TINA TURNER- WE DON'T NEED ANOTHER HERO -Mad Max Beyond Thunder Dome

Tina Turner - We Don't Need Another Hero [Official Music Video]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dq4aOaDXIfY

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GOD HAS A PLAN- #PopeFrancis is going to #Lesbos to save #Greece and #SyrianRefugees from the #PanamaPapers monsters who own the 1% of our world.... ..it's time.... GOD IS ANGRY

From the SUBLIME- #Syrian Refugees to the RIDICULOUS #PanamaPapers

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Culling the Human Herd in the 21st Century

by John Stanton

“There is a de facto redefinition of “the economy” when sharp contractions are gradually lost to standard measures. The unemployed who lose everything…easily fall off the edge of what is defined as “the economy” and counted as such. So do small shop and factory owners who lose everything and commit suicide. And so do the growing number of well-educated students and professionals who leave…all together. These trends redefine the space of the economy. They make it smaller and expel a good share of the unemployed and poor from standard measures. Such a redefinition makes “the economy” presentable, so to speak, allowing it to show a slight growth of GDP per capita.
The reality at the ground level is more akin to a kind of economic version of ethnic cleansing in which elements considered troublesome are dealt with by simply eliminating them. This shrinking and redefinition of economic space so that economies can be represented as being “back on track” holds for a growing number of economies in the European Union and elsewhere [like the United States]… One indication of a people’s economic despair is a sharp rise in suicide. This trend is evident in several countries worldwide from India to the United States…
The channels for expulsion vary greatly. They include austerity policies that have helped shrink the economies of Greece and Spain, environmental policies that overlook toxic emissions from enormous mining operations in Norilsk, Russia and the American state of Montana…if our concern is environmental destruction rather that interstate politics, the fact that both these mining operations are heavy polluters matters more than the fact that one is in Russia and the other in the United States…The diverse processes and conditions I include under the notion of expulsion all share one aspect: they are acute. While the abjectly poor worldwide are the most extreme instance, I do include such diverse conditions as the impoverishment of the middle classes in rich countries, the evictions of millions of small farmers in poor countries…Then there are the countless displaced people warehoused in formal and informal refugee camps, the minoritized groups in rich countries who are warehoused in prisons and the able bodied unemployed men and women warehoused in ghettoes and slums…Some are new types of expulsions, such as the 9 million households in the United States whose homes were foreclosed…”

Saskia Sassen’s forthcoming book Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Harvard-Belknap Press, May 2014) begins its sobering journey with an Introduction titled, “The Savage Sorting.” The Savage Sorting seems destined to become the short-form description of 21^st Century to be remembered, if at all, in some distant future by a genetically reengineered humanity (and biosphere).
Most television watchers are familiar with programming on National Geographic or Animal Planet that depicts “life in the wild” for non-human animals. Typical scenes from “nature” programming include lions and hyenas hunting down young, old and infirm wildebeests or zebras. Ultimately successful, they engage in a feeding frenzy. Sometimes the prey is still alive as it is being disemboweled by the predators. Chimpanzees attack, kill and eat rivals whilst emitting screams that unsettle the viewer’s nerves. Aging grizzly bears are observed losing their prized hunting spots to the young and are left to feed on scraps, themselves destined to be prey for creatures large and small. As the “nature” show goes on, the soothing voice of the human narrator assures the audience that it is all part of the “natural order of things.”
That “natural order of things” also includes human-on-human expulsion and extermination. But before touching a bit on the 21^st Century culling of the human herd, it is worth noting that human-on-non-human carnage continues into this “modern” century. One of the practices of this new age of enlightenment is “Canned Hunting” in South Africa. European, North Americans and Chinese big game hunters, according to the Guardian newspaper, sometimes sit on the back of pickup trucks and wait for lions—bred for a “guaranteed kill”–to run by or walk up to the truck. In the Guardian’s “The lions bred for slaughter: Canned hunting is a fast-growing business in South Africa, where thousands of lions are being bred on farms to be shot by wealthy foreign trophy-hunters,” the reader is confronted with a repulsive picture of a happy hunter gloating over a dead lion.
Humans Don’t Discriminate, They Eliminate Non-Humans and Humans Equally
Then there is the case of the Gray Wolf in the United States. According to The Wolf that Changed America, “Wolves have been feared, hated, and persecuted for hundreds of years in North America. Before the arrival of Europeans, Native Americans incorporated wolves into their legends and rituals, portraying them as ferocious warriors in some traditions and thieving spirits in others. European Americans, however, simply despised wolves. Many, including celebrated painter and naturalist John James Audubon, believed wolves ought to be eradicated for the threat they posed to valuable livestock. This attitude enabled a centuries-long extermination campaign that nearly wiped out the gray wolf in the continental United States by 1950.”
Now that Grey Wolf populations are increasing—thanks to the work of some bright humans–denizens in American states like Idaho, Wyoming and Michigan want to get back to the way things were in the good old 1950s. Killing a wolf and taking a “selfie” with the fur that once adorned its body is still an acceptable practice in some quarters. Those quarters are typically dominated by weekend warriors (take another look at the canned hunter on display in the Guardian for the classic “smirk”). Then again American hunters assisted in the near elimination of the America’s mascot: the Bald Eagle.
But it is not just Americans that seek the death penalty for the Gray Wolf (or are crushing the biosphere that that supports life on Earth). It is the same story, for example, in France. According to the Telegraph, UK,

“Conservation groups are furious. To return to wolf hunts as if we were in the Middle Ages is scandalous. That the local authorities are organizing them is even worse, said Jean-François Darmstaedter, president of Ferus, who threatened to challenge their legality in the European courts.
We call them ‘political killings’ as their only aim is to allow farmers to let off steam but they will solve nothing. Blindly shooting wolves will have no effect other than to exacerbate the problem. If you kill the alpha male, you can split up a pack, which will cause far more damage. The only solution, he said, was to protect flocks properly by using fierce Pyrenean Patou mountain dogs, penning sheep inside high electrified fences at night and firing warning shots if wolves approach. These measures can reduce predation to almost nil, he insisted.”

Just Like the Wolves: Humans Negated, Written off, Warehoused, Displaced
There is a statement in the comment section on PBS’ The Wolf that Changed America. It serves as a brutal reminder of the willingness of humanity to expel through genocide, war, and economic/statistical cleansing many collections of human and non-human beings. Those expulsed rarely have the honor of even being lost to recorded history. America’s Native Americans provide an example. “The context omitted by this film [The Wolf that Changed America] is the conquest and colonization of New Mexico by the United States and the subsequent ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Americans to make way for cattle ranching, to which the wolves were a threat. Now we speak of the conservation of the “wilderness” and its wild inhabitants. But why are the human inhabitants denied and negated?”
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), there are nearly 30 million internally displaced people (IDP’s) around the globe who are, essentially, homeless. War is a primary cause. Making war is a conscious decision by politicians and military leaders who rarely consider the destructive consequences for the indigenous population, culture and infrastructure. As Sassen has pointed out, expulsions are “made” and war may be the ultimate form of expulsion. For example, America’s covert actions in the Syrian civil war and its two invasions of Iraq have contributed significantly to the IDP numbers. Remarkably, as a consequence of US war-making the Christian cultures of Iraq and Syria have nearly vanished.
IDMC notes that IDP’s are the result of “conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations and natural hazard-induced disasters. It should be noted that these figures do not include all IDP situations by other causes, such as development projects. Furthermore, while the figures have been presented separately here, our analysis shows that conflict, disasters and resulting displacement have multiple and often overlapping root causes and impacts. Over half of the countries affected by conflict since 1970 were also affected by disaster-induced displacement in the last five years alone. This is an important consideration for those tasked with policy-making, protection and assistance.” IDMC reports that there are another 37 million IDP’s due to “disasters”. The USA accounts for 900,000 of that number. Where do they go?
If You Want a Good Job, Commit a Crime and Go to Prison
The invisible laborers in America’s prisons reduce the costs for goods and services offered by many large US corporations. Skilled and captive prison labor is used by business and state governments on a regular basis ostensibly to cover the costs of incarceration. There is irony here: What does it say about a society that allows government and business to hire prisoners rather than employing law abiding citizens who are equal to the task? What’s the point of being a “good citizen” when there is little reward in playing by the rules of the State-Corporate designed system of life?
Sassen notes that

“Mass incarceration has long been present in extreme dictatorships. But today it is emerging as inextricably linked to advanced capitalism…Most of the people who are being incarcerated are also the people who do not have work and from whom work will not be found in our current epoch…today’s prisoners in the United States and United Kingdom are increasingly today’s version of the surplus laboring population common in the brutal beginnings of modern capitalism…many transnational corporations have set up satellite factories inside prisons…Available evidence suggests that the majority of corporations profiting [in some form] from prison labor [include] Chevron, Bank of America, AT&T, Starbucks and Walmart…the profits of private prisons are represented are represented as a positive addition to a country’s GDP even as they are a government cost; in contrast, government run prisons are only represented as government debt.”
The State-Corporate Complex consciously makes decisions that “expel” one collective group and incorporates another. According to Sassen, “One familiar example in the West that is both complex and extreme is the expelling of low income workers and the unemployed from government social welfare and health programs, as well as from corporate insurance and unemployment support…These expulsion are made. The instruments for this making range from elementary policies to complex institutions, systems and techniques that require specialized knowledge and intricate organizational formats.”

Fight the Power! OK! But Where is It Located?
“People as consumers and workers play a diminished role in the profits of a range of economic sectors… This tells us that our period is not quite like earlier forms of capitalism that thrived on the on the accelerated expansion of prosperous working and middle classes…What is next? Historically the oppressed have often risen against their masters. But today the oppressed have mostly been expelled and survive at a great distance from their “oppressors”. Further, the oppressor is increasingly a complex system that combines persons, networks and machines with no obvious center” notes Sassen.
The worst elements of capitalism/globalization are everyone’s problem. Destruction of the biosphere and much of human and non-human life, and expulsion from society and the record books is a transnational matter. Someone has to care and someone has to remember. It is no coincidence that wherever on the planet one finds one of the tentacles of the globalized State-Corporate System, Expulsions of every kind take place.
Culling the human herd is, of course, best accomplished through a regional or global conflagration pitting one state, or proxy, versus another. In such a conflict everything “is game” (non-humans too).The preeminent warring power on the planet, the United States, is—in a case of acute irony– threatening military action and stiffer economic sanctions on Russia if it proceeds under the “responsibility to protect” doctrine to “save” Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine. And for good measure the US recently warned China not to look to Russia’s annexing of the Crimea as a model for an invasion and occupation of the disputed Diaoyu Islands that Japan claims.
How About a Canned War with Humans?
So is the State-Corporate System. designed and led by the USA, gearing up for a shooting/economic war against both Russia and China? Can you say tactical nuclear weapons? The reality is that there are too many people in the world. A large number of them are a drag on economic performance. Many of them are “old” and blocking opportunities for the young. There simply is not enough work and the State-Corporate System does not want to pay “living wages.” Why should they when prison labor is widely available.
Odd that the centenary of World War I takes place in 2014.
Humans can only hope that the mystical deity “God” does not become a reality. Worse still would be the appearance of an extraterrestrial species that arrives and demands an accounting of humanity’s stewardship of the Earth and the life it supports.
Being expelled from the planet would be quite painful.
John Stanton is a Virginia based writer. Reach him at captainkong22@gmail.com

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John Stanton is a Virginia based writer. Reach him at captainkong22@gmail.com

Articles

The Illusion of War: Is Terrorism a Criminal Act or an Act of War?

