mid-1980s, at least four major Mafia-style criminal organizations existed and were run by Canadians of Sicilian or Calabrian origin, two of whom were named as members of the Mafia during the Valachi hearings -- namely the organizations run by Paul Volpe and Johnny "Pops" Papalia. Since the murder of Volpe in November 1983, his old organization has mostly disappeared as well as that of Papalia, after he was murdered at the behest of a rival local Calabrian Mafia family in 1997.
Today, several older Calabrian organized crime groups operate in the Greater Toronto/Hamilton areas. There are also newly arrived cells of the N'drangheta operating, many having emigrated from Siderno, Calabria. There is no one godfather in Toronto, but there is a ruling commission of the N'drangheta, of family leaders in the Toronto area which tries to keep order, resolve disputes, and co-ordinate some activities with the ruling commission in Italy.
Montréal Mafia
Since the mid-1980s, Montréal has had one dominant crime family, led by the Sicilian-born Nick Rizzuto and then by his son Vito. Another family was run by Frank Cotroni until his death in 2004. The Québec crime probe exposed the membership and activities of this highly structured group in a number of its reports in the 1970s. Established first in the 1940s by Frank's older and more powerful brother Vic Cotroni, the family evolved in the 1950s into an important branch of the powerful New York City Mafia family of Joe Bonanno. It has extensive ties with Mafia families in Italy and throughout the U.S., as well as with the Toronto, Hamilton and Vancouver organizations.
Serious internal problems between Sicilians and Calabrians in the Montréal organization led to the violent deaths of Paulo Violi (chief lieutenant of Vic Cotroni) and his brothers in the late 1970s. The Cotroni family had primarily been involved in illegal gambling, loan sharking, drug importation, extortion, and the murder and corruption of public officials. After Vic Cotroni's death in 1984, the Sicilians, led by Nick and later Vito Rizzuto took over. The last decade of Vito Rizzuto's rule was marked by internal warfare, especially while Vito was in jail in the U.S. for his role in various mob hits in New York. He died suddenly in 2013 at the age of 67, from natural causes in a Montreal hospital.
There is no clear leader of the family now, as many senior Rizzuto leaders have been murdered, died or are in jail. Reynald Desjardins, Vito's number one lieutenant and right hand man in the decade preceding Vito's death, is now awaiting trial for orchestrating the murder of ex-Bonanno family acting boss Salvatore "the Iron-worker" Montagna, after he tried unsuccessfully to take over the family in 2011.
As of 2014, there was still an ongoing battle for Mafia supremacy in Montréal involving some Calabrian Mafiosi cells from Ontario and dissident Rizzuto family members in Québec.
At the same time, the hearings of the Charbonneau Commission into the practices of the Québec construction industry brought additional heat to bear on the old Rizzuto family leadership. The Commission's televised hearings included the broadcast of surveillance videos and wiretaps of Rizzuto family gatherings, including old man Nick consorting with and taking money from construction bosses and union leaders.
Recent arrivals from Calabria of senior members of the N'drangheta are also vying for a position in the Montréal Mafia world. A state of flux is the best way to describe the Montreal "Mob" as of 2014. In spite of this, most Mafia operations continue unabated. A new figure will likely emerge as the new godfather to run the Montréal Mafia, and he will likely come from the ranks of family members who have power and respect both in the Montréal underworld as well as in Italian and American mafia circles.
Since the 1970s, motorcycle gangs such as the Hells Angels, the Rock Machine, the Outlaws, Satan's Choice, and many others have been significantly involved in organized crime in just about every province from the Maritimes to BC. Their initiation rites have made it difficult for police to penetrate the groups (though in recent decades huge strides have been made in this area), which have become major suppliers of illegal drugs. Motorcycle gangs are also involved in prostitution and contract killing. It is not unusual to find them working with other organized crime groups. The Hells Angels are the most influential and powerful outlaw motorcycle gang in Canada.
With biker gangs comes violence and murder. A major biker war in Québec from the mid-1990s to the early 21st Century led to the killing of hundreds of people, including many innocent bystanders who were in the wrong place at the wrong time — including an 11 year old Montréal boy killed by a biker-war bomb.
New Crime Laws
The resulting outcry from the public and the media in Québec eventually forced the federal Parliament to enact stronger anti-organized crime laws, going after the gangs' wealth, and convicting individuals of membership in an organized crime entity.
By 2006, new organized crime laws were also used for the prosecution of scores of members of the Rizzuto Mafia family, from "soldiers" to senior lieutenants, and even to old Nick Rizzuto, onetime godfather who was then still criminally active in his 80s . Shortly after serving some of his time, Rizzuto was released from prison early because of old age.. The 86-year-old was then killed by a sniper outside his lavish Montréal-area home.
The Hells Angels organization has been hit hard by prosecutions under the new anti-organized crime laws. The once-powerful Hells Angel boss Maurice 'Mom' Boucher is now in jail for life, for his role in a number of murders. Still, the Hells Angels continue to operate, especially in Québec, with the help of puppet gangs with different names but working for the Hells Angels.
Asian Crime Groups
Various Chinese and Vietnamese organized crime groups have become more prominent over the past 35 years in Vancouver and Toronto, following a wave of immigration from Hong Kong. In BC, Chinese crime gangs have been operating for more than 100 years. In the 1920s, Shu Moy, the famed 'King of the Gamblers,' was a powerful organized crime figure in BC, according to the 1928 special inquiry set up by Vancouver City Council to look into illicit gambling rackets, opium dens, houses of prostitution and corruption at the highest levels of municipal government in Vancouver.
Today Chinese youth gangs operate in Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary and other cities and towns, and are involved in protection and extortion rackets. They also run massage parlours as fronts for prostitution, hydroponic grow operations for much in-demand marijuana, as well as the production and export of conventional speed drugs. More sophisticated groups are organized by senior triad leaders from Hong Kong to import heroin from southeast Asia through Vancouver and western Canada. The triads are the Chinese version of the Mafia, especially in their hierarchy and global networks and reach.
The organized crime structure changes quickly in Canada, and usually exists for some years before it is detected in cities or other locations; therefore, there are undoubtedly other groups that have not yet been identified. Columbian cartels are active in Toronto and Montréal. Russian and East European organized crime groups are also quite active in major Canadian cities.
First Nations
First Nations organized crime gangs have long existed in Canada. One prominent native organized mob group is the "Manitoba Warriors," which operates in the Winnipeg area. In January 2014, Winnipeg police arrested 57 men and women aged 17 to 51, alleging that they were members or associates of what police called the "the city's most powerful street gang."
Jamaicans
There are strong organized crime gangs in the Greater Toronto Area primarily composed of Jamaicans, including among others the 'Malvern Crew' and 'The Galloway Boys.' Both gangs have had some of their members plead guilty to belonging to a gang under the anti-organized-crime laws. Innocent people have been killed over the past decade by members of these street gangs, in shoot-outs in Toronto streets, restaurants, and even at a neighbourhood barbecue.
Haitians
In Montréal, Haitian gangs rule the sale of drugs on the street. Gang members have also been involved in violent killings in the past two decades, including the fatal, 2010 shoot-out at an upscale boutique in Old Montréal owned by the late Ducarme Joseph, a long time, well-known Haitian gang leader. Joseph himself was shot to death in August, 2014.
Multi-Ethnic Gangs
Murderous, multi-ethnic drug gangs – such as the one run for years by the three Bacon brothers in BC – killed their way into a large piece of the drug trafficking business there through an alliance with the Red Scorpions, a long-running Asian gang. The Bacon crew has killed many innocent people along their way to power, including the 'Surrey Six' murder victims, two of whom died simply for being at the wrong place at the wrong time. One gang brother, Jonathan Bacon, was himself gunned down by hit men from a rival gang in 2011..
The so-called United Nations (UN) gang in BC is another example of a multi-ethnic crime gang structure that is becoming more common across the country in the 21st century.
Widespread and Structured
There is more to organized crime in Canada than the Italian criminal association known as the Mafia or "the Mob" – although the Mafia is the best known and most documented group. In North America, just about every major national or ethnic group and every segment of society has been involved in organized crime. Thus we have seen Irish, Jewish, Chinese, Jamaican, Haitian, Vietnamese, Somali and many other ethnically-recruited or centered crime gangs.For a long time many scholars did not believe organized crime was highly structured, or capable of sophisticated operations. All this changed because of the revelations of the U.S. Senate "Valachi" hearings in 1963 (named after the chief witness, Mafia member Joe Valachi); because of the documentary evidence from police wiretaps in the 1970s, which allowed police to listen to Mafia leaders discussing their hierarchy and operations in the U.S. and Canada; and because of the creation of the American Witness Protection Program, in which Mafia defectors and informers could build a new life and protect themselves by working with the police and prosecutors.
Only in the 1970s did the existence of a highly organized criminal network in Canada become known to the public – thanks to various court cases as well as Québec inquiries into the Mafia, the widely publicized report of the Waisberg Commission into construction violence in Ontario, and a series of mob killings in Montréal..
$20-Billion Business
In 1984 a joint federal-provincial committee of justice officials estimated that organized crime in Canada took in about $20 billion in revenues annually. The committee was formed in response to a 1980 report by the British Columbia Attorney General's office, which claimed that organized crime figures had interests in Canada's textile, cheese and disposal industries, as well as vending machine companies, meat companies, home-insulation companies, auto body shops and car dealerships, among others.The joint committee calculated that organized crime revenue came from pornography, prostitution, bookmaking, gaming houses, illegal lotteries and other gambling, as well as loan sharking and extortion. These and other activities such as white collar crime (insurance and construction fraud and illegal bankruptcy), arson, bank robbery, motor vehicle theft, computer crime and counterfeit in credit cards, made up about $10 billion in organized crime revenues. Narcotics accounted for the other $10 billion.
Organized crime provides illegal services desired by some members of the general public, such as gambling, prostitution, and contraband alcohol and tobacco sales. In every large Canadian city, local bookmakers used to be involved in organized crime through an elaborate system established to protect the individual bookie from large losses. Today organized crime provides many underground sports betting and illicit card game operations.
Other organized crime activities are not fuelled as much by public demand. They involve the importation and distribution of harder drugs such as heroin, Internet and credit card fraud, and murder and extortion. Other activities that aid and abet organized crime include the ongoing corruption of public officials and the "laundering" of the proceeds of criminal activities.
One of the simplest ways to "launder" money is to engage in activities in which there is a constant flow of cash, such as slot machines and gambling. If the owner of a gambling casino claims to have taken in $1 million when he has actually taken in only $100 000 -- to which has been added $900 000 of illegally obtained money -- it is almost impossible to demonstrate that the $1 million was not procured in the normal course of business. Neighbourhood coin laundries have also been popular ways of laundering organized crime money in Canada.
Without corruption, organized crime groups would find it difficult to exist. The efforts of organized crime members to corrupt police, judges, politicians, lawyers, and government and civilian officials are probably more harmful to society than any other organized crime activity.
Mafia
Of all organized crime groups operating in Canada, the Mafia is the best known. This is because the Québec crime probe report of 1976 (based primarily on information gathered by the "bug" planted in the milk cooler at the headquarters of Montréal mobster Paulo Violi) revealed the structure of the Montréal Mafia and its dependency on the U.S. Mafia family of Joe Bonanno. Public knowledge of the Mafia is also the result of media attention, such as the much-watched "Connections" series on organized crime broadcast by CBC-TV from June 1977 to March 1979.Scholars do not agree on the origin of the term "Mafia," referring to the original organization in Sicily. However, the word “Mafia” was used as early as 1880 by Sicilian scholar Giuseppe Alongi, in his book La Mafia, Fattori, Manifestazioni, reprinted in 1904 and again in 1977. According to the Québec Organized Crime Commission's report of 1977, the term Mafia describes, "a state of mind, a feeling of pride, a philosophy of life and a style of behaviour.” The mark of a known and respected man, it derives from the Sicilian adjective 'mafiusu,' which was used widely since the 19thcentury to describe magnificent or perfect people."
Joe Bonanno, a Mafia don, describes the term in his memoirs: "Mafia is a process, not a thing. Mafia is a form of clan co-operation to which its individual members pledge lifelong loyalty. Friendship connections, family ties, trust, loyalty, obedience – this was the 'glue' that held us together."
The Mafia was exported and adapted to North America by a small group of Italian immigrants, mostly from Sicily and Calabria. In Sicily, and later in the U.S. and Canada, 'Mafia' came to refer to an organized international body of criminals of Sicilian origin, known as Cosa Nostra, but it is now applied to the dominant force in organized crime – the largely Sicilian and Calabrian organized crime "families." These families are held together by a code emphasizing respect for senior family members; by the structure or hierarchy of the family; and by an initiation rite or ceremony.
Although Italian crime families have been active in Canada since the early 1900s, they now operate in much more clearly structured and defined areas acceptable to other mafia families in the U.S. and Canada. More recently new N'drangheta cells of the Calabrian Mafia have emigrated to Canada after coming under intense pressure by Italian authorities in the early 2000s. Many of these newly arrived Mafiosi went to work with older, established Mafia figures, settling in the greater Montréal, Toronto and Hamilton areas. Though located mainly in the major cities, family members tend to gravitate to where wealth moves; in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some moved westward, following the movement of business to British Columbia and Alberta. Vancouver has had serious Mafia infiltration over the years as well as a more obvious biker and Asian crime presence.
Toronto Mafia
In Toronto until the mid-1980s, at least four major Mafia-style criminal organizations existed and were run by Canadians of Sicilian or Calabrian origin, two of whom were named as members of the Mafia during the Valachi hearings -- namely the organizations run by Paul Volpe and Johnny "Pops" Papalia. Since the murder of Volpe in November 1983, his old organization has mostly disappeared as well as that of Papalia, after he was murdered at the behest of a rival local Calabrian Mafia family in 1997.
Today, several older Calabrian organized crime groups operate in the Greater Toronto/Hamilton areas. There are also newly arrived cells of the N'drangheta operating, many having emigrated from Siderno, Calabria. There is no one godfather in Toronto, but there is a ruling commission of the N'drangheta, of family leaders in the Toronto area which tries to keep order, resolve disputes, and co-ordinate some activities with the ruling commission in Italy.
Montréal Mafia
Since the mid-1980s, Montréal has had one dominant crime family, led by the Sicilian-born Nick Rizzuto and then by his son Vito. Another family was run by Frank Cotroni until his death in 2004. The Québec crime probe exposed the membership and activities of this highly structured group in a number of its reports in the 1970s. Established first in the 1940s by Frank's older and more powerful brother Vic Cotroni, the family evolved in the 1950s into an important branch of the powerful New York City Mafia family of Joe Bonanno. It has extensive ties with Mafia families in Italy and throughout the U.S., as well as with the Toronto, Hamilton and Vancouver organizations.
Serious internal problems between Sicilians and Calabrians in the Montréal organization led to the violent deaths of Paulo Violi (chief lieutenant of Vic Cotroni) and his brothers in the late 1970s. The Cotroni family had primarily been involved in illegal gambling, loan sharking, drug importation, extortion, and the murder and corruption of public officials. After Vic Cotroni's death in 1984, the Sicilians, led by Nick and later Vito Rizzuto took over. The last decade of Vito Rizzuto's rule was marked by internal warfare, especially while Vito was in jail in the U.S. for his role in various mob hits in New York. He died suddenly in 2013 at the age of 67, from natural causes in a Montreal hospital.
There is no clear leader of the family now, as many senior Rizzuto leaders have been murdered, died or are in jail. Reynald Desjardins, Vito's number one lieutenant and right hand man in the decade preceding Vito's death, is now awaiting trial for orchestrating the murder of ex-Bonanno family acting boss Salvatore "the Iron-worker" Montagna, after he tried unsuccessfully to take over the family in 2011.
As of 2014, there was still an ongoing battle for Mafia supremacy in Montréal involving some Calabrian Mafiosi cells from Ontario and dissident Rizzuto family members in Québec.
At the same time, the hearings of the Charbonneau Commission into the practices of the Québec construction industry brought additional heat to bear on the old Rizzuto family leadership. The Commission's televised hearings included the broadcast of surveillance videos and wiretaps of Rizzuto family gatherings, including old man Nick consorting with and taking money from construction bosses and union leaders.
Recent arrivals from Calabria of senior members of the N'drangheta are also vying for a position in the Montréal Mafia world. A state of flux is the best way to describe the Montreal "Mob" as of 2014. In spite of this, most Mafia operations continue unabated. A new figure will likely emerge as the new godfather to run the Montréal Mafia, and he will likely come from the ranks of family members who have power and respect both in the Montréal underworld as well as in Italian and American mafia circles.
Other Groups
Biker GangsSince the 1970s, motorcycle gangs such as the Hells Angels, the Rock Machine, the Outlaws, Satan's Choice, and many others have been significantly involved in organized crime in just about every province from the Maritimes to BC. Their initiation rites have made it difficult for police to penetrate the groups (though in recent decades huge strides have been made in this area), which have become major suppliers of illegal drugs. Motorcycle gangs are also involved in prostitution and contract killing. It is not unusual to find them working with other organized crime groups. The Hells Angels are the most influential and powerful outlaw motorcycle gang in Canada.
With biker gangs comes violence and murder. A major biker war in Québec from the mid-1990s to the early 21st Century led to the killing of hundreds of people, including many innocent bystanders who were in the wrong place at the wrong time — including an 11 year old Montréal boy killed by a biker-war bomb.
New Crime Laws
The resulting outcry from the public and the media in Québec eventually forced the federal Parliament to enact stronger anti-organized crime laws, going after the gangs' wealth, and convicting individuals of membership in an organized crime entity.
By 2006, new organized crime laws were also used for the prosecution of scores of members of the Rizzuto Mafia family, from "soldiers" to senior lieutenants, and even to old Nick Rizzuto, onetime godfather who was then still criminally active in his 80s . Shortly after serving some of his time, Rizzuto was released from prison early because of old age.. The 86-year-old was then killed by a sniper outside his lavish Montréal-area home.
The Hells Angels organization has been hit hard by prosecutions under the new anti-organized crime laws. The once-powerful Hells Angel boss Maurice 'Mom' Boucher is now in jail for life, for his role in a number of murders. Still, the Hells Angels continue to operate, especially in Québec, with the help of puppet gangs with different names but working for the Hells Angels.
Asian Crime Groups
Various Chinese and Vietnamese organized crime groups have become more prominent over the past 35 years in Vancouver and Toronto, following a wave of immigration from Hong Kong. In BC, Chinese crime gangs have been operating for more than 100 years. In the 1920s, Shu Moy, the famed 'King of the Gamblers,' was a powerful organized crime figure in BC, according to the 1928 special inquiry set up by Vancouver City Council to look into illicit gambling rackets, opium dens, houses of prostitution and corruption at the highest levels of municipal government in Vancouver.
Today Chinese youth gangs operate in Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary and other cities and towns, and are involved in protection and extortion rackets. They also run massage parlours as fronts for prostitution, hydroponic grow operations for much in-demand marijuana, as well as the production and export of conventional speed drugs. More sophisticated groups are organized by senior triad leaders from Hong Kong to import heroin from southeast Asia through Vancouver and western Canada. The triads are the Chinese version of the Mafia, especially in their hierarchy and global networks and reach.
The organized crime structure changes quickly in Canada, and usually exists for some years before it is detected in cities or other locations; therefore, there are undoubtedly other groups that have not yet been identified. Columbian cartels are active in Toronto and Montréal. Russian and East European organized crime groups are also quite active in major Canadian cities.
First Nations
First Nations organized crime gangs have long existed in Canada. One prominent native organized mob group is the "Manitoba Warriors," which operates in the Winnipeg area. In January 2014, Winnipeg police arrested 57 men and women aged 17 to 51, alleging that they were members or associates of what police called the "the city's most powerful street gang."
Jamaicans
There are strong organized crime gangs in the Greater Toronto Area primarily composed of Jamaicans, including among others the 'Malvern Crew' and 'The Galloway Boys.' Both gangs have had some of their members plead guilty to belonging to a gang under the anti-organized-crime laws. Innocent people have been killed over the past decade by members of these street gangs, in shoot-outs in Toronto streets, restaurants, and even at a neighbourhood barbecue.
Haitians
In Montréal, Haitian gangs rule the sale of drugs on the street. Gang members have also been involved in violent killings in the past two decades, including the fatal, 2010 shoot-out at an upscale boutique in Old Montréal owned by the late Ducarme Joseph, a long time, well-known Haitian gang leader. Joseph himself was shot to death in August, 2014.
Multi-Ethnic Gangs
Murderous, multi-ethnic drug gangs – such as the one run for years by the three Bacon brothers in BC – killed their way into a large piece of the drug trafficking business there through an alliance with the Red Scorpions, a long-running Asian gang. The Bacon crew has killed many innocent people along their way to power, including the 'Surrey Six' murder victims, two of whom died simply for being at the wrong place at the wrong time. One gang brother, Jonathan Bacon, was himself gunned down by hit men from a rival gang in 2011..
The so-called United Nations (UN) gang in BC is another example of a multi-ethnic crime gang structure that is becoming more common across the country in the 21st century.
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/organized-crime/
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2008
Aboriginal youths
Crime is a big issue in this election campaign. The Conservatives are taking credit for "getting tough on crime."
Crime is a big issue in this election campaign. The Conservatives are taking credit for "getting tough on crime."
Two years ago the justice minister began calling for stiffer sentencing for young offenders.
Even the NDP is promising tougher sentencing for gang crime.
But what is "getting tough on crime" legislation likely to look like in practice? Based on what I've learned in the past three years of research with youths in an Alberta young offender centre, "getting tough on crime" will likely mean even more aboriginal people in jail.
Since I began doing research with "high risk" youth in Alberta about 10 years ago, most high-risk youths I've encountered have been aboriginal .
The high incarceration rate (approximately 60 per cent) for aboriginal youth is true across Canada, and is true for the adult aboriginal population, too.
The disproportionate incarceration of aboriginals can only be explained by discrimination within our justice system.
Here is what I've learned to suggest this is so. This information is focused primarily on youth crime, but, no doubt, similar dynamics are at play for the adult population.
- According to Statistics Canada (1998), aboriginal youths were eight times more likely to be incarcerated than non-aboriginal youths;
- The Canadian Criminal Justice Association's 2000 report on Aboriginal Peoples and the Criminal Justice System, (which also cites Alberta's 1991 Cawsey Report), found:
- Aboriginal youth were less likely to be referred for alternative measures programs than sentenced to incarceration;
- Aboriginal youth, on average, spent longer periods in custody than non-aboriginal youth for the same offences;
- Aboriginal people are more likely to be accused of multiple offences, often including offences against the system, such as failure to appear or breach of probation.
The report recommended that "a comprehensive strategy must be advanced and implemented in order to deal with the over-representation of aboriginal inmates in federal and provincial corrections institutions."
- In 2003 the Youth Criminal Justice Act replaced the Young Offender Act, with the objective of reducing over-reliance on incarceration for youth, calling for greater use of alternative measures for minor offences or first offences;
- In 2006, a British Columbia report stated that while youth incarceration rates were down in the province overall, the proportion of aboriginal youth among the incarcerated youth population in B.C. had increased significantly;
- The Supreme Court of Canada has thus far, by only a narrow margin, ruled against the change of legislation proposed by the Conservative government to send youth charged with major offences to adult court automatically. Under the current legislation, the onus is on the Crown to present a case for bumping major youth offences up to adult court.
So, changes in legislation that "get tough on crime," if current practices prevail, will likely mean even higher incarceration rates for aboriginals generally.
I believe that the current upsurge of aboriginal gang activity in Western Canada is a symptom of the injustices faced by aboriginal people in our country, including the disproportionate incarceration rate.
The majority of the aboriginal gangs were, after all, started in prisons. And it is often their involvement in gang activities that land aboriginal youth in jail. I've heard stories from youth of being recruited into gang activity at age 12 by a family member. What options does a youth like this have for escaping a gang lifestyle?
This past spring, in his official apology for residential schools, Prime Minister Stephen Harper acknowledged: "The legacy of Indian residential schools has contributed to social problems that continue to exist in many communities today."
Based on stories I have heard, the kinds of criminal activities that land aboriginal youth in jail are precisely the symptoms of those very social problems that Harper describes. If this apology for past injustices is sincere, then shouldn't it reflect in our actions in the present? Let's not get caught making the same mistakes, finding ourselves having to apologize for ongoing injustices against Canada's aboriginal population through the discriminatory practices of our criminal justice system.
Diane Conrad,
University of Alberta,
Edmonton
http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/letters/story.html?id=d9f426d6-2b0a-44bc-8806-b9e81a07b2c9
Two years ago the justice minister began calling for stiffer sentencing for young offenders.
Even the NDP is promising tougher sentencing for gang crime.
But what is "getting tough on crime" legislation likely to look like in practice? Based on what I've learned in the past three years of research with youths in an Alberta young offender centre, "getting tough on crime" will likely mean even more aboriginal people in jail.
Since I began doing research with "high risk" youth in Alberta about 10 years ago, most high-risk youths I've encountered have been aboriginal .
The high incarceration rate (approximately 60 per cent) for aboriginal youth is true across Canada, and is true for the adult aboriginal population, too.
The disproportionate incarceration of aboriginals can only be explained by discrimination within our justice system.
Here is what I've learned to suggest this is so. This information is focused primarily on youth crime, but, no doubt, similar dynamics are at play for the adult population.
- According to Statistics Canada (1998), aboriginal youths were eight times more likely to be incarcerated than non-aboriginal youths;
- The Canadian Criminal Justice Association's 2000 report on Aboriginal Peoples and the Criminal Justice System, (which also cites Alberta's 1991 Cawsey Report), found:
- Aboriginal youth were less likely to be referred for alternative measures programs than sentenced to incarceration;
- Aboriginal youth, on average, spent longer periods in custody than non-aboriginal youth for the same offences;
- Aboriginal people are more likely to be accused of multiple offences, often including offences against the system, such as failure to appear or breach of probation.
The report recommended that "a comprehensive strategy must be advanced and implemented in order to deal with the over-representation of aboriginal inmates in federal and provincial corrections institutions."
- In 2003 the Youth Criminal Justice Act replaced the Young Offender Act, with the objective of reducing over-reliance on incarceration for youth, calling for greater use of alternative measures for minor offences or first offences;
- In 2006, a British Columbia report stated that while youth incarceration rates were down in the province overall, the proportion of aboriginal youth among the incarcerated youth population in B.C. had increased significantly;
- The Supreme Court of Canada has thus far, by only a narrow margin, ruled against the change of legislation proposed by the Conservative government to send youth charged with major offences to adult court automatically. Under the current legislation, the onus is on the Crown to present a case for bumping major youth offences up to adult court.
So, changes in legislation that "get tough on crime," if current practices prevail, will likely mean even higher incarceration rates for aboriginals generally.
I believe that the current upsurge of aboriginal gang activity in Western Canada is a symptom of the injustices faced by aboriginal people in our country, including the disproportionate incarceration rate.
The majority of the aboriginal gangs were, after all, started in prisons. And it is often their involvement in gang activities that land aboriginal youth in jail. I've heard stories from youth of being recruited into gang activity at age 12 by a family member. What options does a youth like this have for escaping a gang lifestyle?
This past spring, in his official apology for residential schools, Prime Minister Stephen Harper acknowledged: "The legacy of Indian residential schools has contributed to social problems that continue to exist in many communities today."
Based on stories I have heard, the kinds of criminal activities that land aboriginal youth in jail are precisely the symptoms of those very social problems that Harper describes. If this apology for past injustices is sincere, then shouldn't it reflect in our actions in the present? Let's not get caught making the same mistakes, finding ourselves having to apologize for ongoing injustices against Canada's aboriginal population through the discriminatory practices of our criminal justice system.
Diane Conrad,
University of Alberta,
Edmonton
http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/letters/story.html?id=d9f426d6-2b0a-44bc-8806-b9e81a07b2c9
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Comprehensive Approaches to
Address Street Gangs in Canada
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/sp-ps/PS4-113-2011-eng.pdf
Information archivée dans le Web / Information Archived on the Web
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Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards. As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page.Continue to PDF
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Organized Crime
QUICK FACTS
- The RCMP’s Organized Crime Branch consists of the Undercover Operations Unit, the Source Witness Protection Unit and the Organized Crime Program Development Unit.
- Between 2001 and 2003, the RCMP and partner agencies made more arrests of outlaw motorcycle gang members than in any comparable period of time, and effectively shut down entire chapters of the Bandidos and Hells Angels. More that 340 individuals were arrested and charged with crimes ranging from participating in a criminal organization to murder.
- In 2002, Operation Green Sweep resulted in seizures of 190,000 marihuana plants and the arrests of more than 500 people associated with marihuana ‘grow houses’.
- In May 2003, the RCMP’s Drug Section seized about 1,360 kg of cocaine from a boat off the coast of Costa Rica.
Overview
Organized criminal activity in Canada is a multi-faceted problem that requires a broad-based, integrated approach by the country’s law enforcement agencies.The RCMP works closely with its partners to combat organized crime in all of its forms.
Definition
Organized Crime is one of five strategic priorities established by the RCMP. It is defined by Canada’s Criminal Code as crime committed by any group of at least three people that has as one of its main purposes or activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences where the primary motive is profit.That definition encompasses a broad spectrum of criminal groups including outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs)*, Asian-, Italian- and East European-based organizations, and networks of people trafficking in child pornography, counterfeit credit cards or illicit telemarketing or electronic mail schemes.
Countering Organized Crime
Organized crime is an international problem that ignores national boundaries.The fact that some criminal organizations have seemingly limitless resources and involve themselves in almost any illegal activity that turns a profit makes fighting them particularly challenging.
To counter organized crime, the RCMP has tended to move from attempts to shut down particular commodity areas, such as the drug trade, counterfeit goods or prostitution, to targeting criminal groups themselves. Tactical enforcement remains important, but the emphasis is on prioritization in order to more effectively use resources.
OMGs, Asian-based gangs and traditional organized crime groups top the list of organized crime priorities.
In the face of these criminal organizations, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional responses are essential to sharing intelligence and can lead to better planning and coordination. Through programs and teams such as IPOC (Integrated Proceeds of Crime), IBETs (Integrated Border Enforcement Teams) and IMETs (Integrated Market Enforcement Teams), the RCMP is banding together with domestic and international partners to stop organized crime.
Front line officers play an important role in the fight against organized crime by communicating intelligence to their plainclothes counterparts. For instance, the Pipeline/Convoy/Jetway Program, which trains general duty officers to recognize suspicious cargo, has proven to be especially useful in stopping the movement of illegal goods by criminal organizations. One dedicated interdiction team, the Saskatchewan High Volume Traffic Checkstop, Team seized more than 830 kg of marihuana in February 2003.
The RCMP also works closely with Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, which unites Canadian law enforcement agencies in the fight against organized crime by providing the necessary infrastructure for sharing intelligence and promoting inter-agency cooperation.
New Powers of Enforcement
The creation of legislation such as the Organized Crime and Law Enforcement Act, provides Canadian law enforcement with new powers to further combat organized crime. These powers enable the RCMP to continue its efforts to counter organized criminal activities.In addition to providing more latitude for undercover officers, the Act -- passed by Parliament in early 2002 -- simplifies the definition of organized crime, makes it an offence to impede the administration of justice through intimidation and targets those who recruit others to join a criminal organization.
Support for and from the public
Youth, women, seniors, consumers, businesses ... the list goes on. Organized crime puts almost all segments of Canadian society at risk. RCMP Victim Services, established in 1988 as part of the Crime Prevention and Victim Services Branch helps those who fall prey to organized crime, people such as women forced into prostitution and senior citizens who have fallen prey to telemarketing fraud rings.In its fight against organized crime, the RCMP also relies on the public’s help. The RCMP’s Organized Crime Branch is constantly working to increase the number of high-level informants it has inside criminal organizations. One way those who are aware of organized crime can help to stop it is by picking up the phone and calling their local RCMP detachment.
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/fs-fd/org-eng.htm
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Firearms and violent crime in Canada, 2012
By Adam Cotter- Most violent crime in Canada does not involve firearms
- Firearms most frequently present in attempted murders
- Firearm-related homicides increase in 2012
- Canada’s firearm-related homicide rate higher than several peer countries
- Most firearm-related homicides involve handguns
- Firearm homicides more likely to be gang-related
- Firearm-related robbery continues to decline
- Saskatchewan and Manitoba report highest rates of firearm-related violent crime
- Halifax CMA has highest rate of firearm-related violence
- Handguns more often present in CMAs; rifles and shotguns in non-CMAs
- Most victims of firearm-related violent crime are male
- Firearm-related violent crime more likely to be committed by a stranger
- Persons accused of firearm-related violent crime typically young, male
- Youth account for one in five persons accused of firearm-related violent crime
- Firearm-related violent crime less likely to be solved
- Over half of firearm-related violent offences result in finding of guilt
- Summary
- Survey descriptions
- Detailed data tables
- References
- Notes
The analysis of firearm-related violent crime in this Juristat relies on two separate data sources. The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey provides data on firearms and police-reported violent crime while data on firearm-related homicides comes from the Homicide Survey. Quebec is excluded from the analysis of UCR data due to data quality issues; specifically, a large proportion of incidents where the most serious weapon present was reported as unknown. The analysis of firearm related homicides, however, includes all provinces and territories in Canada. As there are differences in coverage between the two data sources, they are used as separate yet complementary sources of data in order to analyze firearm-related violent crime in Canada.
