28 Jul 2014 ... NATO
WAS LOOKING 2 DISBAND AFTER AFGHANISTAN.... check der Spiegel English - we said this... just
trying 2 make this a white man's ...
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BLOGSPOT:
NATO CAUGHT IN BULLSHIT AND BEANS-UKRAINE-Edward Snowden
Love- Der Spiegel- "Prior to the Ukraine crisis, there were many asking
what purpose NATO would serve once the alliance's troops had withdrawn from
Afghanistan"- ALL THOSE $$$ SALARIES 4 THE BIGWIGS? Shame on the lot o
ya-/APRIL 9 DAILY UPDATES- Germans Poll they like their Russian Brothers and
Sisters- many people in West want nations 2 concentrate on their own nations
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2 Sep 2011 ...
Instead, we've witnessed the aggressive expansion of NATO, to include
the former ... After all,
Americans were the good guys who defeated Hitler and made the ... Russia lost 20 million
people in World War II to the Nazi onslaught, and ... NATO is now engaged in three wars in Libya, Afghanistan, and
Iraq.
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IN THIS WEEK'S ISSUE-BRILLIANT
ARTICLE- real, raw and righteous... innocent Ukraines killing each other like
murdering your moms and dads, children and cousins... because of a hijacked
democracy of thieves and a Russian nation that will not let the cruelty
continue.... Canada- look at Quebec and Canada.... could we let this happen??? Ever...
blood of our blood... because NATO needs a reason 2 exist???
Imho.
ON TARGET:
Tough talk is easy but it doesn’t help Ukraine
A Ukrainian soldier guards territory near Debaltseve, eastern Ukraine,
on Sunday. The lack of will to fight and die for the corrupt and bankrupt Ukrainian
regime is reflected in the statistic that Kyiv is pursuing 7,500 criminal cases
against males of military age who have refused conscription. (THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS)
Last week, Prime
Minister Stephen Harper was once again baiting the Russian bear and telling
Vladimir Putin to “back off” from his involvement in the Ukraine crisis.
Harper’s jingoistic
tough-guy rhetoric came on the eve of German Chancellor Angela Merkel and
French President Francois Hollande flying to Moscow to meet with Putin in an
effort to peacefully resolve the Ukraine conflict through mature dialogue.
Germany and France are, of course, the central European military and economic
powers that have the most skin in the game should the civil war in Ukraine
dissolve into a wider clash involving NATO and Russia.
Backing up Harper’s
taunts, Canada has but a single anti-submarine frigate cruising in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea, more than 1,500 kilometres from Russian soil, and a handful
of troops conducting a training exercise in Poland. Canada has also dispatched,
with great fanfare, several tonnes of non-lethal military aid to support the
Ukrainian armed forces. This material could best be described as used camping
gear in the form of surplus tents, sleeping bags and cold-weather gear.
Subsequent to that
generous provision of stores, Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president, came
cap in hand last September to beg for additional military donations from Canada
and the U.S. During his speeches in Ottawa and Washington, Poroshenko noted
repeatedly that “one cannot win the war with blankets.”
It has taken some
time, but now senior U.S. policymakers are also advocating that “defensive
weapons” should be provided to the Ukrainian military to help them crush the
upstart rebels in the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. There is, of
course, no actual military designation of a weapon system as being “defensive”
in nature, other than air defence, and since the Ukrainian rebels in those
regions possess no aircraft, this makes the new U.S. policy an exercise in
political spin.
Pouring weapons
into a simmering civil war would be reckless in the extreme, but providing
freedom-loving, pro-western Ukrainians with a means of self-defence against
Russian aggression seems not only prudent but necessary. The problem with this
simple, oft-repeated storyline of defenceless Ukrainian citizens threatened by
a Russian military juggernaut is that it is complete hogwash.
While a Soviet
republic, Ukraine had an obligatory two-year conscripted military service and a
vast arsenal of combat equipment. Following the country’s declared independence
in 1991, Ukraine radically downsized its standing army, but kept its ample stock
of war material and a trained reserve force of 700,000 former soldiers.
Last March, when
Russian troops seized control of the Crimean peninsula, they did so from their
naval base at Sevastopol, which they had officially leased from Ukraine until
the year 2042.
What was little
reported on at the time was the fact that Ukrainian troops were also stationed
at airbases and ports in the Crimea. Despite the fact that the Ukrainian
military force outnumbered that of the Russians, the annexation was
uncontested. Subsequently, a significant number of those Ukrainian soldiers who
surrendered without firing a shot chose to re-enlist in the Russian military.
Those who did not opt for this, and who remained loyal to the new government in
Kyiv, were peacefully repatriated to Ukraine.
Even some of the
tanks and combat aircraft that were initially seized by Russian forces in the
Crimea were returned intact to their Ukrainian owners.
Furthermore, at
present, through rapid conscription and mobilization, Ukraine has just eclipsed
France in possessing the largest military force in Europe.
As evidenced by its
steady stream of reversals at the hands of the rebels, size is not as important
as motivation in military conflict. The lack of will to fight and die for the
corrupt and bankrupt regime of Poroshenko is reflected in the statistic that
Kyiv is pursuing 7,500 criminal cases against males of military age who have
refused conscription.
The most effective
units fighting to contain the rebels have been the foreign volunteers combat unit
known as the Azov Battalion and the former neo-Nazi militia group called the
Right Sector. Both of these forces openly display Nazi symbols and swastikas,
and the Right Sector still lionizes Stepan Bandera, a Second World War
ultra-nationalist and fascist.
While it is true
that the majority of Ukraine’s Cold War Soviet arsenal is somewhat antiquated,
the pro-Russian rebels are using exactly the same equipment — they do not
possess secret super-weapons. Despite the pleas for assistance from Poroshenko,
Ukraine’s military is neither outnumbered nor outgunned; in fact, it is quite
the opposite. What is lacking is the will.
That being the
case, providing more “defensive weapons” and meaningless taunts from Harper
will solve nothing. While the NATO hawks may wish to fight Putin to the last
drop of Ukrainian blood, it seems that most rational Ukrainians are averse to
that outcome.
Let us hope cooler
heads prevail — soon.
BEST COMMENT:
Excellent article. in addition to the thousands of government
prosecutions of those refusing conscription that Taylor mentions, there are
also thousands fleeing Ukraine to Russia to avoid being drafted. As reported by
Dmitri Kolesnik:
“Each day, new facts about
mass, draft evasion are emerging” reports the Ukrainian daily Korrespondent. It
writes, “In the first wave of military mobilization in 2014, 20 per cent of
those who showed up for the conscription call did so voluntarily. In the second
wave the same year, it was ten per cent.
“This year, only six per
cent of those conscripts showing up for the call to service have done so
voluntarily“.
The New NATO and the Evolution of Peacekeeping:
Implications for Canada
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs
Chairman : The
Honourable Peter Stollery
Deputy Chair
: The Honourable Raynell Andreychuk
Seventh
Report
April 2000
MEMBERSHIP
The Honourable Peter Stollery, Chairman (since November 1999)The Honourable John B. Stewart, Chairman (until November 1999)
The Honourable Raynell Andreychuk, Deputy Chair
and
The Honourable Senators:
|
Norman Atkins
|
Consiglio DiNino
|
|
Roch Bolduc
|
Jerahmiel Grafstein
|
|
*Bernard Boudreau, P.C. (or Dan Hays)
|
Rose-Marie Losier-Cool
|
|
Pat Carney, P.C.
|
*John Lynch-Staunton (or Noël Kinsella)
|
|
Eymard G. Corbin
|
Nick Taylor
|
|
Pierre De Bané, P.C.
|
*Ex-Officio Members
The Honourable Senators Beaudoin, Christensen, Finnerty, Forrestall, Graham, Johnson, Kenny, Lewis, Mahovlich, Meighen, Milne, Perry, Poy, Prud’homme, Robertson, Roche, Rompkey, Spivak and Whelan, were members of the Committee or participated in its work on this study.
Line Gravel
Clerk of the Committee
Clerk of the Committee
ORDER OF REFERENCE
Extract from the Journals of the Senate, Thursday, March 2, 2000:The Honourable Senator Stollery moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Cook:
That, notwithstanding the Orders of the Senate adopted on Thursday October 14, 1999, on Wednesday November 17, 1999 and on Thursday December 16, 1999, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs which was authorized to examine and report upon the ramifications to Canada: 1. of the changed mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Canada’s role in NATO since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Cold War and the recent addition to membership in NATO of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic; and 2. of peacekeeping, with particular reference to Canada’s ability to participate in it under the auspices of any international body of which Canada is a member, be empowered to present its final report no later than April 14, 2000; and
That the Committee retain all powers necessary to publicize the findings of the Committee contained in the final report until April 28, 2000; and
That the Committee be permitted, notwithstanding usual practices, to deposit its report with the Clerk of the Senate, if the Senate is not then sitting; and that the report be deemed to have been tabled in the Chamber.
The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.
Clerk of the Senate
Paul Bélisle
Foreword
When the Cold War effectively ended in 1989, NATO had been in existence for
forty years. For forty years, its primary role had been to ensure the security
of Western Europe against possible aggression from the Warsaw Pact. With the
diminution of that threat, the Alliance was faced with a sudden need to rethink
its whole raison d’être. By the end of the 1990s, not only had NATO
added a new peacekeeping mission that was quite distinct from its original
purpose of collective defence, but also it had come to include former
adversaries as member states of the Alliance. These changes corresponded to a
shift in the nature of the primary threat to global security. Since the end of
the Cold War, internal unrest and civil war, and the threat to peace from
terrorism and rogue states, had become major concerns. As well, there was much
greater attention paid to humanitarian motives as a basis for United Nations
and even NATO action. At the same time, the European Union continued to develop
as a political and economic entity. As it did so, the concept of a European
Security and Defence Identity distinct from NATO began to emerge. In this context, the Senate resolved on March 26, 1999 "That the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs be authorized to examine and report upon the ramifications to Canada of the changed mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Canada’s role in NATO since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the end of the Cold War and the recent addition to membership in NATO of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic; and of peacekeeping, with particular reference to Canada’s ability to participate in it under the auspices of any international body of which Canada is a member."
To carry out its work, the Committee held hearings in Ottawa as well as a series of interviews in European capitals, at the United Nations in New York and in Washington, D.C. We appreciate the valuable advice we received from all of our witnesses and are particularly grateful for the assistance of Canada’s Ambassadors in the cities we visited and for the work of their knowledgeable and helpful staff.
Likewise, we were supported by capable and diligent research staff, Peter Berg, Wolfgang Koerner, David Goetz and David Murphy, while in the preparation of this report, Jim Mitchell and Nigel Chippindale of Sussex Circle provided invaluable assistance. As always, the work of the Committee was made possible by the capable efforts of its translation staff, Paul-André Gravelle, Dominique March, Marielle Papineau and Huguette Pellerin and the proffreader, Yolande Guibord. Finally, we are very much indebted to the Clerk of the Committee, Line Gravel for her efficiency and unfailing support as well as her administrative assistant Louise Archambeault.
Most of the study was completed under the leadership of Senator John B. Stewart, former Chair of the Committee. Even after his retirement in November 1999, he continued to provide invaluable input and advice to the project. His unique knowledge and dedication will be missed by the Committee.