Andrew Majoran07/31/2014, 11:12 pm 2549

“The victimization of people, be it for profit or on behalf of a cause, is a crime”

– Dr. Jennifer L. Hesterman

Introduction
The United States, United Kingdom, and Canada are significant forces in what currently constitutes the Western world. These three nations are closely linked through their overlapping history, ongoing diplomatic relations, and economic power. In short, these three nations are powerful global authorities. It is imperative to note, however, that the powerful and advantageous position held by these nations is not without tribulation. In modern history, Western powers such as the US, the UK, and Canada have been in conflict with international and domestic terrorist organizations that threaten to destroy the social foundations that these countries attribute to their success.
The West has attempted to employ a number of solutions in an effort to combat terrorism. Some resolutions include the legal prosecution of terrorists at the domestic and international level, or engaging terrorists through military combat that is considered ‘warfare’. The purpose of this briefing note is to determine how Western states like the US, the UK, and Canada deal with terrorism, and whether or not terrorism should be contextualized as an ‘act of war’ or a domestic crime. This briefing note will assess the historical perception of war and determine if terrorism can effectively be considered an ‘act of war’. Next, it is imperative to assess modern legal documentation and federal statutes pertaining to terrorism, and the criminal elements involved in terrorism to determine its validity as a crime. Once both an ‘act of war’ and a crime have been appropriately defined and contextualized, this briefing note will assess their modern day application compared to the current use of terminology in international and domestic terrorism.
Defining the Threat
Decades of attempts by scholars and world leaders have been foiled by political indecision and differences. Various attempts through diplomatic relations have failed to yield an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. The issue behind definitional solidarity at the international level is encapsulated by the phrase, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” International bodies, like the United Nations, must balance competing security issues and views on terrorism. How terrorism is defined in Canada may not be considered as such in Ireland or Libya.
Without a uniform globally accepted definition of terrorism it is impossible to criminally prosecute individuals for the crime of terrorism at the international level. All terrorism related matters must be dealt with at the domestic level. This, in turn, complicates legal proceedings when dealing with transnational terrorism spanning a multitude of legal jurisdictions.
Terrorism in Canada and the United Kingdom
Despite indecision internationally, Western countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom have established definitions of terrorism that describe the act from a legal perspective. Each definition broadly encapsulates the Western perception of terrorism. For example, in Canada, Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines terrorism as an act committed:
“In whole or in part of a political, religious, or ideological purpose, objective, or cause” with the intention of intimidating the public “…with regard to its security…including economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act.”¹
Criminal activities recognized within this context include death and bodily harm; endangering a person’s life; posing a risk to the health and safety of the public; causing significant property damage; and interfering with/disrupting essential services, facilities, or systems. ² It is imperative to note that this definition appears in Canada’s Criminal Code, and explicitly outlines the criminal aspects involved in an act of terror. By doing so, Canada deems terrorism a criminal offence subject to Canada’s legal legislation and law enforcement.
Similarly, the United Kingdom outlines the importance of the criminal offence paradigm in relation to terrorism in the British Terrorism Act (2006), which refers to terrorism as “a threat or action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public” and is “made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause” ³ Violence against people; damage to property; endangerment of life; and risks to the health and safety of the public are key criminal areas outlined by the Act. ⁴ The definition of terrorism in the United Kingdom is essentially identical to the definition employed in Canada.
Canada and the United Kingdom deem terrorism a criminal act within their respective legal systems. Through this model, Canada and the UK have shown a desire to pursue terrorists through law enforcement: an incident occurs, an investigation ensues, suspects are identified, pursued, brought to trial, prosecuted, and if convicted, imprisoned. ⁵ Due process is to be conducted regardless of the terrorist attacks size and scope, as the legal groundwork is in place to pursue terrorists legally in both Canada and the UK. This means that both countries are committed to responding to acts of terror as a criminal offence.
Terrorism in the United States
Although the United States is considered a Western state, the American legal system differs to that of it’s neighbours and Western allies, Canada and the United Kingdom. [DC1] [A2] The US also has a multitude of legal bodies that define terrorism, unlike in Canada and the UK. All definitions uniformly address terrorism as being unlawful acts of violence, making terrorism a criminal matter that supports the law enforcement paradigm.
The federally instated Patriot Act in the United States defines terrorism as being an act:
“dangerous to human life…that is a violation of the criminal laws of a state or the United States, if the act appears to be intended to: intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or, to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.” ⁶
This definition essentially encapsulates the two separate definitions employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which defines domestic and international terrorism separately, but both in accordance with the United State Federal Regulations that cite terrorism as a criminal violation. ⁷ American policy and legislation address terrorism as a growing concern, and an outright threat to national security that requires it to be a crime. ⁸ Moreover, terrorism is considered a federal crime, as legislation outlines the act of terrorism as an unlawful offense, and the FBI categorizes it as being illegal and therefore subject to treatment as a criminal act under the full purview of the American legal system.
Is Terrorism More Than a Criminal Act?
By these definitions, terrorism is a criminal act that should be given due process in accordance with the law. However, popular rhetoric, historical tendencies, and current events would lend itself to the belief that terrorism is more than just a run-of-the-mill criminal act. The large scale of some terrorist attacks, combined with our tendency to consider every societal struggle a ‘war’, make it difficult to classify terrorism as only a crime. According to Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. of the United States Air Force, the phrase ‘act of war’ is a political phrase, not a legal one. ⁹ Dunlap states; “Historically, ‘act of war’ usually referenced the rationale for nations to engage in international armed conflict. [An ‘act of war’] could be a variety of things, to include unfriendly economic or commercial actions, or even simply insults to national pride.” ¹⁰ It has become our societal tendency to use the word ‘war’ too loosely describe any variety of conflict.
For example, we apply the term ‘war’ and attribute it to any number of endeavours including the ‘War on Drugs’, the ‘War on Poverty’, and the ‘War on Organized Crime’. ¹¹ Why do we label it as such? According to Colonel Christopher G. Essig, calling a terrorist attack an act of war simplifies the matter, seemingly allowing us to destroy the attacker with whatever force can be brought to bear. ¹² Further, the simplification of a terrorist attack as being an “act of war” allows harsher punitive responses to be justified on the grounds of war, regardless of the size and scope of the terrorist attack, or the reasonable response required to destroy the threat. He continues that the label of “war” has the potential to use military force where it might otherwise not be needed. ¹³ Thus, by referring to a terrorist act as an act of war, we may be effectively legitimizing the terrorist cause, and undermining the law enforcement paradigm that is in place to legally respond to terrorism cases.
By international standards, an ‘act of war’ is loosely outlined by the United Nations as being a prohibited act. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter requires member states to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state. ¹⁴ The UN charter fails to address what an ‘act of war’ is, but it does manage to outlaw conflicts that are physically threatening or forceful in nature. Moreover, we must look to modern history to determine what constitutes a war by international standards.
The traditional Western norm is that wars only take place between nation-states, not between nation-states and criminal organizations, gangs, drug cartels, the Mafia, and other non-state actors. ¹⁵ An act of terrorism, unless sponsored by a state, does not constitute an ‘act of war’. According to Jacob Hornberger in his article, Criminal Offenses vs. Acts of War, “[Acts of Terrorism] remain police matters, whether it’s the military, the police, the DEA, or some other federal agency being employed to bring suspects to justice.” ¹⁶ It is evident that conflicts have taken place over time that have eroded the interpretation of warfare, and changed our perception to be more inclusive. However, it is imperative to note that war, by international standards, is conducted on a state to state level.
It is a mistake to assume that the deployment of military personnel or other government agencies is an indication of warfare. Because the military is so often used in warfare and emergency situations, it promotes the belief that military deployment in terrorism cases is a government response to an ‘act of war’. Terrorism, by definition, is a crime in Western nations like Canada, the US, and the UK, but it appears to warrant responses that exceed the usual size and scope of domestic criminal law, wherein terrorism often involves international groups that are too large and dangerous to be pursued by domestic law enforcement personnel. If an act of terror is considered a criminal offence, it is necessary that we pursue terrorists to the full extent of the law.
We must also be mindful of the rights and constitutional protections all parties have in criminal matters at the domestic level. Therefore, it is essential that all suspected criminals, regardless of their country of origin, be pursued and protected by the laws of the nation they are being tried by. It is important to note, however, that not all countries share Western legal norms, and this complicates matters, as criminal rights are not universal. In the West, the constitutional protection afforded to suspected terrorists has been a point of contention for many years. The nature of terrorist crimes is often so gruesome and invasive that constitutional protection is not properly enforced, lending to the belief that perhaps terrorism exceeds the scope of domestic legal systems.
A notable failure to uphold the constitutional is evidenced in the United State’s handling of the 1985 case of Fawaz Yunis. ¹⁷ The forced extradition of Yunis was executed by the United States in “Operation Goldenrod where Yunis, a suspected terrorist found responsible for the hijacking and destruction of a Royal Jordanian aircraft, was arrested and extradited. ¹⁸ The assault took place on an aircraft flying from Jordan between Beirut and Amman where the United States has no jurisdiction. ¹⁹ Nevertheless, the United States launched “Operation Goldenrod” to force Yunis to the United States to stand trial. ²⁰ In conjunction with five different U.S federal agencies, the United States lured Yunis into international waters using a narcotics deal as a front, overpowered him, and had him transferred to Washington, D.C to stand trial for several violations of the United States Criminal Code. ²¹ The trial was not condemned by international law because the US had extraterritorial jurisdiction stated in the Montreal convention under international law. ²² However, the United States subverted a number of its own laws and conventions in order to convict Yunis.
The United States arrest, trial, and conviction of Fawaz Yunis subverted the legal restrictions of unreasonable search and seizure as outlined by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ²³ In addition, Yunis was deprived of his liberty without due process of the law, which violates the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ²⁴ The United States did not afford Fawaz Yunis a fair trial under its own constitution. The laws in the United States, therefore, are apparently insufficient in properly convicting Yunis of the crimes he stood trial for. The Yunis case demonstrates that United States has the desire to bring terrorists to justice; however, it also reveals that their legal process is insufficient in matters involving complex jurisdictional circumstances. This insufficiency is also evident in the United States capture and trial of Juan Ramon Matta-Ballestero’s on drug charges in Honduras, as well as Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez in Mexico on trafficking charges. ²⁵ All three instances include US law enforcement exercising legal jurisdiction without recognized jurisdiction of non-US citizens abroad, which indicates that extreme crimes of an international nature are difficult to manage at the domestic level using traditional legal practice.
Based on the treatment of the Yunis case, it is possible for constitutional rights to be overlooked in terrorism related issues. This could be due to the greater degree of attention and action that terrorist charges receive compared to other criminal offenses. Public panic tends to be higher in cases of terrorist prosecution and is perceived as being more than just a run-of-the-mill crime. In addition, it can also be argued that although terrorism is a criminal offence in many nations, it is so large in scope that domestic legal systems alone are not equipped to combat terrorism using domestic criminal law.
Bigger Than the Law
Terrorist activity has undoubtedly gained momentum in recent years. According to Dr. Yonah Alexander, there were 300 terrorist attacks worldwide that were accounted for in 1970, but in 1999 this number had risen to over 5000 recorded terrorist incidents, and 8,500 in 2012. ²⁶
Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that, “terrorism is a global menace; it calls for a united, global response. To defeat it, all nations must take counsel together, and act in unison. That is why we have the United Nations.” ²⁷ The statement holds that a threat that is global in nature requires a distinctively global response. Kofi Annan’s belief is that a global cooperative initiative is a viable solution to international terror issues and that individual nations are currently insufficient in dealing with them. This position can best be understood by examining the evolution of terrorism as a threat and by analyzing the successes of global cooperation or multilateral strategy in alternative global issues.
The evolution of terror tactics has been characterized by a dramatic escalation into the international realm. ²⁸ Towards the end of the 20^th century, the transnational reach of terrorist activity increased and many organizations began to target foreign citizens and states, seeking support from likeminded individuals abroad. ²⁹ The United States 2007 National Intelligence Estimate states:
“Globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to find and connect with one another, justify their beliefs, intensify their anger, and mobilize resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.” ³⁰
The trend of supporting a multilateral response to international terrorism is a direct result of the internationalization of terrorism. This has been made possible in part by the progressive enlargement of communication networks.
The operational expansion of terrorists is evident in the case of Al-Qaeda, whose actions on 9/11 indicate that terrorism is no longer merely a domestic problem. According to Mira Banchik in her article The ICC and Terrorism:
“Al-Qaeda has proven that by operating on a network basis it can spread terrorists around the globe to undertake attacks in various parts of the world. In the future we will not be able to rely on domestic legislation only. It will be necessary to determine international concept and approaches which tackle crimes of terrorism on the International level as well.” ³¹
Banchik’s statement relates to a 2007 United States National Intelligence estimate that suggests technological advances are making terrorism much more global in nature, especially in relation to populous terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. ³² Furthermore, the concept of multilateralism is a viable solution to many experts, as the threat of terrorism has become global, and a threat that does not recognize international borders warrants a response of the same caliber.
The Multilateral Truth
Domestic law has proven incapable of successfully combating terrorism through legal and means. Although laws are in place, their enforcement is inconsistent. The events of 9/11 and the Fawaz Yunis case indicate that the legal systems of individual states are simply not equipped to manage criminal acts that are so large and jurisdictionally complex. The solution proposed by some academics and politicians to counter terrorism is to make it a criminal offense at the international level. This would ensure a fair trial and treatment of suspected terrorists by international bodies like NATO, United Nations, or the International Criminal Court.
The formation of an entirely multilateral security contingent is considered to be a positive solution to the world’s security problems but has yet to be formed. The formation of a committee or contingency such as this would inherently face a multitude of complex global security issues. The complexity and diversity of each country’s laws, measures taken to combat terrorism, as well as their own definition of terrorism will become the main struggle for the implementation of such a body. The struggle to develop an overarching definition of “international terrorism” is explained by Eva Herschinger in her article, A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on a Definition of International Terrorism wherein she states that, the current desire to define terrorism should be understood as a collective identity struggle. ³³
Although a multilateral solution would undoubtedly ensure a much more functional system for combating the crime of terrorism, it is not likely to be implemented in the near future. International legal agreements are extremely rare and often unsuccessful. Historically, international law has adapted to provide a legal framework for combating various criminal threats to the international community. The requirement for international cooperation has never been greater.
The integrity and efficacy of international law is subject to the willingness of states involved. It has become evident that issues such as enforcement, jurisdiction, and application have plagued the international effort to combat terror threats. It is exigent to acknowledge that laws created at the international level are not binding and treaties and laws created bilaterally and multilaterally are valid only once adopted and ratified by all the nations involved. ³⁴
In addition, a multilateral agreement ignores state autonomy and their reluctance to cede any degree of power to an international body. What one state considers a terrorist might not accord with an other state interpretations. Likewise, each state involved may not agree to what another state identifies as their enemy. In these cases, the concept of, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” becomes an obstacle to prosecution. Antonio Cassese highlights issues about the mixed identity of the current world order in his book, International Law, explaining that international treaties and legal efforts to suppress terrorism are often not signed or applied by states known to harbour terrorists. ³⁵ As discussed above, states are not legally bound to participate in multilateral counter-terrorism measures. An example of this type of multilateral non-compliance is the 1988 hijacking of a Kuwait Airlines aircraft in Algeria. The hijackers were able to avoid arrest because extradition treaties had not been established between Algeria and the various states with an interest in prosecution. To further complicate matters, Algeria was reluctant to accept non-treaty attempts to extradite or prosecute the hijackers. ³⁶
Some states choose to avoid working multilaterally on security issues that involve the ceding of legal or jurisdictional power. Often states choose to act out of their own self interest as opposed to setting their individual interests aside for the greater benefit of the international community. The United State, for example, is a Western state that is synonymous with acting foremost in their self-interest by operating unilaterally on security issues. ³⁷ The United States current counter-terrorism efforts exert influence fighting terrorism by military and economic means. However, arguably, for count-terrorism efforts to be successful, an integrated effort by the United States and its allies is required. ³⁸ According to Edward C. Luck in his article, “The U.S., Counter-Terrorism, and the Prospects for a Multilateral Alternative” the United States is recognized by some of its European allies as consistently acting in its own self-interest. Luck posits that the United States’ “unilateral urge” was prevalent during the George. W. Bush administration’s tenure, as the multilateral efforts of the Clinton administration were purged by the Bush administration. ³⁹ The rejection of multilateral agreements such as the ABM treaty, and the ICC are multilateral accords heavily favoured by the allies of the United States, but rejected by the United States itself in favour of a unilateral approach. ⁴⁰
The United States has exhibited its unilateral tendencies for countering terrorism in its handling of the Israeli conflict, the war in Afghanistan, and the situation in Iraq. ⁴¹ It is evident that the United States considers itself better able to manage issues unilaterally with a higher degree of efficiency than with a multilateral body. This is supported by Luck’s claim that the United States is in a position of power, which allows the liberty of applying both multilateral and unilateral counter-terrorism strategies in combating international terrorism. ⁴² The advantageous situation of the United States permits leaders to act in the best interests of the Unites States, as opposed to the interest of the international community as a whole.
Another issue preventing a cooperative solution to terrorism is the differing needs of nation states to protect against terrorist threats. Thierry Tardy explains in his article, “The Inherent Difficulties in Interinstitutional Cooperation,”, that Western states tend to ignore the fact that international security threats are not always all-encompassing—what is a threat to the West, may not be relevant, or of immediate importance elsewhere in the world. ⁴³ Tardy states:
“When Western countries define international security and the threats to it, do they take into consideration the security of others as defined by them and not defined for them? Africa considers the main threats to its security lie in extreme poverty, in diseases, and the resulting social collapse in many societies.” ⁴⁴
This conflicting mentality pointed out by Tardy is relevant to Herschinger’s argument that a collective identity is required to fight terrorism effectively. Western states tend to view issues related to terrorism as something that is global in scope; other states fail to recognize the validity of this statement, or disagree with the prioritization of counter-terrorism. For example, states such as France and Germany have not displayed the same eagerness as others in part because the security threats they face do not align with that of their Western allies. ⁴⁵ In addition, these states fear proactive efforts will make them targets. ⁴⁶ Furthermore, as Tardy explains, states often act out of their own self-interest because their priorities do not accurately align with the interests of the states proposing the cooperation.
The Illusion of War
In Canada, the UK, and the US, terrorism is a serious and punishable crime. Its size, scope, and complexity have made terrorism a very difficult and contentious crime, so much so that attempts to combat terrorism have been deemed “warfare” by pundits, news media, and subsequently the general public. For all intents and purposes, terrorism is a crime, and all attempts to combat it fall into the law enforcement paradigm, making the “war on terror” nothing more than an embellishment of the criminal justice response to terror. The powerful and seemingly unprecedented response to terrorism by states results in an “illusion of war”. Military operations and combat missions are used to counter the threat as opposed to typical criminal justice responses like domestic and international law enforcement investigations.
The United States ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ mission in Afghanistan, and the subsequent ISAF mission are perfect examples of this sort of military involvement. From an outsiders view, it would appear as though the United States’ and ISAF’s mission’s against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was warfare; however, this is only partially true. Under the jurisdiction of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, NATO used ISAF to enforce US law following the Al-Qaeda attack on the United States. In the process, the US and NATO forces had to infringe upon the state sovereignty of Afghanistan in order to uphold the integrity of the treaty. This infringement designates the invasion as a traditional act of war, however, combat against the Afghan state never took place, and the mission was entirely dedicated to combating the terror threat posed by Al-Qaeda within the confines of Afghanistan. Therefore, by definitional standards, the US and ISAF mission was primarily an enforcement of the law of the United States in conjunction with Article 5 of the NATO treaty to bring those responsible for the 9/11 attacks to justice, and extinguish the threat they posed to the West.
The belief that the United States’ and NATO’s mission in Afghanistan was an act of war is still widely misconceived. Not only is ‘war’ used liberally by the Western media to describe a struggle, it is also rhetorically misused by politicians. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, President George W. Bush used the word ‘war’ so liberally that it has only been used more frequently in two other instances in the history of the United States. The first instance being President Woodrow Wilson during World War I, and the second by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II. ⁴⁷ It is important to note that both of these historical occasions were wars by traditionally accepted standards between sovereign states, and not terrorist organizations. Powerful world leaders, like George W. Bush, use ‘war’ so frequently in conjunction with terrorism that it is difficult to dismiss ‘war’ as just a media buzz word. The term, in all of its incarnations, is entrenched deeply in the public’s mind to the point where we ignore its traditionally accepted meaning.
In addition, the military methods used to conduct the terror-related criminal investigations often exceed the force and technique used in other serious criminal matters. The use of military strikes via drones, armed assaults, and covert operations indicate that traditional Western criminal justice methods of rehabilitation are not being employed. ⁴⁸ The retributive justice tactics employed by Western nations like Canada, US, and the UK, evidenced in NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan, are unique law enforcement tactics. However; it is clear that terrorism is a unique issue that requires a unique response.
The military approach employed against terrorism improves upon the scope of traditional legal means of combating the issue. Firstly, the traditional approach to law enforcement is reactive, and it is evident that with a threat like terrorism, proactive means are necessary to diffuse future threats. ⁴⁹ Secondly, traditional criminal law tactics require the adherence to due process which is a time-consuming process that can take up to a decade before a conviction is made. ⁵⁰ Third, the catastrophic nature of terrorist attacks makes finding evidence difficult, as much of it is destroyed or made inaccessible by the destructive nature of the terrorist event itself. ⁵¹ Finally, the criminal justice approach to terrorism does not account for terrorist organization’s hierarchy. Those convicted in terrorism cases do not represent all of those responsible, and often do not include higher terrorist authorities. ⁵² Moreover, it is evident that responding to terrorism with traditional criminal justice techniques is not effective in dealing with the threat. Instead, it is clear that a national security approach is required, which is evidenced in the West’s current involvement in the Middle East, and the ongoing military operations against terror groups abroad.
Conclusion
Western states such as Canada, the UK, and the US adamantly condemn terrorism through their own domestic legal legislation. It is evident based on their criminal codes, that terrorism at the domestic and international level is a criminal act, and should be treated as such. However, their responses to acts of terror do not fall into the traditional law enforcement paradigm. Instead, nations like Canada, UK, and the US have employed more retributive tactics to bring terrorists to justice, and further extinguish terror threats. The retributive avenues employed by Western powers are by no means warfare; they are extraordinary criminal justice measures that have been mistaken as warfare due to their distinct military element.
This briefing note has established that terrorism is a crime in Canada, UK, and the US. In addition, terrorism is not an act of war, as war is traditionally reserved for conflicts between two nation states, not nation states and non-state entities, like terrorist organizations. Following the definitional outline supporting terrorism as a crime, this briefing note explored the current domestic legal systems in the West, and how their shortcomings in combating terrorism outline the requirement of states to act outside of their own legal confines to achieve justice. The shortcomings of traditional domestic criminal justice systems is evidenced by the United States’ treatment of suspected terrorist Fawaz Yunis, where during his trial, the US violated its own constitution in order to manipulate the US legal system in order to bring Yunis to justice. After reviewing the flaws with the current Western criminal justice situation in the West, this briefing note explored the proposed use of international law as a means of trying terrorists in a more appropriate and inclusive jurisdictional environment. Unfortunately, although international cooperation is productive in theory, factors such as diversity, self-interest, and legal sovereignty make multilateral cooperation for criminal matters unlikely for the time being.
Following the analysis of the currently employed criminal justice paradigm, this briefing note explored the many reasons why terrorism is believed to be an act of war. Firstly, it is apparent that the word ‘war’ is used too liberally and unguided by a large portion of the population to describe struggles. This is further encouraged by the media, who often use ‘war’ to describe the latest societal plight. Further, politicians use the word improperly to describe conflicts and events that resemble war, but are not actually war by traditionally accepted standards. This misuse has encouraged the liberal use of the word ‘war’, and subsequently has diluted its actual meaning.
In addition to the definitional dilution of the word ‘war’, we have also bared witness to an increase of military mobilization in response to terrorism conflicts. This is evident in the deployment of United States and ISAF forces to Afghanistan and the Middle East to combat the growing threat of Islamic Fundamentalism that has posed a direct physical threat to the West. This briefing note outlined the nature of the conflict and provided several reasons as to why traditional criminal justice techniques used in the West cannot successfully respond to terrorism; instead, military operations are necessary to ensure justice is served. Moreover, it is evident that terrorism is a crime, and will remain a crime in Canada, the UK, and the US. However, criminal justice in these countries has evolved to include a military component capable of upholding the law through counter-terrorism action. With domestic legal systems being ill-equipped to manage the criminal nature of terrorism, and global multilateral cooperation on a significant scale unlikely, it is evident that the current military arm of domestic criminal justice is here to stay. Constitutional violations are likely to continue to occur in the West where the end commonly justifies the means under the unique stipulations of extraordinary threats.