Information on the types of firearm most frequently present and most frequently used in the commission of an offence, the relationship between the accused and victim, the level of injury, and the involvement of youth is presented. These findings are compared to violent crime committed without a firearm to further understand the nature of firearm-related violent crime in Canada. In addition to data from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey and the Homicide Survey, the Integrated Criminal Court Survey is used in this Juristat to examine court case processing of violent offences involving a firearm.
Text box 1
Defining different types of firearm
For the purposes of the UCR and Homicide Surveys, a firearm is any barrelled weapon from which any shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged and that is capable of causing serious bodily injury or death to a person. Different types of firearm are distinguished as such by the two surveys (presented in descending order of seriousness according to the hierarchy for determining most serious weapon):
Fully automatic firearm: Any firearm that allows continuous and rapid firing of bullets with one pull of the trigger.
Sawed-off rifle/shotgun: Any rifle or shotgun with a barrel length which has been altered to less than 457 millimetres, or with an overall weapon length of less than 660 millimetres.
Handgun: Any firearm designed to be held and fired by the action of one hand.
Rifle/shotgun: Any long-barrelled firearm with a barrel length greater than or equal to 457 millimetres, or with an overall length of 660 millimetres or more.
Firearm-like weapon: Any weapon capable of propelling any object through a barrel by means of gunpowder, compressed carbon dioxide, pumped air, or any other means. Includes, for example, flare guns or pellet guns. For UCR data, this category also includes all unknown types of firearms.
End of text box.
Most violent crime in Canada does not involve firearms
Firearms are present in a relatively small proportion of all police-reported violent crime in reporting provinces and territories. Excluding Quebec, police reported approximately 5,600 victims of violent crime where a firearm was present in 2012, a rate of 21 victims for every 100,000 population (Table 1A). In comparison, the rate of victims of non-firearm-related violent crime was about 49 times higher, at 1,033 victims per 100,000 population.Firearm-related violent crime accounted for 2% of all victims of violent crime in 2012, a proportion that has remained stable over the past four years. For the large majority (81%) of victims of violent crime, there was no weapon present during the commission of the offence.1 A weapon other than a firearm, such as a knife or blunt instrument, was present in 17% of violent offences.
Although violent crime is generally decreasing, the rate of firearm-related violent crime is decreasing at a faster pace than violent crime that does not involve firearms. There were about 1,800 fewer victims of firearm-related violent crime in 2012 than there were in 2009, resulting in a 27% decrease in the rate of firearm-related violent crime (Chart 1).2 Since 2009, the rate of violent offences involving other weapons has decreased 9%, while the rate of offences involving the use of physical force, threat, or no weapon has decreased 14%.
Text box 2
Firearm-related violent crime and physical injury
The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey includes two distinct ways of measuring firearm-related violent crime in Canada: most serious weapon present, which is used throughout this Juristat, and weapon causing injury, which is used in this text box. Most serious weapon present collects information on the most serious weapon present during the commission of the crime, regardless of whether or not the weapon was used. This variable captures incidents where a firearm was used against a victim causing injury, used against a victim without causing injury (i.e., as a threat), or was present during the offence and was not used in any manner. It is not possible to distinguish which of these scenarios occurred.
Weapon causing injury indicates the type of weapon used during the commission of a violent offence if the victim suffered a physical injury as a result of a weapon. While this captures information on the weapon used against victims, it does not include information on weapons used if no injury was suffered (e.g., if a victim was threatened with a weapon but the use did not cause physical injury). If multiple weapons were used to inflict injury, the weapon that was used to cause the most physical injury is recorded. Weapon causing injury does not capture incidents where the firearm was used or fired but missed the victim.
A large majority of injuries that occur as the result of a violent crime are not caused by firearms. In 2012, police reported approximately 134,000 victims of violent crime who suffered at least minor physical injury, accounting for under half (47%) of all victims of violent crime (Table 1B). Of these victims, about 107,600 were injured by the use of physical force, and a further 24,776 were injured by the use of a non-firearm weapon. The remaining 1% of these victims (1,325) were injured due to the use of a firearm.
While a small minority of victims of violent crime are injured due to the use of a firearm, these injuries are typically more serious than those caused by the use of other weapons or physical force. The use of a firearm resulted in major physical injury or death of the victim in 33% of incidents where an injury was suffered, a higher proportion than violent offences involving other weapons (14%) or physical force (4%) (Text box chart 1).
While there were approximately 5,600 police-reported violent offences where a firearm was present in 2012, there were about 1,300 police-reported incidents where a firearm was used and an injury was suffered as a result (Table 1B). This suggests that, when firearms are present in the commission of a violent offence, they may not be fired or otherwise used to directly cause physical harm in the majority of cases. However, when they are used, they are more likely to cause serious or fatal injury than other types of weapons or physical force.
End of text box.
Firearms most frequently present in attempted murders
Aside from the violent Criminal Code offences that by definition involve firearms3, firearms are present in some violent offences more frequently than others. In 2012, a firearm was present in four in ten (42%) attempted murders (Table 1A, Chart 2). While attempted murders involved the presence of firearms more often than other types of violent crime (42%), firearms were not present in the majority of incidents. In 49% of all attempted murders, a weapon other than a firearm was present. Furthermore, 2,368 robberies involved a firearm, accounting for 12% of all robberies in 2012.Some types of firearms are present more frequently than others in violent crimes. Of all violent crimes where a firearm was present in 2012, the majority (57%) involved handguns (Table 2). In addition, a rifle or shotgun was present in 16% of firearm-related violent offences, and 4% involved another type of firearm.4 In the remaining 23%, a firearm-like weapon, such as a pellet gun or flare gun, or an unknown type of firearm, was present.
Firearm-related homicides increase in 2012
Homicides account for very few violent crimes in Canada (Perreault 2013), yet are often used as a barometer for the level of violence within a society (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011). There were 172 homicides committed with a firearm in 2012, 14 more than the previous year (Table 3). Consistent with previous years, shootings, along with stabbings, were the most common methods used to commit homicide in 2012, accounting for 33% and 31% of all homicides, respectively. Beating (21%) was the next most frequent cause of death.After reaching its lowest rate since 1971 in 2011, the rate of firearm-related homicide increased 8% to 0.49 per 100,000 population in 2012. Similar to the overall homicide rate (Boyce and Cotter 2013), the rate of firearm-related homicide peaked in 1975 (1.26 per 100,000 population), and then began to decrease. Following an increase in the early 1990s, the firearm-related homicide rate has generally been declining (Chart 3).
Rates of both firearm-related and non-firearm-related homicide have decreased since peaking in the 1970s. Over this period, however, the rate of firearm-related homicide has declined at a faster rate than non-firearm-related homicide. Since 1972, the firearm-related homicide rate has decreased 45%, while the non-firearm-related homicide rate has decreased 22%.
Text box 3
Firearm restrictions in Canada and other countries
Canadian legislation classifies firearms into three categories: prohibited, restricted, and non-restricted. Prohibited firearms include assault weapons, fully automatic firearms, and sawed-off rifles or shotguns. Handguns are generally classified as restricted weapons, while rifles and shotguns are usually non-restricted. Canadian law requires that an individual has a valid license under the Firearms Act in order to own or possess a firearm or to purchase ammunition. There is a screening process that must be completed prior to obtaining a firearm license, which includes a safety course, criminal history and background check, personal references, and a mandatory waiting period (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2013). Until April 5, 2012, all three categories of firearms were required by law to be registered; in 2012, the requirement to register non-restricted firearms was revoked (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2013). Due to legal action, the registration of non-restricted firearms is ongoing in Quebec.
As of the end of 2011, prior to the repeal of the requirement to register non-restricted firearms, there were approximately 7 million non-restricted firearms registered in Canada. In 2012, there were about 800,000 registered firearms in Canada among approximately 2 million licensed owners. In addition, about 2,400 individuals had their firearms license revoked and about 500 individuals were denied a firearm license, most frequently as the result of a court-ordered prohibition or as a condition of probation. Public service agencies reporting to the Canadian Firearms Program indicated that roughly 32,000 firearms were seized in 2012 (Royal Canadian Mounted Police 2013).
Other countries
In the United States, which has a comparatively high rate of firearm homicide (see Chart 4), firearm regulations are state-specific and therefore vary across the country. Relatively few states place restrictions on the possession of firearms. A license to own a rifle or shotgun is required in four states, while a license is needed to possess a handgun in five states. While eight states require handguns to be registered, only the District of Columbia and Hawaii mandate the registration of long guns. In 2007, there were 89 firearms for every 100 citizens in the United States, the highest rate of gun ownership of any country (Berman et al. 2007).
Japan, which in contrast typically has a very low rate of firearm-related homicide (see Chart 4), has had strict gun control legislation in place since the end of World War II. The possession of firearms by private citizens was banned in 1946, although exceptions are allowed for firearms used for hunting following a laborious application and registration process. Citizens can be automatically disqualified from receiving an exception for a number of reasons, including being under 18, having declared bankruptcy, having certain specified health problems, having violated the law, or being reasonably expected to cause harm to his or her self, others, or property (Umeda 2013).
End of text box.
Canada’s firearm-related homicide rate higher than several peer countries
When looking at firearm-related homicide rates in comparable countries, Canada’s rate is about seven times lower than that of the United States (3.5 per 100,000 population), although it is higher than several other peer5 countries (Chart 4). While Canada’s firearm-related homicide rate is similar to those in Ireland and Switzerland, it is significantly higher than the rates in Japan (0.01 per 100,000 population) and the United Kingdom (0.06 per 100,000 population).
Text box 4
Firearm-related violent crime in the United States
Violent crime in the United States tends to involve firearms more frequently than violent crime in Canada. There were 8,813 homicides involving firearms in the United States in 2012, accounting for 69% of all homicides, while in Canada, firearms accounted for 33% of homicides.6 Similar to Canada, the majority (72%) of firearm-related homicides in the United States were committed using a handgun. In addition, when looking at specific offences, the rate of firearm-related crime is higher in the United States than in Canada. In the United States, a firearm was present in 22% of all major assaults, compared to 4% in Canada (Text box 4 table).7 The rate of firearm-related major assault in the United States was about ten times higher than in Canada in 2012 (53 per 100,000 compared to 5 per 100,000). Similarly, robbery in the United States was more likely to involve a firearm than robbery in Canada (41% of all robberies versus 12%).
Offence | Firearm-related violent crime | ||
---|---|---|---|
number | percent of total offencesNote 1 | rateNote 2 | |
Canada | |||
Homicide | 172 | 33 | 0.5 |
Major assaultNote 3, Note 4 | 1,459 | 4 | 5.5 |
RobberyNote 4 | 2,368 | 12 | 8.9 |
United States | |||
HomicideNote 5 | 8,813 | 69 | 3.5 |
Major assaultNote 3 | 143,119 | 22 | 52.8 |
Robbery | 122,174 | 41 | 45.1 |
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, 2012; Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey and Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) Survey. |
End of text box.
Most firearm-related homicides involve handguns
Handguns are the most frequently used firearm in the commission of homicide. Handguns were used in the majority (62%) of firearm-related homicides in 2012, followed by rifles or shotguns (23%). Prior to 1991, firearm-related homicides were most frequently committed with a rifle or shotgun.In the early 1990s, the rate of homicides committed with a handgun surpassed that of homicides committed with a rifle or shotgun for the first time. Since 1995, handguns have accounted for the majority of firearm-related homicides (Chart 5).
The decrease in the rate of homicides committed with a rifle or shotgun also coincides with the decrease in the overall firearm-related homicide rate. Both firearm-related homicide and homicide committed with a rifle or shotgun peaked in 1975; since that year, the rate of homicides committed using a rifle or shotgun has decreased 86%. The rates of homicide committed with handguns or other firearms have also decreased since 1975, but at a much slower pace (-19% and -18%, respectively).
Firearm homicides more likely to be gang-related
Firearm-related homicides are more likely to be related to organized crime or street gang activity than homicides committed without the use of a firearm.8 Over the past two decades, the rate of gang-related homicide committed with a firearm has been consistently higher than the rate of gang-related homicide committed with another weapon (Chart 6).In 2012, about half (46%) of all homicides committed with a firearm were gang-related, compared to fewer than one in ten homicides committed with another type of weapon or with physical force (8% and 5%, respectively). Three-quarters (75%) of gang-related homicides involving firearms were committed with the use of a handgun, with fully automatic firearms (10%) the next most frequently used type of firearm in gang-related homicides.
Firearm-related robbery continues to decline
Similar to the long-term trend in the firearm-related homicide rate, the rate of firearm-related robbery has also been decreasing.9 In 2012, there were 10 firearm-related robberies per 100,000 population, a decrease of 55% from 1998 (Chart 7).10 This decrease in firearm-related robbery has driven the overall decrease in the rate of robbery, which was 27% lower in 2012 than in 1998. Robbery which involved the use of some other type of weapon was at a rate 36% lower in 2012 than in 1998, whereas the rate of robbery that did not involve a weapon peaked in 2006, but was 8% lower in 2012 than it was in 1998.Firearm-related robbery has also declined as a proportion of all robberies. In 2012, about one in ten (13%) robberies were firearm-related, compared to one in three (33%) in 1982.
Saskatchewan and Manitoba report highest rates of firearm-related violent crime
Firearm-related violent crime varies across the provinces and territories. Among the reporting provinces, consistent with trends in crime in general (Perreault 2013), rates of firearm-related violent crime were highest in Saskatchewan (34 per 100,000 population) and Manitoba (32 per 100,000) (Table 4, Chart 8). Saskatchewan and Manitoba also reported the highest rates of non-firearm-related violent crime among reporting provinces in 2012 (1,879 and 1,667 per 100,000 population, respectively). In contrast, rates of firearm-related violent crime were lowest in Prince Edward Island (11 per 100,000) and Newfoundland and Labrador (15 per 100,000).Rates of violent crime are generally higher in the territories than in the provinces (Perreault 2013). Nunavut (154 per 100,000 population) and the Northwest Territories (39 per 100,000) had firearm-related violent crime rates that were higher than any reporting province. Yukon (17 per 100,000), on the other hand, had a firearm-related violent crime rate that was lower than all but three reporting provinces: Ontario, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince Edward Island. All three territories reported non-firearm-related violent crime rates higher than any province.
Handguns are the most frequently present type of firearm in violent crime, and the rate and proportion of their presence differs across the provinces. Looking at the use of handguns specifically, the highest rate among reporting provinces was found in Nova Scotia (16 per 100,000 population), followed by British Columbia (15 per 100,000) (data not shown). Saskatchewan (9 per 100,000) and Manitoba (11 per 100,000), in contrast, recorded rates of handgun-related violent crime that were below the national average (12 per 100,000). While Ontario’s rate of handgun-related violent crime was virtually equal to the rate of all reporting provinces and territories, about two-thirds (68%) of firearm-related violent crime involved handguns, the highest such proportion among the provinces and territories (Table 5).
While Saskatchewan and Manitoba ranked highest among provinces in terms of firearm-related violent crime, they did not have the highest provincial rates of firearm-related homicides. In 2012, Nova Scotia (0.84 per 100,000 population) and Alberta (0.75 per 100,000) recorded the highest rates of firearm-related homicide among the provinces. While both Nova Scotia and Alberta had one more firearm-related homicide than the previous year, much of the overall increase in firearm-related homicides was driven by an increase in Ontario (+11). For the first time since 2006, there were no firearm-related homicides in any of the territories. In addition, there were no firearm-related homicides in Prince Edward Island for the 23rd consecutive year.
Halifax CMA has highest rate of firearm-related violence
Generally, the rates of firearm-related violent crime are virtually equal in census metropolitan areas11 (CMAs) and non-CMAs. In 2012, both CMAs and non-CMAs recorded 21 victims of firearm-related violent crime for every 100,000 populationHalifax, with 41 victims of firearm-related violent crime per 100,000 population, recorded the highest rates among reporting CMAs in 2012, followed by Moncton (39 per 100,000 population) (Table 6, Chart 9). Saskatoon (38 per 100,000) and Hamilton (33 per 100,000) were the next highest, while the lowest rates were found in the CMAs of Greater Sudbury (6 per 100,000) and St. John’s (4 per 100,000).
Halifax also recorded the highest rate of firearm-related homicide (1.93 victims per 100,000 population) among the CMAs for the second straight year (Table 7). Just under half (45%) of all firearm-related homicides in 2012 occurred in one of Canada’s three largest CMAs: Toronto (38 homicides), Montréal (20), or Vancouver (20). While these three CMAs had the greatest number of firearm-related homicides among CMAs, due to their large populations, their firearm-related homicide rates did not rank among the three highest. Sixteen CMAs reported zero firearm-related homicides in 2012.
Handguns more often present in CMAs; rifles and shotguns in non-CMAs
The type of firearm that is most frequently present in firearm-related violent crime differs between CMAs, where handguns are most commonly present, and non-CMA areas, where rifles and shotguns account for a greater proportion. Handguns were present in seven of ten (70%) firearm-related violent offences in CMAs, compared to about one in four (26%) firearm-related violent crimes in non-CMA areas (Table 8). In non-CMA areas, rifles or shotguns were more frequently present than handguns (33% and 26% respectively). In general, larger CMAs report a larger proportion of handguns present in firearm-related violent crime compared to smaller CMAs. For example, in Toronto, Canada’s largest CMA, a handgun was present for more than eight in ten (82%) victims of firearm-related violent crime, the highest proportion among Canada’s CMAs. Greater Sudbury (10%) and Thunder Bay (13%) recorded the lowest proportion of handguns present in firearm-related violent crime.The rate of violent crime where handguns were present was over twice as high in CMAs than in non-CMAs (14 per 100,000 compared to 6 per 100,000), while the rate of violent crime involving rifles or shotguns was about 4 times higher in non-CMA areas compared to CMAs (7.4 and 1.8, respectively). Among the reporting CMAs, Moncton (31 victims per 100,000 population) and Halifax (30 per 100,000) recorded the highest rates of handgun-related violent crime in 2012, while Greater Sudbury (1) and Thunder Bay (1) reported the lowest rates.
Most victims of firearm-related violent crime are male
While, on the whole, about half of all victims of violent crime are male, victims of firearm-related violent crime are more likely to be male. In 2012, two-thirds (67%) of all victims of firearm-related violent crime were male, compared to just under half (48%) of victims of violent crime committed where another weapon or physical force was present.Similarly, while homicide victims are typically male, a higher proportion of victims of firearm-related homicide are male. In 2012, 84% of victims of firearm-related homicide were male, compared to 67% of victims of non-firearm-related homicide – proportions which have been relatively stable over the past decade.
Firearm-related violent crime more likely to be committed by a stranger
While it is generally the case that victims of violent crime know the accused person, this did not hold true for victims of firearm-related violent crime in 2012. The majority (60%) of victims of firearm-related violent crime were victimized by a stranger, compared to about four in ten (36%) victims of violent crime involving another weapon, and one-quarter (25%) of victims of violent crime where no weapon was present (Chart 10). Violent crime committed by intimate partners12, family members, or acquaintances were less likely to have firearms present.Despite this, firearm-related homicides were most frequently committed by a friend or acquaintance of the victim in 2012, accounting for 38% of solved homicides. However, when compared to homicides committed with physical force or another weapon, firearm-related homicides were more likely to be committed by a stranger (14% of solved homicides compared to 23%).
Text box 5
Administrative weapon offences
Not all crime involving firearms is violent. In addition to the information on weapons present in the commission of a violent criminal offence, the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey also captures information on administrative weapons offences, including those that involve firearms, such as possession, unsafe storage, or improper documentation. There were about 14,000 such offences reported in 2012, representing a rate of 41 per 100,000 population (Text box 5 table). The majority of these were possession offences. Offence | 2011 | 2012 | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
number | rateNote 1 | number | rateNote 1 | |
Possession of weapons | 11,260 | 32.7 | 11,144 | 32.0 |
Unsafe storage of firearms | 1,077 | 3.1 | 1,109 | 3.2 |
Weapons possession contrary to order | 812 | 2.4 | 819 | 2.4 |
Firearms documentation or administration | 420 | 1.2 | 418 | 1.2 |
Offensive weapons, explosives | 208 | 0.6 | 248 | 0.7 |
Weapons trafficking | 134 | 0.4 | 113 | 0.3 |
Unauthorized importing or exporting of weapons | 75 | 0.2 | 72 | 0.2 |
Offensive weapons, prohibited | 14 | 0.0 | 18 | 0.1 |
Offensive weapons, restricted | 3 | 0.0 | 5 | 0.0 |
Total weapons offences | 14,003 | 40.6 | 13,946 | 40.0 |
|
End of text box.
Persons accused of firearm-related violent crime typically young, male
In general, persons accused of firearm-related violent crime have similar characteristics as those accused of violent crime involving other types of weapons. Regardless of the most serious weapon present, individuals between the ages of 18 to 24 are most frequently accused of violent crime. For every 100,000 individuals between the ages of 18 to 24, there were 50 accused of firearm-related violent crime, 331 accused of violent crime involving another weapon, and 1,495 accused of violent crime not involving a weapon. Youth (ages 12 to 17) had the next highest rate of individuals accused of firearm-related violent crime (43 per 100,000), followed by those between the ages of 25 and 34 (22 per 100,000).In the reporting provinces and territories in 2012, there were 16 individuals accused of firearm-related violent crime for every 100,000 population over the age of 12 (Table 9). Among the reporting provinces, rates of accused were highest in Saskatchewan (36 per 100,000) and Manitoba (27), while they were lowest in Prince Edward Island (6), Ontario (13), and British Columbia (13).
In addition, for firearm-related violent crime as well as violent crime not involving firearms, the accused persons are typically male. More than nine in ten (92%) of all persons accused of firearm-related violent crime were male, as were more than three-quarters of those accused of violent crime involving another weapon (77%) or no weapon (76%).
Youth account for one in five persons accused of firearm-related violent crime
A small proportion of youth accused of violent crime are accused of an offence where a firearm is present. Among youth accused of a violent crime, about 3% were accused of an offence where a firearm was present. While this was a small proportion of all youth accused of a violent offence, approximately one in five (21%) persons accused of firearm-related violent crime in 2012 were youth (between the ages of 12 and 17) (Table 9).The rate of youth accused of firearm-related violent crime varies across the provinces. Saskatchewan (82 per 100,000 youth), Manitoba (77 per 100,000), and Nova Scotia (72 per 100,000) recorded the highest rates in 2012 (Chart 11). In contrast, among reporting provinces British Columbia (23 per 100,000) and Prince Edward Island (27 per 100,000) reported the lowest rates. Among the territories, the Northwest Territories (169 per 100,000 youth) and Nunavut (124 per 100,000) had rates that were substantially higher than the provinces, whereas Yukon did not report any youth accused of firearm-related violent crime in 2012.
The type of firearm present differs depending on the age of the accused person. Youth accused frequently possessed a firearm-like weapon, such as a pellet gun or flare gun, or an unknown type of firearm (44%), or a handgun (38%) (Table 10). A smaller proportion of youth possessed a rifle or shotgun (12%) or another type of firearm (5%). In contrast, a handgun was the most common type of firearm, present for over half (53%) of all persons between ages 18 and 54 accused of a firearm-related violent offence. For accused persons over the age of 55, a rifle or shotgun was the most frequently present weapon (46%).
Firearm-related violent crime less likely to be solved
When compared to incidents involving other weapons or no weapons, those involving firearms are less likely to be solved, or cleared, by police. In 2012, 44% of all firearm-related violent crime was cleared and charges were laid or recommended against the accused person, while a further 10% was cleared by other means, such as the death of the accused, and 45% was not solved by police. In comparison, in 2012, 30% of violent crime involving another weapon and 31% of violent crime involving no weapons was not solved by police.Similarly, homicides involving firearms are less likely to be solved13 than homicides involving other weapons or physical force. In 2012, 55% of homicides involving firearms had been cleared through laying or recommending charges, suicide of the accused person, or otherwise. In contrast, almost nine in ten homicides involving physical force (89%) or another weapon (89%) had been solved by police, a trend which has been consistent over the past two decades (Chart 12).
Previous research has found that the presence of firearms is a significant factor in the likelihood of a homicide remaining unsolved. Multivariate analysis performed on homicide data from 1976 to 2005 indicated that, after controlling for age of victim, gender, marital status, location, time of incident, and number of victims, firearm-related homicide was 2.9 times more likely to be unsolved compared to homicides involving other weapons (Dauvergne and Li 2006). The relatively low clearance rate of firearm-related homicides may also be associated with the involvement of gangs (Hotton Mahoney and Turner 2012; Trussler 2010). The decline in solved homicides coincides with an increase in gang-related homicides, which generally are more difficult for police to solve (Armstrong et al. 2013). In 2012, over three-quarters (78%) of unsolved firearm-related homicides were gang-related.14
Over half of firearm-related violent offences result in finding of guilt
The presence of a firearm in the commission of a violent offence is also a factor when it comes to processing the case in Canada’s criminal courts. In 2011/2012, adults charged with a selected violent offence involving a firearm were found guilty in 53% of completed cases, compared to 40% of adults charged with the same offence not involving a firearm, based on analysis of the ten offences for which it is possible to distinguish whether or not a firearm was involved15. In general, 50% of all adult court cases involving violent offences resulted in a finding of guilt in 2011/2012 (Boyce 2013). Cases with a firearm-related violent offence were equally likely to end in acquittal compared to cases involving the same offences without a firearm (7% compared to 7%), but were less frequently stayed or withdrawn (38% compared to 49%).The majority (76%) of the cases that were found guilty of a firearm-related violent offence received a custodial sentence, while over half (53%) included probation as part or all of the sentence.16 In contrast, of all cases completed in adult court in 2011/2012, 35% of those that were found guilty resulted in a sentence of custody (Boyce 2013). The relatively high frequency with which these offences result in a custodial sentence may be related to the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code, particularly as they apply to offences committed with a firearm. For about one-third (34%) of firearm-related cases that resulted in a custodial sentence, the length of custody was for a period of two years or more17, with a median sentence length of one year.18
Summary
There were approximately 5,600 victims of firearm-related violent crime in 2012, accounting for 2% of all victims of violent crime. The rate of firearm-related violent crime has decreased 27% since 2009, reaching 21 per 100,000 population in 2012. In 2012, most (57%) victims of firearm-related violent crime were involved in an incident that was handgun-related.Rates of firearm-related violent crime differ across the provinces and territories, with Saskatchewan and Manitoba having the highest rates among the provinces, similar to violent crime in general. Rates of handgun violence are highest in CMAs, while rates of rifle or shotgun violent crime are higher in non-CMA areas.
There were 172 victims of firearm-related homicide in 2012, 14 more than the previous year. When compared to non-firearm homicide, firearm-related homicide is more likely to be related to gang or organized crime activity and less likely to be cleared by police.
Survey descriptions
Aggregate Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR1) Survey
The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey was established in 1962 with the co-operation and assistance of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police. The scope of the survey is Criminal Code offences and other federal statutes that have been reported to federal, provincial or municipal police services in Canada and that have been substantiated through investigation by these services.Coverage of the UCR aggregate data reflects virtually 100% of the total caseload for all police services in Canada. One incident can involve multiple offences. In order to ensure comparability, counts presented in this article are based upon the most serious offence in the incident as determined by a standard classification rule used by all police services. Counts based upon all violations are available upon request.
Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) Survey
The Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) Survey collects detailed information on criminal incidents that have come to the attention of, and have been substantiated by Canadian police services. Information includes characteristics pertaining to incidents (weapon, location), victims (age, sex, accused-victim relationships) and accused persons (age, sex). In 2012, data from police services covered 99% of the population of Canada.The UCR2 Trend Database (2009 to 2012) represents 99% of police services in Canada. Analysis of this four-year trend database is limited to a subset of offences. Offences where the victim information reported is complete are included in the subset, while incomplete records are excluded. In addition, offences are limited to those which have been classified in a consistent manner over the four-year period.
Homicide Survey
The Homicide Survey collects police-reported data on the characteristics of all homicide incidents, victims and accused persons in Canada. The Homicide Survey began collecting information on all murders in 1961 and was expanded in 1974 to include all incidents of manslaughter and infanticide. Although details on these incidents are not available prior to 1974, counts are available from the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey and are included in the historical aggregate totals.Whenever a homicide becomes known to police, the investigating police service completes the survey questionnaires, which are then sent to Statistics Canada. There are cases where homicides become known to police months or years after they occurred. These incidents are counted in the year in which they become known to police. Information on persons accused of homicide are only available for solved incidents (i.e. where at least one accused has been identified). Accused characteristics are updated as homicide cases are solved and new information is submitted to the Homicide Survey. For incidents involving more than one accused, only the relationship between the victim and the closest accused is recorded.
Integrated Criminal Court Survey
The Integrated Criminal Court Survey (ICCS) is administered by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (Statistics Canada) in collaboration with provincial and territorial government departments responsible for criminal courts in Canada. The survey collects statistical information on adult and youth court cases involving Criminal Code and other federal statute offences. Data contained in this article represent the adult criminal court portion of the survey, namely, individuals who were 18 years of age or older at the time of the offence.The primary unit of analysis is a case. A case is defined as one or more charges against an accused person or company that were processed by the courts at the same time and received a final decision. A case combines all charges against the same person having one or more key overlapping dates (date of offence, date of initiation, date of first appearance, date of decision, or date of sentencing) into a single case.
A case that has more than one charge is represented by the charge with the "most serious offence" (MSO). The most serious offence is selected using the following rules. First, court decisions are considered and the charge with the “most serious decision” (MSD) is selected. Court decisions for each charge in a case are ranked from most to least serious as follows: (1) guilty, (2) guilty of a lesser offence, (3) acquitted, (4) stay of proceeding, (5) withdrawn, dismissed or discharged, (6) not criminally responsible, (7) other, and (8) transfer of court jurisdiction.
Second, in cases where two or more charges result in the same MSD (e.g., guilty), Criminal Code sentences are considered. The charge with the most serious offence type is selected according to an offence seriousness scale, based on actual sentences handed down by courts in Canada. Each offence type is ranked by looking at (1) the proportion of guilty charges where custody was imposed and (2) the average (mean) length of custody for the specific type of offence. These values are multiplied together to arrive at the final seriousness ranking for each type of offence. If, after looking at the offence seriousness scale, two or more charges remain tied then information about the sentence type and duration of the sentence are considered (e.g., custody and length of custody, then probation and length of probation, etc.).
In 2011/2012, ICCS coverage reflects all cases completed in adult Canadian criminal courts with the exception of superior courts in Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan as well as municipal courts in Quebec. Information could not be extracted from these electronic reporting systems and was therefore unavailable.
The absence of data from superior courts in these five jurisdictions may have resulted in an underestimation of the severity of sentences since some of the most serious cases, which are likely to result in the most severe sentences, are processed in superior courts. There may also be an underestimation of case elapsed times as more serious cases generally require more court appearances and take more time to complete.
Cases are counted according to the fiscal year in which they are completed. Each year, the ICCS database is “frozen” at the end of March for the production of court statistics pertaining to the preceding fiscal year. However, these counts do not include cases that were pending an outcome at the end of the reference period. If a pending outcome is reached in the next fiscal year, then these cases are included in the completed case counts for that fiscal year. However, if a one-year period of inactivity elapses, then these cases are deemed complete and the originally published counts for the previous fiscal year are subsequently updated and reported in the next year’s release of the data. For example, upon the release of 2011/2012 data, the 2010/2011 data are updated with revisions for cases that were originally pending an outcome in 2010/2011 but have since been deemed complete due to a one-year period of inactivity. Data are revised once and are then permanently “frozen”. Historically, updates to a previous year’s numbers have resulted in an increase of about 2%.
Lastly, there are many factors that influence variations between jurisdictions. These may include Crown and police charging practices, the number, types and severity of offences, and various forms of diversion programs. Therefore, any comparisons between jurisdictions should be interpreted with caution.
Detailed data tables
Table 1A Victims of police-reported violent crime, by offence and most serious weapon present, Canada, 2012Table 1B Victims of police-reported violent crime, by offence and weapon causing injury, Canada, 2012
Table 2 Victims of police-reported violent crime where a firearm was present, by type of firearm, Canada, 2012
Table 3 Victims of firearm-related homicide, by province and territory, Canada, 2011 and 2012
Table 4 Victims of violent crime, by type of weapon, by province and territory, 2012
Table 5 Victims of violent crime where a firearm was present, by type of firearm, by province and territory, 2012
Table 6 Victims of violent crime, by type of weapon, by census metropolitan area, 2012
Table 7 Victims of firearm-related homicide, by census metropolitan area, Canada, 2011 and 2012
Table 8 Victims of violent crime where a firearm was present, by type of firearm, by census metropolitan area, 2012
Table 9 Youth and adults accused of firearm-related violent crime, by province and territory, Canada, 2012
Table 10 Persons accused of police-reported violent crime where a firearm was present, by type of firearm, Canada, 2012
References
Armstrong, J., Plecas, D., & Cohen, I.M. (2013). The value of resources in solving homicides: The difference between gang related and non-gang related cases. Centre for Public Safety and Criminal Justice Research. University of the Fraser Valley.Berman, E.G., Krause, K., Lebrun, E., & McDonald, G. (Eds.). (2007). Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the city. Cambridge University Press.
Boyce, J. (2013). Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 2011/2012. Juristat. Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
Boyce, J. & Cotter, A. (2013). Homicide in Canada, 2012. Juristat. Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Policing Services Program. (2013). Uniform Crime Reporting Incident-Based Survey Manual. Statistics Canada.
Dauvergne, M. & Li, G. (2006). Homicide in Canada, 2005. Juristat. Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol. 26, no. 6.