Peter Stollery
Chair
Chair
Context for the Study
The Committee’s Approach
The Structure of the Report
Chapter II: Canada and the "Old" NATO
The Nature of NATO during the Cold War
Article 2: A Broad Alliance
Article 5: Collective Defence
The Soviet Threat
Flexibility of the NATO Arrangements
Canada’s Experience in the Old NATO
Early Contributions
Defence Role and Multilateralism
Economic Expectations of NATO Membership
Frustration over Lack of Influence
Criticisms of the Canadian Contribution and Military Capacity
Conclusions
Chapter III: The New NATO
The End of the Cold War
Reshaping NATO
A New and Broader Role for NATO
NATO and Humanitarian Interventions
The New Strategic Concept
Sanctions for Out-of-Area Action
Nuclear Weapons Policy
NATO and the European Union
NATO Enlargement
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
Future Considerations for Canada and NATO
Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendations
Chapter IV: The New NATO – Legal Issues
Legality of "Out-of-Area" Operations
The Washington Treaty
The UN Charter
Legality of Non-Article 5 Operations
The Washington Treaty
The UN Charter
Legality of Unilateral Action – and Alternatives
Direct Action by the General Assembly
Emergency Situations
Overall Implications
Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendations
Chapter V: Kosovo
Background to the Conflict
Precursors
The Crisis
NATO Involvement
Negotiations Fail
NATO’s Response: Operation Allied Force
The Campaign
Serbian Withdrawal
The Aftermath
Reflections and Considerations
The Effectiveness of the Air Campaign
War Without Casualties?
Achieving Stability?
Humanitarian Intervention?
National Interests and Interventions
The Reasons for NATO Intervention
Conclusions
Chapter VI: Human Security and the New Peacekeeping
Canada and the Human Security Approach
The New Peacekeeping
The Charter and the New Peacekeeping
Canada’s Role in the New Peacekeeping
Military Implications
The Problem of Using Human Security as a Basis for Policy
Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendations
Chapter VII: The European Security and Defence Identity
The Evolution of ESDI
Restructuring European Forces
The Revolution in Military Affairs
Sharing the Burden
Problems to be Resolved
The Feasibility of ESDI
A Continuing U.S. Role
Implications for Canada
Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendations
Chapter VIII: Parliament and Canada’s External Security Commitments
Canada’s Increasing Involvement in UN and NATO Operations
Canadian Law and Practice
The Direct Role of Parliament
Comparisons
Past Canadian Practice
The Situation in Other Countries
Possibilities of an Enhanced Role for Parliament
Conclusions and Recommendations
Recommendations
Chapter IX: A Final Word
Recommendation
Appendix 1: Glossary
Appendix 2: Witnesses
·
To determine the impact of NATO’s new mandate
and membership on Canada’s role in the Alliance; and
·
To determine what Canada’s role should be
with respect to future peacekeeping missions under either UN or NATO auspices.
·
While these objectives continued to guide the Committee throughout its work,
our perception of the issues evolved over the course of the study. Context for the Study
When the Committee began its work, it was agreed there was no need for a fundamental review of Canada’s policy toward NATO. In its fifty years of existence, NATO had proved to be one of the most successful security alliances ever created and, for Canadians, the virtues of peacekeeping as a security vocation for Canada appeared unassailable.
In part, our assumptions stemmed from the fact that Canada had undertaken major foreign and defence policy reviews just a few years ago. These reviews were carried out in 1993-1994 by two Special Joint Committees of the Senate and House of Commons, and several of our current members were participants at the time. In the defence review, Canada’s continued membership in NATO was not seriously questioned and, aside from some downsizing and the closing of certain headquarters and bases, the role of the Canadian Forces was not substantially altered. On the foreign policy side, there was a sense that, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was a need for Canada to reach out to the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. This was reflected in a shift from a focus on military security to broader notions of global security and a call for the continuation of Canada’s "multilateral tradition."
Moreover, the events that came to form the backdrop of our current inquiries had not yet been fully digested at the time of those two policy reviews. Indeed, some were happening only then. There were the chilling examples of Somalia and Rwanda, both of special importance to Canadians. The former involved crimes committed by our own troops, while in the latter case a competent and well-intentioned Canadian commander was not given the requisite authority and resources to stop a slaughter of horrendous proportion. The first instance raised questions of command and leadership in the Canadian Forces, the second touched on issues of institutional weakness, even ineptitude, on the part of the United Nations.
Despite this, most Canadians still had faith that peacekeeping could be made to work and remained a proper mission for the Canadian Forces. Thus, for Canadians the murder of Shidane Arone in Somalia was a tragic anomaly in the behaviour of Canadian troops. For many, Rwanda was an unfortunate case of an international institution being overwhelmed by events it could neither have predicted nor controlled.
Events in the Balkans were further confirmation of the principal lesson learned from Rwanda, namely that bureaucratic inertia, differing political agendas and a lack of political will can prove as lethal as any battlefield weapon.
(2) By contrast with the slow emergence of facts about Rwanda, the "CNN factor"(3) meant that the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo were immediately accessible, if not comprehensible. For the members of the Committee, the conflict in Kosovo, which unfolded as the hearings proceeded, provided highly instructive insights. It was not our intention to focus solely on Kosovo nor to treat this tragedy as a case study. But as we listened to our witnesses and formed the basis for our questions, Kosovo became a natural reference point.
What we quickly came to realize was that current roles of peace-making and peace-enforcing are not at all the same as the peace-keeping role which Canada has championed for decades.(4) The latter implies that a peace exists to be kept. It presumes that there is a degree of geographic demarcation between opposing sides. It assumes that a settlement can be negotiated once warring sides are exhausted or have reached a stalemate, thereby enabling the United Nations to step between the factions with their consent.
Completely different are cases such as Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans, where the United Nations entered conflicts that were continuing and did so without the full consent of all the parties. In the former Yugoslavia, there was frequently no geographic demarcation between the warring sides, and often it was hard even to identify the political actors. In their efforts to protect civilians and to deliver humanitarian assistance, UN forces invariably came into conflict with those who were trying to gain or maintain power for themselves.
We were also reminded that when the United Nations Charter was drafted, the framers were primarily concerned with preventing aggression by one state against another. By contrast, the world community is today mainly confronted by civil wars, which are more difficult to deal with. In such situations, the precepts of collective security on which both the UN and NATO were founded are of limited utility.
We saw that in recent years there has been a transformation in the nature of peacekeeping. It has moved from a classic model of preventing hostilities between states (or communities within states) to a more ambitious effort to protect the basic human rights of individuals in situations of conflict. This new concept of peacekeeping is founded in large measure on concepts of "human security" and "humanitarian intervention" which themselves are still developing. They have major implications for Canada and its role in the world.
The Committee’s Approach
As we explored these and related issues, the following questions emerged for the Committee as the key ones to be answered:
·
In the case of possible interventions by
Canada, under UN or NATO auspices, in a conflict occurring within a state:
o
What should be the role of Parliament in
determining Canada’s approach?
o
What criteria should determine Canada’s
participation?
o
Under what authority should Canada insist
that any such intervention take place?
o
What is the relationship between NATO and the
UN?
·
What should be Canada’s approach to the
"new" NATO and the European Strategic and Defence Identity (ESDI)?
·
What does the concept of human security mean
for Canada’s foreign policy?
·
We also recognized that the context for answering these questions was in a
continuing state of evolution and that policy was being made – explicitly or de
facto – even as we carried out our study. We saw that, despite the end of
the Cold War, Canada’s defence policy and commitments are playing an ever more
prominent role in our larger foreign policy. In particular, the new concepts
associated with human security have come to be central to both defence and
foreign policy, and Canada has taken a lead role internationally in this
regard.The recent Speech from the Throne, for example, stated that "the government will give increased prominence to human security in its foreign policy." It also affirmed that "the Government will . . . ensure that the Canadian Forces have the capacity to support Canada’s role in building a more secure world . . . ."
Thus the new peacekeeping is becoming an increasingly influential factor in shaping Canada’s foreign policy; it has important bearing on Canada’s traditional defence and security relationships, notably our present and future role in the NATO Alliance and in the United Nations.
The Structure of the Report
The Committee believes the Senate will want to explore the implications for Canadian policy of these changes in the world and of the new concepts that are emerging to deal with them.
To this end, in fulfillment of its mandate, the Committee has in this report:
·
reviewed the origins and evolution of Canada’s role in NATO to the
end of the Cold War;
·
examined the remaking of NATO in the 1990s and the implications of
the new Strategic Concepts for Canada’s role;
·
reviewed legal aspects of NATO’s new roles, particularly with
respect to operations that are not justified by the traditional view of
collective defence;
·
examined events in Kosovo and their possible lessons for the new
NATO and for Canada’s role in it;
·
examined the implications of the shift from traditional concepts
of state security toward a new concept of human security; and
·
reviewed the evolving European Security and Defence Identity
(ESDI) and its potential implications for Canada and for the Alliance;
·
discussed the role of the Senate and House of Commons in Canada’s
external military commitments and how it might be enhanced.
On this basis, the Committee has developed the conclusions and
recommendations set out in the chapters that make up this report. Committee members appreciate that some of our recommendations may prove challenging both to current policy and to Canada’s capacity to operate militarily in support of that policy. But we also believe that only through careful consideration of the new security environment, and honest assessment of Canada’s place in it, can Parliament determine what these new realities should mean for Canadian foreign and defence policy.
The end of the Cold War changed nearly everything with respect to NATO and other aspects of foreign policy, as Chapter III will discuss. But first it is important to review briefly the origins of NATO and of Canada’s role in the Alliance, partly to understand how important are the changes of the past ten years, and partly to demonstrate that some aspects of the "old" organization and its goals still remain, as do long-standing concerns about the adequacy of Canada’s contribution and military preparedness. These are matters which we will take up later in this report.
The Nature of NATO during the Cold War
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed by the original 12 member states in Washington on April 4, 1949. Four more European nations joined the Alliance between 1952 and 1982, completing the membership of the "old" NATO.(5)
NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. Yet it has always been more than just a collective defence arrangement in which members pledge to assist one another if any comes under attack. It is also a political alliance, not only linking individual countries that were once adversaries, but cementing North America with Western Europe. And it is a community of values and common goals in support of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law – the core values of western civilization.
Article 2: A Broad Alliance
The breadth of Alliance doctrine is expressed in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty – what has come to be known as the "Canadian Article." The article states:
The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
Thus, while the Canadian proponents of NATO recognized that its primary explicit purpose would be collective defence, they understood that its success would require the pursuit of political and economic goals as well.(6) Even at the beginning, the economic aspect was less important than the political, since the Marshall Plan was already helping to rebuild European industry.
The themes of Article 2 were reiterated throughout 1948 by Louis St. Laurent, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, and subsequently were taken up by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In 1949, during Senate hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty, Acheson argued that "the central idea of the treaty is not a static one . . . " and that "the North Atlantic Treaty is far more than a defensive arrangement. It is an affirmation of the moral and spiritual values which we hold in common." During 1949 hearings of the U.S. Senate, Acheson and other administration witnesses argued that what they were proposing was very different from previous military alliance systems.(7) On other occasions, however, Acheson referred to Article 2 as the "least essential article."
What made the Treaty different from previous military alliances was that it was based on a clearly articulated support for "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."(8) For some countries, including Canada, the broadening of the NATO purpose through the inclusion of Article 2 was critical in encouraging legislators to approve the Treaty. Needless to say, it was the Soviet threat, not moral suasion, that ultimately convinced most of the signatories to join the Alliance. Yet, since Article 2 did not commit the signatories to any specific action, its inclusion could be said to have provided something for everyone at no apparent cost.
Article 5: Collective Defence
Collective defence was provided for under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty(9). In this article, the signatories agreed that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all . . . ." They agreed that "each Party to the Treaty would assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." (10)
Article 5 is often described as requiring an "automatic" response by member states in the event of hostilities. This assumption, however, is not consistent with a strict interpretation of the Article. Whatever action might be deemed necessary is in fact "left to the discretion of each party, and armed force is seen only as a possible option."(11) It was the manner in which U.S. forces were deployed in Europe that gave Article 5 its real substance. In the early 1950s, the United States deployed its military forces and nuclear weapons forward in Europe, mainly in Germany, so as to ensure that any Soviet attack on a NATO ally would immediately be seen as constituting an attack on the United States.(12)
Strategies changed over the years, moving first to the threat of "massive nuclear retaliation" and then to "flexible response." But, what did not change was the forward deployment of U.S. forces(13). For many years, as discussed below, Canada contributed substantial forces to this deployment strategy.