Works Cited
2007, National Intelligence Estimate . “Introduction .” In Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation. London: Routledge, 2010. 3.
Abbasov, Namiq . “The Application of Jurisdiction on the International Terrorism: What About the ICC?.” Afro Eurasia Strategic Resources Center: Department of European Studies 1 (2012): 1-5.
Alexander, Yonah. “Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses .” DePaul Bus. L.J. 12, no. 59 (1999): 75.
American Civil Liberties Union, How the USA Patriot Act Redefines ‘Domestic Terrorism’. ACLU Website. Accessed 12 April 2014. /www.aclu.org/national-security/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism
Annan, Kofi. “True Faith is Respectful, Compassionate, Devoid of Hatred.” Address, UN Press Release from United Nations , New York, September 18, 2001
Banchik, Mira. “The International Criminal Court and Terrorism.” Peace Studies Journal. (2003): 1-19.
Cassese, Antonio. International Law. Oxford, UK.: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Dunlap Jr, Colonel Charles J. “International Law and Terrorism: Some Qs and As for Operators” United States Air Force. Accessed 24 March 2014. http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlapterrorism.pdf
Elliot, Kennedy, Richard Johnson, and Ted Mellnick. “History Through the President’s Words.” Washington Post. Accessed May 8 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2014-state-of-the-union/language-of-sotu/
Essig, Colonel Christopher G. “Terrorism: Criminal Act of Act of War? Implications for National Security in the 21^st Century”. United States Army War College Strategy Research Project. (2001): 1-45.
Government of Canada, Dept. of Justice. “Definitions of Terrorism and the Canadian Context.” Accessed 27 March 2014. http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rr09_6/p3.html
Government of Great Britain, Ministry of Justice. “British Terrorism Act 2006.” Accessed 29 March 2014. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents
Herschinger, Eva. “A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on a Defintion of International Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 2 (2013): 183-201.
Hornberger, Jacob G. “Criminal Offences vs. Acts of War.” The Future and Freedom Foundation. Accessed 23 March, 2014. http://fff.org/2013/03/13/criminal-offenses-vs-acts-of-war/
Horsley, William. “Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War.” BBC News. Accessed March 23, 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2747175.stm
Kelsen, Hans. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems with Supplement 1964. New York: The Lawbook Exchange, 2000.
Lowenfeld, Andreas F. . “U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law.” American Society of International Law 83, no. 4 (1989): 880-893.
Lowenfeld, Andreas F. “U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued.” The American Journal of International Law 84, no. 2 (1990): 444-493.
Luck, Edward C. . “The U.S., Counter-Terrorism, and the Prospects for a Multilateral Alternative.” In Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11th. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004. 74-101.
Morris, Christopher. “A Crime or an Act of War?” Address to the University of San Diego Ethics Society. Accessed 24 March, 2014. http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Resources/PhilForum/Terrorism/ChristopherMorris.html
Romaniuk, Peter. Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation. London: Routledge, 2010.
Tardy, Thierry. “The Inherent Difficulties of Interinstitutional Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism.” In Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11th. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004. 120-148.
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 (4). Accessed May 4, 2014. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
United States of America, Appellant, v. Fawaz Yunis., 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Accessed 21 July 2013. http://www.leagle.com/decision/19891484867F2d617_11383