Hahn, R.A., Bilukha, O., Crosby, A., Fullilove, M.T., Liberman, A., Moscicki, E., et al. (2005). Firearm laws and the reduction of violence: A systematic review. Annual Journal of Preventative Medicine, 28(2S1), 40-71.
Hotton Mahoney, T., & Turner, J. (2012). Police-reported clearance rates in Canada, 2010. Juristat. Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
Perreault, S. (2013). Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2012. Juristat. Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. (2013). Commissioner of Firearms 2012 Report: The RCMP Canadian Firearms Program, Canada’s Authority on Firearms.
Statistics Canada. (2012). Table 102-0540 - Deaths, by cause, Chapter XX: External causes of morbidity and mortality (V01 to Y89), age group and sex, Canada, annual (number), CANSIM (database). (accessed September 10, 2013).
Trussler, T. (2010). Explaining the changing nature of homicide clearance in Canada. International Criminal Justice Review. Vol. 20(4).
Umeda, S. (2013). Firearms – control, legislation and policy: Japan. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Accessed 28 February 2014 from http://www.loc.gov/law/ help/firearms- control/japan.php.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2011. 2011 Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Context, Data.United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna.
Notes
- No weapon includes physical force and threats.
- Rates are based on the UCR2 Trend file, representing 99% of the population of Canada and including only those police services who have consistently responded in order to allow for comparisons over time.
- Includes using a firearm in the commission of an offence, unlawfully discharging a firearm, or pointing a firearm.
- Includes fully automatic firearms and sawed-off rifles/shotguns.
- Peer countries were determined using a methodology developed by the Conference Board of Canada. The Conference Board of Canada began by selecting countries deemed “high income” by the World Bank, then eliminated countries with a population less than one million, as well as countries smaller than 10,000 square kilometres. Of the remaining countries, the Conference Board of Canada used a five year average of real income per capita and eliminated any countries that fell below the mean. Based on this criteria, a total of 17 countries remained.
- Percent calculation is based on the total number of homicides for which supplemental information (i.e., weapon used) was reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- In order to make comparisons between the FBI definition of aggravated assault and UCR offences, the major assault rate presented here includes assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm (level 2), aggravated assault (level 3), and attempted murder. For further information, see Gannon, Maire. 2001. “Crime comparisons between Canada and the United States”. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-XPE, vol. 21 no. 11.
- A homicide is classified as gang-related when the accused person and/or the victim involved in the homicide was either a member, or a prospective member, of an organized crime group or street gang, or was somehow associated with an organized crime group or street gang, and the offence was carried out as a result of this association. Prior to 2005, police were asked if the homicide was "gang-related". Beginning in 2005, the question was amended to give police the option of specifying whether the homicide was: (a) confirmed as gang-related or (b) "suspected" as being gang-related. As such, figures may be underestimated prior to 2005 due to "suspected" gang-related incidents that were excluded from the figures.
- Robbery-related rates, proportions, and trend data in this section are incident counts provided by the UCR Aggregate Survey. Other numbers in this Juristat related to robbery are victim counts provided by the incident-based UCR2 Survey. As a result, these numbers may not match other numbers presented in the text, tables, or charts.
- As a result of a methodological change to the way in which robbery incidents are counted by the UCR survey, revisions have been applied back to 1998. While this change resulted in a 12 to 13% increase in the number of robberies each year, it did not impact the trend over this period. For further information, see Wallace, Marnie, John Turner, Anthony Matarazzo and Colin Babyak. 2009. "Measuring Crime in Canada: Introducing the Crime Severity Index and Improvements to the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey". Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-004-X.
- A census metropolitan area (CMA) consists of one or more neighbouring municipalities situated around a major urban core. A CMA must have a total population of at least 100,000 of which 50,000 or more live in the urban core. To be included in the CMA, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the central urban area, as measured by commuting flows derived from census data. A CMA typically comprises more than one police service.
- Intimate partner includes current and former legally married and common-law relationships, current and former same-sex relationships, and current and former dating relationships.
- Solved includes all homicides cleared by charge, cleared by suicide of the accused, or cleared otherwise.
- Percent calculation based on those homicides for which gang-related status was known. For 22% of unsolved firearm-related homicides in 2012, it was unknown whether or not the incident was gang-related.
- The following offences were used in all court-based comparisons: manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, attempted murder, causing bodily harm with intent, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping, hostage-taking, and extortion. These ten offences are identified within the Criminal Code as unique offences when a firearm is involved in their commission. As such, it is possible to examine differences based on whether or not a firearm was present and/or used in the commission of these offences. Specific information on the Criminal Code sections, subsections, and paragraphs used in this analysis are available upon request.
- Cases can include more than one type of sentence; as a result, percentages will not add to 100.
- Length of custody data are not available from Manitoba. Since 2004/2005 for the Northwest Territories, the number of custody orders have been under-reported and the number of probation orders have been over-reported by unknown amounts due to clerical procedures. The majority of custody orders were captured as probation. Custodial sentence lengths exclude time spent in custody prior to sentencing and/or the amount of credit awarded for time spent in pre-sentence custody. The length of custodial sentences may be affected by time spent in pre-trial detention. For example, ‘time served', the time spent in custody prior to the decision of the court and sentencing, which often occurs with more serious offences, is likely to affect the sentence length. Excludes cases where the length of custody was unknown or indeterminate.
- Excludes cases in which the length of the custody sentence was unknown or indeterminate.
- Date modified:
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Preventing Youth Involvement in Gangs
Overview
Gang prevention is a public safety priority in British Columbia. The Province is preventing the recruitment of youth into gangs through crime prevention programming and taking the profit motive away from illegal gang activity through the use of civil forfeiture. The Province has invested more than $3.98M in civil forfeiture proceeds for gang prevention and youth crime prevention initiatives since 2011.The Ministry has partnered with the BC Lions since 2010 on the Lions Pride program, which brings together BC Lions players, schools, and local communities to mentor at-risk youth and help keep them active and out of gangs. Program components include school presentations and a flag football program for at-risk youth.
From 2006 to 2010, the Ministry of Justice led a provincial youth gang prevention strategy with funding support from the National Crime Prevention Centre – Public Safety Canada. The Ministry worked with eight priority communities in B.C. (Surrey, Richmond, Abbotsford, Kamloops, Prince George, South Asian Community Coalition, Vancouver School District and the Vancouver Aboriginal Community Policing Centre Society) to develop local action plans to address and prevent youth involvement in gangs and gang violence. The action plans resulted in a number of youth violence prevention programs including mentoring, job training, recreational programming and educational resources. Some communities received additional funding support through the Youth Gang Prevention Fund that is administered by the National Crime Prevention Centre – Public Safety Canada to support the development and implementation of targeted interventions for youth at highest risk of involvement in gangs and gang violence.
Youth Gang Prevention Toolkit
The Youth Gang Prevention Toolkit for Community Planning and its accompanying Quick-Start Guide are designed to assist service providers, community leaders, and others who are working to help prevent youth from becoming involved in gangs or to help them leave gangs. The toolkit was developed with the assistance and partnership of many stakeholders, including the eight communities involved in the provincial youth gang prevention strategy, Alberta’s Ministry of Justice, and the federal government.End Gang Life
In January 2015, the Combined Special Forces Enforcement Unit – British Columbia (CFSEU-BC) launched End Gang Life - Myths & Realities. This series of six, 7-10 minute gang prevention and education videos provides a unique, thought-provoking look into many of the main myths surrounding gangs.The series features interviews with parents who have lost children to gang-related murders, police officers who have spent years investigating gangs and gang-related murders, and former gang members who give rare insight into the world of gangs and gang violence. Together, their powerful testimony exposes the truths and perils of gangs, with the aim of promoting community conversations about gangs and preventing and deterring youth and young adults from entering gang life.
Module 1:
Myths: You’ll make lots of money and be powerful & Selling a little bit of drugs isn’t a big deal - The first module disputes the myth of having lots of money, fancy cars, power and that transporting a little bit of drugs is no big deal. The basis of the first module is essentially high risk, high reward.Module 2:
Myths: As a gangster’s girlfriend/wife you’ll have everything you want & Girls and women aren’t allowed to join gangs - The second module focuses specifically on female involvement in gangs. Girls have a role to play too, and they aren’t immune to the violence that accompanies the lifestyle.Module 3:
Myths: You’ll have plenty of friends and they won’t care if you’re a gangster & You’ll be respected and feared wherever you go & You can always get out whenever you want - The third module highlights the misconception that gang members will be your friends, people you count on, and that that lifestyle will earn you respect. Gang life is a book that gets judged by its cover. The horrors aren’t revealed until later.Module 4:
Myths: Someone will always have your back and you’ll be protected & Even if you do end up in prison, your gang will protect you - The fourth module focuses on the belief that a gang is like a brotherhood and support system. The reality of the situation is that you are entirely alone, fighting a losing battle.Module 5:
Myth: You’ll live a long and happy life - The myth of living a long and happy life is demystified entirely in the fifth module. It is no secret, but many gangsters don’t live past the age of 30.Module 6:
Myths: Gang murders are a victimless crime & Gangs are only a lower class, ethnic problem & “No one in ‘my’ family would ever be in a gang”& Once kids join a gang there’s no hope for them - The sixth module serves to eliminate the stigma that surrounds gang life. It is easy to brush it off and say that these people got what they deserved, and that the murder of a gangster is a victimless crime. But there are victims: the parents, spouses, and children who are left behind to suffer.Reports and Consultation Papers
-
The Promising Practices for Addressing Youth Involvement in Gangs
(Totten Report – April 2008 - External Report)
Provides an overview of the prevalence of gangs in B.C. and Canada, and clear guidelines on evidence-based practices. This report was funded as part of the four-year prevention strategy. - Preventing Youth Involvement in Gangs Crime Prevention information booklet designed to assist service providers, parents, teachers, and others who are working to help prevent youth from becoming involved in gangs or to help them leave gangs.
- Strength-based Approaches to Youth Gang Prevention in B.C. (Community Consultation Paper - External Report - April 2010)
- Gang Prevention for New Immigrant and Refugee Youth in B.C. (Community Consultation Paper - External Report - April 2010)
- Gangs, Girls and Sexual Exploitation in B.C. (Community Consultation Paper - External Report - April 2010)
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A prison gang snapshot – bikers rule the roost
September 21, 2010 By
Canada’s federal prisons have a growing gang problem. More disenfranchised young men who live on a diet of drugs and violence on the street are importing that culture to penitentiary cellblocks, where they can dominate weaker convicts, continue to peddle drugs and kill whenever necessary. Confidential Corrections Canada documents that I obtained – including a gang profile of the inmate population at Joyceville Institution in Kingston, Ontario – reveal that more than 10% of the prison’s convicts are gang affiliated and a dozen are outlaw bikers.
[Read more…]
[Read more…]
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Homicides
View the most recent version.Archived Content
Information identified as archived is provided for reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It is not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards and has not been altered or updated since it was archived. Please "contact us" to request a format other than those available.Thursday, October 23, 2008
2007
After rising through much of the 1960s and early 1970s, Canada's homicide rate has been on a general downward trend since the mid-1970s. This trend continued in 2007 with a further 3% decline in the national homicide rate.
For the past 20 years, shootings and stabbings have each accounted for about one-third of all homicides. This was also the case in 2007, as there were 190 stabbings and 188 shootings.
While the overall rate of homicides committed with a firearm has generally been decreasing since the mid-1970s, the use of handguns has been on the rise. In 2007, handguns were used in two-thirds of all firearm homicides, up from about one-quarter 20 years ago.
Police reported that one in five homicides were gang-related in 2007. Gang-related homicides have been increasing since this information was first collected in 1991.
Use of handguns to commit homicide on the rise
In 2007, 126 homicides were committed with a handgun, 16 more than in 2006. The rate of homicides committed with a handgun has more than doubled over the past 20 years. At the same time, the use of rifles/shotguns to commit homicide continues to decline.Homicides committed with handguns are primarily an urban phenomenon. Within the nation's metropolitan areas, 81% of all firearm-related homicides were committed with a handgun in 2007, compared with 29% in the rest of Canada.
Note to readersAggregate statistics on homicide for 2007 were first released in The Daily on July 17, 2008, as part of a wide-ranging analysis of police-reported crime. This report represents a more detailed examination of the police-reported homicide data.The Criminal Code classifies homicide as first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter or infanticide. Deaths caused by criminal negligence, suicide, and accidental or justifiable homicide are not included. |
Gang-related homicides continue to increase
Gang-related homicides, which include the killing of gang members as well as innocent bystanders, have been increasing since this information was first collected in 1991.In 2007, there were 117 homicides reported as gang-related by police, 16 more than in 2006. This accounted for about 1 in every 5 homicides reported to police.
Firearms were used more often in gang-related homicides than in other types of murder. In 2007, just over two-thirds of gang-related homicides were committed with a firearm, compared with about 20% of homicides that did not involve gangs.
Youth homicides drop in 2007
After reaching an all-time high in 2006, the rate of youth accused of homicide dropped in 2007. There were 74 youth accused of homicide, 11 fewer than in 2006. However, this still resulted in the second highest youth homicide rate since data were first collected in 1961.Youth homicides often involve gangs. In 2007, of all homicides in which a youth was involved as an accused person, about one-third were reported by police as gang-related.
Most victims knew their killer
As in most years, in 2007, over 80% of solved homicides were committed by someone known to the victim. However, there are differences between male and female victims.Male homicide victims were most likely to be killed by an acquaintance, someone known to them through a criminal relationship or a stranger. In contrast, female homicide victims were most frequently killed by a current or former intimate partner, or other family member.
Male victims killed by acquaintances, female victims killed by partners | |||
---|---|---|---|
Victim killed by | Male victims | Female victims | Total victims |
% | |||
Spouse | 5 | 38 | 16 |
Other family member | 15 | 23 | 17 |
Boyfriend/girlfriend | 3 | 5 | 4 |
Acquaintance | 40 | 18 | 33 |
Criminal relationship | 18 | 8 | 15 |
Stranger | 20 | 8 | 16 |
Homicide rates highest in the West and North
The western provinces and the territories have consistently reported the highest homicide rates in the country.Last year was no exception as Manitoba reported the highest homicide rate among the provinces, followed by Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador continued to report the lowest rates.
Manitoba police reported 62 homicides, 23 more than in 2006, giving the province its highest rate since data were first available in 1961. Most of the increase occurred in small urban and rural areas of the province.
However, other provinces reported much lower than average rates. British Columbia's homicide rate was the second lowest in that province since 1961, while Quebec's homicide rate was at its lowest point in over 40 years.
Among the larger metropolitan areas, Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary had the highest homicide rates. Saskatoon, although a smaller metropolitan area, reported the highest homicide rate of all cities (3.60 homicides per 100,000 population).
Toronto police reported 111 homicides in 2007, almost one-fifth of the national total. However, after taking population into account, the Toronto homicide rate is similar to that of other large Canadian cities.
Available on CANSIM: tables 253-0001 to 253-0006.
Definitions, data sources and methods: survey number 3315.
The Juristat article "Homicide in Canada, 2007," Vol. 28, no. 9 (85-002-XWE, free), is now available. From the Publications module of our website, under Free Internet publications, choose Crime and justice, then Juristat.
For more information, or to enquire about the concepts, methods or data quality of this release, contact Information and Client Services (toll-free 1-800-387-2231; 613-951-9023), Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics.
Table(s).
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/081023/dq081023a-eng.htm
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The Nature of Canadian Urban Gangs and their use of Firearms: A Review of the Literature and Police Survey
2. Canadian Studies on Urban Gangs
This section introduces the studies reviewed and includes the definition of urban gangs used in each study. It should be noted that some studies and police departments use the term "street gang" synonymously with "urban gang". These two terms will be used interchangeably throughout this report.2.1 Definitions
Hebert, Hamel and Savoie (1997) conducted a comprehensive review of Canadian and American literature on six gang-based topics, including the definition of a urban gang, and illustrated six different types of gangs. The three less structured types of gangs are copycat gangs, territorial gangs, and delinquent groups, all of which generally do not engage in violence. The three other organized gang groups include violent gangs with ideological goals, street gangs, and criminal organizations.Violent gangs with ideological goals tend to have political or religious agendas and engage in violent activities to attain their goals, such as satanic rituals. Skinheads are an example of this type of group. These gangs may have a highly developed hierarchy, and can be part of larger organizations. They identify themselves with specific clothing and through cultural, religious or political biases but are not generally concerned about territorial control. These groups may engage in serious crimes including group violence (e.g., assault or homicide) for the purpose of asserting their beliefs.
Street gangs are usually comprised of adolescents and young adults who commit various forms of criminal acts. The level of organization tends to vary between gangs, and may have links to adult criminal organizations. They tend to be highly territorial, operating for economic reasons and are primarily involved in drug trafficking. Street gangs may also commit high levels of violence.
Criminal organizations tend to be small groups with stable and sophisticated operations, with the goal of financial gain. Interests are usually highly diversified. Some of these groups may have elaborate rules and generally do not seek attention. They are highly concerned with territorial control, they may use intimidation and violence to promote or protect their interests, and they can even go as far as to eliminate competitors through violent acts.
The Greater Vancouver gang study (Gordon & Foley, 1998) was a project designed to serve four purposes: to develop profile data on known gang members; to test the validity of classifications and definitions from earlier studies; to identify reasons for joining and leaving gangs; and to examine characteristics of gangs from the perspectives of gang membersand agents who work with gang members (e.g., probation officers).
Gordon and Foley (1998) defined a typology of groups prior to collecting data. These types were youth movements, youth groups, criminal groups, wannabe groups, street gangs and criminal business organizations. The first two groups (youth movements, youth groups) were not considered gangs and were not the focus of the study.
- Criminal Groups:
- Small clusters of friends who band together, usually for a short period of time (no more than one year) to commit crime primarily for financial gain. They can be composed of young people and/or adults and may be mistakenly, or carelessly, referred to as a gang.
- Wannabe Groups:
- young people who band together in a loosely structured group primarily to engage in spontaneous social activity and exciting, impulsive, criminal activity including collective violence against other groups of youths. A wannabe group will be highly visible and its members will boast about their "gang" involvement because they want to be seen by others as gang members.
- Street Gangs:
- groups of young people and young adults who band together to form a semi-structured organization primarily to engage in planned and profitable criminal behaviour or organized violence against rival street gangs.
- Criminal Business Organizations:
- organized groups that exhibit a formal structure and a high degree of sophistication. These groups are comprised primarily of adults, including older adults. They engage in criminal activity, primarily for economic reasons, and almost invariably maintain a low profile, which is a key characteristic distinguishing them from street gangs (Gordon and Foley, 1998, p. v).
[…]a group of youth or young adults in the respondent's jurisdiction, under the age of 21, that the respondent or other responsible persons in their agency or community were willing to identify or classify as a gang. As part of this definition, we asked respondents to exclude motorcycle gangs, hate or ideology groups, prison gangs, and other exclusively adult gangs (Astwood, 2004, p. 1).Mellor, MacRaw, and Pauls (2005) undertook a study with three objectives: to develop a multidimensional conceptual framework for youth involvement in gangs in the Canadian context; to identify programs and services relevant to youth gangs in Canada; and to categorize program initiatives based on their level of prevention. Information was obtained through literature reviews and key informants in government departments, police departments, and non-governmental organizations. Mellor, MacRaw and Pauls (2005) proposed a multidimensional model of gang activities, gang organization, and motivation to join gangs, as well as recruitment, and exit strategies. The model focused on five different types of gangs/groups:
- Type A Group of Friends:
- These members are not antisocial, and are therefore not included in this report.
- Type B Spontaneous Criminal Activity Group/Gangs:
- these groups can be large and social in nature. Members are generally prosocial, and the criminal activity that does occur is spontaneous or situation-motivated, such as shoplifting, theft, bullying, swarming, and gratuitous violence. Emphasis tends to be on maintaining a highly visible profile and mystique. These groups were reported to be fluid, with no permanent leadership or hierarchy. Individuals could be members of multiple groups/gangs without negative consequences. There was little evidence that they have any connection to organized crime groups. Weapon use appeared to be limited but can include knives, bats, homemade weapons, and handguns. In addition to being a fashion statement, members may join for other reasons: protection from others, belief that gang membership is "normal" , gaining a sense of belonging and recognition, and a lack of legitimate alternative activities or associations. Recruitment is usually based within existing social networks where friends come together, and in other cases protection is offered. Members tend to leave the group/gang as they mature or change their peer group.
- Type C Purposive Group/Gangs:
- these groups/gangs usually form for the main purpose of committing a specific offence. Size is dependent on the purpose of the formation. Crimes include property offences, home invasion, drug trafficking, procurement, extortion, robbery, hate crimes, and vigilante-type assaults. These gangs can emerge for a specific purpose from existing gangs and may disappear after the offence or activity is completed. These gangs tend to be more structured than Type B groups, with a small, male-dominated membership and few if any links to criminal business organizations. Members may join to fulfill survival or emotional needs, engage in thrill-seeking, alleviate boredom, or take part in retribution. Recruitment can be done within existing social groups which tend to be short-lived, but police intervention by arrest or diversion can result in the group dissolving.
- Type D Youth Street Gangs:
- youth street gangs are typically organized to carry out money-making criminal activity or organized violence against other gangs. Members can be identified through gang-specific clothing, tattoos, or jewellery and mark their territory with gang graffiti. Activities tend to be planned and organized. Youth street gangs have been known to commit a wide array of crimes including sexual and non-sexual harassment, vehicle theft, drug trafficking, weapons procurement, prostitution, intimidation, extortion, robbery, assault, and homicide. These gangs usually have a hierarchy and may or may not have connections to organized crime groups. They tend to have moderate levels of leadership and a code of conduct is often imposed. There can also be affiliate members associated with these gangs who are not fully initiated and are not aware of all operations but may receive protection and have access to drugs and weapons. The core members generally have full membership status and offer complete loyalty and devotion to the gang. Because their focus is to further the gang's interests, they usually have significant influence on other members. Some of the motivations for joining this type of gang include money, power, protection, a lack of legitimate alternatives, and social acceptance. Recruitment can be done by friends or family, or by taking in disenfranchised youth. Some members are coerced to join while in prison. Initiations are usually directed by the leaders and may involve committing certain offences, being beaten, or for females, having intercourse with all male members. Some gangs may even require proof of criminality. These gangs are typically the most difficult to leave but members may have the opportunity of being "beaten out" which involves a severe assault. Those who choose to leave usually require multifaceted exit strategies with help from the police, community groups, and family.
- Type E Structured Criminal Organizations:
- these organizations tend to be highly structured and sophisticated business operations that may operate internationally. To maintain a low profile and distance from criminal acts, these groups tend to use street-level groups to carry out many aspects of the business. They have been known to use children under 12 to spy, commit break and enter, act as couriers, and to engage in child pornography. Youth in these organizations generally have a low ranking.
When Kelly and Caputo asked police how they determined whether criminal activity was gang related, most respondents reported these common indicators:
[A] reliable source of information that an individual is a member of a gang; the individual has been observed associating with known gang members; the individual acknowledges gang membership; the individual has been involved in gang-related crime; there is a court ruling that the individual is a gang member; and the individual uses gang markers, such as gang colours, paraphernalia and tattoos. In fact, one of the most common techniques used for identifying activity as being street gang related was the presence of gang colours, tattoos, dress, and graffiti.Respondents also reported tracking the money from drug sales to determine whether the street gang was retaining it as profit or funnelling it away to another group. Monitoring changes in the criminal activities of known gang members was another indicator. For example, increased violent crimes, increased involvement in drug trafficking, and decreased involvement in other types of crime, such as property offences and suggested that the changing relationship may warrant further inspection.
(Kelly & Caputo, 2005, p. 23).
2.2 Demographics
The research reviewed for the current report included studies that were limited to specific populations, such as youth, adult federal offenders, males, or females. Therefore, the summary of information might not reflect the actual demographic representation of urban gang members.2.2.1 Gender
Three of the studies were specific to males only (Craig et al., 2002; Nafehk, 2002; Nafehk & Stys, 2004), one study had an exclusively female sample (Mackenzie & Johnson, 2003) and the other involved mixed gender samples. Of the mixed gender studies, females made up a small part of the participant group, from 3% (Gordon & Foley, 1998) to 32% (Hamel et al., 1998). According to police respondents in the Astwood survey (2004), the percentage of females in gangs ranged from 0% (Nova Scotia) to 12% (British Columbia), with a national average of 6%.2.2.2 Age
Several of the publications reviewed included individuals of different ages as part of the nature of the study (i.e., youth gang studies did not include older adults, and federal inmate studies excluded youth). The longitudinal study by Craig et al., (2002) involved 76 boys who became gang members by the age of 13 or 14. Two other studies included older individuals under the definition of "youth" . Hamel et al. (1998) extended the age range in their sample of current and former street gang members, resulting in a mean age of 18 years (age range 14 to 25 years). Respondents from the Astwood (2004) Canadian police survey were asked to estimate the number of youth gang members within five age groups. Results from individual locations varied, yielding a national average of 10% below the age of 16 years; 39% between 16 and 18; 37% between 19 and 21, and 14% over 21. Not specific to youth, the Vancouver study by Gordon and Foley (1998) found that the mean age of the 35 street gang members in the sample was 18 years (age range was not reported).2.2.3 Ethnicity
Nafekh (2002) explored the characteristics of Aboriginal federal inmates who were gang members while Craig et al. (2002) limited their sample boys who spoke French as their first language and had parents who were born in Quebec. Other studies described a variety of ethnic demographics. Thirty-eight percent of the Montreal youth in Hamel et al.'s (1998) study had Canadian-born parents, 19% had a Haitian background, 16% had a Latin American background, and the others were from a variety of backgrounds. In the Vancouver study (Gordon & Foley, 1998), the largest group was comprised of Asian gang members (45%), followed by Caucasian (20%), Aboriginal (14%), Middle Eastern (8%), Indo-Canadian (5%), African Canadian (3%) and Hispanic (2%).The ethnic variation of gang composition has also been seen on a national level. The Astwood (2004) police survey reported on the composition of gang members across Canada: African-Canadian (25%), First Nations (22%), Caucasian (18%), Asian (12%), East Indian (14%), Latino/Hispanic (6%), and Middle Eastern (3%). British Columbia had the highest proportion of Asian members (37%). Saskatchewan, Alberta and Manitoba had the highest representation of First Nations members (96%, 58%, and 58% respectively). Ontario had the greatest percentage of East Indian members (21%). Ontario also reported a high proportion of African Canadian members (36%) as did Quebec (51%) and Nova Scotia (48%). Nova Scotia had a high proportion of Caucasian members (47%). The respondents also indicated that 36% of the youth gangs had members of two or more ethnic/racial groups, averaging from less than 1% in Nova Scotia to 46% in British Columbia.
Finally, examining ethnic composition in federal inmate gang members, Nafekh and Stys (2004) reported that there were 916 identified urban gang affiliates in prison between 1996 and 2003, of which 37% were African-Canadian, 29% were Caucasian, 20% were Aboriginal, 3% were Asian, and 11% were from other backgrounds.
2.3 Reasons for Joining a Street Gang
Several of the studies reviewed suggested reasons why youth join gangs. In their study of Montreal youth gangs, Hamel et al. (1998) found that males and females were recruited differently. Girls were usually recruited in a systematic way by finding a vulnerable girl, offering protection and friendship, and then trapping her. It was less clear if the majority of males joined of their own volition or if they were coerced as well. Several of the studies stated that many gang members came from abusive backgrounds and low socio-economic neighbourhoods. Gang membership can offer these individuals a sense of belonging, with the gang often becoming a surrogate family. For some, gang activities provided the means to acquire material possessions and a sense of power. The lifestyle has also been glamorized, particularly by the entertainment industry.2.4 Gang Activities
Several of the studies indicated that urban gang members tend to engage in graffiti or "tagging". The stylized and symbolic images are spray-painted on buildings, bridges, or other structures. It appears that the intent is to announce the gang′s presence, mark territory, and cause fear in the community. Tagging is generally done by relatively newly established gangs and not the more established gangs whose members see it as a guide for police.Not surprisingly, compared to youth who do not become gang members, those who become involved in gangs generally engage in more delinquent behaviour, with the highest involvement in fighting, stealing, vandalism, and drug use (Craig et al., 2002). Results from Hamel et al.'s (1998) study indicated that 68% of the youth in their sample had already committed some type of delinquent act prior to joining a gang, and 83% felt that their gang committed violent acts. Police respondents in the Astwood (2004) survey ranked criminal activities by degree of youth gang involvement in Canada.
Assault was first (72%), followed by drug trafficking (70%), burglary/break and enter (68%), vandalism/graffiti/tagging (64%), intimidation/extortion (56%) and auto theft/exportation (47%). In their Montreal youth gang study, Hamel et al. (1998) reported that females usually provide an income for the gang through exotic dancing, escorting, or prostitution, and acting as drug couriers.
Including youth and adults from all types of gangs in their gang member probation sample, Gordon and Foley (1998) reported that 38% percent of all gang members had a current conviction for violence (not specified), 35% for property offences, 9% for drug related offences, and 3% for weapons related offences. Furthermore, 34% of the sample had a prior conviction for a violent offence. Offence details for different types of gangs were also combined in two federal inmate studies. In a female sample (Mackenzie & Johnson, 2003), gang members were more likely than a matched sample of non-gang member inmates to have committed assault or robbery, but less likely to have committed murder. In a sample of Aboriginal inmates who were gang members, Nafekh (2002) found that the gang members were more likely to be convicted for robbery, assault, and weapons related offences than a matched sample of non-gang affiliated Aboriginal inmates, but less likely to be convicted of sexual assault. Nafekh and Stys (2004) found in another study of federal inmates that street gang members were most likely to have been convicted of robbery, drug offences, homicide, sexual assault and weapons related offences. Additionally, the street gang members were more likely than other types of gang affiliates to have convictions for violent offences.
2.5 Use of Weapons by Gangs
In addition to reporting statistics on weapons related offices, two of the studies reviewed included weapons use as a distinct variable. Hamel et al., (1998) reported that the number of weapons used by urban gangs has increased over times as well as the number of deadly weapons. They suggested that previously, gang responses to minor transgressions were limited to fist fights, whereas now, responses can be with weapons. The Astwood (2004) survey respondents reported the frequency of firearm use in the commission of assaultive crimes: 46% responded "not at all" ; 24% responded "rarely" ; 19% responded "sometimes" ; and 11% responded "often" . In the "often" category, the provincial breakdown of responses ranged from 0% (British Columbia and Nova Scotia) to 67% (Alberta).2.6 Ties to Organized Crime Groups
Hamel et al. (1998) suggested that crime committed by the more organized youth gangs is not very different from that of organized crime groups; however, street gangs appear to engage in different activity across time without a long-term specialization. Police respondents in Kelly and Caputo′s (2005) survey indicated that a major activity of street gangs is to provide distribution networks for the drug trade, control territory, and to collect debts. Other studies reported that much of the violence committed by street gangs is done in relation to the drug business, such as fighting between competitors or raids on the competition, robberies, and property offences to raise capitol to purchase drugs. Although some street gangs run their own independent operations, such as the marijuana grow operations owned and managed by street gangs in British Columbia, or fraud operations (credit and debit cards) and prostitution rings managed by street gangs in Quebec. Many street gangs appear to have ties to organized crime groups. The nature of the ties can vary from temporary contractual relationships, to a permanent integration, with the gang acting as a street level presence of the particular crime group. By using street gangs to achieve their aims, organized crime groups can maintain a distance and be somewhat insulated from direct detection.According to the Astwood (2004) survey, police in Ontario reported that 38% of gang-related drug trafficking and 15% each of the weapons possession and auto theft/exportation offences were committed in collaboration with organized crime groups. In British Columbia, organized crime was involved in 42% of the drug trafficking, 33% of the intimidation/extortion, and 33% of the prostitution offences committed by youth gang members. In Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba combined, organized crime gangs were involved in 42% of the drug trafficking, 32% of all assaults, and 32% of vandalism/graffiti/tagging offences. Forty-four of the survey respondents indicated that youth gangs in their jurisdictions had established subordinate or affiliate relationships with organized crime groups. The most prevalent of these were Aboriginal/Native Canadian gangs (40%), Asian gangs (22%), and outlaw motorcycle gangs (22%).
Depending on the definition used for "street gang", their activities can range from antisocial although not technically illegal acts, to the most serious of crimes. As youth gang members mature, they tend to either dispense with gang association, or become more entrenched by joining larger or more dangerous gangs. A commonality between all of the studies reviewed, is the propensity for street gangs to be involved with drugs, and the violence that permeates that involvement.
- Date modified:
Violent crime statistics - Canada
Click here for a fact sheet on violent crime in Canada
The crime rate went down slightly in 2009, however, Statistics Canada reported that the lower rate was largely driven by declines in three areas of property crime; vehicle theft, mischief and break-ins. John Turner, chief of Statscan's policing services program said that, "Most of the drops we've seen over the last decade have been in non-violent crimes." (Source: Canada's crime rate continues to drop, Globe and Mail, July 21, 2010) Serious assaults, as illustrated in the chart below, have gone up steadily since 1983, with slight decreases in the last couple of years.