The Soviet Threat
Following the end of World War Two, the alliance with the Soviet Union rapidly dissolved. In our hearings, we were reminded that underlying the growing concern with the Soviets was the fact that, as Western leaders soon realized, the "United Nations was not capable of fulfilling its original mandate of providing collective security against international aggression." This conviction was strengthened by the Czech coup of February 1948, the Berlin blockade later that year and other East-West confrontations that indicated Moscow’s aggressive ambitions. Hence one function of NATO was to ensure that West Germany remained solidly within a western alliance military and political alliance. While NATO was intended as a defensive organization, it was meant to provide collective security "through a true political unity of purpose, as much as through any deployment of arms and armies." (14)
Of particular importance was the creation of a unified military command that would bring American conventional military power and technology, as well as the American nuclear umbrella, to bear on European security. This served two basic purposes. First, "it established the principle that Soviet aggression against NATO members would never be local in scope, or treated as an isolated occasion." Second, "it gave the Western European countries the military muscle to resist Soviet pressure to align themselves politically with the U.S.S.R. even if they were not in fact occupied by Soviet forces." Finland provided the example for this latter concern. Although democratic and essentially western, it was, nevertheless, within the Soviet orbit because of the large Soviet military presence on its borders.(15)
Flexibility of the NATO Arrangements
A key point about the North Atlantic Treaty is its simplicity of language and lack of detail. "There is no specified military strategy, no requirement for any particular set of bureaucratic arrangements or military organization, beyond the creation of a North Atlantic Council and a defence committee, both called for in Article 9." (16)As such, the Treaty left considerable latitude for reform and for the creation of new cooperative arrangements. Limits on changes have been imposed only by national interest or inertia, not by the Treaty.
This simplicity and generality has meant flexibility for the Alliance to grow and adapt in pursuit of its objectives. Most observers have found this to be a strength of the organization. But lack of formal rules also meant that the governance of the organization could be dominated by its strongest members and that the processes were not always as transparent as many desired. Flexibility helped the inner circle to have its way, while others (often including Canada) sat in the ante-chamber awaiting word. Nevertheless, working with countries such as Portugal, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Canada was able to amplify its influence, particularly during the early years of the Atlantic Accord.
During their investigations, members of the Committee became concerned about the nature of the Alliance’s decision-making process and were left unconvinced by claims of its democratic and equitable nature. They concluded that a democratic alliance of voluntary participants should require that all have a seat at the table when decisions of consequence are being considered.
Canada’s Experience in the Old NATO
According to Professor Robert Bothwell, Canada’s participation in the formation of NATO was motivated by three basic concerns. First, there was the need to ". . . entice the Americans into a regular relationship with the rest of the world" in order to subject what had emerged as the dominant western power to the constraints of multilateral relationships. Second, there was the need for security, which in 1949 was seen as much in ideological as in military terms; the spread of communism had to be stopped. Finally, there was the desire for wide-ranging political, economic and cultural ties with Europe.(17)
Canada also saw a need to help keep the United States engaged in Europe at a time when there were substantial domestic pressures to withdraw; indeed, the pressures of post-war isolationism were also felt in Canada. As well, Canada supported the creation of an alliance that would solidly link a recovering West Germany with the three great Western powers, the U.S., Britain and France.
Early Contributions
From the outset, Canada was actively engaged in both the defence of Western Europe and the projection of an Atlanticist vision. Our military contribution to European security during the early years of the Alliance was considerable. Canada emerged from the Second World War economically strengthened and a major military power. We were seen to have ". . . an obligation to the defence of Western Europe that surpassed even the obligation of the Europeans, for whom defending themselves and their immediate neighbourhood was about all one could ask in the Alliance’s first decade." We accepted this obligation and determined, as did the Americans, that we would take responsibility not only for our own defence but for extending the "umbrella" to our European allies. Our military presence in Europe came to have great political and operational significance.(18)
By 1953, Canada was allocating more than 8 percent of its GDP to defence spending, a massive increase from 1.4 percent in 1947. During the final year of the Korean War, Canada’s defence/GDP ratio was the fourth highest in NATO. Our defence budget that year accounted for 45 percent of all federal spending. Along with these efforts, Canada operated a Mutual Aid Program for Europe, which, for example, made available to Great Britain advanced F-86 Sabre fighters. From 1951 onward Canada deployed in Europe a well-equipped brigade group and an air division whose strength would eventually reach 12 squadrons, totalling 240 aircraft. For a time, the RCAF in Europe was flying more advanced fighters than even the United States Air Force, prompting one American general to remark of the 1953 military effort in that theatre that "Canada (was) responsible for the biggest contribution . . . to the expansion of West European air defence."(19)
Such a robust contribution could, of course, not be maintained. The expense was simply too onerous and Canada also had important responsibilities with regard to the defence of North America through NORAD. Moreover, the recovery of the European nations meant that Canada’s contribution would inevitably be diluted. The scope of this early commitment, however, is not often remembered by our allies, or even by Canadians, when the question of Canada’s current contribution to NATO is raised.
Defence Role and Multilateralism
Canada’s strategic position has always been unique, not only within NATO but also in the world. No other state, certainly none our size, finds itself in a similar situation. We live next to a superpower with which we have a very close economic relationship and which in great measure guarantees our security. And we have seldom contemplated the conduct of military operations independent of our major allies.
These realities have certain consequences for Canadian military planning and diplomacy. States can normally measure the adequacy or otherwise of their military programs against a military yardstick – the capabilities of one or more potential enemies. In our case this has not proven so. The purpose of Canadian defence programs and activities has long been to pursue our international security objectives through support to an alliance policy. In terms of Canadian national interests, the rationale for much of Canadian defence policy has been to support our national objectives by maintaining influence with our allies. This role of influence has often been considerable; indeed, some of those interviewed in Bonn argued that had Canada not been in NATO, the Alliance might not have survived.
Economic Expectations of NATO Membership
For years, Canadians were told, by both their own officials and their allies, that membership in NATO would bring economic benefits in terms of access for Canadian products to European markets. A strong military commitment was seen to be the golden coin, not only of diplomacy, but also of trade. As regards the latter, at least, matters have changed. The original expectations regarding the benefits of participation in NATO for Canadian trade with EU countries now appear to have been exaggerated. While Canada exports over $23 billion in goods and services to the EU annually, this represents only 1.7% of EU imports, compared to 20% from the U.S.A. and 63% for trade between EU members.
The Committee’s previous studies, however, show that Canada-Europe investment flows are substantial, with 20% of Canada’s investment abroad going to EU countries and 20% of foreign investment in Canada coming from the EU.(20) Likewise, Canada and the EU each have some $50 billion in fixed assets in the other’s economy; for Canada, EU fixed assets are approximately one-third the magnitude of those owned by U.S. interests.
Consequently, during the Committee’s examination of Canada’s trade relations, members were surprised to be told by officials of the European Union that Canada was not economically important in the eyes of Europeans.(21) This attitude did not seem consistent with either the spirit of Article 2 or economic reality.
The Committee concluded that European leaders regard security and transatlantic trade as distinct matters, each to be dealt with separately(22). Their apparent assumption is that Canada will continue to participate in NATO and its various missions, if it sees such participation as desirable for reasons related to its own security and defence.
Frustration over Lack of Influence
While Canada always remained a staunch supporter of NATO, there were frustrations from the outset. The underlying objective was to influence decisions about both security and the broader class of matters envisioned in Article 2. In 1948, even before the conclusion of the talks leading to the Alliance, Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King became annoyed about being taken for granted in discussions relating to a response to the Berlin blockade and, as a consequence, refused Canadian participation in the airlift operation.(23)
In the mid-fifties, concerns about being excluded from the inner decision-making club of Great Britain, France and the United States led Canada to join, with the Norwegians and Italians, in pressing for measures to democratize decision-making. These initiatives came to little. The 1968 decision of the Trudeau government to re-orient Canadian foreign policy on détente and to reduce the military contribution to the Alliance was, according to Professor Bercuson, responsible for further marginalization of Canada’s position within NATO,(24) Not everyone saw it that way at the time, however; recently declassified Cabinet documents reveal that in 1969 the Honourable Donald Macdonald, Minister of National Defence, expressed the view that even a complete withdrawal of forces from Europe would not adversely affect Canada’s credibility and influence.(25) To several of our witnesses, the most important impact of the Canadian decision was to provide fuel to those who argued for a scaling down of American efforts.(26)
When viewed from the perspective of Canada’s initial hopes for the Alliance, we can conclude that NATO has never lived up fully to those expectations. The central objective that was achieved was the avoidance of armed conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe. But, as noted by one of our witnesses, it is extremely difficult to determine the degree to which this achievement can be ascribed to NATO.(27)
One thing that the Committee did determine was that Canada’s influence in NATO has declined over the years. Professor Stairs argued that "we simply must recognize that our military contributions to NATO activities . . . have now reached the point at which they can hardly be expected to significantly reinforce our diplomacy, not, at least, in ways that matter."(28) It is worth asking, however, whether even a substantial increase in Canada’s contribution would lead to greater influence in NATO decision-making.
The aspiration to subject the United States to multilateral relationships, and thus increase Canadian leverage, was dismissed by those who commented on the matter. According to Bercuson, Canada’s support for NATO enlargement – the current expression of this general aspiration – has not been justified by any discernible impact of expanded membership on U.S. leadership in NATO.(29) Nevertheless, an important aspect of Canada’s role remains that of counterbalancing influence.
Criticisms of the Canadian Contribution and Military Capacity
A critical perspective on Canada’s contribution was offered by Mr. Bruce George, MP, Chair of the Defence Committee in the British House of Commons. Mr. George argued that a country of Canada’s size and stature should be doing more to pull its weight in the Alliance. Canada was described as "punching below its weight" and as not accepting its fair share of the Alliance burden. As well, Canada’s decision to pull its CF-18 fighter-bombers out of Germany was characterized as short-sighted. Others on the British Committee suggested that Canada should expand its ground forces and re-invest in heavy armour.
Mr. George’s views seemed to be shared by the Conservative opposition on that Committee. However, others encountered during our visits were generally more understanding, or at least less outspoken, in their comments on Canada’s foreign and defence policy. Nevertheless, it is clear that in other member countries, criticisms of Canada’s contribution to NATO are seldom far below the surface.
Some of the Canadian witnesses were equally critical of Canada’s contribution and defence preparedness over the years. Major General (Ret’d.) Lewis MacKenzie suggested that if all the Canadian troops currently serving abroad were brought home, Canada would still be unable to meet the basic commitments set out in the 1994 Defence White Paper.(30) Others argued that Canada has always traded troops for influence, and that if we expect to be able to exercise influence within NATO, our military commitments will have to be increased. This is not merely a matter of increasing numbers, but, they pointed out, of responding to the rapid rate of technological change in military hardware and of providing forces equipped and trained to work as partners with the Americans and others. The idea that our material contribution equals influence is still adhered to by many.
Conclusions
Over its first four decades, NATO evolved but remained essentially true to the original purposes of the Washington Charter. Canada’s role declined, particularly in military terms, but the basic objective remained the same – to help ensure the collective security of the Alliance against the threat of the Warsaw Pact countries.
As the Cold War came to an end, Europe began a series of dramatic transitions that brought about a new security balance and called into question the continuing relevance of NATO. At the same time, economic and social pressures in virtually every Western country caused a re-examination of defence spending and in many cases led to substantial cut-backs in military budgets. This was certainly the case in Canada.
The late 1980s saw the beginning of the end for the old NATO. The 1990s brought the start of the continuing efforts to remake the Alliance that are discussed in Chapter III. For the Committee, this examination of Canada and the old NATO helped to provide the context within which to understand the changes that have taken place subsequently and the challenges that face NATO and Canada today.