References

“Definitions of Terrorism and the Canadian Context.” Government of Canada, Dept. of Justice. Accessed March 27, 2014, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rr09_6/p3.html.

Ibid.

“British Terrorism Act 2006.” Government of Great Britain, Ministry of Justice. Accessed March 27, 2014. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents

Ibid.

Colonel Christopher G. Essig. “Terrorism: Criminal Act of Act of War? Implications for National Security in the 21st Century.” United States Army War College Strategy Research Project, (2001), 15.

“How the USA Patriot Act Redefines ‘Domestic Terrorism’. American Civil Liberties Union.” ACLU Website. Accessed April 12, 2014. https://www.aclu.org/national-security/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism

Essig. Terrorism: Criminal Act of Act of War? Implications for National Security in the 21st Century, 6.

Ibid, 6.

“International Law and Terrorism: Some Qs and As for Operators,” Colonel Charles J. Dunlap Jr. United States Air Force, Accessed March 24, 2014. http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlapterrorism.pdf

Ibid.

Essig. Terrorism: Criminal Act of Act of War? Implications for National Security in the 21st Century,18.

Ibid, 18.

“Charter of the United Nations, Article 2 (4).” United Nations, Accessed May 4, 2014. http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml

Jacob G Hornberger, “Criminal Offences vs. Acts of War.” The Future and Freedom Foundation, (2003), 5. Accessed March 23, 2014. http://fff.org/2013/03/13/criminal-offenses-vs-acts-of-war/

Ibid, 5.

United States of America, Appellant, v. Fawaz Yunis., 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Accessed July 21, 2013. http://www.leagle.com/decision/19891484867F2d617_11383

Andreas F. Lowenfeld, "U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law." American Society of International Law 83, no. 4 (1989), 880.

Ibid, 880.

Ibid, 881.

Ibid, 880.

Adam F. Lowenfeld, “U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued.” The American Journal of International Law 84, no. 2 (1990), 444.

Yonah Alexander. "Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats and Responses ." DePaul Bus. L.J. 12, no. 59 (1999): 75.

Annan, Kofi. "True Faith is Respectful, Compassionate, Devoid of Hatred." Address to the UN Press Release from United Nations, New York, September 18, 2001.

Peter Romaniuk, Multilateral Counter-Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2010), 1.

Ibid, 1.

2007 National Intelligence Estimate . "Introduction ." In Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation. (London: Routledge, 2003), 3.

Mira Banchik, “The International Criminal Court and Terrorism,” Peace Studies Journal, (2003), 2.

2007 National Intelligence Estimate . "Introduction ." In Multilateral Counter-Terrorism: The Global Politics of Cooperation and Contestation. 3.

Eva Herschinger. "A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on a Definition of International Terrorism." Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 2 (2013), 184.

Hans Kelsen. The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems with Supplement 1964. (New York: The Lawbook Exchange, 2000), 787.

Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford, UK.: Oxford University Press, 2005), 466.

Ibid, 466.

Edward C. Luck "The U.S., Counter-Terrorism, and the Prospects for a Multilateral Alternative." In, Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11th. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 74.

Audrey Kurth Cronin. "Toward an Effective Grand Strategy ." In, Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 293.

Ibid, 74.

Ibid, 94.

Thierry Tardy. "The Inherent Difficulties of Interinstitutional Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism." In, Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11th. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2004), 138.

Ibid, 139.

"Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War," William Horsley, BBC News (11 Feb. 2003.) Accessed March 23, 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2747175.stm

Tardy, The Inherent Difficulties of Interinstitutional Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism,139.

"History Through the President's Words." Elliot Kennedy, Richard Johnson, and Ted Mellnick, Washington Post (January 28, 2014) Accessed May 8, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2014-state-of-the-union/language-of-sotu/

Christopher Morris, "A Crime or an Act of War?" Address to the University of San Diego Ethics Society. Accessed March 24, 2014. http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Resources/PhilForum/Terrorism/ChristopherMorris.html

Essig, Terrorism: Criminal Act of Act of War? Implications for National Security in the 21st Century, 16.

Ibid, 17.

Act of War Criminal Act terrorism

Previous ArticleExamining the Terrorist Threat from America’s Southern BorderNext ArticleShock and Awe: The Rise of the Islamic State & Implications for the Middle East – Part I

Andrew Majoran

Andrew Majoran is currently a Global Terrorism Analyst for an international risk management firm in London, UK. Before assuming his current role, Andrew was the General Manager of The Mackenzie Institute, where he currently sits on the Board of Governors. Immediately after attaining his Masters of Science (MSc.) Degree from the University of London (2013), Andrew worked as a Junior Professional with the Delegation of Canada to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria, where he conducted research and analysis under the direction of the Canadian Ambassador and her staff on various security matters, including: the Ukraine crisis, small arms and light weapons control, and cyber security. Andrew has been published by various policy institutions and think-tanks, including: The Royal Canadian Military Institute, the NATO Association of Canada, International Politics Reviews, and The Mackenzie Institute, on a variety of security and defence related topics. His research on Ballistic Missile Defence, and Canadian anti-terrorism legislation (Bill C-51) has been presented to both the Canadian Senate and Parliament.

http://mackenzieinstitute.com/illusion-war-terrorism-criminal-act-act-war/

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The Global War on [?]: Crafting the Legal Definition of 'International Terrorism'

Abstract:

It is generally accepted that global acts of terrorism constitute breaches of international law. However, the increasing prevalence of such acts in recent years has revealed a startling deficiency in the field of international law, as no uniform definition of this 'crime' actually exists. Such indeterminacy in the law undermines the stability and credibility of the international legal system, and prevents the global powers from holding perpetrators responsible for their actions. This Paper was drafted as a response to this deficiency, and thus isolates those consistent elements used as indicators of the crime of international terrorism, and presents a working definition for the world’s predominant criminal legal body: the International Criminal Court.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911683

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What is WAR?

A state of forcible contention; an armed contest between nations; a state of hostility between two or more nations or states. Gro. de Jur. B. lib. 1, c. 1. Every connection by force between two nations, in external matters, under the au- thority of their respective governments, is a public war. If war is declared in form, It is called "solemn," and is of the perfect kind; because the whole nation is at war with an- other whole nation. When the hostilities are limited as respects places, persons, and things, the war is properly termed "imperfect war." Bas v. Tingy, 4 Dall. 37, 40 1 L. Ed. 731.

Definition List

Act of Terrorism
Act-of-State Doctrine
Act of Sederunt
Act of Providence
Act of Parliament
» Act of War
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships
Acta Diurna
Acta Exteriora Iudicant Interiora Secreta
Acta Jure Gestionis
Acta Jure Imperii

http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/act-of-war/

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Atlantic Charter

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The Atlantic Charter was a pivotal policy statement issued on 15 August 1941, that, early in World War II, defined the Allied goals for the post-war world. The leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States drafted the work and all the Allies of World War II later confirmed it. The Charter stated the ideal goals of the war: no territorial aggrandizement; no territorial changes made against the wishes of the people, self-determination; restoration of self-government to those deprived of it; reduction of trade restrictions; global cooperation to secure better economic and social conditions for all; freedom from fear and want; freedom of the seas; and abandonment of the use of force, as well as disarmament of aggressor nations. Adherents of the Atlantic Charter signed the Declaration by United Nations on the 1 January 1942, which became the basis for the modern United Nations.
The Atlantic Charter set goals for the post-war world and inspired many of the international agreements that shaped the world thereafter. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the post-war independence of European colonies, and much more are derived from the Atlantic Charter.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt drafted the Atlantic Charter at the Atlantic Conference (codenamed Riviera) in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland.^[1] They issued it as a joint declaration on 14 August 1941 although the United States would not officially enter the War until four-months later. The policy was issued as a statement; as such there was no formal, legal document entitled "The Atlantic Charter". It detailed the goals and aims of the Allied powers concerning the war and the post-war world.
Many of the ideas of the Charter came from an ideology of Anglo-American internationalism that sought British and American cooperation for the cause of international security.^[2] Roosevelt's attempts to tie Britain to concrete war aims and Churchill's desperation to bind the U.S. to the war effort helped provide motivations for the meeting which produced the Atlantic Charter. It was assumed at the time that Britain and America would have an equal role to play in any post-war international organization that would be based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter.^[3]
Churchill and Roosevelt began communicating in 1939; this was the first of their 11 wartime meetings.^[4] Both men traveled in secret; Roosevelt was on a ten-day fishing trip.^[5] On 9 August 1941, the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales sailed into Placentia Bay, with Churchill on board, and met the American heavy cruiser USS Augusta where Roosevelt and his staff were waiting. On first meeting, Churchill and Roosevelt were silent for a moment until Churchill said "At long last, Mr. President", to which Roosevelt replied "Glad to have you aboard, Mr. Churchill". Churchill then delivered to the President a letter from King George VI and made an official statement which, despite two attempts, a sound-film crew present failed to record.^[6]

Content and analysis[edit]

Winston Churchill's edited copy of the final draft of the charter

Printed copy of Atlantic Charter distributed as propaganda

The Atlantic Charter made clear that America was supporting Britain in the war. Both America and Britain wanted to present their unity, regarding their mutual principles and hopes for the post-war world and the policies they agreed to follow once the Nazis had been defeated.^[7] A fundamental aim was to focus on the peace that would follow, and not specific American involvement and war strategy, although American involvement appeared increasingly likely.^[8]
The eight principal points of the Charter were:

no territorial gains were to be sought by the United States or the United Kingdom;
territorial adjustments must be in accord with the wishes of the peoples concerned;
all people had a right to self-determination;
trade barriers were to be lowered;
there was to be global economic cooperation and advancement of social welfare;
the participants would work for a world free of want and fear;
the participants would work for freedom of the seas;
there was to be disarmament of aggressor nations, and a post-war common disarmament.