The violent crime rate in Canada has gone down slightly in recent years from a peak in the early 1990s. For instance, in the year 2004, the violent crime rate fell 2%, making it 10% lower than a decade earlier. However, it was still 35% higher than 20 years ago (Source: Statistics Canada, The Daily, July 21, 2005). To put the slight decreases in perspective, between 1962 and 2006, the violent crime rate in Canada, per 100,000, went from 221 to 951, or a 300%+ increase. (See chart below "Crime rates in Canada 1962 - 2006"). According to the Canadian Council on Social Development, "The overall crime rate in Canada rose steadily from 1960 to 1990, it peaked in 1990/91, then started dropping throughout the 1990s. These fluctuations are attributed in part to the "baby-boom" and "baby-boom echo", where the proportion of Canadians between the ages of 15 and 25 was very high for many years before it dropped sharply -- by 18% -- in 1991. Despite decreases in both the proportion of teens aged 15 to 19 and crime rates in the 1990s, overall rates of violent crime are still three times higher than they were in the 1960s, and rates of property crime are twice as high." (Canadian Council on Social Development, Crime Prevention Through Social Development)
A report on youth crime released by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics in May 2008 (for 2006) stated that while overall crime rates have dropped, youth violent crimes have increased 30 per cent since 1991. Violent crime has risen 12 per cent in the last ten years among youths, while the overall violent crime rate in Canada declined 4 per cent in the same time period.
Youth homicide rates have risen 41 per cent since 1997, one of the largest increases in the last ten years, a trend that Dr. Nick Bala, a youth justice expert at Queens University, calls "worrisome", something of an understatement. (Source: May 17, 2008, Globe and Mail)
In Crime Statistics in Canada, 2007, Juristat, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, the chart below appears. It shows that youth violent crime has doubled since 1987. It appears to be the blending of property and violent crime statistics that results in the the "decreases" in youth crime reported by some.
Click here for a fact sheet on violent crime in Canada
In 2006, the overall violent crime rate remained unchanged, mainly due to the relative stability in the rate of minor assaults. However, other than a drop in homicides, most other serious violent crimes were on the rise, similar to 2005. The decline in homicides in 2006 was partially offset by an increase in attempted murders.
Aggravated assaults, the most serious form of assault, also increased for the 2nd year in a row, up 5%. Assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm continued its upward trend, increasing for the 7th straight year, up 4%. This resulted in the highest rate for this offence since it was introduced into the Criminal Code in 1983. (Source: Crime Statistics in Canada, 2006 - Juristat - Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Vol. 27, no. 5)
Property crime rate (per 100K) change from 1962-2006: 1891 to 3588 or a 90% increase
Violent crime rate (per 100K) change from 1962-2006: 221 to 951 or a 300%+ increase
In 2005, the overall crime rate dropped 5%, but this was driven by declines in non-violent crimes. Decreases were seen in most crimes, with the exception of the serious crimes of homicide, attempted murder, assault with a weapon, aggravated assault and robbery.
After increasing 13% in 2004, the homicide rate increased by 4% in 2005. The 2005 homicide rate, 2.0 per 100,000 population, was the highest since 1996. Attempted murders were also on the rise, up 14% from the previous year. There were 772 attempted murders in 2005, 101 more than the previous year. (Source: Crime Statistics in Canada, 2005 - Juristat - Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Vol. 26, no. 4)
Click here for a fact sheet on violent crime in Canada
The text accompanying this chart from Crime Statistics in Canada, 2001 states, "The violent crime rate is 6% less than a decade ago, but 52% higher than 20 years ago."
FIGURE 3 SOURCE: Crime Statistics in Canada, 2001, Juristat, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada - Catalogue no. 85-002-XPE Vol. 22 no. 6
The text accompanying the chart below from Crime Statistics in Canada, 2003 says, "The 2003 violent crime rate was 11% lower than its near-peak in 1993, but still 66% higher than 25 years ago."
FIGURE 4 SOURCE: Crime Statistics in Canada, 2003, Juristat, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada - Catalogue no. 85-002-XPE, Vol. 24, no. 6
According to the Canadian Council on Social Development, "The overall crime rate in Canada rose steadily from 1960 to 1990, it peaked in 1990/91, then started dropping throughout the 1990s. These fluctuations are attributed in part to the "baby-boom" and "baby-boom echo", where the proportion of Canadians between the ages of 15 and 25 was very high for many years before it dropped sharply -- by 18% -- in 1991. Despite decreases in both the proportion of teens aged 15 to 19 and crime rates in the 1990s, overall rates of violent crime are still three times higher than they were in the 1960s, and rates of property crime are twice as high." (Canadian Council on Social Development, Crime Prevention Through Social Development)
Click here for a fact sheet on violent crime in Canada
Violent youth crime
FIGURE 16 SOURCE: Crime Statistics in Canada, 2000, Juristat, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada - Catalogue no. 85-002-XPE, Vol. 21, no. 8
In the Statistics Canada report, Children and Youth in Canada, the following information on youth violent crime is provided:
"In 1999, violent crimes accounted for one in five youths charged with a Criminal Code offence. The rate of youths charged with violent crimes began to fall only recently, with a 2% drop in 1997, a 1% decrease in 1998, and a 5% drop in 1999. Despite these declines, the 1999 youth violent crime rate remained 41% higher than it was a decade earlier." (Emphasis added)
In Crime Statistics in Canada, 2003, Statistics Canada notes: "Throughout the past decade, the trend in the rate of youth violent crime was relatively stable until it began a general increase in 2000 (Figure 17).
FIGURE 17 SOURCE: Crime Statistics in Canada, 2003, Juristat, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada - Catalogue no. 85-002-XPE, Vol. 24, no. 6
In a December 2004 article on youth crime, the Toronto Sun reported the following: "While the number of all crime cases heard in Canadian youth court has dropped 20% over the last decade, violent crimes cases -- for homicide, sexual assault, assault and robbery -- have jumped 25% over the same period, reports Statistics Canada.
"Separate stats from the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) show an increase of 13% in the youth violent crime rate between 1993-2003, with a significant jump in 2000 after a decade of relative stability." The complete article follows along with additional items.
Violent youth crime rising
Stats reveal gangs and girls now figure more often in incidents
December 12, 2004By Brodie Fenlon
Toronto Sun
REALITY CHECK: Is youth violence getting worse or does it just seem that way after two weeks of highly publicized teen crime in Toronto? The answer -- from cops to victims to social agencies to the statistics -- is yes, the streets are meaner for our kids.
Teen violence is more intense, escalates far faster and involves groups, girls and weapons more than ever before, experts say.
"The severity of what is happening is definitely on the rise," says Sally Spencer, executive director of Youth Assisting Youth, a peer-mentoring program for at-risk youth in Toronto and York Region.
From fists to knives
"Before, you'd have a school fight with your fists. Now, forget that. Now, you start with the knives and go to the guns."While the number of all crime cases heard in Canadian youth court has dropped 20% over the last decade, violent crimes cases -- for homicide, sexual assault, assault and robbery -- have jumped 25% over the same period, reports Statistics Canada.
Separate stats from the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) show an increase of 13% in the youth violent crime rate between 1993-2003, with a significant jump in 2000 after a decade of relative stability. In Toronto, arrests of young people aged 12-17 for violent crimes has remained stable since 1999, even dropping by about 200 arrests since they peaked in 2000.
But Stu Auty, president of the Canadian Safe School Network, says that when you take a longer view over several decades, the upward trend in youth violence is unmistakable.
"This is brand spanking new," he says. "When you look at stats compared to 25 years ago, you didn't even find on the charts any of this kind of crime, where kids are stabbed openly on a street corner. It's outrageous."
A straight comparison of the youth violent crime rate in Canada over 25 years shows an increase of several hundred per cent, but it's a statistically inaccurate picture due to major changes in the law and the way police and courts have handled youth over that time, says Marnie Wallace of the CCJS.
'Tip of the iceberg'
"A decade is about as far back as you want to look," she says.Either way, the numbers offer only a glimpse at the "tip of the iceberg" because stats are only collected after police become involved, cautions Staff Sgt. Dave Saunders, head of Youth Programs for the Toronto Police.
"Youth are very uncomfortable reporting crime," he says. "There are many victims who are suffering in silence."
Saunders says there are three distinct trends in Toronto:
- The growth of gang-type or group violence, as was the case with Drew Stewart, 16, who was swarmed by a group of teens and fatally stabbed Dec. 3.
- The rapid escalation to weapons in conflicts, as happened Nov. 28 when Tamara Carter, 11, and an unnamed 23-year-old man were shot on a TTC bus after an argument.
- An increase in female violence.
More difficult to answer is why youth violence is intensifying.
The theories could fill a newspaper: Family breakdown and poor parenting, poverty, violence in the home, the Internet, the decline of religion and morality, video games, the proliferation of guns, lenient laws and weak sentences, a lack of discipline in schools, and on and on.
Joe Wamback, whose son Jonathan was beaten to within inches of his life by a group of Newmarket teens in 1999, says he's fed up with all the excuses for the behaviour of "psychopathic individuals."
"These scumbags make a conscious decision and we need to hold them accountable," Wamback says.
Still, most experts agree our youth are "soaked" in violence from their earliest years in a society that embraces the use of aggression to solve problems.
"Kids are fed a steady diet of aggression in all forms of popular culture," says Dr. Fred Mathews, psychologist and director of research at Central Toronto Youth Services.
'Scripts' for violence
"If you need scripts to teach you how to act out violently, they're everywhere."Mathews notes that many perpetrators of violence have been victims first, often of abuse, violence or neglect in their home.
There's much work being done. In Toronto, Mayor David Miller's community safety plan -- passed by council in March -- has led to the creation of a secretariat to co-ordinate anti-crime work and an advisory panel headed by Ontario Chief Justice Roy McMurtry.
Their work has focused on engaging youth in four neighbourhoods: Malvern, Jamestown, Jane and Finch, and the Kingston-Galloway area.
Toronto Police run a number of outreach and school programs, including the Empowered Student Partnerships program, which challenges high school students to address local problems by coming up with their own campaigns.
And there are programs like Youth Assisting Youth, which for 28 years has been pairing at-risk youth with young mentors to effect change "one kid at a time."
But ultimately, Mathews says, we must begin by looking in the mirror.
"Our children and youth can never be any healthier than the adults around them," he says.
Murder rate lowest since '67
September 30, 2004Toronto Sun
By Kathleen Harris
CANADA'S MURDER rate has dipped to its lowest level since 1967, falling by 7% to 1.73 victims per 100,000 population. Statistics Canada figures released yesterday count 548 homicide victims in 2003 -- with 50 fewer women killed than a year earlier.
Ontario's murder toll was static at 178.
Steve Sullivan, president of the Canadian Resource Centre for Victims of Crime, welcomed the overall decline but raised alarms about the soaring volume of unsolved murders (141) and the hike in homicides committed by youth.
Gun control measures
Last year, 57 kids aged 12-17 were accused of murder -- 15 more than the year before.Sullivan credited a healthy economy and national gun control measures for helping drive down homicide rates.
"Opponents of the registry always say criminals don't use rifles and shotguns, but we know people who kill in their own home do," he said. "I think the fact those numbers are down is encouraging."
While guns remain the murder weapon of choice in Canada, the use of rifles and shotguns is down by half -- from 40% to 20% -- over the past decade.
Alex Swann, spokesman for Public Safety Minister Anne McLellan, said the positive pattern shows the federal gun registry is working.
Boondoggle
But Conservative MP Garry Breitkreuz balked at a suggested link between gun registry and lower murder rates, insisting it's a weak attempt to justify a $1-billion boondoggle.The StatsCan report also found most homicides were committed by someone the victim knew, with crimes committed by strangers hitting a 25-year low. While 64 men killed their wives, only 14 women killed their husbands.
One in seven homicides was related to organized crime or street gangs.
Viciousness of youth attacks increases while numbers remain static
December 7, 2003Canadian Press
By Emily Yearwood-Lee
VANCOUVER (CP) - The memories came rushing back for Len Libin with the news of a fatal attack on a Grade 11 student walking home from a game of pickup basketball last week.
Three years ago, Libin's son, then a 17-year-old athlete and bright student, was beaten into a coma in a random attack by two teenagers and an adult.
The victims of such attacks, says the senior Libin, "so often seem to be just good kids that you hear about that haven't really created problems and just for some reason, I don't know why, are picked."
Joel Libin survived and, despite having to go through extensive rehabilitation, has done "remarkably well," says his father.
The 17-year-old killed last week was not so fortunate.
He was buried Friday, a week after he and three Filipino friends walked past a group of Indo-Canadian teenagers who allegedly called out racial slurs.
There was a chase and the victim, apparently the slowest in the group, was caught and beaten with a blunt object. He died hours later in hospital.
The sheer viciousness of seemingly random attacks by teenagers seems to be increasing, say youth crime experts, although they maintain the actual number of youth murders has remained static.
"What strikes me as a researcher is what I say is an apparent increase in the brutality," says Ray Corrado, a criminologist at Simon Fraser University.
Sibylle Artz, an expert in youth violence at the University of Victoria, agrees.
"That seems to be a consensus among many people who deal with the youth directly," she says.
"They all tell the same story, that they have this experience of this being more brutal, more extreme," says Artz.
"When an attack is perpetrated, it doesn't stop when somebody's down."
The Vancouver teen's death comes on the heals of a Toronto 12-year-old's slaying, allegedly by three teenagers, who were charged with first-degree murder. The victim's brother is one of the accused.
In another high-profile case, three Alberta teenagers were sentenced last month to spend 60 days in custody for spiking a slushie with a toxic chemical and serving it to a fellow student.
The motive appears to have been a dislike for the victim, whom the girls suspected of hacking into one of their computers and erasing the hard drive.
Stranger killings are far more rare, says Corrado. Police aren't aware of any prior relationship between the Vancouver victim and his alleged attackers.
One of the more controversial aspects of the Filipino youth's killing is the suggestion that race was a contributing factor.
Police have hesitated to say the attack was racially motivated, although they acknowledge racial taunts were called out by members of the Indo-Canadian group before Filipino teenager and his friends were chased.
The principal of the victim's school said last week she didn't view the attack as a racial incident.
"I think it was a violent incident," said Jennifer Palmer of Charles Tupper secondary school. "I think the people who perpetrated it may have behaved that way to any group of kids walking down the street."
In a narrow sense, the killing may have been racially motivated, says Corrado.
"The larger question is, would it have happened with another group of young people there that were even (Indo-Canadian)," he says, suggesting the answer would be "yes."
"The violence is what they are looking for; the particular target, they are not."
Regardless of motivation, Corrado and Artz said the number of youth killings in Canada has stayed at roughly the same level - 40 to 50 a year - for the last few decades.
"While the acts are horrific, there is very little indication that youth murder has gone up," says Corrado.
"Canada's youth are still quantitatively relatively non-violent, definitely compared to the United States," he says. "We're not a society where we need to be in constant fear of young people."
The criminologist could only speculate when asked for an explanation as to why brutality of random acts seems to be increasing.
"I've argued it might reflect the cultural norms of the last 15, 20 years, where video games and movies and music, even television, portray a level of violence that is really extraordinary," says Corrado.
Artz agrees. "I believe that having the imagery constantly in front of them, (communicating) that it's fine to use weapons, clubs, action-hero type behaviours.
"We are normalizing the use of violence in our efforts to sell goods."
http://www.thefreeradical.ca/research/violentCrimeStatsCanada.html
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Homicide in Canada, 2010
By Tina Hotton Mahony- Lowest homicide rate in over 40 years
- Homicide rates highest in the western provinces and the territories
- Thunder Bay records the highest homicide rate in 2010
- Firearm-related homicides continue to decline
- Gang-related homicides decline for second year in a row
- Saskatchewan records highest rate of gang-related homicide in 2010
- Victims of gang-related homicide often involved in criminal activities
- Gang-related homicides less likely than other homicides to be solved
- Declines in homicide reported across all major relationship categories
- Rates of intimate partner homicide remained stable in 2010
- Increase in homicides committed by common-law and dating partners
- Occupational risk of homicide
- Youth accounted for 1 in 10 persons accused of homicide
- Summary
- Detailed data tables
- Data Source
- References
- Notes
This Juristat article presents 2010 homicide data, marking the 50th consecutive year for which this information has been collected by Statistics Canada. Trends in gang-related homicide, homicides involving firearms, homicides by youth, and intimate partner homicide are highlighted. This report also presents a profile of homicides involving accused persons with a suspected mental or developmental disorder.
Lowest homicide rate in over 40 years
Following a decade of relative stability, homicides decreased substantially in 2010. There were 554 police-reported homicides in 2010, 56 fewer than the year before (Table 1a). The 2010 homicide rate fell to 1.62 per 100,000 population, its lowest level since 1966 (Chart 1).Chart 1
Homicides, Canada, 1961 to 2010
1. Excludes 329 victims killed in the Air India incident in 1985.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
The 2010 decline in homicides resulted from fewer homicides committed against both males and females (Table 9). The drop in the rate of homicides against males (-12%) was double that for females (-6%), reaching its lowest point in more than 30 years (Chart 2).Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Chart 2
Homicides, by sex of victim, Canada, 1980 to 2010
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Homicide rates highest in the western provinces and the territories
The overall drop in homicides was driven largely by fewer homicides in the western part of the country, primarily in British Columbia. With 35 fewer homicides in 2010 than in 2009, the rate in British Columbia (1.83) fell 31% and reached its lowest point since the mid-1960s. Notable declines were also reported in Alberta (18 fewer homicides) and Manitoba (12 fewer homicides).Despite declines, the 2010 homicide rates were generally higher in the western provinces and northern territories than in the eastern part of the country, continuing the pattern seen over many decades (Table 1b). Drawing comparisons between the provinces, the homicide rate was highest in Manitoba (3.6) and Saskatchewan (3.3) (Chart 3), with rates double the national average. The exception to this pattern was in Nova Scotia (2.2), where the homicide rate rose 39% in 2010 to its highest level since 1998 and the third highest rate among the provinces.
As in British Columbia, Quebec's 2010 homicide rate (1.1) fell to its lowest point since the mid-1960s. Although the rates in Ontario (1.4) as well as Newfoundland and Labrador (0.8) increased from 2009, they remained below the national average. For the second consecutive year, there were no homicides reported in Prince Edward Island.
Homicide rates in the three territories tend to fluctuate considerably from year to year due to their small populations. Among the three territories, the number of homicides was highest in Nunavut with six victims. Yukon and the Northwest Territories each reported 1 homicide in 2010, lower than their previous 10-year averages (Table 1a).
Chart 3
Homicides, by province, 2010
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Thunder Bay records the highest homicide rate in 2010
Among Canada's census metropolitan areas (CMAs),1 Thunder Bay reported the highest homicide rate in 2010 (4.2 homicides per 100,000 population) for the second year in a row. This city's rate was followed by the western CMAs of Saskatoon (3.7) and Regina (3.7), where homicide rates have been above the national average for more than a decade (Table 2).Substantial declines in homicide occurred in several of Canada's largest CMAs in 2010. More specifically, with 25 fewer homicides than the year before, Vancouver's rate fell 42%, resulting in this city's lowest homicide rate since CMA data became available in 1981. Substantial declines were also recorded in Calgary (-39%), Winnipeg (-32%) and Toronto (-13%). Toronto's rate was at its lowest point since 1999.
There is a relatively common misperception in Canada that homicide, and violent crime more generally, is a big city phenomenon (Francisco and Chénier 2007). While almost one-third of Canada's homicides occurred in its three largest CMAs (Toronto, Montréal and Vancouver), the incidence of homicide in these CMAs relative to the size of their populations (i.e. their rates) was below the national average (Chart 4). The 2010 homicide rate in Canada was lower in CMAs than in non-CMAs (1.5 versus 1.9 per 100,000), although this difference was less pronounced over the previous 10-year period (1.8 and 1.9 respectively).
Chart 4
Homicides, by Canada's ten largest census metropolitan areas, 2010
1. Ottawa refers to the Ontario part of the Ottawa-Gatineau CMA.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Text box 1
International comparisons of homicide
Most cross-national research on crime focuses on homicide because of its reliability (Nivette 2011; Van Dijk 2008). Canada's 2010 homicide rate was similar to many European countries, but remained one-third that of the United States (Text box Chart 5).1Chart 5
Homicide rates for selected countries
1. Figures reflect 2010 data.
2. Figures reflect 2009 data.
Source: Statistics Canada, Interpol Ottawa and national statistical office websites.
2. Figures reflect 2009 data.
Source: Statistics Canada, Interpol Ottawa and national statistical office websites.
1. Although the measurement of homicide is considered more reliable than other types of crime, differences in data-collection techniques and definitions across international sources can occur. For example, there may be different approaches to defining intentional and unintentional homicide, and some nations do not distinguish between attempted and completed homicides (Nivette 2011). For these reasons, comparisons are only drawn between nations that follow similar definitions and approaches to collection.
End of text box 1.
Firearm-related homicides continue to decline
Over the past 30 years, the most common method used to commit homicide has varied between shootings and stabbings (Chart 6). In 2010, 32% of homicides involved shootings, followed by stabbings (31%) and beatings (22%). The remaining incidents were committed by strangulation or suffocation (8%), or other methods (8%) such as by motor vehicle, fire, poisoning and Shaken Baby Syndrome (Table 3). Although there have been some annual fluctuations, there was a decrease in shootings from 2009 to 2010 (-7%), consistent with a general decline in firearm-related homicides seen over the past three decades.Chart 6
Homicides, by most common type of method, 1980 to 2010
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Firearms are more likely to be used to commit homicide in some areas of the country than in others (Table 4). When looking at Canada's 10 largest CMAs, for example, one-half of all homicides in Toronto were committed with a firearm in 2010, followed by Vancouver (44%) and Montréal (33%). In 2010, handguns accounted for the majority of homicides committed with a firearm (64%), followed by rifles or shotguns (23%), and other firearms such as sawed-off shotguns, automatic firearms or other firearm-like weapons (13%) (Table 5). Much of the decline in firearm-related homicide since the early 1980's can be attributed to a decrease in homicides involving a rifle or shotgun. Despite a small increase in 2010 (from 30 to 36 victims), recent rates of homicide involving a rifle or shotgun are about one-fifth of those seen 30 years ago (Chart 7).
Over the past three decades, the rates of handgun-related homicide have fluctuated, though notable declines have been seen in recent years. More specifically, from 2007 to 2010, the rate of handgun-related homicide declined by 23%.
Chart 7
Firearm-related homicides, by type of firearm, Canada, 1980 to 2010
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Gang-related homicides decline for second year in a row
Overall, organized crime and/or gang activity is related to fewer than 1 in 5 homicides in Canada each year. According to the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), extreme violence is generally counter-productive for organized crime groups as it both distracts from profit-oriented activities and attracts the attention of law enforcement (CISC 2010). In the Homicide Survey, incidents are classified as "gang-related" when police believe the homicide occurred as a consequence of activities involving an organized crime group or street gang. Homicides of innocent bystanders who are killed as a result of gang-related activity are also considered to be gang-related.In 2010, 94 homicides were considered by police to be gang-related, accounting for 17% of all homicides reported to police. This represented a 25% drop and the second annual decline, following a high in 2008 when 138 homicides were reported by police as gang-related (Table 6). Despite these recent declines, the rate of gang-related homicide has generally been increasing in all provinces since the Homicide Survey began recording this information in 1991 (Chart 8). The only exception is in Quebec, where gang-related homicide was at its highest in 2000.
Chart 8
Gang-related homicides, Canada, 1991 to 2010
Note: These data became available beginning in 1991.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Saskatchewan records highest rate of gang-related homicide in 2010
Among the provinces2, Saskatchewan was the only province to report a notable increase in gang-related homicide, rising from 4 homicides in 2009 to 10 in 2010. Ontario, Manitoba and British Columbia all reported notable decreases in the number of gang-related homicides over the previous year (Table 6).Winnipeg and Vancouver reported the highest rates of gang-related homicide among the ten largest CMAs, followed by Montréal, Toronto and Edmonton (Table 4). However, rates of gang-related homicide in Winnipeg, Vancouver and Toronto were substantially lower in 2010 than in 2009 (decreasing by 56%, 49% and 35% respectively).
Victims of gang-related homicide often involved in criminal activities
The characteristics of gang-related homicides tend to differ from other types of homicides in a number of ways. Compared to homicides that were not gang-related, gang-related homicides in 2010 were more likely to have been committed by more than one accused person (66% versus 13%), to have involved the use of firearms (76% versus 18%) and to have been related to the illegal drug trade (such as trafficking or settling of drug-related accounts) (62% versus 9%). The most common drugs identified in gang-related homicides involving drugs were cocaine (51%) and cannabis (31%).Victims of gang-related homicides, like persons accused in these incidents, are usually male, relatively young and are often involved in criminal activities themselves. More specifically, in 2010, close to 93% of gang-related homicides involved a male victim, compared to 66% of other homicide victims. Victims of gang-related homicides were also younger on average than other homicide victims (31 and 36 years, respectively), though not as young as persons accused in gang-related incidents (24 years on average).
Close to 7 in 10 victims in gang-related homicides (68%) had a criminal record, lower than the proportion among persons accused in gang-related incidents (88%). Victims of these homicides were also more likely to be involved in criminal activities themselves. Police respondents recorded illegal activities as the main source of "employment" for 7 in 10 victims of gang-related homicide (71%), six times higher than for other homicide victims (12%). The most common motive3 recorded by police for gang-related homicide was the settling of accounts (61%).
Gang-related homicides less likely than other homicides to be solved
In 2010, almost three-quarters of homicides (75%) were solved by police through the identification of an accused person. This proportion of solved or "cleared" homicides remained unchanged from 2009, and mirrored the previous 10-year average.4Gang-related homicides are less likely than other homicides to be solved by police. Police identified an accused person in 34% of gang-related homicides in 2010 compared to 89% of non-gang-related homicides. This is consistent with previous research, which suggests that homicides involving criminal associates and illegal activities (e.g., gangs, drugs, prostitution) take longer on average for police to solve, and are generally more likely to go unsolved (Dauvergne and Li 2006).
Declines in homicide reported across all major relationship categories
Among solved homicides in 2010, most victims (83%) knew their killer. Acquaintances comprised the majority of accused persons (40%), followed by family members (34%), strangers (17%), and criminal relationships (9%) (Table 7).Between 2009 and 2010, declines in homicide rates were reported across all four major accused-victim relationship categories (Chart 9). Rates of homicide committed by acquaintances and family members saw a decrease of 7% and 9% respectively. Rates fell even further for homicides committed by strangers (-14%) and criminal acquaintances (-21%).
Chart 9
Homicides, by accused-victim relationship, Canada, 1991 to 2010
1. Acquaintances include boyfriend/girlfriend and other non-spousal intimate relationships, close friends, neighbours, authority figures, business relationships (legal) and casual acquaintances.
2. Family relationships include current and former spouses (legal, common-law, same-sex), parents and children (including biological, adopted, step and foster relationships), siblings and other extended family.
3. Criminal relationships include, for example, prostitutes, drug dealers and their clients, loansharks and gang members. It should be noted that some gang-related homicides may have been scored as "acquaintance".
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
2. Family relationships include current and former spouses (legal, common-law, same-sex), parents and children (including biological, adopted, step and foster relationships), siblings and other extended family.
3. Criminal relationships include, for example, prostitutes, drug dealers and their clients, loansharks and gang members. It should be noted that some gang-related homicides may have been scored as "acquaintance".
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Rates of intimate partner homicide remained stable in 2010
There are many different ways of defining intimate relationships in the context of lethal violence (Johnson and Dawson 2011). The focus can be on "spousal homicide" in marital or common-law relationships, or can be expanded to include lethal violence that occurs in dating relationships. In this section of the article, the broader scope is used, and the term "intimate partner homicide" is applied.Over the past three decades there has been a general decline in the rate of intimate partner homicide in Canada (decreasing 32% from 1980 to 2010) (Chart 10). A decline in rates of homicide committed by an intimate partner can be found in most parts of the country, with the largest decreases reported in British Columbia and Ontario.5 Previous research has suggested that a decline in rates of intimate partner homicide can be attributed to many factors, including improvements in women's socioeconomic status and the increased availability of resources for victims of violence (Dawson et al. 2009; Pottie Bunge 2002; Dugan et al. 1999).
In recent years, the number of intimate partner homicides, including spousal homicides, has been relatively stable. In 2010, there were 89 victims of homicide by an intimate partner, one above the number recorded in 2009.
Chart 10
Intimate partner homicides, Canada, 1980 to 2010
Note: Rates are calculated per 100,000 population (aged 15 years and older). Intimate partners include current and former spouses (legal, common-law and same sex) as well as persons in dating and other intimate relationships.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Increase in homicides committed by common-law and dating partners
The risk of intimate partner homicide varies according to a number of factors, including the characteristics of the victim and the type of relationship shared with the accused.6 In 2010, current and former common-law spouses accounted for close to one-half of homicides committed by an intimate partner (45%), followed equally by legal spouses (28%) and dating partners (28%). This was a considerable shift from the previous ten-year period, when current or former legal spouses made up the largest share of persons accused of killing an intimate partner (42%).In fact, much of the decline in intimate partner homicide over the past 30 years can be attributed to a decline in homicides in the context of legal marriage. The number of homicides by current and former legal spouses decreased 52% from 1980 to 2010, while homicides within common-law and dating relationships increased (Chart 11). This trend may reflect a demographic shift across the country in which more young couples are deciding to delay marriage or selecting a common-law relationship prior to, or as an alternative to, legal marriage (Clark 2007).
Chart 11
Intimate partner homicide, by relationship type, 1980 to 2010
Note: Includes both current and former relationships. Same-sex spouses were removed from this analysis as the Homicide Survey does not collect information on the legal status of same-sex unions. Percentages are calculated for victims aged 15 years and over.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
However, even with the shifting composition of conjugal relationships in Canada, women and men were more likely to be killed by a common-law partner than a married partner. When the number of homicides was adjusted to account for the population in these types of unions, the 2010 rate of homicide in current common-law relationships was nearly 8 times higher than the rate in current marital relationships (1.12 and 0.15 respectively).7Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Occupational risk of homicide
Starting in 1997, the Homicide Survey was expanded to include questions on the occupation of the victim and whether or not the homicide was a direct result of the victim's profession.8 Omitting illegal occupations (such as drug dealing and prostitution9), there were 130 homicides from 2000 to 2010 that police believed were directly related to the victim's job. Twenty-seven of these homicides involved transportation-related occupations, such as taxi drivers, truck drivers, and bus drivers. Another 1 in 5 work-related homicides (26) involved security occupations (including police10 and correctional officers as well as other security personnel). Retail employees (including service station and convenience store clerks) accounted for 22 of all work-related homicides, followed by restaurant, bar and hotel workers (19), and janitors or superintendents (6).11Since 2000, police recorded that 78 prostitutes were killed as a direct result of their occupation, including 5 in 2010. This was lower than the average number of 7 victims killed each year between 2000 and 2009.
Youth accounted for 1 in 10 persons accused of homicide
There were 56 youth (12 to 17 years of age) accused of homicide in 2010, down from 79 the previous year. This number was slightly lower than the 2000 to 2009 average of 59 youth accused of homicide per year. Male youth have consistently been more likely than female youth to be accused of homicide, with the rate for males about 10 times higher than that for females in 2010 (Table 8, Chart 12).Homicides committed by youth differ from those committed by adults in several different ways. For example, compared to adults, solved homicides with a youth accused were more likely to be gang-related (25% compared to 12%) and were more likely to involve a co-accused (57% compared to 36%).
Chart 12
Youth (12 to 17 years) accused of homicide, by sex, Canada, 1980 to 2010
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Text box 2
Persons accused of homicide with a suspected mental or developmental disorder
There has been growing concern over the past decade over the involvement of individuals with mental illnesses in crime and the criminal justice system. In 2001, the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology1 formed a roundtable on mental health, and found that more data were needed on the mental health status of Canadians, including those passing through the criminal justice system.One of the main challenges in gathering consistent data on the involvement of individuals with mental illness in the criminal justice system is selecting a precise and common definition. That is, the types of behaviours and conditions that could be included in a definition of mental illness can vary widely, which in turn, poses challenges for targeted and meaningful data collection (Sinha 2009).
In 1997, a question was added to the Homicide Survey that asks police services to indicate if the accused person was suffering from a suspected mental or developmental disorder at the time of the homicide.2 This encompasses a wide variety of conditions such as schizophrenia, depression, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, mental disability, dementia, psychotic and neurotic illnesses or sociopathic tendencies. It is important to note that this information is based on the investigating police officer's assessment and does not reflect a diagnosis from a medical professional.
Between 2000 and 2010, there were 621 persons accused of homicide reported by police to have a suspected mental or developmental disorder, accounting for 13%3 of all persons accused over this time period. More than one-half of all accused persons with a suspected mental or developmental disorder killed a family member (56%), followed by an acquaintance (33%), stranger (10%) or criminal associate (1%).4 Approximately 1 in 3 (33%) had a previous conviction for a violent offence and 1 in 5 (18%) had a previous conviction(s) for a non-violent offence, lower than other persons accused of homicide (42% and 21% respectively).
The characteristics of homicides involving an accused with a suspected mental or developmental disorder differ in a number of different ways from other homicides. A higher proportion of female (18%) than male accused (13%) were reported as having a suspected mental or developmental disorder. The prevalence of these conditions among the accused population also increased steadily with age. Among accused persons 18 to 24 years of age, approximately 7% were suspected of having a mental illness, rising to 33% among accused persons over the age of 55 (Chart 13).
Chart 13
Persons accused of homicide with a suspected mental or developmental disorder, within each age group, 2000 to 2010
Note: This chart reports persons with a suspected mental or developmental disorder as a proportion of all accused within each age category.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide Survey.
1. Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology. 2006. Out of the Shadows At Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction Services in Canada. Final Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.(accessed August 5, 2011).