------------------
NATO: The alliance that should have been dissolved
NATO backing the
Ukrainian military is about as sensible as Russia's support for paramilitary
forces
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko gave NATO Secretary
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen the Order of Liberty, Ukraine's highest award for
foreign nationals [AP]
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Ian Klinke
Ian Klinke is a researcher at
the University of Oxford.
Russia's disrespect for
Ukrainian sovereignty has captivated the Western media for months. The focus on
Moscow's bullish behavior has, however, obscured both NATO's recent attempts of
joining the Ukrainian proxy war and its long-term strategy of Eastern expansion.
The upcoming summit in Wales is only the most recent reminder that NATO should
have been disbanded long ago.
Western journalists and think tankers are increasingly telling
us that Russia is re-creating a bipolar order in Europe. The Kremlin's support
for separatists in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has sparked accusations that
Russia is breathing new life into a confrontation that Europe thought to have
overcome 25 years ago. Yet, while both the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and the
Kremlin's involvement in the 2014 Ukrainian civil war show that Russia
Russia's
disrespect for Ukrainian sovereignty has captivated the Western media for
months. The focus on Moscow's bullish behaviour has, however, obscured both
NATO's recent attempts of joining the Ukrainian proxy war and its long-term
strategy of Eastern expansion. The upcoming summit in Wales is only the most
recent reminder that NATO should have been disbanded long ago.
Western
journalists and think tankers are increasingly telling us that Russia is
re-creating a bipolar order in Europe. The Kremlin's support for separatists in
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine has sparked accusations that Russia is breathing new
life into a confrontation that Europe thought to have overcome 25 years ago.
Yet, while both the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and the Kremlin's involvement in
the 2014 Ukrainian civil war show that Russia is an important source of
regional instability, it is not the only one. Western commentators often reduce
NATO's involvement in Ukraine to that of a passive bystander, but such a view
is highly misleading.
Over the last months, the alliance has sent fighter planes to
Eastern Europe and increased its naval presence in the Black and Baltic Seas.
NATO has unilaterally suspended its military and civilian cooperation with
Russia and its deputy secretary general has downgraded Russia from
"partner" to "more of an adversary".
Most controversially, NATO is wrapping up an aid package to modernise the
Ukrainian army and is therefore fast becoming, like Russia, an active party in
the Ukrainian civil war.
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Inside Story - What are Russia's plans for eastern Ukraine?
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While NATO has so far been careful not to pass heavy armoury to
Kiev, the alliance has neither ruled out individual members from sending such
weapons nor from participating in military exercises on Ukrainian soil - even
during the ongoing war. Grateful for such allegiance, Kiev has recentlydecorated NATO's outgoing Secretary General
Anders Rasmussen with the Order of Liberty, Ukraine's highest award for foreign
nationals. In return, Ukraine's President Poroshenko has received the honour of
being invited to NATO's September summit in Wales as the only non-NATO head of
state.
This week's much-awaited summit in Wales could bring a decisive
boost to the North Atlantic alliance's new proxy war. Already, the secretary
general has announced his intention to beef up NATO's rapid response force and
to encourage increased military spending throughout the alliance. He has also
called for permanent military bases to be installed in NATO's Eastern members.
The alliance has been careful not to call such bases "permanent"
because they would breach a 1997 promise to Russia, but they will send an
unambiguous signal to the Kremlin nevertheless. "The point is that any
potential aggressor should know that if they were to even think of an attack
against a NATO ally," Rasmussen recently explained,
"they will meet NATO troops."
Beating the war drum
The most significant source of support for the new line comes
from NATO's most powerful member. In early June, Washington announced a $1bn fund to bolster the wider US military
presence in Europe. US President and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Barack Obama
has promised Poland and other Eastern European NATO
members "unbreakable commitments", backed both by "the strongest
alliance in the world" and "the most powerful military in
history".
But
it is not just Washington that is beating the war drum. Today, politicians like
Poland's Radek Sikorski, Lithuania's Dalia Grybauskaite or Estonia's Toomas
Hendrik Ilves are pursuing a similar line. The very states that were eager to
host the controversial Missile Defence Shield in the 2000s are now lobbying for
permanent military bases on their territory. Even Germany, sometimes considered
a lethargic member of NATO, has stocked up troops in the Polish headquarters of
the Multinational Corps North East, a facility concerned with the defence of
NATO's Eastern territorial border.
While
these recent events have often been read as mere reactions to Russia's imperial
reflexes, it is important not to divorce them from their historical context. A
crucial key to NATO's current investment in Ukraine is the alliance's
longstanding identity crisis. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, which was disbanded in
1991, the North Atlantic alliance has survived the end of the Cold War. It has
had to legitimate its further institutional existence in two distinct if rather
contradictory ways.
Firstly,
it replaced its Cold War policy of "forward defence" with that of
"forward presence" (non-linear defence lines, scattered across the
globe). This new mission was powerfully demonstrated by a number of "out
of area" wars against Serbia in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in
2011, but also by combating pirates off the Horn of Africa. Given the fiasco in
Afghanistan, this strategy is now widely considered to have failed.
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NATO: Russia supplying Ukraine rebels tanks
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Secondly, it embarked on an ambitious enlargement agenda to
Eastern Europe that saw the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland enter the
alliance in 1999. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia and the three Baltic
states followed in 2004 as well as Croatia and Albania in 2009. NATO has
furthermore developed close ties with a number of post-Soviet republics,
particularly with Georgia and Ukraine, both of which have in the past declared
an interest in joining the alliance.
NATO has held military exercises with
these states and recently reiterated its continued support for Georgia's plans
to gain NATO membership. Tbilisi now builds units according to NATO standards
so as to ensure interoperability in the future. It is this policy of regional
involvement that is directly at odds with the alliance's global mission.
Indeed, it has helped to re-create the very linear defence line it claims to
have abandoned in the early 1990s, but now further to the East.
In response to such allegations, NATO has
held that its expansion to the former Warsaw Pact and its flirtation with the
post-Soviet republics was never directed against Moscow, but merely an attempt
to stabilise democratic transitions in these states. Russia has never quite
believed that version of events, reminding the alliance that its most powerful
member state once gave Russia an informal promise that NATO would not expand
eastwards.
Perhaps more interestingly, NATO's new
members were also never fully committed to the story that NATO enlargement had
nothing to do with Russia. It should be remembered that it was anti-Soviet
politicians like Poland's Lech Walesa and the Czech Republic's Vaclav Havel who
originally lobbied for their countries to join NATO.
What
should have been done 25 years ago
In the run up to the September summit it
seems as if NATO's 25-year identity crisis might finally have been resolved. As
the US Secretary of State John Kerry has
recently put it, the war in Ukraine has called NATO "back to the role that
this alliance was originally created to perform". As both NATO and Russia
seem to be using the current Ukrainian crisis to re-enact their Cold War roles,
a debate on the alliance's purpose is more than timely.
Today's critics of NATO frequently face
charges of Kremlin apologism, quite in the same way that the anti-nuclear and
peace protestors were ritually accused of being Soviet puppets during the Cold
War. Yet, to take a critical stance on NATO does not mean to embrace Putin.
Unlike what some commentators have argued,
we do not need more understanding for a nationalist, militarist and autocrat
whose new Eastern Monroe doctrine is destabilising Eastern Europe while
isolating his country. Instead, we need a better grasp of NATO and its drive to
further militarise of Eastern Europe. This alliance is currently aiding a
nationalist regime that did very little to diffuse its ethnic tensions in the
aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution and that is now shelling its own
citizens. Backing the Ukrainian military is about as sensible as Russia's
support for paramilitary forces in Eastern Ukraine.
The only reasonable response to the
current crisis is a radical rethinking of European security that starts with
the realisation that the continent has two problems: Russia and NATO. The West
cannot disband Russia, but it can finally start a process that it should have
started in 1991: the dissolution of its antiquated military alliance.
This solution is admittedly
counter-intuitive in the light of Russia's current assertiveness, but it is
ultimately the only sane step towards a more peaceful continent. Perhaps it is
important to remember that it was the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and not the
West that called off the Cold War. Interestingly, this happened at a time when
Washington was excessively funding terrorist paramilitaries and freedom
fighters around the world while showing very little respect for the sovereignty
of certain Latin American neighbours.
Ian
Klinke is a researcher at the University of Oxford.
Source: Al Jazeera
Future of NATO and Atlantic
Security after the 2014 Wales Summit
INTRODUCTION Almost a quarter century after the Cold War, NATO leaders met in Newport at a critical transition moment in history of the alliance. The latest NATO summit which was described as ‘one of the most important summits in the history of our alliance’ by Rasmussen,(1) was held on September 4-5, 2014 in Wales, United Kingdom. This summit should be handled carefully as it was NATO’s first meeting since Russia provided large-scale military support to separatist forces fighting in Ukraine and the last before the completion of the alliance’s mission in Afghanistan.(2) Summit meetings tend to speed up the decision-making processes in NATO. Allied leaders have encountered with the new challenging tasks and blurred visions for re-defining NATO’s possible strategic roles and providing the means of credibility and stability in the Euro Atlantic region, from Ukraine to Africa and Middle East. New developments and regional crises have led to better relations between American and European allies; and also reinforced the determination. NATO’s political and military dimensions are faced with a new kind of alarming nature in ongoing risks and threats. With the civil war in Eastern Ukraine and radical Islamic extremists’ attacks across Syria and Northern Iraq; NATO has turned its face toward new threats and also made a final decision to withdraw the ISAF mission from Afghanistan. During the Wales Summit, NATO discussed how to respond to Russia’s politics in Ukraine and how to stop the civil war since the ongoing conflict affects the border security of member states. Russian President Putin was not invited to the NATO summit, but he was still the center of attention for 67 heads of state and government gathered in Wales.
Future of NATO’s Deterrence Capacity
Recent NATO summit has succeeded in building a reliable response to new security challenges. The leaders have decided to organize a new mode of Readiness Action Plan (3) ; reconciled NATO’s missions of collective defense capacity and crisis management ability. From a pessimistic perspective, when we observe the ongoing military and political developments of global strategic trends, we can see that today the world is turning out to be a far more dangerous place than a peaceful place. But in spite of NATO’s enlargement, the allies have encountered with a new kind of responsibility mission that differs from the Cold War security challenges: piracy, terrorism, cyber-warfare, and Russia’s hybrid de-stabilization strategy. Nature of the strategic security environment has changed dramatically, which is full of friction with traditional and non-traditional risks and emerging threats. However, we think that these unpredictable challenges will not be eliminated soon.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it might have been legitimate to question NATO’s future. From those 12 founding members in 1949, there are now 28 members accounting for over 60 percent of world defense expenditures. NATO has recently focused on taking more ‘operational’ roles – with missions in the Balkans, whereas the former Secretary General Lord Roberts has noted that it primarily operated to save the lives of Bosnian Muslims. It operated in Iraq… and, most recently, of course, in Afghanistan…(4)
Allies affirm the alliance’s unrivalled military might and they are committed to provide the resources needed to address today’s and tomorrow’s challenges; but they also pledge to use NATO as the unique and essential transatlantic forum for political consultation as it was always intended to be. Russia broke that trust by annexing Crimea and invading Eastern Ukraine, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly decided earlier this year to expel the Russian Parliament after it authorized the use of military force. Furthermore, we are grateful for the contributions of recent conflicts which have reminded us that we cannot take security for granted. In Wales, allies have recognized that NATO’s relationship with Russia has fundamentally changed, demonstrating unity by stepping up NATO and allies’ political, economic and military support for Ukraine, deploying more defensive assets in Eastern Europe, and strengthening NATO’s rapid reaction capability and its ability to respond to ‘hybrid warfare’.(5)
NATO has adopted a “Readiness Action Plan” to strengthen NATO’s collective defense and shield Central and Eastern European states as the former Soviet bloc that joined the alliance in the last 15 years by modernizing their military infrastructure, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, rotating air patrols and holding regular joint exercises on their territories.(6)
• Can NATO provide credible collective defense to its members?