Although Clause Three clearly states that all peoples have the right to decide their form of government, it fails to say what changes are necessary in both social and economic terms, so as to achieve freedom and peace.^[9]
Clause Four, with respect to international trade, consciously emphasized that both "victor [and] vanquished" would be given market access "on equal terms." This was a repudiation of the punitive trade relations that were established within Europe post-World War I, as exemplified by the Paris Economy Pact.
Only two clauses expressly discuss national, social, and economic conditions necessary post-war, despite this significance.

Origin of the name[edit]

When it was released to the public, the Charter was titled "Joint Declaration by the President and the Prime Minister" and was generally known as the "Joint Declaration". The Labour Party newspaper Daily Herald coined the name Atlantic Charter, but Churchill used it in Parliament on 24 August 1941, and has since been generally adopted.^[10]
No signed version ever existed. The document was threshed out through several drafts and the final agreed text was telegraphed to London and Washington. President Roosevelt gave Congress the Charter's content on 21 August 1941.^[11] He said later, "There isn't any copy of the Atlantic Charter, so far as I know. I haven't got one. The British haven't got one. The nearest thing you will get is the [message of the] radio operator on Augusta and Prince of Wales. That's the nearest thing you will come to it ... There was no formal document."^[4]
The British War Cabinet replied with its approval and a similar acceptance was telegraphed from Washington. During this process, an error crept into the London text, but this was subsequently corrected. The account in Churchill's The Second World War concludes "A number of verbal alterations were agreed, and the document was then in its final shape", and makes no mention of any signing or ceremony. In Churchill's account of the Yalta Conference he quotes Roosevelt saying of the unwritten British constitution that "it was like the Atlantic Charter - the document did not exist, yet all the world knew about it. Among his papers he had found one copy signed by himself and me, but strange to say both signatures were in his own handwriting."^[12]

Acceptance by Inter-Allied Council and by United Nations[edit]

The Allied nations and leading organizations quickly and widely endorsed the Charter.^[13] At the subsequent meeting of the Inter-Allied Council in London on 24 September 1941, the governments in exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia, as well as the Soviet Union, and representatives of the Free French Forces, unanimously adopted adherence to the common principles of policy set forth in the Atlantic Charter.^[14] On 1 January 1942, a larger group of nations, who adhered to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, issued a joint Declaration by United Nations stressing their solidarity in the defense against Hitlerism.^[15]

Impact on the Axis powers[edit]

World map of colonization at the end of the Second World War in 1945

The Axis powers interpreted these diplomatic agreements as a potential alliance against them. In Tokyo, the Atlantic Charter rallied support for the militarists in the Japanese government, who pushed for a more aggressive approach against the U.S. and Britain.
The British dropped millions of flysheets over Germany to allay fears of a punitive peace that would destroy the German state. The text cited the Charter as the authoritative statement of the joint commitment of Great Britain and the U.S. "not to admit any economical discrimination of those defeated" and promised that "Germany and the other states can again achieve enduring peace and prosperity."^[16]
The most striking feature of the discussion was that an agreement had been made between a range of countries that held diverse opinions, who were accepting that internal policies were relevant to the international problem.^[17] The agreement proved to be one of the first steps towards the formation of the United Nations.

Impact on imperial powers and imperial ambitions[edit]

The problems came not from Germany and Japan, but from those of the allies that had empires and which resisted self-determination—especially the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Netherlands. Initially it appears that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that the third point of Charter was not going to apply to Africa and Asia. However Roosevelt's speechwriter Robert E. Sherwood noted that "it was not long before the people of India, Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia were beginning to ask if the Atlantic Charter extended also to the Pacific and to Asia in general." With a war that could only be won with the help of these allies, Roosevelt's solution was to put some pressure on Britain but to postpone until after the war the issue of self-determination of the colonies.^[18]

British Empire[edit]

Public opinion in Britain and the Commonwealth was delighted with the principles of the meetings but disappointed that the U.S. was not entering the war. Churchill admitted that he had hoped the U.S. would finally decide to commit itself.
The acknowledgement that all peoples had a right to self-determination gave hope to independence leaders in British colonies.^[19]
The Americans were insistent that the charter was to acknowledge that the war was being fought to ensure self-determination.^[20] The British were forced to agree to these aims but in a September 1941 speech, Churchill stated that the Charter was only meant to apply to states under German occupation, and certainly not to the peoples who formed part of the British Empire.^[21]
Churchill rejected its universal applicability when it came to the self-determination of subject nations such as British India. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in 1942 wrote to President Roosevelt: "I venture to think that the Allied declaration that the Allies are fighting to make the world safe for the freedom of the individual and for democracy sounds hollow so long as India and for that matter Africa are exploited by Great Britain..."^[22] Roosevelt repeatedly brought the need for Indian independence to Churchill's attention, but was repeatedly rebuffed.^[22] However Gandhi refused to help either the British or the American war effort against Germany and Japan in any way, leaving Roosevelt no choice but to back Churchill.^[23] India was already contributing significantly to the war effort, sending over 2.5 million men (the largest volunteer force in the world at the time) to fight for the Allies, mostly in West Asia and North Africa.^[24]

Poland[edit]

Churchill was unhappy with the inclusion of references to peoples' right to "self-determination" and stated that he considered the Charter an "interim and partial statement of war aims designed to reassure all countries of our righteous purpose and not the complete structure which we should build after the victory." An office of the Polish Government in Exile wrote to warn Władysław Sikorski that if the Charter was implemented with regards to national self-determination, it would make the desired Polish annexation of Danzig, East Prussia and parts of German Silesia impossible, which led the Poles to approach Britain asking for a flexible interpretation of the Charter.^[25]

Baltic states[edit]

During the war Churchill argued for an interpretation of the charter in order to allow the Soviet Union to continue to control the Baltic states, an interpretation rejected by the U.S. until March 1944.^[26] Lord Beaverbrook warned that the Atlantic Charter "would be a menace to our [Britain's] own safety as well as to that of the Soviet Union." The U.S. refused to recognize the Soviet takeover of the Baltics, but did not press the issue against Stalin when he was fighting the Germans.^[27] Roosevelt planned to raise the Baltic issue after the war, but he died in April 1945, before fighting had ended in Europe.^[28]

Notes[edit]

1. ^ Langer and Gleason, chapter 21

2. ^ Cull, pp.4,6

3. ^ Cull, pp 15, 21.

4. ^ ^a ^b Gunther, pp. 15-16

5. ^ Weigold, pp.15–16

6. ^ Gratwick, p. 72

7. ^ Stone, p. 5

8. ^ O'Sullivan and Welles

9. ^ Stone, p. 21

10. ^ Wrigley, p. 29

11. ^ "President Roosevelt's message to Congress on the Atlantic Charter". The Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Library. 21 August 1941. Retrieved 14 August 2013.

12. ^ Churchill, p. 393

13. ^ Lauren|, pp. 140–41

14. ^ "Inter-Allied Council Statement on the Principles of the Atlantic Charter". The Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Library. 24 September 1941. Retrieved 14 August 2013.

15. ^ "Joint Declaration by the United Nations". The Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Library. 1 January 1942. Retrieved 14 August 2013.

16. ^ Sauer, p. 407

17. ^ Stone, p. 80

18. ^ Borgwardt, p. 29

19. ^ Bayly and Harper

20. ^ Louis (1985) pp. 395–420

21. ^ Crawford, p. 297

22. ^ ^a ^b Sathasivam, p. 59

23. ^ Louis, (2006), p. 400

24. ^ "Second World War Memorials". Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Retrieved 14 August 2013.

25. ^ Prażmowska, p. 93

26. ^ Whitcomb, p. 18;

27. ^ Louis (1998), p. 224

28. ^ Hoopes and Brinkley, p. 52

Bibliography[edit]

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Beschloss, Michael R. (2003). The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 9780743244541.
Borgwardt, Elizabeth (2007). A new deal for the world: America's vision for human rights. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674281912.
Brinkley, Douglas G.; Facey-Crowther, David, eds. (1994). The Atlantic Charter. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9780312089306.
Charmley, John. "Churchill and the American Alliance". Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (Royal Historical Society). Sixth Series 11. ISSN 0080-4401.
Churchill, Winston (2010). Triumph and Tragedy: The Second World War. RosettaBooks. ISBN 9780795311475.
Crawford, Neta C. (2002). Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521002790. )
Cull, Nicholas (March 1996). "Selling peace: the origins, promotion and fate of the Anglo-American new order during the Second World War". Diplomacy and Statecraft 7 (1). doi:10.1080/09592299608405992.
Gratwick, Harry (2009). Penobscot Bay: People, Ports & Pastimes. The History Press.
Gunther, John (1950). Roosevelt in retrospect: a profile in history. New York: Harper & Brothers.
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Jordan, Jonathan W. (2015), American Warlords: How Roosevelt's High Command Led America to Victory in World War II (NAL/Caliber 2015).
Hoopes, Townsend; Brinkley, Douglas (2000). FDR and the Creation of the U.N. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300085532.
Kimball, Warren (1997). Forged in war: Churchill, Roosevelt and the Second World War. New York: HarperCollins. ISBN 9780062034847.
Langer, William L.; Gleason, S. Everett (1953). The Undeclared War 1940-1941: The World Crisis and American Foreign Policy. Harper & Brothers. ISBN 978-1258766986.
Lauren, Paul Gordon (2011). The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen. U of Pennsylvania Press.
Louis, William Roger (Summer 1985). "American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire". International Affairs (Royal Institute of International (Affairs 1944–)) 61 (3). ISSN 0020-5850.
Louis, William Roger (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization. London: I.B.Tauris. ISBN 9781845113476.
Louis, William Roger (1998). More adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain. London: I.B.Tauris. ISBN 9781860642937.
O'Sullivan, Christopher D. (2008). Sumner Welles, Post-War Planning and the Quest for a New World Order 1937–1943. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231142588.
Prażmowska, Anita (1995). Britain and Poland, 1939–1943: the betrayed ally. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521483858.
Sauer, Ernst (1955). Grundlehre des Völkerrechts, 2nd edition (in German). Cologne: Carl Heymanns.
Smith, Jean Edward (2008). FDR. New York: Random House LLC. ISBN 9780812970494.
Sathasivam, Kanishkan (2005). 'Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan, and US Foreign Policy. Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. ISBN 9780754637622.
Stone, Julius (June 1942). "Peace Planning and the Atlantic Charter". Australian Quarterly (Australian Institute of Policy and Science) 14 (2). ISSN 0005-0091.
Whitcomb, Roger S. (1998). The Cold War in Retrospect: The Formative Years. Westport, CT: Praeger. ISBN 9780275962531.
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Wrigley, Chris (2002). Winston Churchill: A Biographical Companion. ABC-CLIO.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_Charter

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WAR- Encylopedia Britannia

Alternative title: warfare

Table of Contents

War,

Korean War; Seoul [Credit: U.S. Army Photo]

in the popular sense, a conflict among political groups involving hostilities of considerable duration and magnitude. In the usage of social science, certain qualifications are added. Sociologists usually apply the term to such conflicts only if they are initiated and conducted in accordance with socially recognized forms. They treat war as an institution recognized in custom or in law. Military writers usually confine the term to hostilities in which the contending groups are sufficiently equal in power to render the outcome uncertain for a time. Armed conflicts of powerful states with isolated and powerless peoples are usually called pacifications, military expeditions, or explorations; with small states, they are called interventions or reprisals; and with internal groups, rebellions or insurrections. Such incidents, if the resistance is sufficiently strong or protracted, may achieve a magnitude that entitles them to the name “war.”
In all ages war has been an important topic of analysis. In the latter part of the 20th century, in the aftermath of two world wars and in the shadow of nuclear, biological, and chemical holocaust, more was written on the subject than ever before. Endeavours to understand the nature of war, to formulate some theory of its causes, conduct, and prevention, are of great importance, for theory shapes human expectations and determines human behaviour. The various schools of theorists are generally aware of the profound influence they can exercise upon life, and their writings usually include a strong normative element, for, when accepted by politicians, their ideas can assume the characteristics of self-fulfilling prophecies.The analysis of war may be divided into several categories. Philosophical, political, economic, technological, legal, sociological, and psychological approaches are frequently distinguished. These distinctions indicate the varying focuses of interest and the different analytical categories employed by the theoretician, but most of the actual theories are mixed because war is an extremely complex social phenomenon that cannot be explained by any single factor or through any single approach.