2. The Homicide Survey questionnaire was revised in 2005 to include a separate category for "suspected" mental or developmental disorder. For the purpose of this analysis, the suspected and affirmative categories were combined to allow for a longer time series. There was no substantial difference in the proportion of accused persons recorded as having a mental or developmental disorder after the question was changed in 2005.
3. For approximately one-quarter of accused persons (24%), the mental health status was recorded by police as "unknown". These cases were not included in the calculation of percentages in this section.
4. This is based on a subset of incidents involving a single accused.
2. The Homicide Survey questionnaire was revised in 2005 to include a separate category for "suspected" mental or developmental disorder. For the purpose of this analysis, the suspected and affirmative categories were combined to allow for a longer time series. There was no substantial difference in the proportion of accused persons recorded as having a mental or developmental disorder after the question was changed in 2005.
3. For approximately one-quarter of accused persons (24%), the mental health status was recorded by police as "unknown". These cases were not included in the calculation of percentages in this section.
4. This is based on a subset of incidents involving a single accused.
End of text box 2.
Summary
Following a decade of relative stability, Canada's homicide rate fell 10% in 2010 and reached its lowest level in more than forty years. With some exceptions, annual declines were reported in most parts of the country, and included decreases in rates of gang-related homicide (-25%) and homicides involving firearms (-7%).Decreases were recorded for homicides committed by criminal associates (-21%), strangers (-14%), family members (-9%) and acquaintances (-7%). Focusing exclusively on intimate relationships, the rate has remained relatively stable for the past three years following several decades of relative decline. Declines in homicide by married spouses were off-set by an increase in homicide in common-law and dating relationships reflecting, in part, changes in the composition of conjugal relationships in Canada.
Detailed data tables
Table 1A Number of homicides by province or territory, 1980 to 2010Table 1B Homicide rates by province or territory, 1980 to 2010
Table 2 Homicides, by census metropolitan area, 2009 and 2010
Table 3 Methods used to commit homicide, Canada, 2000 to 2010
Table 4 Firearm-related and gang-related homicides, Canada's ten largest census metropolitan areas, 2010
Table 5 Homicides involving firearms, by type of firearm, Canada, 2000 to 2010
Table 6 Number of gang-related homicides, by region, 2000 to 2010
Table 7 Solved homicides by accused-victim relationship, Canada, 2010
Table 8 Youth (12 to 17 years) accused of homicide, Canada, 2000 to 2010
Table 9 Homicide victims and accused persons, by sex, Canada, 2000 to 2010
Data Source
The Homicide Survey collects police-reported data on the characteristics of all homicide incidents, victims and accused persons in Canada. The Homicide Survey began collecting information on all murders in 1961 and was expanded in 1974 to include all incidents of manslaughter and infanticide. Although details on these incidents are not available prior to 1974, counts are available from the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey and are included in the historical aggregate totals.Whenever a homicide becomes known to police, the investigating police service completes the survey questionnaires, which are then sent to Statistics Canada. There are cases where homicides become known to police months or years after they occurred. These incidents are counted in the year in which they become known to police. Information on persons accused of homicide are only available for solved incidents (i.e. where at least one accused has been identified). Accused characteristics are updated as homicide cases are solved and new information is submitted to the Homicide Survey. For incidents involving more than one accused, only the relationship between the victim and the closest accused is recorded.
References
Brennan, S. and M. Dauvergne. 2011. "Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2010." Juristat. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X.(accessed September 15, 2011).
Clark, W. 2007. "Delayed transitions of young adults." Canadian Social Trends. No. 84. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-008-X.
(accessed September 15, 2011).
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. 2010. 2010 Report on Organized Crime. CISC Catalogue no. PS61 -1/2010.
(accessed September 15, 2011).
Dauvergne, M. and G. Li. 2006. "Homicide in Canada, 2005." Juristat. Vol. 26, no. 6. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
(accessed September 15, 2011).
Dawson, M., V. Pottie Bunge and T. Baldé. 2009. "National trends in intimate partner homicides: explaining declines in Canada, 1976 to 2001." Violence Against Women. Sage Publications. Vol. 15, no. 3.
Dugan, L., D. S. Nagin and R. Rosenfield. 1999. "Explaining the decline in intimate partner homicide: the effects of changing domesticity, women's status, and domestic violence resources." Homicide Studies. Sage Publications. Vol. 3, no. 3. p. 187-214.
Francisco, J. and C. Chénier. 2007. "A comparison of large urban, small urban and rural crime rates, 2005." Juristat. Vol. 27, no. 3. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
(accessed September 15, 2011).
Gannon, M., K. Mihorean, K. Beattie, A. Taylor-Butts and R. Kong, 2005. Criminal Justice Indicators. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-227-X.
(accessed September 15, 2011).
Johnson, H. and M. Dawson. 2011. Violence Against Women in Canada: Research and Policy Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Marshall, Ineke and Carolyn Block. 2004. "Maximizing the availability of cross-national data on homicide." Homicide Studies. Sage Publications. Vol. 8, no. 3. p. 267-310.
Nivette, A. 2011. "Cross-national predictors of crime: a meta-analysis." Homicide Studies. Sage Publications. Vol. 15, no. 2. p. 103-131.
Pottie Bunge, V. 2002. "National trends in intimate partner homicide, 1974-2000." Juristat. Vol. 22, no. 5. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
(accessed September 15, 2011).
Sinha, M. 2009. "An investigation into the feasibility of collecting data on the involvement of adults and youth with mental health issues in the criminal justice system." Crime and Justice Research Paper Series. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-681-M, no. 16.
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology. 2006. Out of the Shadows At Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction Services in Canada. Final Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.
(accessed August 5, 2011).
Van Dijk, J. 2008. The World of Crime: Breaking the Silence on Problems of Security, Justice, and Development Across the World. Sage Publications.
Notes
1. A census metropolitan area (CMA) consists of one or more neighbouring municipalities situated around a major urban core. A CMA must have a total population of at least 100,000 of which 50,000 or more live in the urban core. To be included in the CMA, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the central urban area, as measured by commuting flows derived from census data. A CMA typically comprises more than one police service.2. Due to the small number of gang-related homicides in the Atlantic provinces, they were combined for this analysis. Annual increases or declines may have been reported among one or more of the individual provinces in this region.
3. Incidents in which the motive was recorded as unknown were removed from the calculation of percentages. They accounted for 11% of all incidents between 1991 and 2010.
4. It is important to note that because of the complexity of many homicide investigations, some incidents are solved after having been reported to the Homicide Survey. While this information is updated annually, some incidents may be missed. In a retrospective study to update clearance status information on all unsolved homicides that occurred between 1961 and 2005, the clearance status of 11% of these previously unsolved homicides were updated to solved. Consequently this information should be used with caution as the proportion of solved cases may be slightly underestimated.
5. Due to the small number of homicides in the eastern provinces and in the northern territories, this trend is based upon combined rates for the Atlantic region and the three territories.
6. The following analysis excludes a small number of same-sex spouses as the Homicide Survey does not collect information on the legal status of same-sex unions.
7. Separated and divorced common-law and marital partners were not included in the calculation of these rates due to the unavailability of population data for former common-law unions. Rates are based upon 2009 marital status population estimates, the most recent data available at the time of publication. Same-sex spouses were removed from this analysis as the Homicide Survey does not collect information on the legal status of same-sex unions.
8. In most cases, the victim will have been on the job at the time of the incident; however, there will be some incidents where the homicide was occupation-related but the victim was not actually working at the time of the killing (e.g. an off-duty police officer who is killed out of revenge).
9. Although prostitution is not illegal in Canada, many acts related to sex work are prohibited, such as public communication for the purpose of prostitution, living off the avails of prostitution, and operating or using a bawdy house.
10. There were 20 police officers and constables killed on the job between 2000 and 2010, including 1 in 2010.
11. The remaining 29 work-related homicides involved various other occupations.
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Combat Gang Violence
American and Canadian law enforcement officials have adopted a common definition for “gang.” The definition of gang was drafted in a 2005 joint meeting of Police Chiefs, identifies a youth gang as, âThree or more persons, formerly or informally organized, engaged in a pattern of criminal behaviour creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation within any community; who may have a common name or identifying sign or symbol which may constitute a criminal organization as defined in the Criminal Code of Canada.â
Because most people associate gang activity with depressed American inner cities, the statistics often surprise them.  In its ground-breaking report, âYouth Gangs in Canada: What Do We Know?â, Public Safety Canada summarized results of nationwide law enforcement surveys, estimating thatâ¦
More alarming, the specifics call attention to the problemâs urgency:
Edmonton Police go on to detail social and environmental problems that contribute to gang membership.
âThe wraparound approachâ
In its carefully researched, evidence-based, comprehensive and compelling study, âPrevention of Youth Gang Violence: Overview of Strategies and Approaches,â Canadaâs National Crime Prevention Centre  strongly advocates, âthe wraparound approachâ to reduction of gang membership and gang-related crime. The report explains, âThe wraparound approach has been implemented in the United States and Canada throughout the 1990s, as well as more recently. The wraparound process is an intensive, individualized care management approach designed for children, youth and individuals with serious or complex emotional and/or behavioural problems.
A comprehensive continuum of individualized services and support networks are adapted to meet the unique needs of individuals. This approach differs from traditional interventions in that it is less prescriptive and allows for flexibility in the design of the service delivery model.â Advocates note that the Centreâs plan treats gang participation as a constellation of emotional and behavioural issues which will respond to proper intervention and treatment.
How you can help
Crime Stoppers of Northern Minnesota and Northwest Ontario encourage you to report all suspicious activity to policeâespecially if it shows telltale signs of gang involvement. Moreover, if you have first-hand knowledge of gang activity in your neighborhood, call Crime Stoppers, where representatives always safeguard your anonymity and promptly relay important information to police. Most of all, please support Crime Stoppersâ efforts to combat all kinds of crime in our region.
https://tipshelp.com/know-the-signs/combat-gang-violence/
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In Canadaâs major cities, gang offenses typically are prosecuted under the laws governing âparticipation in a criminal organization.âSupplementing the Police Chiefsâ definition, the Montréal Police Service’s description stresses anti-social and delinquent behaviours that distinguish youth gangs from other criminal enterprises. Montreal Police identify a gang as, âAn organized group of adolescents and/or young adults who rely on group intimidation and violence, and commit criminal acts in order to gain power and recognition and/or control certain areas of unlawful activity.”
Consistent with Montrealâs stress on the value of power and recognition, officials in northern Minnesota and northwestern Ontario stress that gang members flagrantly display their criminal affiliation by wearing gang colours, getting tattoos of common gang symbols, flashing a variety of gang signsâtheir own specialized hand signals, and sometimes with âsignatureâ modi operandi  in their commission of violent crimes.In its extremely handy Gang factsheet, Deal.Org, part of the National Youth Services branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Crime Prevention Services, notes that gangs differ dramatically in size, structure, sophistication, and age. In general, though, gangs identify with and seek to control their neighborhoods, and they commit violent crimes to establish their hegemony over both territory and all criminal activity inside their territory. In many cases, gang members employ gratuitous violence to discourage and deter would-be competitors. Deal.Org also describes how youth gangs are responsible for the vast majority of graffiti and vandalism in their territories, and graffiti serves to establish strict, inviolable boundaries for the gangâs operations. Most youth gangs are linked to larger criminal enterprises in order to import and distribute drugs, smuggle and sell weapons, and conduct human trafficking to expand their sex trade. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police say that organized crime groups often employ youth gangs as debt collectors, car thieves, and âenforcers.â Just as importantly, Public Safety Canada adds, âOnce thought just to be in larger cities like Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal, youth gangs are now found in more rural areas as well.â
Because most people associate gang activity with depressed American inner cities, the statistics often surprise them.  In its ground-breaking report, âYouth Gangs in Canada: What Do We Know?â, Public Safety Canada summarized results of nationwide law enforcement surveys, estimating thatâ¦
- Canada has 434 youth gangs with roughly 7,000 members nationally.
- Ontario has the highest number of youth gangs and youth gang members in absolute terms, with 216 youth gangs and 3,320 youth gang members. Saskatchewan is second (28 youth gangs and 1,315 members), followed by British Columbia (102 youth gangs and 1,027 members)Â [9]. police in Ontario reported that 38% of gang-related drug trafficking and 15% each of the weapons possession and auto theft/exportation offences were committed in collaboration with organized crime groups.
- For the country as a whole, the vast majority of youth gang members are male (94%).
- Almost half (48%) of all youth gang members are under the age of 18. Most (39%) are between 16 and 18 years old.
- The largest proportion of youth gang members are African Canadian (25%), followed by First Nations (21%) and Caucasian (18%).
- Police agencies and Aboriginal organizations indicate that there is a growing percentage of female gang membership in western Canadian provinces, including British Columbia (12%), Manitoba (10%) and Saskatchewan (9%).
Detailing “Traits of Gang Members,” Edmonton Police say, “The excitement of gang activity, which often involves violence, danger, and outward expressions of cultural biases, coupled with the acceptance given by fellow gang members, provide the social support and community involvement that are often lacking in the lives of young male gang members.”According to officials at  Public Safety Canada,  âFrom a prevention perspective, it is vital to understand that youth involvement in crime and violence is linked with the experience of the gang itself⦠Most youth who join gangs have already been involved in crime, violence and illegal drug use. The prevalence and scope of youth gang involvement varies across the country, but the “gang effect” of increased delinquency, drug use and violence is a common thread.â Researchers also explain, âIn the United States, studies of large urban samples show that youth gang members are responsible for a large proportion of all violent adolescent offences. On average, 20% of gang members were responsible for committing about 80% of all serious violent adolescent offences.â Similarly, in Canada, one carefully controlled, reliable study found, âSixteen percent of alleged young offenders who were classified as chronic offenders were responsible for 58% of all alleged criminal incidents.â
More alarming, the specifics call attention to the problemâs urgency:
- There is a correlation between gang presence in schools and the availability of both guns and drugs in schools.
- 18.7% of boys (ages 14 to 17) in Montréal and 15.1% in Toronto have brought a gun to school.
- School dropouts who get involved in drug selling are at higher risk of being involved in gun-related violence.
Because of low self-worth and self-esteem, some youth join gangs seeking the status they lack due to unemployment or academic failure at school. If young people do not see themselves as intelligent, leaders, or star athletes, they join other groups where they feel they can excel.Many youngsters do not have a positive adult role model. Many see domestic violence and alcohol and other drug use in the home. Lack of parental involvement and the absence of rules and family rituals allow older gang members to be viewed as authority figures by young teens and children. Young people join gangs to receive the attention, affirmation, and protection they may feel they are lacking at home. Many street gang members carry on a family tradition established by siblings, parents, grandparents, uncles, aunts, or cousins who they see as role models. Joining a gang provides friends with whom they can share their free time.
Edmonton Police go on to detail social and environmental problems that contribute to gang membership.
Few job opportunities, no positive recreational choices, or lack of effective responses to peer pressure can create a climate favouring gang membership.Many people are without jobs or a source of income. Becoming a gang member can provide a teen with an opportunity to make large amounts money quickly, because many gangs are involved in the illegal sale of drugs and firearms. The monetary allure of gang membership is difficult to counteract. Gang members share profits from drug trafficking and other illegal activities. To a teen, money translates into social status.
âThe wraparound approachâ
In its carefully researched, evidence-based, comprehensive and compelling study, âPrevention of Youth Gang Violence: Overview of Strategies and Approaches,â Canadaâs National Crime Prevention Centre  strongly advocates, âthe wraparound approachâ to reduction of gang membership and gang-related crime. The report explains, âThe wraparound approach has been implemented in the United States and Canada throughout the 1990s, as well as more recently. The wraparound process is an intensive, individualized care management approach designed for children, youth and individuals with serious or complex emotional and/or behavioural problems.
A comprehensive continuum of individualized services and support networks are adapted to meet the unique needs of individuals. This approach differs from traditional interventions in that it is less prescriptive and allows for flexibility in the design of the service delivery model.â Advocates note that the Centreâs plan treats gang participation as a constellation of emotional and behavioural issues which will respond to proper intervention and treatment.
Taking the problem out of the criminal justice system and assigning it to clinicians and educators, the wraparound approach goes to the heart of most gang membersâ motivation.Advocates concede that effective wraparound programs will differ from one area to another, but they insist a common set of six general principles and practices must guide the development and implementation of local interventions:
- A collaborative, community-based interagency team (with professionals from youth justice, education, mental health and social services systems) designs, implements and oversees the project.
- A formal interagency agreement identifies the target population for the initiative: how they will be enrolled in the program; how services will be delivered and paid for; what roles different agencies and individuals will play; and what resources will be committed by various groups.
- Care coordinators are responsible for helping participants create a customized treatment program for guiding youth and their families through the system of care.
- Â Child and family teams (family members, paid service providers, and community members such as teachers and mentors), who know the youth and his/her complex needs, work in partnership to ensure that the young personâs needs in all life domains are addressed with cultural competence.
- A youth-driven comprehensive plan of care, which is updated continually, identifies the young personâs unique strengths and weaknesses across domains, targets specific goals and outlines action plans. This plan addresses the role of individual team members (young person and family included) in achieving the goals.
- All wraparound programs articulate specific performance measures to assess the outcome of interventions throughout the course of the initiative.
How you can help
Crime Stoppers of Northern Minnesota and Northwest Ontario encourage you to report all suspicious activity to policeâespecially if it shows telltale signs of gang involvement. Moreover, if you have first-hand knowledge of gang activity in your neighborhood, call Crime Stoppers, where representatives always safeguard your anonymity and promptly relay important information to police. Most of all, please support Crime Stoppersâ efforts to combat all kinds of crime in our region.
https://tipshelp.com/know-the-signs/combat-gang-violence/
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2009
INTRODUCTION
On February 9, 2009, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (the Committee) adopted the following motion:
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), it is moved that the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights devote four sittings to the study of the state of organized crime in Canada and the consequential legislative amendments that should be made and that the Chair report its conclusions and recommendations to the House.
The Committee quickly realized that many more meetings than those discussed in the motion would be required in order for it to acquire some understanding of the state of organized crime for three main reasons. One was that the witnesses who testified before the Committee made it clear that the term “organized crime” covered a wide array of criminal activities that affected many facets of Canadian society. Its effects can be felt not only in the criminal justice system, but also in the areas of education and social services, to name but a few. To explore properly the effects of organized crime and the legislative means of tackling it would take many more meetings than originally scheduled.
The second main reason to have more meetings on organized crime was that the issues raised were not only large in number, but complex in nature. One example of this was the issue of crime prevention versus crime deterrence. Different witnesses had different perspectives on this topic, depending upon their background. The Committee chose to hear from a diverse range of witnesses, including law enforcement officials, victims of crime, workers with social service agencies, academics, journalists, business people, government officials, and members of the public. Out of this diverse group of witnesses, the Committee was presented with a wide range of opinions on the many issues addressed in this report.
The third main reason that more meetings would be required to carry out this study was that no single definition of “organized crime” can be applied across Canada. In such a diverse country of regions, it is perhaps not surprising that organized crime takes on many and different forms in different parts of Canada. As a result, a legislative solution that may work in one area may prove to be less effective in another. The Committee, therefore, felt it was important to explore as many different parts of Canada as budgets and time allowed in order to investigate the nature of organized crime at the local level.
The Committee was left with difficult decisions as to where to travel as part of its study. In the end, it has heard witnesses in Ottawa, travelled to Vancouver, Montréal, Halifax, Toronto, Edmonton, and Winnipeg for public hearings, and received briefs from various individuals and organizations.[1] While it was not possible to visit every community that members of the Committee wished to, it was felt that the cities chosen provided some representation of the diversity of organized crime activities in Canada. In addition to its organized crime study, the Committee has also heard related testimony on Bill C-14, an Act to amend the Criminal Code (organized crime and protection of justice system participants)[2] and as part of a study on declaring certain groups to be criminal organizations.[3] The Committee also benefited from testimony on the issue of “gangsterism” heard during the 1st Session of the 39th Parliament.[4]
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Organized crime poses a serious long-term threat to Canada’s institutions, society, economy, and to our individual quality of life. Many organized crime groups use or exploit the legitimate economy to some degree by insulating their activities, laundering proceeds of crime and committing financial crimes via a legitimate front. Organized crime groups exploit opportunities around the country and create a sophisticated trans-national network to facilitate criminal activities and challenge law enforcement efforts.
The Committee was informed that gangs and organized crime have been with us for at least 150 years. Alienated and disenfranchised young men long ago forged a common bond of lawlessness, using crime as a means of generating wealth. New opportunities for organized crime arrived when illicit drugs became more widely available, due to the increasing ease of international travel and commerce.[5]
Organized crime involves white collar criminal activity, gang activity and both domestic and foreign participants. Organized crime is of concern not only for its direct impacts, such as the selling of illicit drugs, but also for the indirect impacts, such as the violence that spills into the larger community when rival organized crime groups try to gain control over areas in which to sell drugs.
There are immediate and direct costs to the victims of organized crime. These costs can be financial but, more importantly, they can be physical in nature as well as mentally and emotionally traumatic. The losses suffered by victims through such things as the violation of their sense of personal safety and security are long-lasting and difficult to measure. Victims of organized crime can be found everywhere as this type of crime knows no boundaries and carries out its activities in communities of all sizes. Such activities can occur everywhere through such things as fraud over the Internet, the sale of counterfeit goods, and breach of intellectual property laws. The cost of crime is not only a personal one, however, as it is passed on from victims to their insurance companies to businesses and then to consumers. In this way, the personal toll of organized crime becomes a burden on society as a whole. Furthermore, there is also a high price for taxpayers in the form of increased costs for law enforcement and the justice and correctional systems.
Domestic policing efforts across Canada increasingly require the development of strategies and programs that address the international components of organized crime. Currently, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and local law enforcement units are focused on reducing the threat and impact of organized crime. In countering the growth of organized crime groups and dismantling their structures and sub-groups, a critical component is the improved coordination, sharing and use of criminal intelligence and resources. This sharing of information and resources is used in support of integrated policing, law enforcement plans and strategies, and assists the police in communicating the impact and scope of organized crime.
The impact of organized crime on the lives of Canadians was certainly communicated clearly to the Committee throughout its hearings. The Committee also heard a level of frustration with how the justice system functions in this regard. There was often an expressed perception that this system operates with a bias in favour of the accused rather than the victim.[6]
LAWS IN RELATION TO ORGANIZED CRIME
The offence of participation in a criminal organization was enacted in 1997 as part of Bill C-95.[7] At that time, a “criminal organization” meant any group, association or other body consisting of five or more persons, whether formally or informally organized, that met two requirements: (1) have as one of its primary activities the commission of an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or more; and (2) any or all of its members engage in, or have, within the preceding five years, engaged in the commission of a series of such offences. That offence was punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 14 years, and required that the accused have participated in the activities of a gang and been a party to the commission of an indictable offence committed in relation to a criminal group.
Coming into force in 2000, Bill C-22 created the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).[8] FINTRAC is an independent agency responsible for the collection, analysis, assessment and disclosure of information in order to assist in the detection, prevention and deterrence of money laundering and financing of terrorist activities in Canada and abroad. FINTRAC receives reports from financial institutions and intermediaries, analyzes and assesses the reported information, and discloses suspicions of money laundering or of terrorist financing activities to police authorities and others as permitted by its governing legislation. FINTRAC also discloses to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) information that is relevant to threats to the security of Canada.
Concerns were expressed by police and prosecutors that the definition of a “criminal organization” was too complex and too narrow in scope. As a result, in 2002, Bill C-24[9] amended the definition of a “criminal organization” in three main ways by:
Therefore, the definition of “criminal organization” now requires that a group, however organized, meet two requirements: (1) be composed of three or more persons in or outside Canada; and (2) have, as one of its main purposes or main activities, the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group. The Criminal Code[11] expressly provides, however, that the term “criminal organization” does not mean a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate commission of a single offence. A “serious offence” is defined as an indictable offence for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or more, or another offence that is prescribed by regulation. Facilitation of an offence does not require actual knowledge of a particular offence or that an offence actually has been committed. Committing an offence means being a party to it or counselling any person to be a party to it.[12]
The finding by a court that a group is a criminal organization is done on a case-by-case basis and is only applicable to the individuals in that case. For example, the Hells Angels[13] has been found by the courts to be a criminal organization but there is no official directory of such a finding nor will there be continuous labelling. In other words, the existence of a particular group as a criminal organization must be proven anew in every case.
There are three specific Criminal Code offences in relation to criminal organizations. One is participation in the activities of a criminal organization (s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code; punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years). This enables police to investigate and charge persons who fulfill a role that furthers the ability of the criminal organization to commit criminal acts. This may include, for example, individuals who launder money for a criminal organization, facilitating the concealment of the illegal proceeds of criminal organizations. In 2010, Statistics Canada reports there were 10 violations of section 467.11, with 26 persons accused of this offence.[14]
A second offence is commission of an offence for a criminal organization (s. 467.12 of the Criminal Code; punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 14 years). It provides for those who commit various criminal offences such as drug importation, drug exportation, extortion, arson, kidnapping, violence, gaming, and money-laundering from which the organization derives a benefit. Statistics Canada reports there were 39 violations of section 467.12 in 2010, with 85 persons accused of this offence.[15]
Instructing the commission of an offence for a criminal organization is the third offence and is punishable by imprisonment for life (s. 467.13 of the Criminal Code). Statistics Canada reports there were 50 violations of section 467.13 in 2010, with 39 persons accused of this offence.[16] Sentences for all three types of offences must be served consecutively with any other sentence.[17] At the same time as these offences were added to the Criminal Code, new investigative tools to be directed against criminal organizations were also created. These included special peace bonds,[18] new powers to seize proceeds of crime by broadening the definition of a “designated offence” from which proceeds could be seized,[19] greater powers to resort to electronic surveillance,[20] and a new reverse onus bail provision for those charged with the new offences.[21]
It should be noted that membership in a criminal organization is not an offence. Sections 467.11 and 467.12 do not require that the accused be part of the group that constitutes the criminal organization, but this is a requirement under section 467.13. It should also be kept in mind that other Criminal Code provisions may be applied in organized crime situations. These other provisions include: conspiracy (section 465), forming an intention in common to carry out an unlawful purpose (section 21), aiding and abetting (section 21) and counselling (section 22) a person to commit a crime. These Criminal Code provisions should be read in combination with the provisions that define the three criminal organization offences.
The law concerning organized crime found in the Criminal Code is still relatively new. In Ontario, the R. v. Lindsay[22] case in 2005 determined that the Hells Angels were a “criminal organization” as that term is defined in the Criminal Code. More specifically, the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Hells Angels has as one of its main purposes the facilitation of one or more serious offences that would likely result in the receipt of a financial benefit by its members, in particular drug trafficking. This was the first time in Canada that a judge declared a group, as opposed to individuals, to be a “criminal organization” as that term is defined in the Criminal Code.
In R. c. Aurélius, a street gang was declared to be a “criminal organization” and some offenders in that gang received enhanced sentences as a result.[23] In that case, members of a street gang trafficked in cocaine for the benefit of a criminal organization in the terms encompassed by section 467.12 of the Criminal Code. As a result, some members of this particular street gang were found guilty of “gangstérisme” (gangsterism).
In a brief to the Committee looking at trends in organized crime prosecutions,[24] it was suggested that it is often difficult to justify laying Criminal Code criminal organization charges (rather than simply proceeding with the underlying charges) due to the increased complexity that such charges bring to the prosecution. The opportunity to seek consecutive sentences mandated by section 467.14 of the Criminal Code is often offset by the added time and effort involved in proving criminal organization offences. In addition, charging additional, peripheral figures involved in a criminal organization might unduly complicate the prosecution.
The complexity and dedication of resources required to prosecute criminal organization offences was brought home to this Committee by a prosecutor with the Quebec Organized Crime Prosecutions Bureau.[25] The successful prosecutions of members of the Hells Angels in Quebec and the break-up of the Bandidos biker gang in Quebec were attributed to the combined effect of the above-noted legislative changes along with other measures. These additional measures included:
In addition to the laws concerning criminal organizations specifically, laws of general application can be used to prosecute and disrupt organized crime. The Halifax Regional Police, for example, has put in place Operation Breach.[26] In response to the fact that the majority of crimes are committed by a limited number of offenders, Operation Breach strictly monitors offenders released into the community to ensure compliance with release conditions and prevent further criminal behaviour. The goal of Operation Breach is to make certain that persons believed to be actively involved in further offences comply with their release conditions. Non-compliance results in new charges, which in turn results in more restrictive conditions or the offender being returned to custody. The Halifax Regional Police believe that Operation Breach has shown that the enforcement of release conditions has a deterrent effect and can reduce crime. A related effort is to ensure that arrest warrants are executed. This enhances community safety by reducing criminal opportunities for those illegally at large who will now be arrested and, therefore, will not be able to engage in further criminal activity.
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CANADA
In 2008, over 900 organized crime groups were identified in Canada, including approximately 300 street gangs.[27] In 2011, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) identified 729 crime groups.[28] The change in the numbers of criminal groups is said to reflect a number of factors including fluidity in the criminal marketplace, disruptions by law enforcement, and changes in intelligence collection practices. In its 2010 Report on Organized Crime, CISC focused on street gangs, stating that, since 2006, there has been an increase in the number of such gangs identified by law enforcement agencies across Canada. The factors that may account for this increase include higher-level organized crime groups being identified as street gangs, cells from larger gangs being identified as new entities, street gangs splintering into smaller criminal groups, or gangs changing names.[29]
CISC’s main purpose has been to facilitate the timely production and exchange of criminal intelligence information within the Canadian law enforcement community. CISC supports the effort to reduce the harm caused by organized crime through the delivery of strategic intelligence products and services and by providing leadership and expertise to its member agencies. CISC is an umbrella organization of all Canadian law enforcement agencies and as such, is encouraged by all stakeholders and member agencies to actively pursue an impartial autonomous role within the complex network of relationships it manages.
In its testimony before the Committee, CISC categorized organized crime groups in Canada into four levels of threat. Category one groups pose the most significant level of threat and operate inter-provincially or internationally. Twenty-four criminal organizations currently belong to this category.[30] Category two groups operate with international or inter-provincial scope as well, but have been determined to be at a lower threat level than the category one groups. There are 262 such groups in Canada today. Category three groups are confined to a single province, but can encompass more than one city or region; 121 category three groups operate in Canada. Finally, category four groups are confined to a single area, such as a town or a city; 210 criminal organizations belong to this category. The number of groups in each category remains fluid. CISC did not rate 30 groups for various reasons and 82 groups came to CISC’s attention after its national threat assessment was compiled.[31]
Nationally, the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, Southern Ontario and Greater Montréal are considered to be the primary criminal hubs, with both the largest concentration of criminal organizations as well as the most active and dynamic criminal markets. In 2010, of the 56 gang-related homicides committed in Canada’s ten largest cities, 82% were committed in Toronto, Montréal, and Vancouver.[32]
The RCMP in Toronto informed the Committee that adaptability is the cornerstone of the survival and success of organized crime.[33] CISC reports that, traditionally, organized crime was thought to be composed of hierarchically structured groups that were ethnically, racially, or culturally homogeneous and that tended to operate within a strict culture of rules and codes. Today, however, CISC reports that law enforcement is detecting more multi-ethnic criminal groups. There has also been an evolution in the way organized crime groups operate away from an authoritarian, rule-bound structure towards one that is more loosely structured. These groups now have fluid linkages between members and associates, with a diverse range of leadership structures.[34] The different organized crime groups forge alliances which are fluid in both duration and scope. The purpose behind these alliances is the acquisition and legitimization of wealth.
The growth of criminal organizations from diverse cultural backgrounds was also reflected in a report the Committee received on organized crime in Quebec.[35] The 2009 Situation Report breaks down organized crime in Quebec into the following categories: Asian-origin organized crime; Aboriginal-origin organized crime; Italian-origin traditional organized crime; Quebec-origin traditional organized crime; street gangs; Latin-American-origin organized crime; East European-origin organized crime; Near- and Middle-East-origin organized crime; and criminal bikers. The police have observed a number of alliances or associations forming within the criminal community of that province. When these prove necessary to the success of their criminal enterprises, organized crime members do not hesitate to employ the expertise of other criminals. One example of such cooperation is the agreement between Italian-origin traditional organized crime and the criminal bikers to allocate territory for drug distribution purposes. Violence can erupt, however, during struggles to control crime groups and during struggles between these groups to control criminal markets.
The Committee was also informed that emerging organized crime groups are less inclined than their predecessors to display outwardly and blatantly the signs or “brands” of more traditional groups (e.g. the Hells Angels symbol on jackets). These newer groups tend not to use a particular name, tattoo, clothing, or jewellery as identifiers. This tends to make prosecutions under organized crime laws more difficult.[36] Another trend in organized crime has been that of globalization. Just as in the legitimate business world, there has been an increase in organized crime’s scope of operations with national and international connections now being the norm.[37]
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES
One fact about the activities of organized crime that was emphasized many times before the Committee is that they are all centred upon the profit motive. This has many implications, one of which is that organized crime does not restrict itself to one market or one geographical area. It will go where there is money to be made. Cross-jurisdictional crime, in turn, makes it necessary for different law enforcement agencies to work together and share information.