• Can NATO still keep effective deterrence capability?
• Has NATO missed early warning signs of emerging security threats?
• What are the successes and failures of the alliance for response?
These questions are at the heart of NATO’s strategic challenges.
NATO Members
Many analysts claim that the Wales Summit is the most important meeting and the most difficult test for NATO. The alliance must rise to the challenge emerged with Russia’s aggression to reassert its own credibility.(7) Prior to the summit, it is expected that the most important topics would be the end of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan by emphasizing the question: ‘How will NATO be able to continue its presence in Afghanistan and its activities after ISAF? The other relevant discussion topics were: ‘What will be the future of NATO and where the alliance goes?’, ‘What will be the value of military capabilities of the alliance’ and finally ‘The situation in Ukraine and NATO’s role in it’.(8) In fact, the following are the formal agenda items outlined by NATO’s leaders for the Wales Summit;
• Enhancing allied readiness and strengthening collective defense capabilities in response to Russian aggression,
• Marking the planned withdrawal of the NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 and launching a non-combat security sector training mission in the country, and
• Boosting NATO’s support for partners.
Nevertheless, according to official documents, it could be claimed that the meeting’s agenda has been marked by the Ukraine crisis as well as the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In that regard, in order to reach a comprehensive approach regarding the overall consequences of the summit, it will be useful to examine the final declaration.
Increasing NATO’s ability to build political dialogue with partners is vital especially in strategically important regions. The credibility of the alliance is built upon credible, modern and well-coordinated armed forces which remain highly important as guarantors of peace and stability. This critical and unique credibility was best secured by achieving strategic relevance, military utility and greater resources.(9) Credibility of the alliance is more than just recognizing the strategic threats of the age; it is about adapting military capability to meet those threats. To conclude, NATO is an alliance built on the credibility of its operational capability and the political resolve to use that capability. The capability to project and sustain expeditionary forces both within and beyond the borders of NATO is an essential part of credibility. There will always be factors affecting political choices when there is a threat or use of force. But the capability itself is fundamental.(10)
NATO’s Reaction to Ukraine Conflict
NATO decided to carry out exploration and monitoring activities on land and at sea regularly across Eastern Europe and the Baltic states that are believed to be under Russian threat. Anticipated field of activity will remain limited within NATO territories. In the solution of the Ukraine problem which drew attention as the priority issue of the summit, NATO preferred to develop a series of military and diplomatic precautions, communicating a harsh warning letter to Moscow for now. In a meeting with the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, President of Russia Vladimir Putin said, “I can conquer Kiev in two weeks if I want to.” This statement was an alarm bell for NATO allies.(11) In that regard, Rasmussen underlined that they were faced with a dramatically changed security environment by Russian attacks to Ukraine.(12) In Wales Summit Declaration, it is clearly stated that ‘Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a whole, free and peaceful Europe.’(13) Additionally, the joint statement released by the heads of state and government officially condemns Russia’s escalating and illegal military intervention in Ukraine and urge Russia to stop and withdraw its forces from Ukraine and along the Ukrainian border. According to NATO, “the violence and insecurity in the region caused by Russia and the Russian-backed separatists are resulting in a deteriorating humanitarian situation and material destruction in Eastern Ukraine.”
Violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a serious breach of international law and a major challenge to Euro-Atlantic security.’(14) Rasmussen clearly stated that, as long as Kremlin continued on its current path, a seven-point peace plan introduced by Putin was meaningless. (15) Rasmussen also noted that Russia was called to step back and take the path to peace.(16) Among the members of the alliance, it is possible to observe a general consensus on Russia’s role in destabilizing the region. Crimea case in March 2014 could seem as the first land grab in Europe by a major power since the end of the Cold War.(17) Even though this ‘illegitimate occupation’ which raised legitimate concerns among the members of the alliance seemed as the most serious crisis in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO’s response was mostly rhetorical.(18) Nevertheless, as a response to the annexation in April 1, the alliance has suspended all its practical cooperation with Moscow for the second time since Russia’s invasion of Georgia. In the 2014 summit, NATO has once again underlined that they do not and will not recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate ‘annexation’ of Crimea. It is important to highlight that, Crimea’s annexation has demonstrated the effectiveness of unconventional warfare tactics. Nevertheless, the alliance noted in the Article 23 that NATO does not seek a confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. However, they added, “we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our alliance and security depend, and we see a concerted campaign of violence by Russia and Russian-backed separatists at destabilizing Ukraine as a sovereign state.” For instance, we consider that the developments in Eastern Europe bring a strong wake up call to NATO for reevaluating the plans towards giving meaning to the strategic relation with Russia.
For the alliance, Ukraine seems as a long-standing and distinctive partner. It is clearly stated by the alliance that they value Ukraine’s past and present contributions to current operations and NATO’s response force.(19) Also the alliance declared that they will continue to encourage and support the reforms in Ukraine through the Annual National Program. It is expressed that additional efforts will be launched to support the reform and transformation of the security and defense sectors and to promote greater interoperability between Ukraine’s and NATO’s forces. At the end of the summit, NATO recognized Ukraine’s intention to expand its Distinctive Partnership with NATO and strategic consultations in the NATO-Ukraine Commission.(20)
However, this approach and Ukraine’s attempts to establish closer relations with the alliance is strongly criticized by Russia. As stated by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the West and NATO are warned against offering any kind of membership to Ukraine and not supporting Kiev’s desire for establishing closer relations with the alliance, saying that it threatens the attempts to reach a cease-fire.(21) Lavrov underlined the importance to curb such attempts and stop provoking such approaches from abroad to ensure national unity in Ukraine. Another centerpiece of NATO summit was the announcement of a more robust rapid response force on Ukraine’s eastern flank, which would aim to serve as a deterrent to Russian aggression. In the joint statement of Obama and Cameron, it is underlined that “We must use our military to ensure a persistent presence in Eastern Europe, making clear to Russia that we will always uphold our Article 5 commitments to collective self-defense”.(22) At that point, it is important to add that NATO has agreed on a new Readiness Action Plan which means the alliance will update its defense planning and increase its presence on Central and Eastern Europe with additional equipment, training, exercises and troop rotations. U.S will contribute $1 billion to support this plan. (23)
Consisting of 4,000 NATO troops, it will initially deploy in the Baltics this fall. Clearly, NATO does not view such a deployment as a violation of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, in which NATO had promised not to place combat forces on the territory of new member states. In any event, that deployment will be followed by two weeks of joint NATO-Ukrainian military exercises outside of L’viv in September followed in a short order by bilateral UK-Polish military exercises in October.(24)
In the Wales Declaration, it is expressed that while Russia’s military intervention, armed separatists and instability continue in Ukraine, NATO continues to support sanctions imposed by the European Union and G7 to address the destabilizing behavior of Russia to arrive at a political solution.(25) Amongst these are the measures taken by allies including Canada, Norway and the United States, as well as the EU’s decisions to limit access to capital markets for Russian state-owned financial institutions, trade in arms, establish restrictions for export of goods for military purposes, curtail Russian access to sensitive defense and energy sector technologies and other measures.
Syria and Islamic State Terrorism Threat in the Middle East(26)
Discussions among NATO allies at the summit raised new arguments about the crisis in Syria and Iraq due to ISIL terrorist organization. Indeed, US President Obama declared that several NATO states were forming a “new coalition of the willing” to combat ISIL in Middle East. President Obama says “strong regional partnerships” are the cornerstone of any comprehensive strategy to confront Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria.(27) The rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East and limited success of NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Libya are other actors that will determine NATO’s future direction. On that subject, Rasmussen told that international community has an obligation to stop the Islamic State from advancing further. The alliance accepted that the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) poses a grave threat to Iraqi and Syrian people and beyond. It is also indicated that, if the security of any ally is threatened, NATO will not hesitate to take all necessary steps to ensure collective security. As a response to the threat posed by ISIL, ‘a core coalition’ has declared that key allies stand ready to confront the terrorist threat through military intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic efforts.(28)
Afghanistan Problem and Defense Budgets of the Allies (29)
NATO’s mission in Afghanistan will end in December 2014 and the alliance requested Afghanistan to sign relevant Security Agreements that will enable NATO troops to remain in the country in 2015 onwards. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has specifically been a NATO mission and during 2014 the alliance is committed to withdraw fully from combat operations which will be the end of the longest and most expensive mission in NATO history.(30) In the Wales statement, it is declared that the nature and scope of NATO’s engagement will change the alliance’s estimation on a period of transmission. According to the statement, three parallel activities are being provided: in the short period NATO allies and partners will be ready to continue to exercise, train and assist the Afghan Security Forces; in the medium term, they will reaffirm the financial sustainment; and in the long term, the alliance is planning to establish a stronger partnership with Afghanistan.(31) NATO allies and partner nations stand ready to continue to train, advice and assist the ANSF after 2014. For this purpose, a new, non-combat mission will be established depending on the signing of the US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and NATO-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement. The Resolute Support Mission should be in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan and it should be supported by a United Nations Security Council Resolution. NATO and its allies are committed to the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership. Under this partnership, both the political and practical elements of the partnership should be jointly owned and strengthened through regular consultation on issues of strategic concern. NATO is ready to work with Afghanistan to develop this partnership in line with NATO’s Partnership Policy, possibly including the development of an Individual Partnership Cooperation Program at an appropriate time.(32)
NATO and Partners
Another key discussion topic of the summit was the defense budgets of the alliance’s members, underlining that one of the key objectives is to reverse the ongoing downward trend in defense spending.(33) North America and Europe agreed to increase their defense expenditure in real terms as GDP grows and will direct their defense budgets as efficiently and effectively as possible. Allies agreed to reverse the declining defense budgets and aim to limit their defense spending to 2% of GDP within a decade, as the alliance’s goal is 2% of GDP on defense. In 2013, total spending of NATO’s European allies was around 1.6% of GDP. On the contrary, Russia has increased its defense spending by about 50% since 2008. However, many analysts do not expect European allies to substantially increase their defense spending in short to medium term.
Source: http://i.imgur.com/J6XP2Rh.png.
Reaffirmation of transatlantic solidarity, – “Welfare instead of warfare” –
For the first time, NATO is prepared to deploy forces at new military installations along Russia’s western border that would include the bases in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia to host NATO troops. Leaders will agree to modernize their military might, creating a “spearhead” rapid-response force of 4,000 troops. At this point, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel addresses that these forces are formed by the USA, UK, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey. At the NATO summit in Newport, Wales, the United States announced that Turkey, as an ally in the US-led NATO military alliance, is the only Muslim nation in a "core coalition" of 10 countries committed to battle IS militants in Iraq. "Everybody understands that the Turks are in a special category," said a US official.
Turkey’s Critical Role at the Summit
Turkey attended the NATO Summit under the presidency of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Erdoğan met with US President Barack Obama, Prime Minister of Germany Angela Merkel, President of France François Hollande and the leaders of other allied countries. Erdoğan pointed out that Turkey has a different position both within NATO and similar new entities. Obama told, "I want to express my appreciation for the cooperation between US and Turkish military and intelligence services in dealing with the issue of foreign fighters, an area where we still have more work to do."(34) During the summit, Erdoğan said, “Illegal annexation of Crimea will not be recognized”, and emphasized that Crimean Tatar Turks who are exposed to pressure should be isolated and the efforts for finding a solution to the crisis should be supported. With an intervention at the session, Erdoğan asserted that NATO should fulfill its commitments for Azerbaijan and solve the Karabakh problem within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. But after the summit, despite the increasing pressure on Turkey, a surprising development occurred. The hostages captured by ISIL from the Turkish Embassy building in Mosul, Iraq on September 20 were saved by the National Intelligence Service of Turkey (MIT) and brought to Turkey. President Erdoğan recorded that 49 embassy personnel who were detained by ISIL were saved by means of “a local operation”, which is crucial for indicating Turkey’s level. Ankara is expected to make arrangements for a new road map in the Syria phase of the fight against ISIL. (35) Turkish government is wary of Syrian Kurds and their YPG militia, which is believed to be affiliated with the Kurdish PKK movement in south-east Turkey that has waged a long insurgency.