Evolution of theories of war

Battle of Waterloo [Credit: © Photos.com/Thinkstock]

Reflecting changes in the international system, theories of war have passed through several phases in the course of the past three centuries. After the ending of the wars of religion, about the middle of the 17th century, wars were fought for the interests of individual sovereigns and were limited both in their objectives and in their scope. The art of maneuver became decisive, and analysis of war was couched accordingly in terms of strategies. The situation changed fundamentally with the outbreak of the French Revolution, which increased the size of forces from small professional to large conscript armies and broadened the objectives of war to the ideals of the revolution, ideals that appealed to the masses who were subject to conscription. In the relative order of post-Napoleonic Europe, the mainstream of theory returned to the idea of war as a rational, limited instrument of national policy. This approach was best articulated by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz in his famous classic On War (1832–37).

Cloth Hall; Battle of Ypres [Credit: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.]

World War I, which was “total” in character because it resulted in the mobilization of entire populations and economies for a prolonged period of time, did not fit into the Clausewitzian pattern of limited conflict, and it led to a renewal of other theories. These no longer regarded war as a rational instrument of state policy. The theorists held that war, in its modern, total form, if still conceived as a national state instrument, should be undertaken only if the most vital interests of the state, touching upon its very survival, are concerned. Otherwise, warfare serves broad ideologies and not the more narrowly defined interests of a sovereign or a nation. Like the religious wars of the 17th century, war becomes part of “grand designs,” such as the rising of the proletariat in communist eschatology or the Nazi doctrine of a master race.
Some theoreticians have gone even further, denying war any rational character whatsoever. To them war is a calamity and a social disaster, whether it is afflicted by one nation upon another or conceived of as afflicting humanity as a whole. The idea is not new—in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars it was articulated, for example, by Tolstoy in the concluding chapter of War and Peace (1865–69). In the second half of the 20th century it gained new currency in peace research, a contemporary form of theorizing that combines analysis of the origins of warfare with a strong normative element aiming at its prevention. Peace research concentrates on two areas: the analysis of the international system and the empirical study of the phenomenon of war.

M65 atomic cannon [Credit: National Archives and Records Administration]

World War II and the subsequent evolution of weapons of mass destruction made the task of understanding the nature of war even more urgent. On the one hand, war had become an intractable social phenomenon, the elimination of which seemed to be an essential precondition for the survival of mankind. On the other hand, the use of war as an instrument of policy was calculated in an unprecedented manner by the nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. War also remained a stark but rational instrumentality in certain more limited conflicts, such as those between Israel and the Arab nations. Thinking about war, consequently, became increasingly more differentiated because it had to answer questions related to very different types of conflict.

Clausewitz, Carl von [Credit: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin—Preussischer Kulturbesitz]

Clausewitz cogently defines war as a rational instrument of foreign policy: “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” Modern definitions of war, such as “armed conflict between political units,” generally disregard the narrow, legalistic definitions characteristic of the 19th century, which limited the concept to formally declared war between states. Such a definition includes civil wars but at the same time excludes such phenomena as insurrections, banditry, or piracy. Finally, war is generally understood to embrace only armed conflicts on a fairly large scale, usually excluding conflicts in which fewer than 50,000 combatants are involved.

The causes of war

Contemporary theories of the causes of war divide roughly into two major schools. One attributes war to certain innate biological and psychological factors or drives, the other attributes it to certain social relations and institutions. Both schools include optimists and pessimists concerning the preventability of war.

Biological theories

Theories centring upon man’s innate drives are developed by ethologists, who draw analogies from animal behaviour, and also by psychologists and psychoanalysts.

Ethology

Ethologists start with the persuasive argument that study of animal warfare may contribute toward an understanding of war as employed by man. The behaviour of monkeys and apes in captivity and the behaviour of young children, for example, show basic similarities. In both cases it is possible to observe that aggressive behaviour usually arises from several drives: rivalry for possession, the intrusion of a stranger, or frustration of an activity. The major conflict situations leading to aggression among animals, especially those concerning access of males to females and control of a territory for feeding and breeding, are usually associated with patterns of dominance.
The analogies of animal to human behaviour drawn by many ethologists, however, are severely questioned by their more restrained colleagues as well as by many social scientists. The term “aggression,” for example, is imprecisely and inconsistently used, often referring merely to the largely symbolic behaviour of animals involving such signals as grimaces.
Observed animal behaviour can be regarded as a possible important source of inspiration for hypotheses, but these must then be checked through the study of actual human behaviour. As this has not yet been adequately done, the hypotheses advanced have little foundation and are merely interesting ideas to be investigated. Further, human behaviour is not fixed to the extent that animal behaviour is, partly because man rapidly evolves different patterns of behaviour in response to environmental factors, such as geography, climate, and contact with other social groups. The variety of these behaviour patterns is such that they can be used on both sides of an argument concerning, for example, whether or not men have an innate tendency to be aggressive.
Two particularly interesting subjects studied by ethologists are the effects of overcrowding on animals and animal behaviour regarding territory. The study of overcrowding is incomplete, and the findings that normal behaviour patterns tend to break down in such conditions and that aggressive behaviour often becomes prominent are subject to the qualification that animal and human reactions to overcrowding may be different. Ethologists have also advanced plausible hypotheses concerning biological means of population control through reduced fertility that occurs when animal populations increase beyond the capacity of their environment. Whether such biological control mechanisms operate in human society, however, requires further investigation.
Findings concerning the “territorial imperative” in animals—that is, the demarcation and defense against intrusion of a fixed area for feeding and breeding—are even more subject to qualification when an analogy is drawn from them to human behaviour. The analogy between an animal territory and a territorial state is obviously extremely tenuous. In nature the territories of members of a species differ in extent but usually seem to be provided with adequate resources, and use of force in their defense is rarely necessary, as the customary menacing signals generally lead to the withdrawal of potential rivals. This scarcely compares with the sometimes catastrophic defense of the territory of a national state.

Psychology

Spinoza, Benedict de [Credit: Imagno/Austrian Archives/Hulton Archive/Getty Images]

One school of theorists has postulated that the major causes of war can be found in man’s psychological nature. Such psychological approaches range from very general, often merely intuitive assertions regarding human nature to complex analyses utilizing the concepts and techniques of modern psychology. The former category includes a wide range of ethical and philosophical teaching and insights, including the works of such figures as St. Augustine and the 17th-century Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza.
Modern writers utilizing psychological approaches emphasize the significance of psychological maladjustments or complexes and of false, stereotyped images held by decision makers of other countries and their leaders. Some psychologists posit an innate aggressiveness in man. Others concentrate upon public opinion and its influence, particularly in times of tension. Others stress the importance of decision makers and the need for their careful selection and training. Most believe that an improved social adjustment of individuals would decrease frustration, insecurity, and fear and would reduce the likelihood of war. All of them believe in the importance of research and education. Still, the limitations of such approaches derive from their very generality. Also, whether the psychological premises are optimistic or pessimistic about the nature of man, one cannot ignore the impact upon human behaviour of social and political institutions that give man the opportunities to exercise his good or evil propensities and to impose restraints upon him.

Social theories

Whereas psychological explanations of war contain much that seems to be valid, they are insufficient because man behaves differently in different social contexts. Hence, many thinkers have sought their explanations in these contexts, focusing either on the internal organization of states or on the international system within which these operate. The most voluminous and influential theories attributing war to the nature of the state fall into two broad streams, which can be loosely called liberal and socialist.

Liberal analyses

The early or classical liberals of the 18th and 19th centuries distinguished three basic elements in their analysis—individuals, society, and the state—and regarded the state as the outcome of the interaction of the former two. They assumed that society is self-regulating and that the socioeconomic system is able to run smoothly with little interference from the government. Economy, decentralization, and freedom from governmental control were the classical liberal’s main concerns, as shown particularly clearly in the writings of John Stuart Mill. They accepted the necessity of maintaining defense but postulated the existence of a basic harmony of interests among states, which would minimize the incidence of wars. Economic cooperation based upon an international division of labour and upon free trade would be in the interests of everybody—commerce would be the great panacea, the rational substitute for war.
In explanation of wars that did occur, however, liberals emphasized a variety of factors. First, they focused on autocratic governments, which were presumed to wage war against the wishes of peacefully inclined people. It thus became a major tenet of liberal political philosophy that war could be eliminated by introducing universal suffrage because the people would surely vote out of office any belligerently inclined government. From the early American pamphleteer Thomas Paine onward, a major school of liberals supported republicanism and stressed the peaceful impact of public opinion. Although they could not agree about actual policies, they stressed certain general ideas concerning relations between states, paralleling their laissez-faire ideas of the internal organization of the state with ideas of a minimum amount of international organization, use of force strictly limited to repelling aggression, the importance of public opinion and of democratically elected governments, and rational resolution of conflicts and disputes. Later in the course of the 19th century, however, and especially after World War I, liberals began to accept the conclusion that an unregulated international society did not automatically tend toward peace and advocated international organization as a corrective.

Socialist analyses

Whereas liberals concentrated on political structures, regarding them as of primary importance in determining the propensity of states to engage in war, socialists turned to the socioeconomic system of states as the primary factor. Early in the 20th century the two streams did to some extent converge, as evidenced by the fact that the English radical liberal John Hobson explained wars in terms later adopted by Vladimir Lenin.
Karl Marx attributed war not to the behaviour of states but to the class structure of society. To him wars occurred not as an often voluntary instrument of state policy but as the result of a clash of social forces. To Marx the state was merely a political superstructure; the primary, determining factor lies in the capitalist mode of production, which leads to the development of two antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie controls governmental machinery in its own interests. In its international relations, the capitalist state engages in wars because it is driven by the dynamism of its system—the constantly growing need for raw materials, markets, and supplies of cheap labour. The only way to avoid war is to remove its basic cause, by replacing capitalism with socialism, thus abolishing both class struggle and states. The Marxist doctrine, however, gave no clear guidance about the interim period before the millennium is reached; and the international solidarity of the proletariat proved a myth when war broke out in 1914, facing the European Social Democratic parties with the problem of adopting an attitude to the outbreak of the war. The Second International of working-class parties had repeatedly passed resolutions urging the working classes to bring pressure upon their respective governments to prevent war, but, once war had broken out, each individual party chose to regard it as defensive for its own state and to participate in the war effort. This was explained by Lenin as being due to a split in the organization of the proletariat that could be overcome only through the activity of a rigidly organized revolutionary vanguard.
Socialists in the West turned increasingly, although in varying degrees, to revisionist interpretations of Marxism and returned to their attempts to revise socioeconomic structures through evolutionary constitutional processes, seeing this as the only possible means of preventing wars. In the Soviet Union the socialist theory of war changed as the new communist regime responded to changes in circumstances. Soviet theoreticians distinguished three major types of war: between capitalist states, between capitalist and socialist states, and colonial wars of liberation. The internecine wars among capitalist states were supposed to arise from capitalist competition and imperialist rivalries, such as those that led to the two world wars. They were desirable, for they weakened the capitalist camp. A war between capitalist and socialist states was one that clearly expressed the basic principle of class struggle and was, therefore, one for which the socialist states must prepare. Finally, wars of colonial liberation could be expected between subjugated people and their colonial masters.