Illicit drugs continue to be the largest criminal market in Canada with 57% of the criminal marketplace being taken up by the trade in drugs. The majority (83%) of organized crime groups are involved in the illicit drug trade. The predominant drug is cocaine, followed by cannabis, and then followed by synthetic drugs.[38] One indication of the size of the drugs trade is that, in the Atlantic region, since 2008, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has seized more than $176 million in drugs arriving at Atlantic ports in sea containers. The majority of these drug seizures consist of hashish coming from Asia and Africa and cocaine arriving from South America.[39] One of the challenges in identifying suspect containers is the use of legitimate companies by organized crime to conceal drug shipments. Of the 109 organized crime groups profiled for the Atlantic provinces, 99 are involved in the illicit drug trade and in Nova Scotia, organized crime accounts for 90% of the drug trade.[40] Canada has also become a source country for synthetic drugs (like ecstasy and crystal meth). Organized crime groups smuggle in the precursor chemicals from source countries such as China and India. Canada continues to export significant quantities of ecstasy and methamphetamine to meet expanding international market demands.[41]
One of the features of organized crime is its determination to establish a monopoly on the production, distribution, and sale of illicit goods in any given market.[42] This is one aspect of organized crime operating as a business. Learning about the limitations and effectiveness of law enforcement investigative techniques through the disclosure required by law, organized crime figures no longer have assets in their names, they lease vehicles, they use nominee companies, and they own assets abroad. Moreover, organized crime specializes in certain areas and changes the sectors in which it operates to those with less risk and greater profits.
Where law enforcement successes have disrupted or dismantled specific crime groups, this impact tends to be short-term. It creates a temporary void into which market expansion occurs, or creates opportunities for well-situated organized criminal groups to exploit. In general, criminal markets are highly resistant to long-term disruption, as consumer demand in Canada is large enough for criminal networks to continue their activities and for other criminal groups to take the place of those broken up by police.[43]
In 2011, CISC reported that financial crime accounts for approximately 11% of criminal market activity. Payment card fraud is by far the largest part of this market and it continues to expand.[44] Payment card fraud involves card thefts, fraudulent card applications, fake deposits, and skimming or counterfeiting. Securities and mortgage fraud is another area of the financial crime market in which organized crime has an interest.
The remaining 32% of criminal market activity is taken up with other illicit goods and services. These criminal activities include theft, contraband such as alcohol and tobacco, the sex trade, and human trafficking.
The Committee was informed that the largest amount of human trafficking taking place in Canada is domestic, that is, Canadian girls are being trafficked within Canada. This trafficking is done through organized crime networks.[45] CISC has reported that street gangs facilitate the recruitment, control, movement and exploitation of Canadian-born females in the domestic sex trade, primarily in strip bars in several cities across the country.[46]
In its meetings held in six cities across Canada in addition to hearings in Ottawa, the Committee learned of the wide array of organized crime groups and activities. In some areas, the traditional “Mafia-style” organized crime groups held considerable sway while in others, Aboriginal or other ethnically-based gangs were the local criminal power. Trafficking in illicit drugs seemed to be a common component of organized crime activities, with other areas being human trafficking, counterfeit products, illegal gambling, money laundering, and vehicle theft. Another aspect of organized crime that was frequently discussed during the Committee’s hearings was the violence that has been experienced when organized crime groups come into conflict with each other over control of lucrative markets, such as supplying illicit drugs. This violence is exacerbated and can involve innocent bystanders when firearms are used. Finally, witnesses in a number of cities discussed the expansion of organized crime into “legitimate” business sectors, such as construction. This mixing of legitimate and illegitimate can make singling out and prosecuting organized crime groups more problematic.
The activities listed above can all generate wealth and there is a reduced risk to the criminal organization when that activity is not trafficking in illicit drugs. In cases of tobacco smuggling, for example, the profits can be as high as they are for drug smuggling, but the risk of prosecution and the punishment following conviction is much lower.[47]
Criminal organization activities are also being abetted by a new kind of accomplice, usually called a “facilitator”. These are experts in a certain field, often members of a professional order, such as lawyers and accountants. They are not forced to work with a criminal organization but rather, choose to do so due to the generous compensation they receive. These professionals are sought out because of their expertise, and, also, the rules of confidentiality to which they are bound. However, it is often difficult to prove that the facilitator knew that the organization for which he or she performed some work was engaged in illegal activities. Rules such as solicitor-client confidentiality can also make the work of the police in this area more difficult.[48]
Criminal organizations have escalated their use of violence in taking over and defending territory. Street gangs have become more violent and unpredictable. In 2010, police reported 94 homicides as being gang-related, compared to 72 in 2000.[49] These include homicides linked to organized crime groups or street gangs, as well as the death of any innocent bystanders during the incident. Furthermore, the victims of gang-related homicides as a percentage of all homicides rose from 13.2 % in 2000 to 17 % in 2010. Most gang-related homicides (56) occurred within Canada's largest census metropolitan areas (CMAs). The 10 largest CMAs accounted for just under half of all homicides in the nation in 2010 (269 out of 554), but 60% of all gang-related homicides (56 out of 94). Police in the metropolitan area of Toronto reported 20 gang-related homicides, the most of any CMA. However, accounting for population, Winnipeg’s four gang-related homicides in 2010 gave it the highest rate among the 10 largest metropolitan areas.[50]
The increase in gang-related homicides, in comparison to the number of homicides not related to gang activity, can be seen in the following two charts:
Firearms were used more often in gang-related homicides than in other types of homicide. In 2010, 76% of gang-related homicides in Canada were committed with a firearm, compared to 18% of homicides unrelated to gangs. Among all gang-related homicides that were committed between 2000 and 2010, handguns were used in almost 60% of incidents.[51] By comparison, in homicides not related to gang activity between 2000 and 2010, a handgun was used in approximately 12% of incidents. Knives were the most common weapon used in non-gang-related homicides.[52] Gang members have, therefore, started wearing bullet-proof vests and modifying their vehicles to be armoured. The number of homicides attributable to gangs has generally increased since information gathering on this topic began in 1991 (though it has declined recently), despite the fact that the overall rate of homicides in Canada has generally decreased since the mid-1970s.
Moreover, the number of young persons charged with homicides attributable to gangs has generally increased since 2002. The number of youths accused of gang-related homicides peaked in 2007 when 35 youths were accused of this offence, which declined to 10 accused in 2008 and increased to 14 youth accused of committing a gang-related homicide in 2010. Compared to adults, more incidents of homicide involving youth were gang-related. In 2010, among incidents with a youth accused, 25% involved gangs, compared to 12% of incidents with an adult accused.[53]
Given the clandestine nature of criminal activities, it is difficult to evaluate the total impact of organized crime in this country, but, given the diversity of criminal markets in Canada, we know it is significant. The overall impact of organized crime is significant due to the spectrum of criminal markets operating in Canada. Some forms of criminal activity are highly visible and affect individuals and communities on a daily basis, such as street-level drug-trafficking, assaults, violence, and intimidation. Conversely, more covert operations, such as mortgage fraud, vehicle theft, and identity fraud, pose long-term threats to Canadian institutions and consumers.[54]
Another difficulty in evaluating the impact of organized crime in this country is that the Committee has been told that only about one-third of crimes committed in Canada are reported to the police, but police statistics are widely used as representing the actual crime rate. As a result, policy makers, the media, the legal system and the public can be misled.[55] The Committee was urged to look at the Statistics Canada report, Criminal Victimization in Canada,[56] as a more accurate measure of the amount of criminal activity in Canada. The General Social Survey from 2009, which was the genesis of the victimization survey, indicated that about 7.4 million Canadians – just over one-quarter of the population aged 15 years and older – reported being victimized one or more times in the 12 months preceding the survey, but only 31% of criminal incidents came to the attention of police in 2009.[57]
The Committee was informed that a problem with respect to accurately portraying current crime statistics is that the Criminal Victimization Survey is only carried out by Statistics Canada once every five years. As a result, the media tend to pay more attention to annual reports of crimes reported to police. We were told that the current widely used approach of equating crime reported to police as an indicator of the total extent of crime was wrong, misleading and in need of change.[58]
A number of caveats need to be raised when trying to compare the results of victimization surveys with the amount of crime reported to the police. In Canada, there are two primary sources of data on the prevalence of crime: victimization surveys such as the General Social Survey (GSS), and police-reported surveys such as the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey. These two surveys are very different in survey type, coverage, scope, and source of information. The GSS is a sample survey, which in 2009 sampled about 19,500 individuals aged 15 years and older. In contrast, the UCR survey is a census of all incidents reported by police services across Canada. While the GSS captures information on eight offences, the UCR survey collects data on over 100 categories of criminal offences.
Another key difference between the two surveys is that the UCR survey records criminal incidents that are reported to the police and the GSS records respondents’ personal accounts of criminal victimization incidents. Many factors can influence the UCR police-reported crime rate, including the willingness of the public to report crimes to the police, reporting by police to the UCR survey, and changes in legislation, policies or enforcement practices. One way to estimate the extent of crime that is not reported to police is through the GSS victimization survey. Because the GSS asks a sample of the population about their personal victimization experiences, it captures information on crimes, whether or not they have been reported to police. The amount of unreported victimization can be substantial. For example, the 2009 GSS estimated that 88% of sexual assaults and 77% of household property thefts were not reported to the police. As a result, victimization surveys usually produce much higher rates of victimization than police-reported crime statistics.
Despite this, the 2009 GSS also reported that 93% of Canadians felt either very or somewhat satisfied with their personal safety, indicating they felt as safe as they had in the 2004 GSS; 90% of respondents reported that they felt safe when walking alone in their neighbourhood at night. The GSS also asked Canadians about their perception of crime in their communities; 62% of respondents said they believed crime rates in their community had not changed over the past five years.[59]
Despite the benefits of victimization surveys, they do have limitations. For one, they rely on respondents to report events accurately. They are also only able to address certain types of victimization. They do not capture information on crimes that have no obvious victim (e.g. prostitution or impaired driving), where the victim is a business or school, where the victim is dead (as in homicides), or when the victim is a child (anyone under the age of 15 in the case of the GSS).
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that Statistics Canada carry out the Criminal Victimization Survey annually, and that the Government of Canada provide Statistics Canada with the appropriate funds to do so, in order to give policy makers, police, the justice system and the public a better measure of criminal activity in Canada.
ORGANIZED CRIME IN PRISONS
The introduction of anti-gang legislation, coupled with integrated and aggressive police investigations, has reportedly led to an increase in the number of gang members and their associates under the jurisdiction of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). The Committee was informed that, as of November 30, 2011, 2,293 offenders under CSC’s jurisdiction were identified as members or associates of a criminal organization. Of these offenders, 70% (or 1,605) were incarcerated and 30% (or 688) were under some type of community supervision. The overall offender population under CSC supervision was 23,021, meaning that the gang population comprised 9.96% of the overall offender population.[60]
The most common type of criminal organization is street gangs with 39% of the national prison gang population. The street gang population within CSC has grown rapidly in the past 10 years and CSC predicts a continuation of this trend in the future. The second largest criminal organization type under CSC jurisdiction is Aboriginal gangs with 26% of the population, followed by motorcycle gangs (17%), traditional organized crime (8%), other gangs (7%), and Asian gangs (3%).[61] The street and Aboriginal gangs, which combine to account for 76% of the organized crime affiliations within CSC, are predominantly weighted in the Prairies region, which manages 83% of the Aboriginal gang members and 38% of the street gang population.
The increase in gang members under CSC jurisdiction has created a number of challenges:
Gang rivalries sometimes mean that CSC cannot integrate offenders but, rather, must segregate and separate certain types of gangs. Separation, however, is not always a realistic approach to dealing with gangs. Intelligence-led risk management is employed to examine issues of gang dynamics and try to prevent conflict among gangs. In addition, CSC aims to provide all gang members with an opportunity to no longer affiliate themselves with a gang.[62]
The Committee also heard that jail can sometimes fail to serve as a deterrent for certain youth; in fact, it can sometimes be a step up from their previous life.[63] For first-time offenders, jail becomes a place to form negative associations. The jail system provides a place where gangs can recruit and crime can become more organized. Once released, the supports that are needed for any meaningful change are not always available, and so the gang associations made in jail become the support system for these former prisoners.
One of the difficulties related to organized crime in prisons is that the vast majority of prisoners are, at some point, released into the community. At first glance, the scope of the issue would not seem to be that large. The Committee was informed that, in 2010-2011, the Parole Board of Canada made 308 conditional release decisions for 139 offenders who had a criminal organization conviction. This was out of a total of 23,054 conditional release decisions, accounting for 1.3% of all decisions in that year. Since 1998-99, the Board has made 1,917 conditional release decisions for offenders convicted of criminal organization offences.[64]
The Board has clarified that it has full discretion to use information on violence and organized crime and gang activity in making its decisions. Reports of criminal conduct by an offender for which there has not been a conviction can be taken into account.[65] The Parole Board has the authority under section 133 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act[66] to impose whatever conditions it feels are necessary to protect society and assist the offender in reintegrating into society. One of the considerations in this regard is any involvement of the offender with criminal organizations. Another consideration in any release plan is whether the placement of the offender in a community may result in associations with members or associates of criminal organizations.[67]
The duty to act fairly requires that information the Parole Board considers in its decisions be shared with the offender. The Board has assured the Committee that it is taking steps to safeguard sensitive information so that the Board may receive what it needs, offenders see what they are entitled to under the law, and sources or ongoing investigations remain protected.
The Parole Board has recently collaborated with the Halifax Regional Police to create a new-style police report designed to give the Board relevant and detailed intelligence about offenders without jeopardizing sources or investigations. The Board reports that five RCMP detachments have adopted this model and it is reaching out to other police partners.[68]
Another issue with respect to those released into the community from prison is that there are no longer bars and physical restraints to keep gang members away from each other or even away from members of their own gang. CSC tries to work with offenders from the time they are incarcerated to their time of release and beyond to, for example, see that they acquire relevant employment skills. A multidisciplinary team of parole officers, community employment coordinators, psychologists, and mental health workers follows up on the progress of offenders, going so far as to verify with employers that offenders are doing what they claim to be doing.[69]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Correctional Service of Canada develop stronger rehabilitation programs, including mental health assessments, for offenders involved in organized crime. These support programs must also be continued in the post-release community situation to help ex-prisoners reintegrate into society.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Parole Board of Canada continue in its efforts to work with its police partners to create police reports designed to give the Board relevant and detailed intelligence about offenders without jeopardizing sources or investigations.
A LIST OF CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS
The simplest means of providing evidence of the existence of a criminal organization is to have one of its members testify. In many cases, however, prosecutors are not able to have access to this type of witness. They must, therefore, use other types of evidence such as wiretaps, visual surveillance, and dealings with undercover police. This manner of proceeding can be dangerous, complex, and involve a number of delays. The most laborious step in the prosecution of a criminal organization is proving that the group is, in fact, a “criminal organization” in the Criminal Code sense of the term.
The Committee was told that, while the police do not necessarily take issue with the criteria established for designating a group as a criminal organization, they do take issue with the fact that once designated, it carries no weight in subsequent court cases. The specific example given was that of the Manitoba Chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club, which has already been found by the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench to be a criminal organization, and yet in upcoming trials of Hells Angels members, this fact will have to be proved once again.[70] Proving that a group is a criminal organization is a costly and time-consuming endeavour. Arguably, the financial and human resources required to furnish this proof would be better spent targeting other criminal organizations.
A means of drawing up a list of criminal organizations similar to the mechanism used for terrorist groups does not currently exist in Canadian law. While important court decisions have recognized that certain criminal groups, such as the Hells Angels, are “criminal organizations” in the Criminal Code sense of the term, in Canada, the Crown must, in every case involving such groups, offer proof that the case concerns a criminal organization according to the legal definition. Courts in British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba have ruled that in the current state of the law, the determination that a group is a criminal organization only applies to the accused before the court.
The Committee has been informed that providing this proof often means that there are long delays in matters which are already very demanding. In order to lighten the load of the Crown, some have suggested establishing an official list of criminal organizations already recognized by the jurisprudence as being criminal organizations under the Criminal Code.[71] One of the potential advantages of establishing such a list would be to lessen the time required for the Crown to prove that a group before the court is, in fact, a “criminal organization”. The Crown could, as well, concentrate its energy on demonstrating the other elements of the offence before the court. A further advantage of a list of criminal organizations would be that it would prevent criminal organizations from advertising themselves and thereby intimidating the public.
The organizations that would appear on the list, such as the Hells Angels, have been designated as criminal organizations in numerous court decisions. In the case of other groups who carry a distinctive name and who have already been declared to be criminal organizations by the courts, the representative of the Ministry of Justice of Quebec mentioned the Bandidos and the Cosa Nostra. As for other organizations, it was emphasized that we should, perhaps, wait until there are a sufficient number of findings from the courts and until the evidence is clear before proceeding to put their names on a list.
The Committee was informed, however, that there are a number of problems with maintaining a list of criminal organizations. One is that the law on criminal organizations is still relatively young. Changing the rules at this point may provoke constitutional challenges (such as the right to freely associate) and further complicate an already complex area of the law. Another constitutional issue that might be raised is that a list would impose sanctions on the basis of an executive decision rather than a judicial finding. This raises questions about the transparency of the process that results in a listing decision. However, it also raises questions about the presumption of innocence in section 11(d) of the Charter as it substitutes a Cabinet decision for proof of an essential element of a crime.
The listing process would also be difficult to maintain. It would be difficult to designate less structured groups, such as street gangs, whose name and membership are always changing and whose actions are unpredictable. As the membership of some gangs is highly fluid, it would be difficult to prove that the group on trial is the same entity as the group on the list. Therefore, a list of criminal organizations would always be incomplete and outdated.
The main objection to establishing a list of criminal organizations, though, is that it may not reduce the burden on the police or Crown prosecutors. The police must still continue to collect intelligence proving the existence of a criminal organization, as well as evidence of the link between the accused and that organization. This will involve the same delays as those that were to be avoided by the establishment of a list. Expert witnesses must still be called to explain the context and workings of the criminal organization in order for the judge or jury to understand the case put before them. In addition, it is not always necessary to prove that a criminal organization exists. A prosecutor need only prove that three or more individuals formed a group for criminal purposes. To impose the enhanced penalties applicable to a criminal organization, it is not necessary to prove that the group before the court can be labelled as “Hells Angels”, for example.
A list of criminal organizations may also prove to be a double-edged sword. It may work with some of the more structured and long-lasting criminal organizations, such as the Hells Angels. The fact that other groups are not on the list could be used by the defence as a fact casting doubt on whether there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they were, in fact, criminal organizations.[72]
As has been seen with no-fly lists, the creation of such a list can also create significant problems for those who may find themselves wrongly included on the list. Wrongly included persons can have difficulty getting their names removed from such a list and suffer great interference with their personal liberty until they are able to do so.[73] The potential problems in this area were highlighted in a report by the United States Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General which found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had submitted incomplete and inaccurate information to be added to the United States government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist. The FBI failed to include known terrorism suspects and to remove records of people that have been cleared.[74]
The Committee was also informed that a range of options, other than the creation of a list of criminal organizations, was being examined by the Department of Justice, such as allowing a judge to take judicial notice of earlier decisions. This approach would take one judicial decision and apply it in another case, as opposed to a government designation process falling outside of a courtroom entirely. There would be a rebuttable presumption that a judge could take judicial notice of a similar set of facts presented in an earlier case, subject to the defence having a right to challenge that notice.
Another option being considered is the introduction of legislation that would clarify what sort of evidence could be introduced to prove the existence of a criminal organization.[75] A third option is that Parliament could declare the issue of whether a group is a criminal organization to be a question of law so that this matter could be decided by a judge prior to trial under section 645(5) of the Criminal Code.[76] A fourth option is to have a gang expert prepare an affidavit under section 657.3 of the Criminal Code and attach as an exhibit the testimony of a previous case that had proven the existence of a certain
criminal organization. Unless the defence challenges this evidence in some way, the finding of the previous court should apply in the subsequent court.[77]
On the basis of all of the above-noted concerns, the Committee does not believe that the time is right for the creation of a list of criminal organizations that can be used in the prosecution of these groups. Instead, the Committee urges the Department of Justice to consider, rather than the creation of such a list, other options which may make prosecutions of criminal organizations more efficient and therefore quicker.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Department of Justice fully explore and implement as soon as possible other options than the creation of a list of criminal organizations which may make prosecutions of criminal organizations more efficient and, therefore, quicker.
INFORMATION SHARING AMONG LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS
The policing approach to organized crime must itself be organized. The Committee was informed, however, that one of the problems in British Columbia is that there is no single organization in place that operates on a region-wide basis to address organized crime issues.[78] Different police services operate in different “silos” without there being a single organization, under provincial control, that operates on a regional basis.
One attempt to coordinate police services on a larger level was the creation of the CISC, which began in 1970 and today comprises nearly 400 law enforcement agencies from across Canada. CISC’s goal is to be a leader in the development of an integrated and intelligence-led approach to tackling organized crime. Its purpose is to facilitate the timely production and exchange of criminal intelligence within the Canadian law enforcement community. It is complemented by 10 provincial bureaus that operate independently. CISC produces a criminal intelligence service report on organized crime. This publication highlights some of the ways criminal groups can victimize Canadians. The report also includes information regarding the dynamics of criminal intelligence groups, or criminal groups, their methods of operation, and the criminal markets in which they operate.
The Strategic Intelligence Analysis Section of CISC is responsible for the production of various strategic intelligence products, including the annual release of the National Threat Assessment on Organized and Serious Crime, the National Criminal Intelligence Estimate on Organized and Serious Crime, and the Annual Report on Organized Crime. This section also designed, developed and implemented a “strategic early warning” methodology and system to enhance current law enforcement practices with a proactive approach to crime control and prevention.
Currently, joint units of law enforcement organizations at all levels conduct integrated investigations to target specific criminal organizations. Certain bi-national teams with United States authorities target in particular trans-border crime by exchanging information and collaborating on a daily basis. Links with foreign police services have also been established to combat the global aspect of organized crime.
The Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime (CIROC), which represents the totality of police services in Canada, was recently created with a mandate to coordinate a strategic plan for fighting organized or serious crime through the integration of Canadian police efforts at the municipal, provincial/territorial, regional, and national levels. As part of the CIROC, information is shared nation-wide, and operational decisions are made by a committee of representatives from various law enforcement organizations in Canada. The goal is to operationalize intelligence produced by CISC in partnership with the CIS provincial bureaux. A key objective of the CIROC program is to increase inter-provincial cooperation as it relates to intelligence sharing and operational coordination in Canada. According to CISC, the CIROC is building the foundation that will enable law enforcement agencies across the country to share information in a more timely, reliable, and efficient manner. It is expected that this improved communication will translate into enhanced operational success.
The Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System (ACIIS) is the Canadian law enforcement community’s national database for criminal information and intelligence on organized and serious crime. Through ACIIS, law enforcement agencies at all levels collaborate in the collection, analysis and sharing of criminal intelligence across the country. ACIIS was built in 1976 with an intended group of users numbering 50 across Canada. Today, there are over 1,400 users. Aside from capacity issues, there is lacking an ability to take advantage of technological innovations so that law enforcement can share and access real-time information across jurisdictions. Criminal activity is not constrained by geography and the information to combat should be free-flowing as well. CISC told the Committee that there is a need to replace ACIIS; as organized crime changes and grows more complex, the value of information and intelligence to law enforcement arises from how fast it can be gathered, understood, and transferred.[79]
The Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario (CISO) welcomed the introduction by the CISC of a model that explains how organized crime operates as fluid, entrepreneurial networks that operate within both illicit and licit marketplaces. This is part of a shift from threat to risk analysis in the assessment of organized crime in Canada.[80]
Under the old model, CISC focused on the criminal actors. Under the hybrid model, the focus will be on both the criminal actors and their operating environment. This environment encompasses both the licit and illicit economic sectors. Organized crime will now be thought of as small, loosely structured networks that react to fluctuations in the economic, political and legal environments. It also emphasizes the inter-connectivity and inter-dependency of licit and illicit markets and depicts criminal networks as rational and profit-maximizing.
There are still-valid arguments that suggest that the institutional model under which police services operate is too compartmentalized and has proven to significantly hamper the flow of information from federal police agencies such as the RCMP to other federal, provincial, and municipal partners. Specifically, matters of federal security clearances, national security databases, and restrictive reporting structures inhibit true integration and effective information sharing. This needs to be remedied to ensure that full intelligence sharing takes place. One police officer said that what was needed was a provincial law enforcement view as opposed to an agency view.[81] We believe that this can be expanded to the taking of a national and even an international law enforcement view.
The Committee has heard that certain legislative restrictions have a negative impact on the ability of the police to share information with both domestic and international law enforcement partners. What is required is a legislative scheme that is clear with respect to the sharing of criminal intelligence in order to facilitate more effective and efficient investigations of organized crime. The legislative restrictions should be removed in cases where they are not necessary for privacy or other reasons.[82]
A practice that has proved beneficial in the prosecution of organized crime in Vancouver is the use of a Regional Gang Prosecutor. The investigative and prosecutorial efficiencies realized by the assignment of a dedicated prosecutor cannot be overstated. Investigations tend to remain focused, warrants are executed in a timely manner, and appropriate charges are laid. The employment of a dedicated prosecutor familiar with a particular file can also facilitate detention orders at bail hearings and encourage guilty pleas. As part of the Vancouver Police Department’s Chronic Offender Program and Identity Theft Task Force, provincial Crown attorneys become part of the investigation early in the process. The Regional Gang Prosecutor consolidates charges and presents the evidence at the bail hearing, trial, and sentencing. The result has been detention orders and guilty pleas in over 90% of these cases.[83]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that legislative restrictions on the sharing of criminal intelligence concerning organized crime be examined. The object of this examination will be to determine whether these restrictions have a valid purpose and, if not, whether they should be removed to facilitate the efforts of law enforcement to tackle organized crime.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System (ACIIS) be upgraded so that it has the technological capability of managing the increasing amount of information that is collected about organized criminal activity in Canada. A new technological platform for ACIIS can, with appropriate security provisions, significantly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of analysts, investigators, and intelligence officers.
DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE
The 1991 Supreme Court of Canada decision R. v. Stinchcombe[84] and subsequent case law require prosecutors to disclose relevant information to the accused. Information is considered relevant if there is a reasonable likelihood that it could be used to support the Crown’s case, argue a defence, or make a decision likely to influence the actions of the defence. In addition, the burden upon the Crown is always present, meaning that evidence must be disclosed as soon as additional information is received. The obligation to disclose continues even after conviction, including after appeals have been decided or the time of the appeal has elapsed. The obligation to disclose evidence is one component of the right afforded the accused to make full answer and defence. This right is guaranteed by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[85]
The existence of the right to make full answer and defence means that the threshold of relevance of information is quite low. The Supreme Court has called for the production of information that can reasonably be used by the accused either in meeting the case for the Crown, advancing a defence or otherwise in making a decision which may affect the conduct of the defence such as, for example, whether to call evidence.[86] Disclosure may also encourage the resolution of facts in issue, including the possible entering of guilty pleas at an early stage in the proceedings.
There are some exceptions to the obligation to disclose. Disclosure concerning the identity or location of a witness may be delayed to prevent intimidation or harassment of witnesses or their families, danger to their lives or safety, or other interference with the administration of justice. In this instance, Crown counsel must disclose the information as soon as the justification for the delay in disclosure no longer exists. The fact that some disclosure is being delayed should be communicated to the defence without jeopardizing the reason for the delay.[87] In the organized crime context, another claim of privilege against disclosure is if it would tend to identify a confidential police informer. The one exception to the police informer privilege is where the information is needed to establish the innocence of the accused. Disclosure is also not required if it would reveal secret investigative techniques, methods, and tactics that may compromise future investigations using the same techniques, methods, and tactics.
While the principles underlying disclosure obligations may be accepted, the obligation can present practical challenges. Organized crime investigations often involve disclosing a large number of documents to the defence, resulting in considerable costs and delays in proceedings. Stinchcombe requirements place a heavy demand on police and judicial resources. In addition, disputes can arise concerning which information is relevant and what fits within the categories of privileged information. These disputes and delays in providing disclosure can impede speedy trials and even cause prosecutions to be dismissed for delay.[88] Another area of concern is that disclosed information can be misused. While respecting the right of the accused to full answer and defence, a number of witnesses before the Committee suggested that consideration should be given to accelerating the disclosure process and clearly and consistently defining the level of relevance.
Due to the large volume of material to be disclosed in organized crime prosecutions, electronic disclosure is now the preferred method. This form of disclosure reduces costs, takes up less space than paper copies, and lends itself well to disclosing the originals of electronic, audio, and video surveillance. To meet the goal of making timely disclosure, prosecutors and police must act with foresight, meaning that disclosure must be planned when an investigation is launched. There must be a focus to the investigation to avoid complicating it unnecessarily, and the disclosure must be comprehensible and intelligible.[89]
A concern that was brought to the Committee’s attention was that disclosure packages are being used by organized crime to uncover the investigative tactics of police. This means that counter-surveillance is becoming a big issue. Furthermore, traditional police investigative tactics are no longer as effective as they once were. The Calgary Chief of Police suggested that the Stinchcombe decision be reviewed for the purposes of simplifying disclosure for police and, where appropriate, masking police techniques so that organized crime groups cannot study them and develop counter-investigative techniques. The Chief also suggested increasing the use of technology to address issues around the volume of disclosure. Finally, he suggested increasing the federal prosecutorial capacity by increasing positions and funding.[90]
Another disclosure issue is the lack of clear understanding of what is relevant disclosure on the part of the police. In the absence of a clearly defined threshold, the police feel that they end up providing material that has no evidentiary value. In determining whether certain material is relevant, opinion comes to the fore and consistency becomes an issue. This raises questions as to why material is relevant in one trial but not in another. Clearly defined parameters need to be developed with respect to what is relevant disclosure.
The Committee heard testimony from the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. Witnesses from this organization noted the difficulties inherent in disclosing large amounts of information when prosecuting organized crime groups. The Committee was informed, however, that three principles were followed to ensure that the disclosure process was carried out as efficiently as possible. The first was called “foresight” and it meant that disclosure needed to be planned from the beginning of the investigation. Prosecutors should be assigned at a very early stage in the process to assist investigators with disclosure as evidence is received. The second principle was termed “focus”. This referred to restricting the extent of an inquiry and to avoid a scatter-shot approach. The third principle is termed “management”. This refers to the fact that disclosure must be understandable and readable. This means that evidence must be classified according to its usefulness from the very beginning of the investigation.[91]
The issue of disclosure was also addressed by former Ontario Chief Justice Patrick Lesage and Professor Michael Code in their Report of the Review of Large and Complex Criminal Case Procedures.[92] Patrick Lesage was a witness before the Committee and he acknowledged the difficulty in attempting to legislate a concept such as “relevance”. Mr. Lesage did point to one codification of disclosure in the case of the so-called “rape shield laws”, but pointed out how complicated the rules are in this area.[93] Nevertheless, some of the recommendations in the report echoed those made before the Committee by the Public Prosecution Service. For example, the report recommends much closer collaboration between the police and the Crown in large, complex cases (such as those involving organized crime) at the pre-charge stage. This collaboration will include assistance with the preparation of disclosure. Another recommendation in the Lesage-Code report is that defence requests for the disclosure of materials outside the investigative file should be subject to a number of requirements, one of which is that they must be particularized in order to identify the materials in question and to explain how they could assist the defence.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work with provincial and territorial counterparts to encourage a close collaboration between the police and prosecutors in organized crime prosecutions in order to plan disclosure at the earliest stages of an investigation. Such disclosure should be guided by parameters of relevance which, to the greatest extent possible, are codified. The model for such codification could be the process that led to the legislation of the so-called “rape shield laws”. Any defence request for additional disclosure materials should be particularized in order to identify the materials in question and to explain how they could assist the defence.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work with provincial and territorial counterparts to establish a model of electronic disclosure that can serve as a standard Crown brief in all long, complex organized crime cases. Such a brief should be the product of police and Crown co-operation and should, amongst other exclusions, not include disclosure that could identify a confidential informant or reveal a secret police investigative technique.
SENTENCING
On a number of occasions, the Committee was told that the Canadian justice system is plagued with repeat offenders who take up an inordinate amount of enforcement and legal resources. The burden that is being placed upon police and the justice system would be lessened if there were a reduction in the number of court appearances by repeat offenders. The argument here is the “revolving door” nature of the justice system whereby certain offenders are arrested over and over again, yet do not seem to receive sentences that are commensurate with their repeated criminal behaviour. It is believed that the community then suffers the harms caused by repeat offenders while the offenders themselves are relatively unaffected.[94]
Previous convictions are currently taken into account by judges when passing sentence as a judicially recognized aggravating factor. They relate to character, in that they disentitle an offender to consideration as a first-time offender who is inexperienced or who has behaved out of character. The consideration of previous convictions can be used in an effort at individual deterrence, particularly where there is an indication of escalating offences. Such convictions, however, may not be particularly relevant if they took place a long time ago or were for very different conduct. The testimony before the Committee, though, was to the effect that insufficient emphasis is placed on repeated offences when sentence is imposed. The clearest means of rectifying this lack of emphasis was thought to be to place this sentencing factor in the Criminal Code as one of the principles of sentencing.