Just after the summit, the US central command said warplanes from the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates launched airstrikes on four locations in Syria on Saturday and Sunday, including three on Kobani that destroyed an ISIL fighting position and staging area. The Obama administration had been pressing Ankara to play a larger role against the extremists, who have taken control of large swaths of Syria and Iraq, including territory on Turkey’s border. US defense officials said that Turkey agreed to let US and coalition forces use its bases, including a key installation within 100 miles of the Syrian border, for operations against Islamic State (ISIL) militants in Syria and Iraq. Beyond training and bases, there are other issues that US expects Turkey to agree upon. US officials have not said which issues they are because of ongoing discussions. (36)
CONCLUSION
Lessons from the past twenty-five years put forward the need for NATO with a more global outlook, which can only be achieved by a stable Europe. As its principal outcome, the Wales Summit had an assurance of enduring credibility of NATO, and sent a powerful message which guarantees the collective security of 28 members and Euro Atlantic partnership. NATO must continue to serve both as an indispensable guarantor of transatlantic bond and our collective defense, and as an essential tool for crisis management. NATO is the ultima ratio guardian of liberty and security. NATO is part of democratic peace and stability as well as a high-politics institution, and must therefore engage far more effectively. For the defense of our security capacity and our common democratic values, North America and Europe are the backbones of our alliance. NATO is the democracy and human rights keeper in Europe; the continent would not be united, free, or peaceful without its power. For today and tomorrow, NATO may continue to be our collective democratic defense club, which guards the way for prosperity and development.
But in a wider perspective on partnership and cooperation principle, there is a highly important transition in world affairs and ongoing developments; NATO is entering a new and unpredictable era as the alliance shifts from operations to contingencies. The Syrian and Ukrainian crises demonstrate the danger of several threats. There is a new balance today, which necessitates the ability and capability of NATO to conduct operations across the full spectrum of missions from stabilization and reconstruction to high-end war fighting. In this regard, allies have to sharpen NATO’s decision making processes as well as its ability to deploy immediately. NATO’s New Readiness Action Plan aims to provide the capability to rapidly deploy a force in an even shorter timeframe. Also, the alliance’s existing Standing Naval Forces should be reorganized with a focus on the model of co-operation and interoperability within the same rapid response capability against possible sudden problems.
In conclusion, today NATO is entering the new-missions age, and allied states want to increase NATO’s collective firepower and to achieve reasonable deterrence credibility as a collective security phenomenon that deals with the aggression and threats of today.
DIPNOTS
1. “Ukraine 'IS' to dominate agenda as NATO summit opens,” Deutsche Welle, September 04, 2014, accessed September 07, 2014, http://www.dw.de/ukraine-is-to-dominate-agenda-as-nato-summit-opens/a-17899409.
2. Paul Belki: “NATO’s Wales Summit: Expected Outcomes and Key Challenges”, Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2014, accessed September 07, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43698.pdf, 1.
3. In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, the paragraphs from 4 to 14 are on the issue of the Readiness Action Plan.
4. UK Defence Secretary: Michael Fallon, “Returning Home? NATO and European Security: Speech by Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, delivered at RUSI's NATO Summit Conference”, Royal United Services Institute, September 03, 2014, accessed October 07, 2014, https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E53FCA748B8545/info:public/infoID:E540702F09C809/.
5. Hugh Bayley MP: “NATO’s Wales Consensus – a view from the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’’, European Leadership Network, September, 15, 2014, accessed October 07, 2014, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/natos-wales-consensus--a-view-from-the-president-of-the-nato-parliamentary-assembly_1897.html.
6. A "spearhead" force of up to 5,000 troops should eventually be deployable "anywhere in the world" within a couple of days, instead of up to several weeks now, to deter an aggressor in a crisis. While that fell short of the permanent presence of NATO troops that Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania wanted, they declared themselves satisfied, especially after U.S. President Barack Obama visited Tallinn on the eve of the summit to underline Washington's commitment to defend the Baltic States. Paul Taylor and Adrian Croft: “Analysis – NATO’s new missions won't solve Ukraine, Iraq crises,” Reuters, September 07, 2014, accessed October 08, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-analysis-idUKKBN0H20FA20140907.
7. Andrew Foxall: ‘‘A Fateful Summit: The Future of NATO’s Relationship with Russia’, Russia Studies Centre Policy Paper No. 1, September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/A-Fateful-Summit-The-Future-of-NATOs-Relationship-with-Russia.pdf, 1.
8. Atlantische Commissie: “The NATO Summit 2014: What to Expect in Wales?”, February 20, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.atlcom.nl/upload/Report_NATO_Summit_meeting_20-02-14.pdf.
9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO OTAN, “Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)”, Fact Sheet, September 2014, accessed October 11, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-Factsheet-AGS_en.pdf.
10. General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff: “Returning Home? NATO and European Security”, Royal United Services Institute, September 3, 2014, accessed October 08, 2014, https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E53FCA748B8545/info:public/infoID:E54070D2F34101/#.VAcTC1ZabwI.
11. Mesut Casin : ‘’ NATO Summit and New Road Maps of the Alliance’’, Hazar Strateji Enstititüsü.
12. Adrian Croft and Kylie Maclellan: “NATO Chief, at Summit, says Russia Attacking Ukraine,” Reuters, September 04, 2014, accessed October 08, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-nato-summit-ukraine-idUSKBN0GY2R420140904.
13.. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Article 1st of Wales Summit Declaration”, September, 05, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
14. In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, the paragraphs between 16 and 30 are on the recent events in Ukraine.
15. http://www.dw.de/ukraine-is-to-dominate-agenda-as-nato-summit-opens/a-17899409.
16. “NATO Summit: Alliance ‘stands with Ukraine,” BBC, September 04, 2014, accessed October 05, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29056870.
17. Foxall, “A Fateful Summit: The Future of NATO’s Relationship with Russia,” 2.
18. Foxall, “A Fateful Summit: The Future of NATO’s Relationship with Russia,” 6.
19. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO OTAN, “NATO-Ukraine relations: The background”, Media Backgrounder, September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-Backgrounder_NATO-Ukraine_en.pdf.
20.“NATO Summit Concludes: Wales Declaration Condemns Russian Annexation of Crimea,” September 07, 2014, http://currentgyan.com/nato-summit-concludes-wales-declaration-condemns-russian-annexation-crimea/.
21. Stephen Fidler: “As Leaders Meet for NATO Summit, Alliance Says Russian Troops Still Active in Ukraine”, The Wall Street Journal, September 04, 2014, October 09, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/nato-says-russian-troops-still-active-in-ukraine-1409823664.
22. “Obama Meets Ukraine Leader in Show of Solidarity”, CBS News, September 04, 2014, October 09, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-meets-ukraine-president-petro-poroshenko-at-nato-summit-in-wales/.
23. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference’, September 05, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/remarks-president-obama-nato-summit-press-conference.
24. James Carden: ‘’ The 2014 NATO Summit: Giving War a Chance’’, The Nation, 8 September 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/181521/2014-nato-summit-giving-war-chance#.
25. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO OTAN, “Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission”, Press Release (2014) 124, issued on 04 September 2014, last updated: 04 September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm.
26. In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, the paragraphs between 33 and 38 are on the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
27. Devin Dwyer: “Rooting out a cancer like ISIL will not be quick or easy, but I’m confident that we can and we will, working closely with our allies and our partners,” Obama said. “4 Things to Watch as Obama Heads to Estonia, NATO Summit in Wales, ABC News, September 02, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/09/4-things-to-watch-as-obama-heads-to-estonia-nato-summit-in-wales/.
28. “NATO Members Prepared to Join Forces against ISIL”, The National World, September 06, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/world/uk/nato-members-prepared-to-join-forces-against-isil.
29. In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, the paragraphs 41,42,43 and 44 are regarding the recent situation in Afghanistan.
30. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO OTAN, “NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan After 2014”, Media Backgrounder, September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-Backgrounder-Afghanistan_en.pdf and also please see NATO OTAN, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures”, September 3, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140903-ISAF-Placemat-final.pdf
31. The Government of United Kingdom, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales from 4 to 5 September 2014, “Article 43”, accessed October 09, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351406/Wales_Summit_Declaration.pdf.
32. NATO decided to support an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and inclusive peace process, as stated at the 2011 Bonn Conference and at the Chicago Summit in 2012. They also decided to support Afghanistan in making further progress towards becoming a stable, sovereign, democratic and united country, where rule of law and good governance prevail.• They emphasized the particular importance of strengthening efforts to implement the rights of women, need for the protection of children from armed conflict and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, and to include women fully in political, peace and reconciliation processes.
33. In the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration, the paragraphs 14 and 15 are regarding the declining defense budgets of NATO member countries.
34. “Turkey May Play Quiet Role In US Coalition Against ISIS”, Reuters , 5 September, 2014. 35. Mesut Casin, ibid. 36. “Turkey Opens its Bases for US and Coalition Forces in Fight Against ISIS”, The Guardian, 13 October, 2014.
REFERENCES
1. Atlantische Commissie, “The NATO Summit 2014: What to Expect in Wales?”, February 20, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.atlcom.nl/upload/Report_NATO_Summit_meeting_20-02-14.pdf, 1-14.
2. Bayley, Hugh MP. “NATO’s Wales Consensus – a view from the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’’, European Leadership Network, September, 15, 2014, accessed October 07, 2014, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/natos-wales-consensus--a-view-from-the-president-of-the-nato-parliamentary-assembly_1897.html.
3. Belkin, Paul. “NATO’s Wales Summit: Expected Outcomes and Key Challenges”, Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2014, accessed September 07, 2014, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43698.pdf, 1-13.
4. Croft, Adrian and Maclellan, Kylie. “NATO Chief, at Summit, says Russia Attacking Ukraine,” Reuters, September 04, 2014, accessed October 08, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/04/us-nato-summit-ukraine-idUSKBN0GY2R420140904.
5. Dwyer, Devin. “Rooting out a cancer like ISIL will not be quick or easy, but I’m confident that we can and we will, working closely with our allies and our partners,” Obama said. “4 Things to Watch as Obama Heads to Estonia, NATO Summit in Wales, ABC News, September 02, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/09/4-things-to-watch-as-obama-heads-to-estonia-nato-summit-in-wales/.
6. Fidler, Stephen. “As Leaders Meet for NATO Summit, Alliance Says Russian Troops Still Active in Ukraine”, The Wall Street Journal, September 04, 2014, October 09, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/nato-says-russian-troops-still-active-in-ukraine-1409823664.
7. Foxall, Andrew. “A Fateful Summit: The Future of NATO’s Relationship with Russia,” Russia Studies Centre Policy Paper No. 1, September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/A-Fateful-Summit-The-Future-of-NATOs-Relationship-with-Russia.pdf, 1-15.
8. General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of the Defence Staff: “Returning Home? NATO and European Security”, Royal United Services Institute, September 3, 2014, accessed October 08, 2014,https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E53FCA748B8545/info:public/infoID:E54070D2F34101/#.VAcTC1ZabwI.
9. “NATO Members Prepared to Join Forces against ISIL”, The National World, September 06, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.thenational.ae/world/uk/nato-members-prepared-to-join-forces-against-isil.
10. “NATO Summit: Alliance ‘stands with Ukraine,” BBC, September 04, 2014, accessed October 05, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29056870.
11. NATO Summit Concludes: Wales Declaration Condemns Russian Annexation of Crimea,” September 07, 2014, http://currentgyan.com/nato-summit-concludes-wales-declaration-condemns-russian-annexation-crimea/.
12. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO OTAN. “Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS)”, Fact Sheet, September 2014, accessed October 11, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-Factsheet-AGS_en.pdf.
13. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Article 1st of Wales Summit Declaration”, September, 05, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
14. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO OTAN, “NATO-Ukraine relations: The background”, Media Backgrounder, September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-Backgrounder_NATO-Ukraine_en.pdf.
15. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO OTAN. “Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission”, Press Release (2014) 124, issued on 04 September 2014, last updated: 04 September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112695.htm.
16. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO OTAN, “NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan After 2014”, Media Backgrounder, September 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140901-Backgrounder-Afghanistan_en.pdf.
17. NATO OTAN. “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures”, September 3, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_09/20140901_140903-ISAF-Placemat-final.pdf.
18. “Obama Meets Ukraine Leader in Show of Solidarity”, CBS News, September 04, 2014, October 09, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-meets-ukraine-president-petro-poroshenko-at-nato-summit-in-wales/.
19. Taylor Paul and Croft, Adrian. “Analysis – NATO’s new missions won't solve Ukraine, Iraq crises,” Reuters, September 07, 2014, accessed October 08, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/07/uk-ukraine-crisis-nato-analysis-idUKKBN0H20FA20140907.
20. The Government of United Kingdom, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales from 4 to 5 September 2014, “Article 43”, accessed October 09, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351406/Wales_Summit_Declaration.pdf.
21. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference’, September 05, 2014, accessed October 09, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/remarks-president-obama-nato-summit-press-conference.
22. UK Defence Secretary: Michael Fallon, “Returning Home? NATO and European Security: Speech by Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, delivered at RUSI's NATO Summit Conference”, Royal United Services Institute, September 03, 2014, accessed October 07, 2014, https://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E53FCA748B8545/info:public/infoID:E540702F09C809.
23. “Ukraine 'IS' to dominate agenda as NATO summit opens,” Deutsche Welle, September 04, 2014, accessed September 07, 2014, http://www.dw.de/ukraine-is-to-dominate-agenda-as-nato-summit-opens/a-17899409.
Note: “The views expressed in this blog are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the Institute's editorial policy.”
HomeDOCUMENTSCommittee
Reports2011 Annual
Session175 DSC 11 E rev. 1 FINAL - TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE
SECURITY EFFORT
175
DSC 11 E rev. 1 FINAL- TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: ASSESSING THE SECURITY EFFORT
|
SVEN
MIKSER (ESTONIA), GENERAL RAPPORTEUR
|
|
I.
INTRODUCTION
II.
REVIEWING THE CAMPAIGN: RESOURCES AND STRATEGY
III.
REGIONAL PROGRESS REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
IV.
GENERAL CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT
V.
NATO TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
VI.
THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE INITIATIVE
VII.
TARGETING THE ENEMY’S LEADERSHIP
VIII.
THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES
IX.
COUNTER-NARCOTIC EFFORTS
X.
CONCLUSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
1.
At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit NATO member states clearly re-affirmed
their enduring long term commitment to a sovereign, independent, democratic,
secure and stable Afghanistan. Members pledged their commitment to the
Afghan people and to an Afghanistan that will never again be a safe haven for
terrorists and terrorism. The Lisbon Summit Declaration underlined that
the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
mission in Afghanistan ‘remains the Alliance’s key priority’, and welcomed
the important progress that had been made to date. Strategically, the
declaration bound the future security of the Alliance with the future
security of Afghanistan by asserting ‘Afghanistan’s security is directly
linked to our own security’, whilst welcoming the valuable and increased
contributions made by ISAF partners.1
2. The ISAF mission has entered a new phase of transition, or ‘Inteqal’ in Dari. Within the framework of Afghan sovereignty, the objectives of the Inteqal framework are ‘to strengthen Afghan ownership and leadership across all functions of government and throughout the territory of Afghanistan’.2 This phase has already seen the process of transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership in seven provinces and districts in 2011, constituting 21% of the Afghan population.3
3.
NATO’s senior leadership has been adamant that transitions will be based on
conditions on the ground rather than driven by any political calendar or
deadline, following joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision.
Looking toward the end of 2014, member states expressed their intent that
Afghan forces will assume full responsibility for security across the whole
of Afghanistan. After transition, NATO forces are slated to remain in a
supporting role.4
4.
The killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has fed into a reassessment in
many NATO capitals regarding how rapidly withdrawals from Afghanistan could
and should occur. The June 2011 speech by US President Obama, in
which he announced the phased withdrawal of previously ‘surged’ US troops, has
increased focus on the transition strategy and the ability of the Afghans to
provide their own security and governance within the 2014 timeframe. It
has also prompted other NATO member states to announce their own
withdrawal/end of combat mission dates. It should be noted that, for
all the strategic and political repercussions of bin Laden’s death, the event
has had little impact on day to day operations in Afghanistan itself.
5.
This discussion also occurs in the context of continued insecurity in Afghanistan,
as 2010 was the most lethal year for both Afghan civilians and NATO personnel
and the first six months of 2011 have been the most lethal for Afghan
civilians since this conflict began.5 Recent data collected by the
Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) suggests that total insurgent attacks
between January and March 2011 have soared 51% higher than last year.
The increase in the number of attacks between seasons is also higher than the
same period in 2010. March 2011 saw 1,102 attacks, averaging 35 per
day, even surpassing the August 2009 peak surrounding the Presidential
elections.6 The deliberate targeting by the insurgency of high-profile
Afghan officials involved in the transition process also presents a
significant challenge.
6.
Given these developments, this report, prepared for the NATO Parliamentary
Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee, differs significantly from a
previous draft presented to the Committee in May. It is intended to
assess, insofar as possible given the resources at our disposal, the
evolution of the security situation in Afghanistan. It is deliberately
limited in scope in that reports by the other Committees of the Assembly are
treating other critical areas such as governance, development, and the role
of neighbouring countries.
7.
This report will cover the issues that most clearly occupy the realm of
security. Thus the elements of ISAF strategy that are covered include:
the ongoing military operations and their impact on the enemy and on the
establishment of zones of stability; efforts to continue to develop the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), principally through the NATO Training
Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), as well as standing up local security forces;
the ongoing controversy of the role of private security companies; and
efforts to address the narcotics problem.
8.
One key judgment should be made clear at the outset: the results of the surge
of troops that flowed into Afghanistan between December 2009 and November
2010 remain open to interpretation. While important security gains have
indubitably been made in the South and Southwest of the country, and despite
the impressive progress of the Afghan security forces, insecurity remains
pervasive enough to suggest that sustained effort will remain necessary if
gains are to be consolidated. To put it more succinctly, the hard-won
progress gained by international forces on behalf of the Afghan people and
our own populations is real; but it remains fragile.
II. REVIEWING THE CAMPAIGN: RESOURCES AND STRATEGY
9.
In 2010-2011, the Afghanistan campaign was waged largely based on
counter-insurgency strategy (COIN). Buoyed by a ‘surge’ of more than
30,000 troops completed in November 2010, ISAF and ANSF forces launched
combat operations to clear and hold more locations across Afghanistan.
Largely as a result of these operations, and as expected by military
planners7, there was an upsurge in violence in 2010 as the more numerous
international forces spread into more areas and thus came more frequently into
direct contact with insurgents.8 An outline of the strategic plan
facilitated by these operations is found below; the sections which follow
afterwards provide an overview of the locations of major ISAF/ANSF operations
and an assessment of the current security situation in these areas.
10.
The ISAF campaign strategy focuses on three main efforts:9
* To gain the initiative by protecting the population in densely populated areas where the insurgency has had significant influence; * To separate insurgency influence from the populace and support Afghan Government sub-national structures to establish rule of law and deliver basic services; and * To implement population security measures that connect contiguous economic corridors, foster community development and generate employment opportunities.
11.
Central to this COIN strategy is the conditions-based transition of security
responsibility to ANSF. In September 2010, the Joint Afghan-NATO
Inteqal Board (JANIB) met for the first time to discuss transition.10
In March 2011, the first output from the JANIB outlined the prospects for
beginning transition in some areas this year.11 This was a joint
agreement between NATO and the Afghan leadership, involving the respective
chains of command, with the final decision made by President Karzai.
General Petraeus, former COMISAF, highlighted that “this is a process, not a
single event” and that there are various stages to successful
transition.12
12.
As of June 2011, there were approximately 90,000 US Forces and approximately
42,381 international forces in Afghanistan.13 The 30,000 US personnel
increase that arrived in 2010 was comprised of three separate force packages,
each built to provide specific capabilities essential to achieving the main
goals of the campaign plan, particularly in Regional Command
South (RCSouth) and Regional Command East (RC-East). The US force
surge was completed in November 2010. Moreover, NATO welcomed force
pledges from 40 countries in a range of capabilities including operations,
tactics, and training. ISAF received pledges of 9,700 additional
personnel from NATO and non-NATO partners since President’s Obama’s December
2009 speech and General Petraeus said that, overall, ISAF had the inputs
right.14
13.
The ISAF concept of operations is depicted in Figure 1. The main
operational effort remains focused on the Central Helmand River Valley, where
comprehensive civil-military efforts are aimed at bringing improved
governance, development and security to the more than 500,000 Afghans living
in these six districts.
III. REGIONAL PROGRESS REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 14. Regional Command East (RC-East) RC-East consists of 14 provinces: Bamyan, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Panjshir, Parwan, and Wardak. This command spans nearly 120,000 square kilometres. It is the most heavily populated of the five Regional Commands in Afghanistan, with roughly seven to ten million residents.16 Major operations have strived to disrupt insurgent activity there. RC-East operations improved security conditions for the September 2010 parliamentary elections and protected the southern approaches to Kabul City in the Wardak and Logar provinces. Tactical gains in RC-East are translating into strategically significant progress, with two provinces, Bamiyan and Panjshir, and one provincial capital, Mehta Lam, meeting the security, governance and development requirements sufficient for transition to have begun in July. There has also been an 18% reduction in the most common form of insurgent attack in this area. The programme to enable local forces to provide security known as the Afghan Local Police (ALP) programme (detailed in Section VI) has also expanded into 13 districts.17 Figures from November 2010 suggested RC-East forces conducted about 95% of their operations partnered with ANSF at that time, with ANSF in the lead in approximately 18% of those operations.18
15.
RC- East assessment
In Nangarhar, Kunar, and Laghman provinces, RC-East emphasised improved Afghan government service delivery, civil training programmes, and stability projects in key population centres. A late 2010 survey showed that 50% of Afghans in the East perceived that overall conditions were improving, one of the highest percentages in Afghanistan.19 However, Kunar province, which directly borders Pakistan, is a known haven for al-Qaeda and the Taliban; and alQaeda affiliated commanders are believed to be responsible for a spate of suicide bombings and kidnappings.20 The outlook in Laghman and Nangarhar provinces is better, and the military have transitioned Langhman’s capital already.21 Coupled with the transfer of Bamiyan and Panjshir provinces, this will allow “40% of the population in Regional Command-East (to be) under Afghan control” according to the commander of US Forces in the region.22 Moreover, there has been considerable military progress, with 70% of the Taliban leadership in this area of operations thought to have been captured or killed in 2010. However, rifts between locals and the government continue to impede progress on governance.23
16.
Regional Command – South (RC-South)
RC-South officially split into RC-South and RC-SouthWest in June 2010 to allow for greater command and control over what was previously a large and very active area of operations. This improvement in unity of command and effort has ensured a more rational and effective approach to partnered counterinsurgency in both Helmand and Kandahar provinces. RC-South now includes the provinces of Daykundi, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul. These have a combined population of about two million inhabitants and covers approximately 155,000km2.24 Operations in the vicinity of Kandahar City, Afghanistan’s second largest city, have been the major RC-South effort in support of operation Hamkari. Since Kandahar City represents a critical population hub for cultural, commercial, and institutional activities in the south, RC-South is modelling operations on Regional Command-Capital (RC-Capital)’s successes in Kabul. During late 2010 and early 2011 RC-South continued to shift its focus from military operations against the insurgency to bolstering Afghan governance.25 RC-South conducts 100% of its operations partnered with ANSF, of which 44% are ANSF-led.26
17.