Prague: Soviet invasion [Credit: Libor Hajsky—AFP/Getty Images]

The weakness of the theory was that the two major expected types of war, the intracapitalist and the capitalist-socialist, did not materialize as frequently as Soviet theoreticians had predicted. Further, the theory failed to adequately analyze the situation in the Soviet Union and in the socialist camp. Even in communist countries, nationalism seems to have proved more powerful than socialism: “national liberation” movements appeared and had to be forcibly subdued in the Soviet Union, despite its communist regime. Also, war between socialist states was not unthinkable, as the doctrine indicated: only the colossal preponderance of Soviet forces prevented a full-scale war in 1956 against Hungary and in 1968 against Czechoslovakia; war between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China was a serious possibility for two decades after the Sino-Soviet split in 1962; and armed conflict erupted between China and Vietnam after the latter country became the most powerful in Southeast Asia. Finally, the theory did not provide for wars of liberation against socialist states, such as that conducted by the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989.

Nationalism

Many theories claim or imply that wars result ultimately from the allegiance of men to nations and from the intimate connection between the nation and a state. This link between the nation and the state is firmly established by the doctrine of national self-determination, which has become in the eyes of many the major basis of the legitimacy of states and the major factor in their establishment and breakup. It was the principle on which the political boundaries of eastern Europe and the Balkans were arranged after World War I and became the principal slogan of the anticolonial movement of the 20th century, finding expression in Chapter I, article 1, of the Charter of the United Nations in the objective of “self-determination of peoples,” as well as in the more specific provisions of Chapters XI and XII. It is this intimate link between nationalism and statehood that renders them both so dangerous. The rulers of a state are ultimately governed in their behaviour by what is loosely summed up as the “national interest,” which occasionally clashes directly with the national interests of other states.

Anschluss [Credit: Topical Press Agency/Hulton Archve/Getty Images]

The ideal of the nation-state is never fully achieved. In no historical case does one find all members of a particular nation gathered within one state’s boundaries. Conversely, many states contain sizable national minorities. This lack of full correlation has frequently given rise to dangerous tensions that can ultimately lead to war. A government inspired by nationalism may conduct a policy aiming at the assimilation of national minorities, as was the general tendency of central and eastern European governments in the interwar period; it may also attempt to reunite the members of the nation living outside its boundaries, as Adolf Hitler did. National groups that are not in control of a state may feel dissatisfied with its regime and claim self-determination in a separate state, as demonstrated in the attempt to carve Biafra out of Nigeria and the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan.
There is no rational basis for deciding on the extent to which the self-determination principle should be applied in allowing national minorities to break away. As a rule, the majority group violently opposes the breakaway movement. Violent conflicts can ensue and, through foreign involvement, turn into international wars. No suitable method has been found for divorcing nationalism from the state and for meeting national demands through adequate social and cultural provisions within a larger unit. Such an attempt in the Austro-Hungarian Empire before its dissolution in World War I failed. Even the Soviet Union was not permanently successful in containing its large proportion of national minorities.
Nationalism not only induces wars but, through the severity of its influence, makes compromise and acceptance of defeat more difficult. It thus tends to prolong the duration and increase the severity of wars. Possibly, however, this is the characteristic only of new, immature nationalisms, for nationalism has ceased to be a major cause of conflict and war among the nations of western Europe.
Nationalism is but one form of ideology: in all ages people seem to develop beliefs and try to proselytize others. Even within particular ideological groups, schisms result in conflicts as violent as those between totally opposed creeds, and heretics are often regarded as more dangerous and hostile than opponents. As long as individual states can identify themselves with explosive differences in beliefs, the probability of a war between states is increased, and its intensity is likely to be greater.

Special-interest groups

Whereas some theories of war regard the state as an undifferentiated whole and generalize about its behaviour, other theorists are more sociologically oriented and focus on the roles played within the state by various special-interest groups.
A distinction is made by these theorists between the great mass of people and those groupings directly involved or influential with government. The people, about whose attitudes adequate knowledge is lacking, are generally assumed to be taken up with their daily lives and to be in favour of peace. The influential groups, who are directly involved in external affairs and, hence, in wars, are the main subject of analysis. Warlike governments dragging peace-loving people into international conflict is a recurrent theme of both liberal and socialist analyses of war. Some writers have gone to the length of postulating a continuous conspiracy of the rulers against the ruled that can be traced to prehistoric times, when priests and warriors combined in the first state structures. Most writers, however, narrow the field and seek an answer to the question of why some governments are more prone to engage in war than others, and they generally find the answer in the influence of important interest groups that pursue particular and selfish ends.
The chief and most obvious of such groups is the military. Military prowess was a major qualification for political leadership in primitive societies; the search for military glory as well as for the spoils of victory seems to have been one of the major motivations for war. Once the military function became differentiated and separated from civilian ones, a tension between the two became one of the most important issues of politics. The plausible view has generally been held that the military strive for war, in which they attain greater resources and can satisfy their status seeking and, sometimes, also an aspiration for direct and full political power. In peacetime the military are obviously less important, are denied resources, and are less likely to influence or attain political power directly. At the same time, a second, although usually subsidiary, consideration of the military as a causal agent in war holds that an officer corps is directly responsible for any fighting and is thus more aware of its potential dangers for its members and for the state as well. Although intent on keeping the state in a high state of preparedness, the military may be more cautious than civilians about engaging in war. It is often held, however, that increased military preparedness may result in increased tensions and thus indirectly lead to the outbreak of war.
Closely allied are theories about groups that profit from wars economically—capitalists and the financiers, especially those involved in industries catering to war. All these play a central part as the villains of the piece in socialist and liberal theories of war, and even those not subscribing to such theories do not deny the importance of military-industrial complexes in countries in which large sectors of the economy specialize in war supplies. But, although industrialists in all the technologically advanced systems are undoubtedly influential in determining such factors as the level of armaments to be maintained, it is difficult to assume that their influence is or could be decisive when actual questions concerning war or peace are being decided by politicians.
Finally, some scientists and technologists constitute a new, much smaller, but important group with special interests in war. To some extent one can generalize about them, although the group is heterogeneous, embracing as it does nuclear scientists, space researchers, biologists and geneticists, chemists, and engineers. If they are involved in defense work, they all share the interest of the military in securing more resources for their research: without their military applications, for example, neither nuclear nor space research would have gone ahead nearly as fast as it has. War, however, does not enhance the status and standing of scientists; on the contrary, they come under the close control of the military. They also usually have peaceful alternatives to military research, although these may not be very satisfactory or ample. Consequently, although modern war technology depends heavily upon scientists and although many of them are employed by governments in work directly or indirectly concerned with this technology, scientists as a group are far from being wedded to war. On the contrary, many of them are deeply concerned with the mass destruction made possible by science and participate in international pacifist movements.

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Table of Contents

The control of war

The international environment within which states and the people within them operate is regarded by many theorists as the major factor determining the occurrence and nature of wars. War remains possible as long as individual states seek to ensure self-preservation and promote their individual interests and—in the absence of a reliable international agency to control the actions of other states—rely on their own efforts. It is no accident that reforms of the international system figure prominently in many prescriptions for the prevention of war. Whereas the reform of human propensities or of the state is bound to be a long drawn-out affair if it is at all possible, relatively straightforward partial reforms of the international system may produce significant restraints upon resorting to war, and a thorough reform could make war impossible.

Alternative title: warfare

Table of Contents

The control of war

Some theorists, being more optimistic about the nature of states, concentrate upon the removal of the fear and suspicion of other states, which is characteristic of the present as well as of all historical political systems; others, being less optimistic, think mainly of possible controls and restraints upon the behaviour of states. The underlying reasoning of both parties is generally similar. If individual states in competitive situations are governed by a short-term conception of their interests, acute conflicts between them will occur and will show a strong tendency to escalate. Thus, one state erects a tariff barrier to protect its industry against the competition of a trade partner, and the partner retaliates, the retaliatory interaction being repeated until the two countries find themselves in a trade war. Armaments races show a similar tendency to escalate, particularly so in an age of rapid technological change. The economic and scientific efforts necessary to avoid falling behind rivals in the invention and development of rapidly improving weapons of mass destruction have already reached unprecedented heights. And yet, neither trade wars nor arms races necessarily end in violent conflict. There seem to be operating some restraining and inhibiting factors that prevent an automatic escalation. Much of the theory of war concerns itself with the identification, improvement, and development of these restraining factors.

Diplomacy

The outcome of starkly competitive behaviour leading to wars is clearly against the interests of states, and it is rational for them to seek more desirable outcomes. If competitive behaviour is dangerous, theorists seek for alternative methods of cooperative behaviour that would not jeopardize the interests of the state through exposing it to the possibly less cooperative behaviour of others. Some theorists concentrate upon improving the rationality of the decision making of individual states through a better understanding of the international environment, through eliminating misperceptions and irrational fears, and through making clear the full possible costs of engaging in war and the full destructiveness of an all-out war, possible in our age.

The Battle of the Pyramids [Credit: © Photos.com/Jupiterimages]

The relative paucity of wars and their limited nature throughout the century following the Napoleonic Wars (1815–1914) stirred great theoretical interest in the nature of the balance-of-power system of that period—that is, in the process by which the power of competing groups of states tended toward a condition of equilibrium. Contributing to the successful operation of the balance-of-power system of the 19th century were relatively slow technological change, great diversionary opportunities for industrial and colonial expansion, and the ideological and cultural homogeneity of Europe. Pursuit of a balance of power is a way of conducting foreign policy that is perhaps less prone to war than other types of policy because, instead of indiscriminately increasing their power, states increase it only moderately, so as not to provoke others; and instead of joining the strongest, they join the weaker side in order to ensure balance. States in a balance-of-power system must, however, be ready to abide by constraints upon their behaviour in order to ensure stability of the system.
The application to international relations of a branch of mathematics—game theory—that analyzes the strategy of conflict situations has provided a new tool of analysis. In state interaction, as in any game situation, one side’s strategy generally depends upon that side’s expectations of the other side’s strategy. If all sides in a game are to maximize their chances of a satisfactory outcome, it is necessary that some rational rules of behaviour be conceptualized and agreed upon, and this idea of a set of rational rules can be applied to competing states in the international system. Game theorists distinguish antagonistic situations called zero-sum games, in which one state’s gain can be only at the expense of another state because the “payoff” is fixed. Even then a mutually acceptable distribution of gains can be rationally reached on the basis of the “minimax” principle—the party in a position of advantage satisfies itself with the minimum acceptable gain because it realizes that the other party, in a position of disadvantage, would yield on the basis of its possible minimum loss but would violently oppose a distribution even more to its detriment. In other situations, called non-zero-sum games, the payoff is not constant but can be increased by a cooperative approach; the gain of one participant is not at the cost of another. The contestants, however, have to agree about the distribution of the gain, which is the product of their cooperation.
The theory of games is the foundation of theories of bargaining that analyze the behaviour of individual states in interaction. Diplomacy based upon such theories is less likely to lead to war. Policymakers pursuing such strategies will conduct conflicts of the zero-sum type so that war is avoided. More than that, with some skill, such situations can be transformed into the non-zero-sum type by introducing additional benefits accruing from cooperation in other interactions and also, more generally, by eliminating the likelihood of war and, consequently, by reducing the costs of preparing for one.