The Committee heard testimony that, unlike other crimes in Canada where addictions or stupidity may be the primary motivator, organized crime is motivated by greed and profit; it relies on the victimization of the naive and innocent. The Committee was, therefore, urged to recognize that serious crime requires serious sentencing.[95] The Committee also heard that prisoners convicted of criminal organization offences were unlike other prisoners in that they were more likely to have been married, employed and healthy, with fewer addiction problems. Once again, their motivation for criminal activity would seem to be profit, rather than as a response to their socioeconomic circumstances. These organized crime prisoners tend to spend longer terms in prison but, once they achieve parole, they are more successful as parolees.[96]
The Committee was also informed that money laundering is an important source of income for organized crime; it is almost impossible to run a criminal organization if there is no avenue to launder money. This can lead to corruption and infiltration of legitimate business.[97] The Committee was also informed that enhanced sentences speak to the denunciation of crime and a sense of justice to the community — some of the objectives of sentencing. In Canada, however, the Committee was told that the average sentence is 30 days for criminal offences and we are accomplishing nothing with the status quo. If sentences were increased in length, we should expect to see a reduction in the level of criminal activity.[98]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Criminal Code be amended to impose mandatory minimum sentences for the criminal organization offences, particularly for the offence set out in section 467.13 of the Criminal Code — Instructing Commission of Offence for Criminal Organization.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Criminal Code be amended to increase penalties for money laundering offences.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND YOUTH
The Committee was told on a number of occasions that we need to address the issue of organized crime early in the lives of those susceptible to joining gangs. One witness told the Committee that we could start at the age of four because the diagnosis of conduct disorder and oppositional defiance disorder can be made at that age. It was also stated that by the third grade, it can be determined which children will be life-course persistent offenders and which are going to be adolescent-limited offenders.[99] While 5% to 6% of criminals fall into the former category, they have a great deal of influence over other young people. It was suggested that early intervention is necessary to bring out the strengths of the child and lead them away from the antisocial path.
The danger posed by gangs is their attractiveness in furnishing a ready-made social network. Gangs provide a social opportunity and an economic opportunity, much like any other business, although in this case a business carrying on illegal activities. No particular talent is required to join a gang — all that is required is a need for money or belonging, as well as social pressures to join.[100]
One of the witnesses heard by the Committee who runs a gang prevention-intervention program for youth between the ages of 16 and 24 pointed to the utter lack of connection the participants had to other activities in the community. The goal of her program was to foster in its participants a sense of belonging to something greater than themselves, which is known to reduce the likelihood of gang participation.[101] To effectively prevent youth from joining gangs, it is necessary to understand how youth become so disconnected. In other words, it is critical to know the risk factors that tend to lead young people to become involved in gangs.
To answer the question of risks, we were pointed to a study conducted by the National Crime Prevention Centre, which concluded that the most important risk factors for gang involvement include negative influences in the youth’s life, limited attachment to the community, over-reliance on anti-social peers, poor parental supervision, alcohol and drug abuse, poor educational or employment potential, and a need for recognition and belonging.[102] A number of studies indicate that risk factors associated with gang involvement are present long before a youth joins a gang. Unless the risk factors are addressed early on, early negative life experiences and subsequent involvement in crime will reinforce the path towards continued delinquency.[103]
The Committee heard from a number of witnesses who work with youth who may be attracted to the gang life. These witnesses stated that we need to address the issue of why young people are attracted to gangs and how they may be diverted from them. By the time young people are in a gang, it is often too late to try to turn them away from a life of crime.
The young people who are most likely to be drawn into criminal activity are often from low-income families, experience social isolation, are not generally successful in school, and do not have great hopes for success in the future. The Committee was told that much youth crime is born out of a lack of adult supervision or simply for survival purposes. Without the proper intervention, petty criminal activities like trespassing, joy riding, underage drinking, and disturbing the peace will likely progress, with or without gang involvement.[104] Violent youth crime is most often gang-related and gangs have a great appeal to youth in these circumstances — offering status, financial gain, protection, mentoring, affiliation, and excitement.[105]
The Committee was informed that a commitment to crime prevention programs that focuses on creating positive opportunities for youth, particularly those most at risk, is not only a more effective way of reducing crime, but it requires far less funding. After-school activities targeted at the “prime time for juvenile crime” all have payoffs far greater than the investment.[106]
A number of witnesses who work with young people emphasized that the key to effective interventions is that they be long-term and reliable. Effective programs are undermined when they are time-limited or funding is removed after a pilot program is completed. A challenge for programs for youth is that much time and energy goes into applying for funding and developing contacts. The uncertainty over the renewal of funding can make staffing difficult. The turnover of staff entails a loss of expertise and the relationships those staff have built up with youth.[107] Youth need programs that are welcoming and consistently available.
We heard that certain crime prevention initiatives have demonstrated their value. There are many reputable organizations that work with young people and respond to their needs. These needs include programs that provide youth with opportunities to gain skills and confidence. These can only be acquired over time. By providing adequate long-term funding, bolstering the ability to enhance successful programs, and putting in place evaluations of long-term impacts, governments would ensure that their funds produce the greatest benefit. Every young person diverted from the criminal lifestyle reduces the costs to the criminal justice system in responding to crime.
One of the witnesses before the Committee made reference to the cost-effectiveness of funding after-school programs and other support systems, as opposed to funding incarceration.[108] There was also a reference to a 1993 report of this Committee, which is referred to by the Institute for the Prevention of Crime in its report entitled Building a Safer Canada.[109] The Institute cites the 1993 report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, also known as the “Horner Report”, as calling for the allocation of the equivalent of 5% of the federal criminal justice budget towards crime prevention. The Horner Report referred to a cost-benefit analysis of the Perry Preschool Project, which was implemented in Michigan in 1962. In this program, children aged 3 and 4 from backgrounds of poverty received daily preschool programs for 2.5 hours per day and a home visit once a week for 1.5 hours. Compared to a control group of children who did not participate in the program, more project children completed high school, attended post-secondary schools, and were employed; fewer were on welfare or had an arrest record. The cost-benefit analysis showed that for every $1 invested in a one-year program, there was a return of $5. This was determined as the cost of the preschool participants absorbing fewer public resources since they were more likely to be well-educated and employed, and the reduced cost of their lower level of criminal offences.[110]
Risk factors do not cause crime nor do they guarantee that someone will become involved in crime. The effects of socio-economic disadvantage can be overcome by the presence of a supportive family life, adequate levels of social support (such as community recreation programs), and a socially cohesive neighbourhood. Yet some groups in Canada suffer disproportionately from risk factors and, as a result, have higher rates of crime and victimization. One such group is First Nations children, youth, and families. Aboriginal peoples experience lower incomes, lower educational levels, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse, more family breakdowns, and poorer housing conditions than the Canadian averages.[111]
One approach to crime and victimization in Canada is reactive. In this approach, we wait for victimization to occur, count on the victim or a witness to call the police, and then count on the police to investigate the offence and arrest the suspect(s). The matter then proceeds to the courts and the offender may be punished. One problem with this approach is that a large proportion of Canadians do not report criminal incidents to the police. In its 2009 General Social Survey, Statistics Canada reports that, in all, 31% of criminal incidents came to the attention of police.[112] The second problem with the reactive approach is that, of the cases that do come to the attention of the police, only some of those result in a formal charge, so the offenders are not identified and brought to justice. Only about 58% of adult cases that do come to court result in a conviction while the figure is 60% for youth court cases.[113] Some types of crimes, such as child, spousal, and sexual abuse are especially underreported so the problems remain hidden from the criminal justice system. A third difficulty with the reactive approach is that offenders who serve custodial sentences are not necessarily rehabilitated when they return to society. Furthermore, the prison population does not encompass all offenders. Finally, the reactive approach often fails to address the underlying factors associated with criminal behaviour.
The Committee was told by the Chief of Police of Saskatoon that “Until we can tackle the social problems that are the contributors to crime — poverty, poor housing, racism, addiction, and abuse — gang activity will flourish and gangs will remain a viable option for those who are marginalized. We can lock gang members away, but if, when they are released, they return to the same environment they came from, it's very probable that they will once again re-enter their former lifestyle.”[114]
One sign of hope in the effort to combat organized crime is that almost 80% of offenders belonging to gangs report that they are dissatisfied with their lives and would rather live a life outside of the dictates of the gang sub-culture.[115] This provides an opportunity for intervention to get gang members to no longer affiliate with gangs. This intervention, however, will be arduous and painstaking in terms of its duration with the potential for violence and hostility needing to be assessed and managed while offenders are incarcerated and then re-integrated into the community.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada, in partnership with its provincial and territorial counterparts, allocate more resources in a stable, long-term manner for youth at risk of entering into a criminal lifestyle. This funding should ensure that youth at risk have access to programs to divert them from gangs and to promote alternatives to gangs.
DRUGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME
The Committee was told, on a number of occasions, that a common feature of urban gangs is that the primary focus of activity involves illicit drugs. Crimes committed for drug-related reasons include property offences, robbery, assault, and homicide. Another aspect of drugs and organized crime is the exploitation of drug-addicted youth. The Committee was informed that the typical wait in Manitoba for a drug treatment bed is anywhere between 7 and 90 days.[116] Most often, the stay in the treatment centre is between 21 and 28 days, which has no relevance to how long a drug remains within an addict’s body.
Drug-addicted or drug-dependent youth are particularly vulnerable to be preyed upon by organized crime when they lack stable, permanent housing. This type of housing is the base that is needed to help drug addicts get through treatment. Poor or non-existent housing is one of the “root causes” of crime that the Committee was urged repeatedly to address. Providing housing is not a panacea, but it does provide the platform from which other services can be implemented more effectively.[117]
The Committee has been informed by officials from Statistics Canada, however, that the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey, which was introduced in 1962, excludes drug-related crimes. This is a very lucrative area for organized crime.
The Committee was told that, from 1993 to 2007, the number of marijuana plants seized across Canada increased eight-fold from about 238,000 plants to about 1.9 million plants per year. The amount of marijuana seized increased almost seven-fold, from 7,314 kilograms to 49,918 kilograms. At an estimated $6 billion per year in British Columbia alone, this is a very lucrative business for organized crime. British Columbia’s Organized Crime Agency has estimated that organized crime groups control 85% of British Columbia’s marijuana trade. Much of this trade is with the United States where marijuana is traded for guns, cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy) and illegal tobacco.[118]
Aside from its role in funding organized crime, illegal marijuana grow operations entail a number of public safety risks, including fire, electrocution, structural hazards, and violence. This violence takes the form of homicides, armed confrontations, drive-by shootings, and extortions.
The proceeds of organized crime in Canada are generally taxable.[119] The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) operates the Special Enforcement Program (SEP) that attempts to collect tax money from individuals suspected of earning income from illegal activities. A large pool of untapped tax revenue is currently being lost because marijuana grow-ops are not being taxed. The opportunity to tax this lucrative illegal activity is being lost because there is no mechanism in place to automatically share information about drug production operations with the CRA. In addition, the risk of being audited would provide a financial deterrent to growing marijuana, which would, in turn, disrupt a major source of funding for organized crime. The suggestion was made to the Committee that police organizations be required to report every file associated with drug production to the CRA.[120] Further discussion and a recommendation on this topic are contained in the section entitled “Proceeds of Crime”.[121]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada, in partnership with its provincial and territorial counterparts, allocate more resources in the area of addiction services and numbers of treatment beds in order to reduce wait times. The drug-addicted are particularly vulnerable to recruitment into organized crime and any assistance in reducing this vulnerability would be helpful.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that Statistics Canada be required to include in the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey all drug-related offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
PROCEEDS OF CRIME
Criminal organizations commonly engage in money laundering as it can make their income from criminal activities appear legitimate. It is clearly a widespread problem: according to Statistics Canada, in 2010, the police reported 646 cases of offences under the Criminal Code relating to the proceeds of crime, involving 546 alleged offenders.[122]
The first legislation addressing the proceeds of crime came into force in Canada in 1989. The Criminal Code was amended in 2005,[123] reversing the burden of proof in requests for the seizure of the proceeds of crime in the case of an accused party found guilty of an organized criminal offence or an offence under certain provisions of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.[124] Under subsection 462.37(2.01) of the Criminal Code, the court must order the seizure of an offender’s assets if it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person engaged in a pattern of criminal activity, or that the income from sources not related to designated offences cannot reasonably account for the value of all the offender’s property. The offender may, however, avoid forfeiture if he or she establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that the property is not the proceeds of crime.
Many witnesses told the Committee that these provisions are not effective — and are therefore used very little or not at all[125] — to confiscate property linked to a criminal organization, since the prosecutor must always prove beyond any reasonable doubt whose property it is. Martine Fontaine, Officer in Charge, Integrated Proceeds of Crime, RCMP in Montréal, noted that “investigations become very complex because we have to prove that the individual owns the property despite the fact that according to the land registry, the property actually belongs to his wife, his daughter, his brother, his father or his deceased mother, or that the car is a rental. Bank accounts are hidden by fronts such as companies, trusts (…).”[126]
Law enforcement agencies and Crown prosecutors accordingly prefer to take action under provincial laws on the confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Police services may invoke these laws independently to settle unresolved cases or cases in which there is insufficient evidence to confiscate assets under the Criminal Code.
The confiscation regime under provincial laws is indeed more flexible. For example, Ontario’s Civil Remedies Act, 2001,[127] — whose constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada[128] — does not require an allegation or proof that a person has committed a specific crime. Moreover, the forfeiture proceedings established by the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 do not require the identification of the owner of the proceeds of crime. The example given by the Supreme Court pertains to money seized from a gang safe house: “In such a case, the Attorney General may be able to show on a balance of probabilities that money constituted the proceeds of crime in general without identifying any particular crime or criminal.”[129]
In order to increase the effectiveness and use of the Part XII.2 provisions of the Criminal Code on the forfeiture of the proceeds of organized criminal activity, Francis Brabant, Legal Counsel, Sûreté du Québec, suggested the possibility of changing the burden of proof when establishing the ownership of a criminal organization’s proceeds of crime from “beyond any reasonable doubt” to “on the balance of probabilities.”[130] This would make it easier for prosecutors to prove that an asset that appears to belong to a front really belongs to a member of a criminal organization, and is therefore subject to seizure and confiscation. The Committee is of the opinion that the confiscation of the proceeds of crime of criminal organizations is crucial in fighting organized crime and supports the implementation of measures to facilitate it, subject to individuals’ rights and freedoms.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada consider the possibility of amending Part XII.2 of the Criminal Code to allow for the ownership of the proceeds of crime to be established on the balance of probabilities in cases involving organized crime offences.
Members of criminal organizations often use corporations to conceal their ownership of the proceeds of crime. Corporations are currently required to present documents of incorporation and issue annual reports to federal and provincial authorities. Yet, provincial and federal laws on incorporation often require the name and contact information for a founder and board member only, and not for the shareholders. Annual reports provide the company’s address, the names of its officers and directors, their home addresses and some other information. However, no information about ownership is provided. This further complicates police investigations into criminal organizations and the confiscation of their assets.
The use of front men, which is commonplace in criminal organizations, also complicates police investigations. According to Yvan Poulin, General Counsel, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, “It is therefore very difficult to link individuals to goods that you attempt to confiscate. Several years ago, it was the major problem and I would say that the problem has remained unchanged. No matter to what extent the burden has been reduced or in some cases transferred to the accused, you still must establish a link between the asset and the individual in order to be able to confiscate it.”[131]
While it may be necessary to use front men or nominees for the sake of competition, Ken Froese, forensic accountant and Senior Managing Director, Froese Forensic Partners Ltd., maintains there should be a time limit on their use. This would provide a clearer picture of the involvement of persons under investigation and their finances.[132] He recommends a one-year limit on the use of nominees, from the date of incorporation. After that time, the company would be required to provide information about ownership or request an exemption. This would facilitate investigations into the finances of suspected members of organized crime.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that, at the next meeting of federal, provincial and territorial ministers of justice, they consider the possibility of amending federal and provincial laws governing corporations in Canada so that the by-laws establishing a corporation and its annual reports provide information about its ownership, including the shareholders’ names and addresses. The ministers should also consider the possibility of establishing a time limit on the use of nominees in order to make the identity of the owners, officers and directors known.
Criminal organizations sometimes use over a dozen different financial institutions throughout Canada and the world to conceal their proceeds of crime. A single police force often does not have the resources to track all the movements of illegal funds. This is why FINTRAC was created in 2000. In carrying out its mandate, FINTRAC can disclose information to police services when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that it would be useful in support of investigations and prosecutions relating to money laundering or terrorist financing. FINTRAC is a useful source of information for all police services in Canada due to its ability to track funds from criminal activities in Canada and around the world.
Under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, certain persons and entities — such as financial institutions, securities brokers, accountants and casinos — are required to report to FINTRAC information on various types of financial transactions. In particular, they must report information regarding suspicious transactions relating to money laundering or terrorist financing, regardless of the dollar value involved, and cash transactions of $10,000 or more.
In an investigation of the Hells Angels, it was difficult to follow the money trail because liquid assets and their proceeds were not deposited into financial institutions or recorded. It is very difficult to track cash transactions in order to create a financial profile of those suspected of organized criminal activity. Such persons usually spend large amounts in cash. Ken Froese, who has examined the circumstances under which fairly large amounts of cash were spent, maintains that it would be helpful in police investigations of organized crime to be able to track payments of $10,000 or more involving automobile dealers, companies that operate private automatic banking machines,[133] construction and home renovation companies, racetracks, law firms and cash payments of $1,000 or more at hotels. The declaration of such major cash purchases, which can reasonably be believed to be of the kind made by a member of a criminal organization — would help law enforcement agencies create a financial profile of a person or groups of persons subject to an investigation.[134] Yet the companies Mr. Froese suggested are currently not required to report information to FINTRAC. Chantal Jalbert, Assistant Director, Regional Operations and Compliance, FINTRAC, stated however that the current list of reporting bodies is complete and effective.[135]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends amending the regime under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to require automobile dealers, companies operating private automatic banking machines, construction and home renovation companies, racetracks and law firms to report cash transactions of $7,500 or more to FINTRAC. Guidelines would have to be established, however, to ensure that the reporting requirement imposed on law firms does not violate confidentiality or lawyer-client privilege.
Under section 462.48 of the Criminal Code, the Attorney General may submit a request to a judge to obtain tax information from the CRA regarding a person for whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that they committed an organized crime offence, a terrorism offence, a designated substance offence, such as drug trafficking, importing or exporting, or an offence involving the laundering of proceeds of crime from the commission of a designated substance offence.
While drug trafficking is the most significant market for criminal organizations, they have increasingly diversified their activities to include financial crime, money laundering, identity theft, tobacco smuggling, arms dealing, human trafficking, cybercrime, vehicle theft and counterfeiting of consumer products and medications. The Committee was told that the current application of section 462.48 is too limited. During an investigation, the police said they did not have the tools needed to obtain federal tax information.[136] To effectively fight organized crime, we must be able to identify the proceeds of organized crime from all sources, and not limited to the drug trade. Section 462.48 should therefore be amended to give prosecutors access to tax information about persons for whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that they committed a money laundering offence involving the proceeds of any criminal offence subject to indictment.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that section 462.48 of the Criminal Code be amended to include the offence of money laundering involving property, objects or proceeds acquired through an offence designated in section 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code.
The proceeds of crime are taxable in the same way as legitimate income is. The CRA is empowered to use a number of tools to enforce the Income Tax Act, including civil measures and criminal proceedings leading to fines, penalties and prison sentences. Under its Special Enforcement Program, the Agency conducts audits of individuals suspected of earning income from organized crime or any other illegal activity. These audits lead to new levies and penalties and interest, if applicable. The CRA also administers the Criminal Investigations Program (CIP). Under this program, the Agency investigates suspected cases of tax evasion, fraud and other serious violations of tax laws.
The CRA works closely with the RCMP, provincial and local police services and other law enforcement agencies to stop the spread of organized crime. Since 2003, it has had a relationship with police organizations for the reporting of illicit drug operations to the Agency. It was pointed out to the Committee, however, that police organizations are not required to report all drug production cases.[137] To enable the CRA to apply the Income Tax Act to more frequently target the proceeds of crime of illicit drug operations, police services in Canada should report all illicit drug production to the Agency.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the federal, provincial and territorial ministers of justice, revenue and public safety consider the possibility of requiring law enforcement agencies to report illegal drug production in Canada to the Canada Revenue Agency.
Seized or confiscated property, or money that is not used to compensate victims or that cannot be returned to an innocent third party, is confiscated by the Crown. The proceeds of crime confiscated by the Crown is shared, under grant programs, among the various orders of government and police services, in keeping with a statutory formula and the contribution made by each of them to the confiscation. At the federal level, in drug-related charges for instance, property is shared in accordance with the Forfeited Property Sharing Regulations pursuant to the Seized Property Management Act. The Seized Property Management Directorate is responsible for the management and disposition of proceeds pursuant to a court order of management.
Once a court has issued an order of management, the Seized Property Management Directorate takes action to that effect. In some cases, however, it can take from one week to six months for such an order to be issued. In the meantime, the police service is responsible for and bears the cost of managing the assets in question. Don Perron, who works with the Organized Crime Enforcement Bureau and is part of the Ontario Provincial Police Asset Forfeiture and Identity Crimes Program, noted that police services do not have the resources they need to carry out this temporary responsibility.[138] The Seized Property Management Directorate should therefore assume responsibility for property management from the time it is seized.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends amending the Forfeited Property Sharing Regulations and the Seized Property Management Act so that the Seized Property Management Directorate can assume responsibility for managing the property as soon as it is seized.
While the provinces appear to receive their fair share of the funds seized under the Seized Property Management Act, Peter Shadgett, Director, Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario, raised concerns regarding the use of these funds to effectively fight organized crime.[139] The confiscated assets would be sufficient to at least partially fund the work of law enforcement agencies in fighting organized crime.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that, at the next meeting of federal, provincial and territorial ministers of justice, consideration be given to awarding more of the funds from the confiscation of the proceeds of crime to fighting organized crime.
LAWFUL ACCESS
According to a number of witnesses, including law enforcement officials, electronic eavesdropping legislation has not kept pace with recent changes in telecommunications. Despite some amendments, the structure of Part VI of the Criminal Code, which pertains to electronic eavesdropping, has remained unchanged since 1974. There is no Canadian law at present that requires all telecommunications service providers, including Internet service providers and telecommunications device manufacturers, to use devices that allow for interception. As a result, it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible in some cases, for law enforcement officials to legally intercept communications. There are lengthy delays and the costs are high. Yet this method of investigation is often essential in fighting organized crime. Moreover, when communications can be intercepted, not all telecommunications service providers release standardized information to law enforcement agencies.
Legislation could address this lack of a standard regarding the interception of telecommunications. Bill C-30[140] has recently been introduced to require telecommunications service providers to have the ability to intercept communications on their networks and to provide the intercepted communication in the form specified by law enforcement. This includes decrypted communications if the telecommunications service provider has the technical capacity to provide this. Law enforcement officials suggested that these requirements be extended to manufacturers of telecommunications devices such as the BlackBerry and other smart phones.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada pursue legislation requiring telecommunications service providers and telecommunications device manufacturers to build the ability to intercept telecommunications into their equipment and networks.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada introduce legislation requiring telecommunications service providers and telecommunications device manufacturers to decrypt legally intercepted communications or to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies in this regard.
According to law enforcement agencies, it is difficult to consistently obtain from telecommunications service providers such basic information as their clients’ names and addresses. Without explicit statutory requirements, some service providers voluntarily disclose this information while others require a warrant before releasing the information requested. Furthermore, there have been contradictory court decisions on this matter. While some courts require law enforcement agencies to produce a warrant to force service providers to disclose their clients’ names and addresses, others do not consider a warrant necessary.[141]
In some cases, therefore, a police service that has an IP address associated with the commission of an offence must obtain a warrant to require the Internet service provider to disclose the name of the subscriber of this IP address. The warrant must as a rule include the name of the party suspected of the offence.
To address this problem, a special system could be established enabling law enforcement agencies, without a court order, but under certain conditions, to require a telecommunications service provider to provide basic information identifying their subscribers, such as their name, IP address, e-mail address or telephone number. Bill C-30 includes such a provision.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends the establishment of a statutory mechanism enabling law enforcement agencies, without a warrant, to require telecommunication service providers to disclose basic information identifying their subscribers. Privacy measures would have to be created, however, and prior court authorization would always be required to allow these agencies to intercept private communications.
A number of witnesses appearing before the Committee reported that the frequent replacement of cell phones by members of organized crime (for instance, a device may be used for a few hours only for the commission of an offence) and the use of prepaid cell phone services make it more difficult for law enforcement agencies, since they allow users to remain anonymous. At present, cell phone merchants are not required to verify purchasers’ identity.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada examine the possibility of requiring cell phone merchants to verify the identity of purchasers. It could also determine whether it would be appropriate to impose the same requirement on telecommunications service providers.
The court may grant permission initially to engage in electronic eavesdropping for a maximum of 60 days (section 186(4)(e) of the Criminal Code). This maximum period is extended to a year for the investigation of organized crime offences (section 186.1 of the Criminal Code). However, as Claude Bélanger, Former Principal General Counsel, Department of Justice noted, permission to install a GPS on a vehicle (tracking warrant) may only be granted for a maximum of 60 days, regardless of the type of offence (section 492.1(2) of the Criminal Code). Further tracking warrants may be issued, but the Committee was told that the more actions that are required to continue an investigation, the greater the chances are of jeopardizing that investigation.[142] The Committee is of the opinion that the standardization of the maximum duration of a tracking warrant with the electronic eavesdropping warrant would be helpful in fighting organized crime.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that section 492.1 of the Criminal Code be amended to allow for the use of a tracking warrant for an initial maximum duration of one year for the investigation of an organized crime offence.
One of the problems mentioned to the Committee was the use of countersurveillance techniques by criminal organizations to detect the use of electronic eavesdropping devices by the police and to create interference fields. According to Calgary Chief of Police, Rick Hanson, many police officers conducting traffic stops have lost the use of their phone and, in some cases their radio, because of jamming devices.[143]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada examine the possibility of creating an offence in the Criminal Code regarding the use, possession, sale, manufacturing and importing of jamming devices.
MEGA-TRIALS
The “mega-trial” phenomenon is generally characterized by lengthy investigations, usually involving wiretapping and joint enterprises, which usually means a large number of accused and counts, and considerable quantities of evidence. Organized crime cases often deal with sophisticated accused parties who have used sophisticated methods to avoid detection or are engaged in extensive criminal activity. As a result, the proof of the Crown’s case may involve production of many pages of wiretap transcripts, surveillance reports, witness statements and other documentary evidence. These cases present major challenges for all components of the justice system.
On February 25, 2008, the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General appointed former Chief Justice Patrick Lesage and Professor Michael Code (now Justice Code) to conduct a review of large and complex criminal case procedures. The report was released on November 28, 2008 and contained 41 recommendations.[144] A number of the recommendations were taken up at the federal level in Bill C-2, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, which received Royal Assent on June 26, 2011.[145]
In the Lesage-Code report, the authors state that the general effect of the criminal organization legislation is to enact an aggravated form of already existing offences, if the accused can be proven to be part of a “criminal organization.” Many of the “mega-trials” in Ontario and elsewhere are gang-related and require a great deal of time to prove the additional aggravating “criminal organization” element. The authors point out that in the leading “criminal organization” case in Ontario, the underlying extortion offence was proven by the Crown in one week, while the “criminal organization” portion of the trial then lasted for approximately six weeks with complex and lengthy evidence about the Hells Angels.[146]
In 2011, another important case relating to the Hells Angels was decided, this time in Québec – R. v. Auclair.[147] One hundred and fifty-six people allegedly associated with the Hells Angels were arrested in 2009 and charged with various offences including murder, conspiracy to commit murder, trafficking in illegal substances, conspiracy to traffic in illegal substances and the commission of an indictable offence for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization. The accused sought a stay of proceedings due, in part, to an allegation that it was an abuse of process that a lengthy delay was anticipated before any trial would begin.
The Quebec Superior Court concluded that a single trial of 29 charges against 155 accused (one of the accused was deceased by that time) was not possible. The court found that there was no abuse of process, but divided the accused into a number of groups based on location and the accusations against them.
The main issue for the court was that there were only two appropriate courtrooms where the trials could take place in the entire province of Quebec. The 13 trials that would be required after the court divided the accused into groups would have resulted in some accused waiting until 2021 to start their trial, based on the availability of only two appropriate courtrooms. This was found to be an unreasonable delay and the court ordered that only the trials of the accused charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder should go ahead. Those accused who were not facing such charges (31 in total) were ordered to be released from custody. The court noted that it is up to police and prosecutors to plan their investigations and prosecutions based on the existing capacity in the justice system. The decision is being appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal.
Although Bill C-2 does not address the lack of appropriate courtrooms, which is a provincial matter, it does address a number of other issues related to “mega-trials”. The approach taken by Bill C-2 is to add a new Part XVIII.1 to the Criminal Code to allow for the appointment of a case management judge. This judge may be different from the trial judge but will have extensive pre-trial powers, including the ability to adjudicate issues concerning the disclosure of evidence, the admissibility of evidence, and expert witnesses. Any such decisions would be binding on the trial judge, unless it would not be in the interests of justice.
Bill C-2 also provides for a joint hearing to allow for preliminary decisions to be made that would be binding on separate but related trials in the same province before a court of the same jurisdiction. Similarly, severance of trials for multiple counts or multiple accused may be postponed to allow for one decision to be made regarding disclosure, admissibility of evidence and Charter of Rights issues that would be binding in all of the subsequent trials. The bill also provides that, in the case of a mistrial, certain decisions made during the trial are binding on the parties in any new trial. Finally, Bill C-2 would make it easier to correct errors with direct indictments and avoid new bail hearings when a direct indictment is preferred.[148]
In addition, in order to protect jurors, Bill C-2 provides that they will generally be called by a number, rather than their name, and access to juror cards and lists can be restricted where necessary for the proper administration of justice. Bill C-2 also allows for the swearing in of up to 14 jurors for lengthy trials, subject to a random selection process that will determine which jurors will deliberate.[149]
Though not addressed in Bill C-2, the Lesage-Code report also examined ways to avoid lengthy procedural delays in major terrorism prosecutions. A significant feature of terrorism prosecutions that sets them apart from other long, complex criminal trials, is the likelihood that national security evidence will factor into the case. The claim of privilege, pursuant to section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act[150], therefore, will become a common feature of such prosecutions. Section 38 removes the national security issue from the trial court and gives exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to the Federal Court. This section also allows for interlocutory appeals.[151] Both of these features of section 38 tend to delay terrorism trials. Section 38 could be amended to give the Superior Court of Justice jurisdiction to rule on claims of national security privilege and to remove the ability to appeal such rulings before the trial has ended.
A further difficulty that is posed during “mega-trials” is that of unrepresented litigants. An unrepresented accused person who is intent on controlling or disrupting a trial, or who simply does not know how to conduct a trial, can turn a relatively straightforward trial into a lengthy and complex matter. It then becomes a challenge for the trial judge to ensure in these circumstances that the unrepresented or self-represented accused receives a fair and efficient trial. This can create a conflict between the impartiality of a trial judge and his or her need to intervene to protect the rights of the accused. Yet section 651(2) of the Criminal Code sets out the statutory right of an accused to be self-represented, and the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that an accused person has control over the decision of whether to have counsel.[152]
While an accused person has the right to be present during the whole of his or her trial, section 650(2)(a) of the Criminal Code provides that an accused who interrupts the proceedings and interferes with the conduct of the trial may be removed from the courtroom. There is, however, no power vested in the trial judge to appoint counsel for a self-represented accused in these circumstances. An amendment to the Criminal Code could be made to provide this power. There is precedent for the appointment of counsel regardless of the wishes of the accused. For example, section 672.24(1) of the Code provides that, where the court has reasonable grounds to believe that an accused is unfit to stand trial, and the accused is not represented by counsel, the court shall order that the accused be represented by counsel.
The Public Prosecution Service of Canada has also addressed the “mega-trial” issue. It endorses the cooperation of Crown counsel with the investigative agency and points out that counsel are required, on an ongoing basis, to assess every case according to the test of whether there is a reasonable prospect of conviction and whether prosecution is in the public interest. A review of the charges should be done before they are laid. Then, the consideration of the public interest factor should take into account what will be strategically feasible. A prosecution that is so large and complex that no reasonable juror will be able to follow the evidence does not serve the public interest.[153]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Canada Evidence Act be amended to give the Superior Court of Justice jurisdiction to rule on claims of national security privilege and remove the ability to appeal such rulings before the trial has ended.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Criminal Code be amended to provide a power to appoint counsel for a self-represented accused where the continued presence of the accused makes a fair trial unfeasible.
WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAMS
In 1984, the RCMP established a witness protection program (WPP) to protect individuals collaborating with the justice system. In 1996, the Witness Protection Program Act[154] came into force, ensuring that WPP applicants had a clear understanding of their rights and obligations, as well as the scope of the protection that could be afforded. The Act also addressed the admission criteria for witnesses, the obligations of those who administer the program, and the requirements of reporting to Parliament.
The federal WPP is one of the resources accessible to law enforcement in Canada which can provide protection and support to witnesses who find themselves at risk as a result of their participation in the justice system. This protection may be particularly useful in organized crime cases due to the extreme violence demonstrated by organized crime, its extensive financial resources, and its willingness to exact revenge against those willing to cooperate with law enforcement. The increasing capacity of organized crime to locate and intimidate or harm witnesses, often through the expanded use of technology, has required witness protection processes to evolve and adapt over time.[155]
The federal WPP is not the only such program in Canada. The provinces of Alberta, Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan all have a WPP in place. The programs in Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan are based on legislation while those in Quebec and Ontario are based on policies adopted by the police. The provincial programs, as well as programs that exist at the municipal level, were generally created to meet the short-term needs of witnesses prior to a trial and not necessarily to accommodate the needs of those requiring life-long protection or a change of identity.