Regional integration

Because wars within states have been eliminated through the establishment of suitable political structures, such as central governments that hold a monopoly of coercive power, many theories concentrate upon the establishment of parallel structures within the international context. Regional integration (cooperation in economic, social, and political affairs, as, for example, within the European Union) and the establishment of security communities (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) have made much greater advances than attempts at the reform of the entire global international system.
Because conflicts among neighbours tend to be frequent, regional integration is an important advance toward reducing the incidence of war. Even if it were to become generally successful, however, regional integration would simply shift the problem of war to a different level: there would be fewer possibilities of war because intraregional conflicts would be contained, but interregional conflicts could still give rise to wars of much greater scope and severity. The phenomenon of war must, therefore, be analyzed at the universal level.

International law

Kellogg-Briand Pact [Credit: Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images]

Some of the most influential thinking about war and the international system has come from specialists in international law. All of them postulate that there exists an international society of states that accepts the binding force of some norms of international behaviour. These norms are referred to as international law, although they differ fundamentally from municipal law because no sovereign exists who can enforce them. Most international lawyers realistically accept that international law is, consequently, among rather than above states. It is, according to legal doctrine, binding on states but unenforceable.
International law concerns itself largely with two aspects of war: its legality and its regulation. As far as the legality of war is concerned, there arose in the 20th century a general consensus among states, expressed in several international treaties, including the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and the Charter of the United Nations, that resort to armed force, except in certain circumstances such as self-defense, is illegal. Such a legalistic approach to the prevention of war, however, remains futile in the absence of a means of enforcement. The enforcement provisions of the United Nations Charter, which entail the application of military and economic sanctions, have never been applied successfully, owing to political disagreement among the major powers. This underlines the fact that legal norms, to be effective, must reflect an underlying political reality.

The United Nations

United Nations General Assembly [Credit: Marcel Bolomey/United Nations, Photo 24480]

The United Nations is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. The several approaches to peace outlined in its Charter and developed in its practice are based upon and clearly reflect the cumulative development of the relevant theories of war.
Drawing heavily upon the experience of the League of Nations, the Charter develops three interrelated approaches: first, pacific settlement of disputes, which would leave nations with nothing to fight about; second, collective security, which would confront aggressors with too much to fight against; and third, disarmament, which would deprive them of anything substantial with which to fight.

Peaceful settlement of disputes

Pacific settlement of disputes is based upon the assumption that war is primarily a technique for settling disputes, although it can, of course, also serve other purposes, such as allaying fears and seeking status. Further assumptions are that war frequently comes about because of the unawareness of decision makers of the possibility of settling disputes peacefully to the mutual advantage of both sides—an unawareness due to mere ignorance, pride, lack of imagination, or selfish and cynical leadership. It is thus possible that international organizations can contribute to the prevention of wars by devising and institutionalizing alternative, peaceful techniques for the settlement of disputes and by persuading the states to use them.
The scope of this approach is limited, for states are notoriously reluctant to abide by impartial findings on matters they regard as being of vital importance. Hence, what the procedures really offer is a means of slowing down the progression of a dispute toward war, giving reason a chance to prevail.

Collective security

Collective security is an approach to peace involving an agreement by which states agree to take collective action against any state defined as an aggressor. Leaving aside the problems of settling disputes or enforcing law or satisfying justice, it concentrates upon forestalling violence by bringing to bear an overwhelmingly superior international force against any aggressor. Although collective security, in somewhat different forms, played a prominent part in the League of Nations Covenant and is embodied in the United Nations Charter, it has completely failed in both cases. Failing an international government capable of ultimately determining the issues, nations have not managed to agree on an unequivocal definition of aggression, have not in practice accepted the principle that aggression must be acted against independently of the identity of the perpetrator, and, therefore, have not established the international collective security force envisaged in the Charter.

Disarmament

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Credit: Bill Fitz-Patrick]

Disarmament and limitation of armaments are based upon the theory that states are inclined to strive for dominance in arms over any potential rivals and that this leads to arms races that tend to end in war. The major besetting sin of this theory is that it often tends to confuse cause with effect. Although arms races develop momentum of their own, they are themselves the result of political tensions leading to war. In short, it is the tensions that cause war, not the arms races. To hold otherwise is to mistake a symptom for a cause. Hence, reducing the levels of armaments does not necessarily reduce these tensions. Furthermore, it is the instability of strategic balances, rather than their level, that leads to war; agreements about disarmament or limitation of armaments may easily disturb the existing precarious balance and, therefore, be actually conducive to war.

Limiting conflict

As these major approaches to peace envisaged in its Charter have not proved very fruitful, the United Nations has developed two new procedures aiming at the limitation of wars. First, “preventive diplomacy,” largely comprising the diplomatic initiatives of the secretary-general and the stationing of peacekeeping forces, has served to contain local conflicts and to prevent escalation, especially the involvement of the superpowers. Second, although the General Assembly’s recommendations have no legal binding force, they have become increasingly influential, for the assembly has become an important agency for what has been called the collective legitimization of state policies. Resort to war becomes more costly when a state is faced with the prospects of a collective condemnation. This new restraint upon war does not, however, act upon conflicts that the assembly may favourably regard as wars of colonial liberation. Nor could the assembly’s disapproval be relied upon to deter states from waging war in pursuit of an interest they deemed to be truly vital.

World government

Both the shortcomings and the limited practicability of all the approaches to the elimination of war through the reform of the international system have driven many thinkers to accept the idea that war can only be abolished by a full-scale world government. No midway solution between the relative anarchy of independent, individual states and a world government with the full paraphernalia of legislative powers and of an overwhelming military force would provide a sufficiently stable international framework for the nations to feel that wars would not break out and thus stop them from behaviour that is often conducive to wars. In an age faced with the danger of a war escalating into a general extermination of mankind, the central importance of preserving peace is obvious and is generally accepted. But here the thinkers divide. Some press on from this analysis to the logical conclusion that mankind must and, therefore, will establish a world government, and they advance ideas on how best to proceed in this direction. Others regard the world government as completely utopian, no matter how logical and desirable it may be. Yet, in terms of actual policies, the adherents of the two schools do not necessarily divide. Whether they do or do not believe that world government is attainable, they agree that the complex phenomenon of war represents a potential calamity of such a magnitude that all theorists must endeavour to understand it and to apply their understanding to the prevention and mitigation of war with all the means at their disposal.
Joseph FrankelThe Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica

http://www.britannica.com/topic/war

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ONE TIN SOLDIER

Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law

Go to Online Edition

Edited by David James Cantor and Jean-François Durieux
This book contributes to a long-standing but ever topical debate about whether persons fleeing war to seek asylum in another country – ‘war refugees’ – are protected by international law. It seeks to add to this debate by bringing together a detailed set of analyses examining the extent to which the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) may usefully advance the legal protection of such persons. This generates a range of questions about the respective protection frameworks established under international refugee law and IHL and, specifically, the potential for interaction between them. As the first collection to deal with the subject, the eighteen chapters that make up this unique volume supply a range of perspectives on how the relationship between these two separate fields of law may be articulated and whether IHL may contribute to providing refuge from the inhumanity of war.

Biographical note

David James Cantor is Director of the Refugee Law Initiative and a Reader in Human Rights Law at the School of Advanced Study, University of London. His research addresses the protection of refugees and other displaced persons and he has carried out extensive fieldwork across Latin America. He has also trained and advised governments from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and the Pacific. He previously worked as a Legal Officer at the Refugee Legal Centre and for UNHCR. He holds a three-year ESRC Future Research Leaders grant for his project on Pushing the Boundaries: New Dynamics of Forced Migration and Transnational Responses in Latin America. He is director of the new distance-learning MA in Refugee Protection and Forced Migration Studies.

Jean-François Durieux has taught international law at the Refugee Studies Centre (Oxford) 2007-2009, and again 2011-2012. He is currently affiliated with this Centre as a Research Associate and as Senior Adviser to the Humanitarian Innovation Project. He served with UNHCR for over 30 years, during which he worked in Africa, Asia, North America and Latin America, as well as at UNHCR Headquarters in Geneva, notably in the Division of International Protection and in the Regional Bureau for Europe. He has published widely in the field of international and regional refugee law, with a focus on legal responses to mass influxes of refugees, as well as the legal implications of refugee emergencies and protracted refugee situations. He has organised seminars and short courses on statelessness and on the cross-fertilisation of refugee law, human rights law, and international humanitarian law.

Reviews

"Over time, the conduct of hostilities, together with the protection of refugees, have undergone major changes. The assessment whether individuals can be defined as refugees within the meaning of the Refugee Convention has progressed with the support of modern technology. However, the definition of terms, such as armed conflict, civilian and combatant continues to muddy waters in this area. This collection of essays provides clarity on these interpretive issues and suggests approaches for overcoming the challenges that humanitarian law poses for refugee law. This book will be useful not only for academics, but also for legal practitioners and students, who are invited to reflect on the complex nexus between refugee law and humanitarian law."
Anna Marie Brennan, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2014), Oxford University Press.

Part I Introduction
Chapter 1: Refuge from Inhumanity? Canvassing the Issues Jean-François Durieux and David James Cantor
Part II Interpretive Guidance from IHL: Cross-Cutting Issues
Chapter 2: The ‘War Flaw’ and Why It Matters Hugo Storey
Chapter 3: Causation in International Protection from Armed Conflict Hélène Lambert
Chapter 4: Expanding Refugee Protection through International Humanitarian Law: Driving on a Highway or Walking near the Edge of the Abyss? Stéphane Jaquemet
Part III Interpretive Guidance from IHL: Inclusion and Exclusion under the Refugee Convention
Chapter 5: Persecution and the Nexus to a Refugee Convention Ground in Non-International Armed Conflict: Insights from Customary International Humanitarian Law Vanessa Holzer
Chapter 6: Inclusion of Refugees from Armed Conflict: Combatants and Ex-combatants Eric Fripp
Chapter 7: Exclusion is Not Just about Saying ‘No’: Taking Exclusion Seriously in Complex Conflicts Geoff Gilbert
Part IV Interpretive guidance from IHL: regional definitions and systems
Chapter 8: The African War Refugee: Using IHL to Interpret the 1969 African Refugee Convention’s Expanded Refugee Definition Tamara Wood
Chapter 9: A Simple Solution to War Refugees? The Latin American Expanded Definition and its relationship to IHL David James Cantor and Diana Trimiño Mora
Chapter 10: Revisiting the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps Maja Janmyr
Chapter 11: The (Mis)Use of International Humanitarian Law under Article 15(C) of the EU Qualification Directive Céline Bauloz
Chapter 12: What Protection for Persons Fleeing Indiscriminate Violence? The Impact of the European Courts on the EU Subsidiary Protection Regime Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi
Chapter 13: Of Autonomy, Autarky, Purposiveness and Fragmentation: The Relationship between EU Asylum Law and International Humanitarian Law Violeta Moreno-Lax
Part V IHL Protections for Non-Return to Armed Conflict
Chapter 14: Laws of Unintended Consequence? Nationality, Allegiance and the Removal of Refugees during Wartime David James Cantor
Chapter 15: The Scope of the Obligation Not to Return Fighters under the Law of Armed Conflict Françoise J. Hampson
Chapter 16: Non-Refoulement between ‘Common Article 1’ and ‘Common Article 3’ Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler
Part VI Wider Approaches to Protection of War Victims
Chapter 17: Protection against the Forced Return of War Refugees: An Interdisciplinary Consensus on Humanitarian Non-refoulement Jennifer Moore
Chapter 18: Non-refoulement, Temporary Refuge, and the ‘New’ Asylum Seekers Guy S. Goodwin-Gill
Index.

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References

What is WAR?

Related Terms

Definition List

Atlantic Charter

Content and analysis[edit]

Origin of the name[edit]

Acceptance by Inter-Allied Council and by United Nations[edit]

Impact on the Axis powers[edit]

Impact on imperial powers and imperial ambitions[edit]

British Empire[edit]

Poland[edit]

Baltic states[edit]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

Bibliography[edit]

Evolution of theories of war

The causes of war

Biological theories

You may also be interested in...

The control of war

The control of war

International law

Peaceful settlement of disputes

Limiting conflict

Refuge from Inhumanity? War Refugees and International Humanitarian Law

Biographical note

Reviews

Table of contents

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