There is no dedicated federal funding for the federal, provincial, or municipal WPPs. This can create impediments when serious crimes are being investigated, but there are not sufficient resources to pay for witness protection. The RCMP currently spends approximately $7 million to $8 million to protect 830 witnesses, but these numbers can easily fluctuate.[156] This money can be used to fund relocation, accommodation, change of identity, psychological counselling, and financial support to facilitate the witnesses’ re-establishment or ability to become self-sufficient, in addition to officers’ wages. On the issue of funding, the Committee heard that, in order to place a witness in the federal WPP, local police forces have to pay the cost, which can make the program unaffordable for smaller jurisdictions.[157] If the program is not used and witnesses do not come forward because of this failure, it may become harder and harder to infiltrate organized crime.
Once admitted into the WPP, a witness must enter into a protection agreement, which contains the obligations of both parties. Section 11 of the Act states that it is an offence to knowingly disclose, directly or indirectly, information about the location or a change of identity of a protectee or former protectee. Protectees and former protectees can, however, disclose information about themselves so long as this does not compromise the integrity of the WPP or endanger other protectees. The RCMP may terminate protection if the protectee deliberately infringes a condition of the protection agreement or if there is evidence of a material misrepresentation. The statute allows the Minister of Public Safety to enter into an agreement with a foreign government or an international court or tribunal to admit foreign nationals into the WPP.
A current challenge to the WPP is the lack of resources. Increasing demands are being placed upon the WPP as a result of expanding gang activity and the offer of protective services to those associated with gangs who wish to provide testimony but are afraid of reprisals. As such, even when the number of people in the WPP has decreased, the budget has not necessarily decreased as improvements to the program are made and the costs to protect each individual witness increase.
The provinces have also requested that changes to the WPP be made to facilitate their ability to obtain federal identification documentation without having to enter their protectees into the federal WPP, which is the current practice.[158] The RCMP and Public Safety Canada are in agreement with this suggestion and are currently working to develop a secure process to implement it.[159]
While our Committee did not undertake a thorough review of the federal WPP, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security did carry out such a study. Its report, entitled Review of the Witness Protection Program, was published in March 2008.[160] That Committee made nine recommendations, and in its response the Government of Canada, it stated: “the appropriate time must be devoted to studying best practices and lessons learned by our international partners so that we may develop, along with our federal, provincial and territorial partners, the best possible program for Canada. Consultations with our partners are currently underway and the Committee’s recommendations will certainly help guide further discussions and inform future enhancements to the Program.”[161]
We note that, in its testimony before our Committee, the RCMP stated that it had developed an internal document with a number of recommendations. First, consideration is being given to amending the Witness Protection Program Act to better respond to the needs of provincial partners. Second, the RCMP is changing its WPP program to improve the services it offers so that, for example, the WPP will be more “protectee focussed”, address more fully the safety of WPP personnel and the public, and provide greater accountability. A Risk Assessment and Management model is being finalized to ensure that national standards are consistently applied prior to entry into the program. Training has been increased and there is greater consideration of the socio-psychological needs of protectees. Finally, new technologies will be used to better monitor cases, identify issues, increase accountability and improve the accuracy of reporting.[162]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that there be dedicated federal funding for the federal Witness Protection Program. This funding should at least provide a base level for the maintenance of the WPP at its current level of need. Funding should be assessed annually and increased, as needed, to aid in the fight against organized crime.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee understands that the RCMP and Public Safety Canada are currently working to amend the current WPP practice to facilitate the ability of provincial witness protection programs to obtain federal identification documentation without having to enter their protectees into the federal WPP and recommends that this change be instituted as soon as possible.
BORDER ISSUES
In Edmonton, the Committee heard that $17 million in drugs had been seized by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) Prairie Region in 2009.[163] The majority of the drug seizures have involved cocaine from South America, doda from the United States, and khat from Africa. While most drug shipments arriving by air do so outside the Prairie Region, there have been increases in the number of drug shipments at the Calgary and Edmonton International Airports. A challenge for the CBSA is to identify suspect containers and shipments as organized crime uses legitimate companies to conceal their drug shipments.[164]
While in Winnipeg, the Committee heard testimony about the problems created by the 460-kilometre border between Manitoba and the United States. In remote areas along this border, organized criminal groups recognize the advantages of operating there as the risk of detection is minimal. In addition, the ready access to firearms in the U.S., along with the many potential customers for illicit goods, makes the area attractive to organized crime. The Committee also heard that organized criminal groups are diversifying into such areas as the importation and selling of counterfeit goods. The risk of apprehension is low and the investigations, which often cross international boundaries, can be very complex and involve victims in multiple jurisdictions and countries, making prosecution difficult and in some cases impossible.[165] Another potential border threat to Manitoba is the targeting of the port of Churchill by organized crime as a means to gain relatively easy access into North America. This threat will grow as ocean access into Hudson’s Bay could become ice-free in the near future.
The scale of the issue of border control was brought home to the Committee during its hearings in Montréal. The CBSA in the Quebec region is responsible for securing 32 land border crossings, 25 airports (including 3 international airports), 9 marine ports, 6 railroad stations, and 5 inland customs offices. Each year, the CBSA in the Quebec region processes more than 4 million air passengers, 6 million road travellers, and approximately 2 million commercial releases. Out of these totals, the CBSA conducts nearly 600,000 examinations each year. In 2008, the CBSA in the Quebec region took nearly 16,000 enforcement actions resulting in 2,451 narcotics seizures and 378 currency seizures.[166]
Another aspect of the work of the CBSA is immigration inland enforcement. Employees in this area work to ensure the successful deportation of people who are deemed inadmissible to Canada. Enforcement related to organized crime in this area is of great importance to the CBSA due to section 37 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.[167] This section states that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of organized criminality for (a) being a member of an organized criminal group; or (b) engaging, in the context of transnational crime, in activities such as people smuggling, trafficking in persons or money laundering.
In addition to seizing illegal goods, which includes precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of ecstasy and methamphetamines, and immigration inland enforcement, the Criminal Investigation Division of the CBSA investigates and initiates prosecution for criminal offences against Canada’s border legislation. This includes suspected misrepresentations, evasions, or commissions of fraud with respect to the international movement of goods and people.
Finally, the Intelligence Division of the CBSA has a mandate to identify threats to Canada and to communicate this information to its law enforcement partners. Intelligence officers and analysts work on such issues as export control, missing children, fraudulent documents and the smuggling of various types of contraband, including humans, tobacco, illicit drugs, and weapons. The work of the Intelligence Division can lead to the realization that an individual is part of a larger group, such as organized crime.[168] In Toronto, the Committee heard about the activities of the Pearson International Airport Intelligence Unit or the YYZ Intelligence Unit. The work of this unit has resulted in the dismissal of over 50 airport employees.
JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE
Section 515 of the Criminal Code currently provides for the detention before trial of those persons charged with offences whom it is feared may not appear in court to answer the charges against them, or where there are grounds to believe that the person would commit further offences if they were not detained. A concern expressed by the former Edmonton Chief of Police was not so much with the legislation needed to protect the public as it was that the legislative processes are not being used to the extent that they should be. This is especially the case with prolific, chronic or repeat offenders. As a result, the public is not being properly protected from further victimization.[169]
Former Chief Boyd referred to studies carried out in Edmonton and Halifax in 2006 and 2008 that examined criminal offender backgrounds. These studies revealed that offenders were arrested and released dozens of times, where they breached their conditions of release multiple times, and where they re-offended, harming the public. The background of these chronic offenders suggests that they should be incapacitated through pre-trial detention. While these chronic offenders are often dependent on alcohol or drugs, which is a health issue, it becomes an issue for the criminal justice system when they harm others in their quest for money to buy alcohol or drugs. The Committee was urged to make consideration of the risk assessment carried out for bail hearings mandatory. In other words, reference to this assessment must be made in the decision to release an accused person pending trial. The Committee was also urged to update bail laws to take account of such options as electronic monitoring.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that section 515 of the Criminal Code be amended to specify that one of the conditions of an order granting interim judicial release can be an order to wear an electronic monitoring device.
LEGAL AID
The Lesage-Code report noted that Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) may have contributed to the phenomenon of overly-long criminal trials in Ontario by the steady diminution of the legal aid tariff while trials were becoming longer and more complex. This has led to many leading members of the bar not taking on such trials. These senior and experienced counsels could be relied upon to focus on the essential issues in a trial and to conduct it in a responsible and efficient manner. Today, however, such counsels tend to avoid lengthy, complex trials as not being feasible financially. The inexperienced counsels that do take on long trials at the legal aid tariff require advice and supervision as to how they should conduct a defence so that trials are not unduly protracted.
LAO administers a Big Case Management (BCM) program. The BCM program has been created to deal with particularly large cases that are likely to exceed the cost of an average legal aid certificate. The BCM program covers cases that cost LAO between $20,000 and $75,000. If the case exceeds this upper limit, there is a further degree of oversight from a panel of experts known as the Exceptions Committee. Approximately 25% of the LAO criminal budget is spent on BCM cases. These cases are increasingly being conducted by junior lawyers, while the Lesage-Code report notes that, between 1999 and 2007, there was a 15% decline in the number of senior lawyers who took on any Legal Aid cases.
The preferred means of dealing with this situation is to pay higher fees and restrict eligibility to ensure that highly qualified lawyers will take on long, complex cases. The enhanced fees will make it economical for senior counsels to take on the defence in such cases. The benefit is that the trials should end up being shorter and less costly, as senior counsels will generally focus on the real issues in the case and will have no reason to unduly prolong the case.
An issue related to that of the role of counsel in complex trials is the problem of recruiting and retaining talented lawyers in the Public Prosecution Service of Canada. The Committee was informed that the salaries of federal prosecutors have fallen behind those of a number of provinces. The result is that, after federal prosecutors have amassed a certain amount of experience, they transfer to the provinces at salaries that could be as much as 40% to 60% higher.[170]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the federal contribution to legal aid be reviewed for “mega-trials” with a federal law element (such as prosecutions under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act) in order to attract senior counsel.
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada review the salaries of prosecutors with the Public Prosecution Service of Canada to determine whether they are comparable with the salaries of prosecutors with provincial prosecution services.
PUBLIC EDUCATION
A key component in the fight against organized crime is public education. This takes many forms. One is educating the public about the dangers of counterfeit goods. One of these dangers is that a counterfeit of, for example, medicine may, in fact, be harmful. A second danger is that a member of the public might think that he or she is getting a “good deal” when purchasing a deeply-discounted counterfeit product. But the labour of many people was exploited in the making of that product and the profit from the sale goes straight into the pocket of organized crime.
To combat payment card fraud, users of these cards need to learn about the scams perpetrated by organized crime and ways to protect themselves. The purchase of contraband tobacco may seem advantageous from a financial standpoint but it is not a “victimless crime”, as it funds large organized crime groups and leads to a significant tax revenue loss.
The Committee was told that organized crime relies for its success upon its ability to prey upon the naive and the vulnerable. The way to combat this is through public education. Such education has to start at a young age so that children get the right messages about drugs and cyber-predatory behaviour. It is these elements that lead to approaches for prostitution and gang involvement. There is no other way to explain the continuing success of Internet frauds other than public ignorance. There must be a national commitment to education to reduce levels of victimization.[171]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that there be a review of federal public education programs to assess their adequacy and effectiveness in reducing the level of victimization caused by organized crime.
CRIME PREVENTION
A continued refrain throughout the Committee’s hearings was that expressed by a number of police officers who told the Committee that the key to tackling organized crime is to have a strong enforcement strategy but, equally, to have a strong prevention strategy as well. If the problem of organized crime can be addressed at the front end, it will make the job of the police a lot easier at the back end.[172] Another way of expressing this was that it is all well and good to have diversion programs in the Youth Criminal Justice Act, but we need some place to divert youth to. If youth are living in a terrible situation to begin with, and if the only solution we have is to put them in the criminal justice system, then we cannot expect any different outcome other than continued criminal activity.[173]
Another aspect of the prevention of crime policy deals with immigrants. The Committee was informed that the lack of accessible places for immigrants with programming directed at them as children and youth will have consequences later on when and if they become involved with the law.[174]
Finally, the Committee was told that a prevention approach is about working with people in a number of sectors; not just the police, but also the environmental sectors, housing, health, education, youth, and social services. These actors target the areas and the groups most at risk and put facilities and support into education and recreation and other alternatives to young people joining a gang. It is these efforts, in combination with those of law enforcement, that will yield the results we seek.[175] As one witness put it, focused, proactive policing is necessary when dealing with organized crime, but if we concentrate on policing alone and do not address the contributing factors to crime, we will never make any significant inroads to preventing crime in the first place.[176]
RECOMMENDATION
The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work with the provinces and territories to put in place a comprehensive crime prevention program.
[1] A list of witnesses and briefs can be found in the Appendices.
[2] Bill C-14 was given Royal Assent on June 23, 2009 and became S.C. 2009, c. 22. It came into force on October 2, 2009.
[3] Testimony on this issue was heard on May 12, 2009, May 26, 2009, and June 15, 2009.
[4] Testimony on this issue was heard on January 30, 2007 and February 1, 2007. The Committee had adopted a motion on December 13, 2006 in the following terms:
Whereas various important witnesses have indicated to the Committee that there is a significant link between armed offences, street gangs and organized crime;
Whereas parliamentarians have an obligation to legislate on the basis of meaningful and conclusive information;
It is proposed that the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights not begin the clause-by-clause review of Bill C-10 until it has devoted two more meetings to the issue of street gangs, and two more meetings to examine the overall effect on gangsterism of Bills C-95 and C-24, adopted in 1997 and 2001;
It is also proposed, with respect to gangsterism, that the research assistants produce a summary of the case law and provide Committee members with a file comprising the court judgments in full.
[5] Testimony of Professor Neil Boyd, Professor of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3853912&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[6] Brief of Ray Hudson, Manager of Policy Development and Communications, Surrey Board of Trade, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009.
[7] S.C. 1997, c. 23.
[8] S.C. 2000, c. 17.
[9] S.C. 2001, c. 32.
[10] A “serious offence” is defined in section 467.1 of the Criminal Code to mean an indictable offence under any Act of Parliament for which the maximum punishment is at least five years’ imprisonment or another offence that is prescribed by regulation. The Regulations Prescribing Certain Offences to be Serious Offences make a number of criminal offences “serious offences” for the purposes of the organized crime provisions. Some of the criminal acts carried out by organized crime do not always meet the definition of serious offence because they are not punishable by five years or more. This may prevent these groups from being labelled as “criminal organizations” in the Criminal Code. The Regulations designate 11 specific offences in the areas of gambling, prostitution, and drug activity as “serious offences”. The Regulations can be found at: http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2010/2010-08-04/html/sor-dors161-eng.html.
[11] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
[12] Criminal Code, s. 467.1.
[13] R. v. Lindsay; 2005 CarswellOnt 2911; [2005] O.T.C. 583; R. v. Myles (2007) 48 C.R. (6th) 108 (Ont. S.C.).
[14] Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Incident-based Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR2) Survey.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Section 467.14 of the Criminal Code.
[18] Criminal Code, s. 810.01(1).
[19] Criminal Code, s. 462.3(1).
[20] Criminal Code, Part VI.
[21] Criminal Code, s. 515(6)(a)(ii).
[22] R. v. Lindsay; 2005 CarswellOnt 2911; [2005] O.T.C. 583 ; R. v. Myles (2007) 48 C.R. (6th) 108 (Ont. S.C.).
[23] R. c. Aurélius (2007), QCCQ 227.
[24] Bullerwell, Dane, Student-at-Law, Memorandum “Trends in Organized Crime Prosecutions” to Justice Wachowich, March 26, 2010.
[25] Testimony of Randall Richmond before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, January 30, 2007, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2645085& Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1.
[26] Halifax Regional Police, Community Response Model of Policing.
[27] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 11, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=3742931&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[29] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2010 Report on Organized Crime, p. 18, http://www.cisc.gc.ca/ annual_reports/annual_report_2010/document/report_oc_2010_e.pdf.
[30] The Hells Angels, which belong to this upper category, are Canada’s largest biker gang. However, on April 15, 2009, 156 arrest warrants were issued for full-patch members and associates of the Hells Angels in the SHARQC (Stratégie Hells Angels Région Québec) police operation. Charges laid included gangsterism, trafficking in a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit murder, and murder.
[31] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 16, 2012, http://prismweb.parl.gc.ca/IntranetDocuments/ CommitteeBusiness/41/1/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/JUSTEVBLUES21.HTM.
[32] Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide in Canada, 2010, Minister of Industry, October 2011, Table 4, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11561/tbl/tbl04-eng.htm.
[33] Brief of Superintendent Robert Davis, Greater Toronto Area District Commander, Royal Canadian Mounted Police — “O” Division, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 25, 2010.
[34] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2010 Report on Organized Crime, p. 12, http://www.cisc.gc.ca/ annual_reports/annual_report_2010/document/report_oc_2010_e.pdf.
[35] Organized Crime in Québec, 2009 Situation Report.
[36] Brief of Assistant Commissioner Alistair D. Macintyre, Officer in Charge of Criminal Operations, RCMP British Columbia to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009.
[37] Brief of Inspector Clemens Imgrund, Officer in Charge, Division Intelligence, “K” Division, RCMP, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 29, 2010.
[38] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 16, 2012, http://prismweb.parl.gc.ca/IntranetDocuments/ CommitteeBusiness/41/1/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/JUSTEVBLUES21.HTM.
[39] Brief of David Aggett, Director, Enforcement and Intelligence Division, Canada Border Services Agency — Atlantic Region, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, October 23, 2009.
[40] Brief of Superintendent Brian Brennan, RCMP “H” Division — Nova Scotia, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, October 23, 2009.
[41] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2010 Report on Organized Crime, p. 26, http://www.cisc.gc.ca/ annual_reports/annual_report_2010/table_of_contents_2010_e.html.
[42] Brief of Inspector Sylvain Joyal, Officer-in-Charge Montréal Drug Section, Royal Canadian Mounted Police — “C” Division, October 22, 2009.
[43] Testimony of Donald R. Dixon, Director General, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 11, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3742931&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[44] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 16, 2012, http://prismweb.parl.gc.ca/IntranetDocuments/Committee Business/41/1/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/JUSTEVBLUES21.HTM.
[45] Testimony of Julian Sher, October 22, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=4167421&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[46] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 2008 Report on Organized Crime, http://www.cisc.gc.ca/ annual_reports/annual_report_2008/human_smuggling_2008_e.html.
[47] See Davis, Note 33.
[48] Testimony of Inspector Denis Morin, Sûreté du Québec, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, October 22, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ Publication.aspx?DocId=4167422&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[49] Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide in Canada, 2010, Minister of Industry, October 2011, Table 6, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11561/tbl/tbl04-eng.htm.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Julie McAuley, Director, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Organized Crime, Written Submission to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 1, 2012.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Homicide in Canada, 2010, Minister of Industry, October 2011, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11561/tbl/tbl04-eng.htm.
[54] Testimony of Donald R. Dixon, Director General, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 11, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3742931&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#Int-2652816.
[55] Canadian Chamber of Commerce Resolution, adopted at the Annual General Meeting, September 18, 2007, http://www.chamber.ca/images/uploads/Resolutions/2009/PolicyBook07-09.pdf.
[56] Samuel Perreault and Shannon Brennan, Statistics Canada, Criminal Victimization in Canada, 2009, Summer 2010, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11340-eng.htm.
[57] The most common reasons cited for not reporting victimization incidents to the police were because the victim felt that the incident was not important enough (68%), they thought there was nothing the police could do to help (59%), they dealt with the situation in another way (42%), or they felt the incident was a personal matter (36%).
[58] Testimony of Darcy Rezac, Managing Director, Vancouver Board of Trade, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 25, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/ HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3775476&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[59] Samuel Perreault and Shannon Brennan, Statistics Canada, Criminal Victimization in Canada, 2009, Summer 2010, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11340-eng.htm.
[60] Correctional Service Canada, Gang Statistics and Strategy Brief Prepared for the Justice Committee, December 15, 2011.
[61] Ibid. It should be noted that an offender can have more than one gang affiliation.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Brief of Resource Assistance for Youth (Winnipeg) to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010.
[64] Letter from Harvey Cenaiko, Chairperson of the Parole Board of Canada, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, January 19, 2012.
[65] In Fernandez v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 275 (2011), the Federal Court held that the Parole Board may question an offender about past conduct that could have supported a prosecution for a criminal organization offence, for which he was not charged. As a result of this consideration, the Board ordered the offender to be detained past his statutory release date until the expiry of the committal warrant.
[66] S.C. 1992, c. 20, s. 133(3) “(3) The releasing authority may impose any conditions on the parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence of an offender that it considers reasonable and necessary in order to protect society and to facilitate the successful reintegration into society of the offender.”
[67] Letter from Harvey Cenaiko, Chairperson of the Parole Board of Canada, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, January 19, 2012.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Testimony of Jan Fox, District Director, Alberta/Northwest Territories District Office, Correctional Service Canada, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 29, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4391311&Language=E&Mode=1& Parl=40&Ses=3.
[70] Brief of Inspector John Ferguson, Officer in Charge, Drugs and Integrated Organized Crime, “D” Division, RCMP, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010.
[71] Testimony of Jocelyn Latulippe, Chief Inspector, Director of Criminal Inquiries, Sûreté du Québec, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, May 12, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3890919&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[72] Testimony of William Bartlett, Senior Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, May 12, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3890919&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[73] Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Brief to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 25, 2010.
[74] “The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices”, U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, Audit Report 09-25, May 2009, http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf.
[75] See Bartlett, Note 72.
[76] Testimony of Christopher Mainella, Senior Counsel, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, May 26, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3920857&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[77] Testimony of Paul Burstein, Barrister and Solicitor, Burstein & Unger, As an Individual, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, June 15, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3993315&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[78] Testimony of Professor Robert Gordon, Professor and Director, School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3853912&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[79] Criminal Intelligence Service Canada testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 16, 2012, http://prismweb.parl.gc.ca/IntranetDocuments/ CommitteeBusiness/41/1/JUST/Meetings/Evidence/JUSTEVBLUES21.HTM.
[80] See the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada website at: http://www.cisc.gc.ca/products_services/ model_poster/poster_mod_e.html.
[81] Brief of Inspector John Ferguson, Officer in Charge, Drugs and Integrated Organized Crime, “D” Division, RCMP, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010.
[82] Testimony of Inspector Robert Bazin, Officer in Charge, Border Integrity, “D” Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, March 30, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=4399041&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[83] Brief of Inspector Bob Stewart, Vancouver Police Department, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009.
[84] [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
[85] R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 at para. 74.
[86] R. v. Egger, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 451 at 467.
[87] Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, Chapter 18, Disclosure, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/fps-sfp/fpd/ch18.html.
[88] The decision of R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 held that a delay of almost two years following the preliminary inquiry was excessive and unreasonable. By the terms of section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, any person charged with an offence has the right to be tried within a reasonable time. The determination of what is “reasonable” will depend upon the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, waiver of the delay by the accused, and prejudice to the accused.
[89] Brief of the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, April 15, 2010.
[90] Brief of Rick Hanson, Calgary Chief of Police, March 29, 2010.
[91] Testimony of Yvan Poulin, General Counsel, Quebec Regional Office, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, April 15, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4423055& Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3094404.
[92] Submitted to the Attorney General of Ontario, November 2008, http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ english/about/pubs/lesage_code/lesage_code_report_en.pdf.
[93] Testimony of Patrick Lesage, Former Chief Justice of the Ontario Superior Court, As an Individual, April 15, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4423055&Language=E&Mode=1& Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3094404.
[94] Brief of the Greater Victoria Chamber of Commerce, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009.
[95] Testimony of Chief Rick Hanson, Chief of Police, Calgary Police Service, March 29, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4391311&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[96] Testimony of Dr. Larry Motiuk, Special Advisor, Infrastructure Renewal Team, Correctional Service Canada, April 29, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4481483&Language= E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[97] Testimony of Antonio Nicaso, Author and Journalist, As an Individual, March 25, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4382472&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[98] Testimony of Professor John Martin, Professor, University of the Fraser Valley, As an Individual, April 20, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4447605&Language=E&Mode=1& Parl=40&Ses=3.
[99] Testimony of Dr. Matt Logan, Retired Royal Canadian Mounted Police Operational Psychologist, Behavioural Science Group in Major Crime, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=3854946&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[100] Testimony of Marshall Williams, Member, In My Own Voice (Halifax), before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, October 28, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4184077&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[101] Brief of Laura Johnson, Project Coordinator — Just TV (Winnipeg) to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010.
[102] National Crime Prevention Centre, Youth Gang Involvement: What Are the Risk Factors?”, 2007, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/cp/bldngevd/_fl/2007-YG-2_e.pdf.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Brief of Resource Assistance for Youth (Winnipeg) to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010.
[105] Michael Owen, Brief for the Study on the State of Organized Crime in Canada, submitted by the Boys and Girls Clubs of Winnipeg, March 30, 2010.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Brief of Macdonald Youth Services (Winnipeg) to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010.
[108] See Owen, Note 105.
[109] Institute for the Prevention of Crime, Building a Safer Canada: First Report of the National Working Group on Crime Prevention, University of Ottawa, September 2007, https://www.cacp.ca/media/coalitiongroups /efiles/5/BuildingaSaferCanada.pdf.
[110] Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General (“Horner Commission”). (1993) Crime Prevention in Canada: Towards a National Strategy. Ottawa: House of Commons.
[111] Building a Safer Canada, p. 13.
[112] Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization in Canada, 2009, Ministry of Industry, Summer 2010, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11340-eng.htm.
[113] Building a Safer Canada, p. 8.
[114] Testimony of Clive Weighill, Chief of Police, Saskatoon Police Service, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/ HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4399041&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3071310.
[115] Brief of Hugo Foss, Psychologist with the Correctional Service Canada, Prairie Region, to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 29, 2010.
[116] Brief to the Committee from Resource Assistance for Youth (Winnipeg), March 30, 2010.
[117] Brief of the Greater Victoria Chamber of Commerce to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009.
[118] Disrupting Canada’s Marijuana Grow Industry: Four deterrents intended to limit a primary funding source for Organized Crime Groups, Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights by the City of Surrey, the City of Langley, RCMP “E” Division, and Darryl Plecas, Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of the Fraser Valley, April 30, 2009.
[119] Canada Revenue Agency, Fact Sheet, Proceeds of Crime Are Taxable, November 2006, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/nwsrm/fctshts/2006/m11/fs061123-eng.html.
[120] Testimony of Len Garis, Chief, Surrey Fire Services, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=3854946&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[121] See discussion on page 41 and the Recommendation which follows.
[122] Julie McAuley, Director, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Organized Crime, Written Submission to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 1, 2012.
[123] S.C. 2005, c. 44 (Bill C-53).
[124] These offences are trafficking, importing, exporting and producing drugs.
[125] The RCMP has used certain provisions of the Act to freeze assets, such as during Operation Colisée, which targeted the Montreal Mafia (Testimony of Inspector Martine Fontaine, Officer in Charge, Integrated Proceeds of Crime, Montréal, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, October 22, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4167422&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2).
[126] Testimony of Inspector Martine Fontaine, Officer in Charge, Integrated Proceeds of Crime, Montréal, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, October 22, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=4167422&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2).
[127] S.O. 2001, c. 28.
[128] Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] 1 S. C. R. 624.
[129] Ibid., para. 47 (Court’s emphasis).
[130] Testimony of Francis Brabant, Legal Counsel, Sûreté du Québec, October 22, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4167422&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[131] Testimony of Yvan Poulin, General Counsel, Québec Regional Office, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, April 15, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4423055 &Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[132] Testimony of Ken Froese, Senior Managing Director, Froese Forensic Partners Ltd., April 13, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4423056&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[133] That is, operated by companies that are not recognized financial institutions.
[134] Testimony of Ken Froese, Senior Managing Director, Froese Forensic Partners Ltd., April 13, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4423056&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[135] Testimony of Chantal Jalbert, Assistant Director, Regional Operations and Compliance, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, April 15, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4423055&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[136] Testimony of Inspector Martine Fontaine, Officer in Charge, Integrated Proceeds of Crime, Montréal, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, October 22, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=4167422&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[137] Testimony of Len Garis, Chief, Surrey Fire Services, April 30, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/ HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3854946&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2#Int-2733135.
[138] Testimony of Inspector Don Perron, Organized Crime Enforcement Bureau, Asset Forfeiture and Identity Crimes Program, Ontario Provincial Police, April 13, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ Publication.aspx?DocId=4423056&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3085944.
[139] Testimony of Superintendent Peter Shadgett, Director, Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario, March 25, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4382472&Language=E&Mode=1& Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3062717.
[140] An Act to enact the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act and to amend the Criminal Code and other acts, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, (http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/ 411/Government/C-30/C-30_1/C-30_1.PDF).
[141] See R. v. McNeice, 2010 BCSC 1544 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Brousseau, 2010 ONSC 6753 (Ont. S.C.J.), R. v. Kwok, [2008] O.J. 2414 (C.J. On.), R. v. Wilson, 2009 Carswell Ont 2064 (C.S. On.), R. v. Cuttell, 2009 Carswell Ont 5896 (C.J. On.).
[142] Testimony of Claude Bélanger, Former Principal General Counsel, Department of Justice, As an Individual, January 30, 2007, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2645085&Language= E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1#Int-1859525.
[143] Testimony of Chief Rick Hanson, Chief of Police, Calgary Police Service, March 29, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4391311&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[144] The Honourable Patrick J. Lesage and Professor Michael Code, Report of the Review of Large and Complex Criminal Case Procedures, November 2008, http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ english/about/pubs/lesage_code/lesage_code_report_en.pdf.
[145] For more information on Bill C-2, see: http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E &Mode=1&billId=5085519.
[146] R. v. Lindsay; 2005 CarswellOnt 2911; [2005] O.T.C. 583
[147] 2011 QCCS 2661.
[148] Section 577 of the Criminal Code permits the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General to send a case directly to trial without a preliminary inquiry or after an accused has been discharged following a preliminary inquiry.
[149] Criminal Code, s. 644(2) indicates that a jury is properly constituted so long as the number of jurors does not drop below 10.
[150] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.
[151] Section 38.04 of the Canada Evidence Act allows the Attorney General of Canada to apply at any time to the Federal Court for a ruling with respect to the potential disclosure of sensitive or potentially injurious information. Section 38.09 of the Act provides for an appeal of a disclosure order to the Federal Court of Appeal.
[152] R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 at 972.
[153] Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, Chapter 54, Megacase Management, http://www.justice.gc.ca/ eng/dept-min/pub/fps-sfp/fpd/ch54.html.
[154] S.C. 1996, c. 15.
[155] Testimony of Superintendent Eric Slinn, Director, Drugs and Organized Crime Branches, RCMP, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 16, 2012, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5391481&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=1.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Testimony of Chief Frank A. Beazley, Chief of Police, Halifax Regional Municipality, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, October 23, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4167423&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[158] Testimony of Chief Superintendent Thomas Bucher (Director General, Drugs and Organized Crime, Royal Canadian Mounted Police) before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 13, 2010, http://prismweb.parl.gc.ca/IntranetDocuments/CommitteeBusiness/40/3/JUST/ Meetings/Evidence/JUSTEVBLUES11.HTM.
[159] Testimony of Superintendent Eric Slinn, Director, Drugs and Organized Crime Branches, RCMP, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 16, 2012, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5391481&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=1.
[160] The report can be found here: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/CommitteeBusiness/StudyActivityHome.aspx? Cmte=SECU&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2&Stac=2275593.
[161] The full Government of Canada response may be found here: http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/ Publication.aspx?DocId=3599123&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2.
[162] Testimony of Superintendent Eric Slinn, Director, Drugs and Organized Crime Branches, RCMP, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, February 16, 2012, http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=5391481&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=1.
[163] Testimony of Mike Skappak, Director, Criminal Investigations, Prairie Region, Canada Border Services Agency, March 29, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx ?DocId=4391311&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3064882.
[164] Brief of the Canada Border Services Agency to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 29, 2010.
[165] Testimony of Inspector Robert Bazin, Officer in Charge, Border Integrity, “D” Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4399041&Language=E& Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3071250.
[166] Brief of Angelo De Riggi, Regional Programs Manager, Intelligence Division, Canada Border Services Agency, Quebec Region, October 22, 2009.
[167] S.C. 2001, c. 27.
[168] Brief of Bonnie Lou Gancy, Director of Intelligence for the Greater Toronto Area Region, Canada Border Services Agency, Greater Toronto Area Region, March 25, 2010.
[169] Brief of former Edmonton Chief of Police Michael J. Boyd, March 29, 2010.
[170] Testimony of Marco Mendicino, Acting President, Association of Justice Counsel, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, April 30, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3854946&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[171] Testimony of Chief Rick Hanson, Chief of Police, Calgary Police Service, March 29, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4391311&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[172] Testimony of Inspector John Ferguson, Officer in Charge, Drugs and Integrated Organized Crime, “D” Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx? DocId=4399041&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3071310.
[173] Testimony of Clive Weighill, Chief of Police, Saskatoon Police Service, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 30, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4399041&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3#Int-3071310.
[174] Testimony of the Reverend Julius Tiangson, Executive Director, Gateway Centre for New Canadians, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, March 25, 2010, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4382472&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3.
[175] Testimony of Dr. Margaret Shaw, Sociology and Criminology, International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montréal), before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, October 22, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4167421&Language =E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
[176] Testimony of Chief Frank A. Beazley, Chief of Police, Halifax Regional Police, before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, October 23, 2009, http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4167423&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=2.
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