RC-South assessment
There was heavy fighting and stiff resistance as NATO forces surged into the traditional Taliban heartland of Kandahar city and its environs in autumn 2010.27 Following Operation Hamkari in late 2010, Afghan and coalition partners have engaged in operations to consolidate and expand areas where hard earned security gains were made. In particular, the ANSF have made important strides in their ability to plan and execute operations on their own.28 Highway One, important for trade and communications, is now relatively secure.29 Despite this, more time will be needed to gauge the success of Hamkari, as well as the roll out of the local security initiative called the Afghan Local Police in several locations. There have been some positive gains in the Kandahari’s perception of improving living conditions and declining Taliban activity.30
18.
However, a recent spate of assassinations, suicide bombings and attacks has
raised concerns about a change of tactics amongst insurgents in this area,
whose conventional capabilities have been significantly weakened by ISAF
efforts.31 The victims of these targeted attacks have included
President Karazai’s brother, Ahmed Wali, who was the key power broker in
Kandahar city and was reportedly assisting the allies with their efforts to
negotiate a political settlement with the Taliban.32
19.
Regional Command – Southwest (RC-Southwest)
ISAF established RC-Southwest in June 2010. The new headquarters assumed responsibility for former portions of RC-South areas and now controls operations in Helmand, Nimruz and parts of Farah provinces. These have a combined population of approximately 1,3 million and combined area of about 100,000 square kilometres.33 This new command and control architecture also enabled RCSouthwest forces to support each other in remote areas in Helmand and to the west and south, and allows expanding groupings of “cleared-held-built” districts to connect along Highway One from west to east.
20.
The main effort for RC-Southwest, and indeed ISAF, still remains operation
Moshtarak in the Central Helmand River Valley. This operation has sought to
extend the authority of the Afghan Government to the previously
ungoverned Nad-e-Ali District, including the town of Marjah. Operations
were conducted in 2010-2011 to clear areas, capture and kill insurgents and
support development and legitimate governance in this area. Counter
Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) operations were also conducted in
northern Helmand. RC-Southwest implemented measures to counter the
movement of illicit materials and drugs with interdiction operations
resulting in the destruction of illicit drugs valued at approximately US$135
million. RC-Southwest partners ANSF on approximately 77% of all its
operations, of which 8% had Afghan Forces in the lead.34
21.
RC-Southwest assessment
The overall security situation in RC-Southwest was assessed as “good” by General Richard Mills, Commander RC-Southwest in February 2011.35 The critical provinces of Helmand and Nimruz have clearly seen significant security improvements since the end of the 2010 fighting season.36 The combined forces under RC-Southwest have reduced previous insurgent safe havens in the Central Helmand River Valley. Despite a difficult start, the high-profile operation Moshtarak has yielded definite improvements in the security situation around the towns of Garmsir, Nawa, Nad-e-Ali and Marjah.37 The RC-Southwest commander has stated that the insurgency in these areas has “suffered defeat after defeat on the battlefield" and that he “believe(s) they have been beaten".38 In other areas such as Sangin, despite some improvements, the security situation remains poor.39 One of the success stories of 2010 is that general approval ratings for NATO have advanced sharply in Helmand during the year, reflective of its increased commitment to the province.40 In the Lower Helmand River Valley there have been increasing signs of improved commercial activity, coupled with increased delivery of aid via District Delivery Plans. Security gains, paralleled by improvements in governance and development have allowed the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, to transition in 2011.41 However, despite a relatively strong and able Helmand Governor, sustained development of governance and anti-corruption initiatives in Helmand remain weak and inconsistent.
22.
Regional Command West – (RC-West)
RC-West comprises four provinces: Herat, Farah, Badghis and Ghor. RC-West population is approximately 3,156,000 people. RC-W borders Iran and has an area of 160,319 km2.42 RC-West operations focused on consolidating the security gains made during the winter campaign, as well as the expansion of security along key areas related to the future construction of Highway One. Security conditions in the major cities of Bala Murghab, Qala-e-Naw, Herat and Farah have improved, and Herat city began transition in July.43 RC-West forces execute 67% of their operations partnered with ANSF; 8% of these operations see ANSF in the lead.44
23.
Regional Command – North (RC-North)
RC-North comprises nine provinces: Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, Balkh, Samangan, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul and Faryab. It shares borders with Pakistan, Tajikistan, China and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. RC-North spans an area of 162,151 km2 and has a population of 6,751,000 people.45 RC-North operations during 2010 focused on “shape-hold-build” in key terrain districts in Baghlan province. The RC-North main effort is to ensure Afghan freedom of movement, disrupt insurgent commanders, and support local and regional governance and development. Improving security to allow for the construction of the final section of Highway One remains a priority.46 RC-North conducts 75% of its operations in partnership with ANSF units, 25% of those operations are led by the ANSF.47 24. RC-West and RC-North assessment As in other areas in Afghanistan, recent attacks on high-profile Afghan officials have had quite significant impacts on security in these provinces.48 Of particular note is the May 2011 attack that killed northern Afghanistan’s well-known police chief General Daud and two German soldiers, and wounded General Markus Kneip, the ISAF commander for northern Afghanistan..49 Such attacks underline the challenges of protecting prominent administration officials and highlight the insurgency’s increased use of assassinations to destabilise transition. In RC-West, Farah and Badghis provinces remain areas of insurgent activity, despite gains in 2010.50
25.
Commanders report that RC-North has traditionally been among the most secure
in the country51 and progress has been made in the last 12 months.
Unfortunately, a December 2010 poll found that northern Afghans believed
their living conditions were worsening markedly and Taliban activity was
increasing.52 Commanders were concerned about losing momentum and
preventing a return of the insurgency to these cleared areas during
spring/summer 2011.53 The biggest remaining challenges are to ensure
that recent gains are sustained and expanded in the Baghlan-Kunduz corridor,
a vital effort to encourage the local population to support the government
and security forces.54
26.
Regional Command – Capital (RC-Capital)
RC-Capital comprises Kabul city and fourteen districts of Kabul province. It has an area of 4,462 square kilometres and the province’s population is 3,450,000.55 RC-Capital continued to set the security standard for the rest of Afghanistan. Afghans in RC-Capital increasingly have growing confidence in the ability of the Afghan Government and the ANSF to sustain a relatively secure environment for the people of the area. RC-Capital conducts 100% of its operations partnered with ANSF, who lead operations in all but one district.56
27.
RC-Capital assessment
The combined ANSF effort in Kabul performed notably well in supporting the April 2010 Peace Jirga, the July 2010 International Kabul Conference, and the September 2010 Parliamentary elections. Although insurgents did attempt attacks against these venues, security at these events was generally deemed a success. Operations in Kabul province are joint Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) operations and involve inter-departmental and security service planning and co-ordination. ISAF and Coalition shaping operations help to disrupt and interdict insurgent network planning and attack threats against the capital. Recently, and mirroring trends in other parts of Afghanistan, there has been an increase in bombings and attacks in Kabul, indicating a change in insurgent tactics to targeting key officials in the transition process. Of special note was the assassination of President Karzai’s close associate and ally, Jan Mohammed Khan, in Kabul in July.57 IV. GENERAL CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT
28.
Figure 2 shows the regional command structure of the ISAF operation in
relation to the Afghan provinces and usefully portrays the evolution of the
security situation in these RC’s. As indicated, since the
implementation of the surge, overall progress in improving the wider security
situation in Afghanistan has been slow. Figure 2 also shows how
insecure RCs South and Southwest remain despite the improvements over the
last year. While there have been localised tactical successes in delivering
security, as yet these have failed to deliver strategic results.59
29.
There remain significant and widespread challenges to both security and
governance in many areas. The insurgency continues to retain momentum
in certain areas and is targeting high profile non-military targets, such as
hospitals, hotels and high level officials.60 Violence between March
and September 2010 was at its highest ever rate with insurgent attacks
increasing nearly 55% over the previous quarter and by 65% compared to the
third quarter of 2009.61 There have also been over 25 attacks by ANSF
or ANSF impersonators on NATO soldiers and Afghan officials over the last two
years.62
30.
Military planners have long suggested that the insurgency’s activity in
summer 2011 would be an indicator of its continuing capability.63
Unfortunately, early evidence seems to indicate that such attacks have
continued at an alarming rate throughout the summer fighting season.
May 2011 was one of the most violent months on record, with 1,571 insurgent
attacks launched. June 2011 showed only a 2% reduction on this
figure.64 May was also the deadliest month for Afghan civilians on
record, with 368 being killed according to the United Nations (of these, 82%
of the casualties were caused by the insurgency and 12% by NATO
forces).65
V. NATO TRAINING MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
31.
As outlined in last year’s Defence and Security Committee General Report on
‘Preparing the Afghan National Security Forces for Transition’, progress with
the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) was the ISAF success story
of 2010. The following paragraphs provide an update on this progress,
on targets for 2011, and outline the remaining challenges for the training
mission.
32.
As of March 2011, ANSF numbers sat at almost 285,000, representing Afghan
army strength of 159,363 and Afghan National Police at over 125,589.
The 92,000 more Afghan soldiers and police represents an over 42% expansion
of the ANSF between November 2009 and March 2011, including an over 57% increase
in the size of the ANA alone over during this period. It is
currently projected that by October 2011 total ANSF numbers will reach
305,000.66 This will be facilitated by the fact that 58,000 police and
soldiers are in training everyday at present. As of July 2011, evidence
suggests that ANSF numbers will be increased to around 352,000 by summer
2012.67
33.
There has also been good progress in improving the quality of the ANSF.
Literacy is critical for developing leaders and sustaining equipment.
Over the last year there has been a successful drive to increase literacy in
the ANSF. In 2008 literacy rates were 14%; currently 85% of ANSF
recruits now have basic literacy when leaving training.68 Between March
2010 and March 2011 there has been a 136% increase in ANSF personnel in
literacy training.69 Moreover, 80% of the police and 95% of the army
now receive their pay via electronic funds transfer, greatly reducing the
opportunities for corruption, and both the police and army are now paid a
living wage that meets or exceeds the national standard of living.
34.
Focus has also been placed on properly equipping the ANSF. US$7,7
billion has been invested in Afghan equipment since November 2009. Army
and police forces are now equipped with quality weapons, tactical gear and
technical equipment, including radios, biometric devices and protective
wear. All ANSF boots and uniforms are now made in Afghanistan, creating
indigenous industrial capability. With a further US$4,9 billion to be
spent on equipment, officials suggest that advances in literacy should
overlap to ensure correct stewardship of equipment and protection of this
investment.70
35.
Progress has also been made in improving the trainer-recruit ratio.
NTM-A is now at 73% of manning requirements, up from 25% one year ago.
ANA instructor ratios in basic training have jumped from 1:79 to 1:29 during
this period. Initiatives have also been introduced to improve the
quality of life of the ANSF, such as better food, rotation of operational
units and individual leave packages. Such initiatives help improve
manpower figures by attracting new recruits and retaining those in the
forces, as does greater emphasis on personnel accountability within the
ANA. At present, 74% of those completing their two-year contracts sign
up for further service.71 NATO officials have consistently urged
nations whose combat forces are relieved by the transition process to
re-invest their efforts by allocating their resources to the training
mission. NTM-A recently warned a visiting Assembly delegation of a
prospective shortfall of 470 trainers in March 2012, and a continuing
shortfall of 450 Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams.
36.
“The NATO Air Training Command-Afghanistan (NATC-A) is an NTM-A/CSTC-A
organisation that builds air power in Afghanistan along four lines of
operation: aircraft build; airmen build; infrastructure build; and
operational capability. The institutional development of the Afghan Air Force
(AAF) integrates these four lines of operation by building a professional,
self-sustaining institution”. In January 2011 the AAF had 56 aircraft,
or approximately 38% of the planned build of 146 aircraft. Personnel
strength was approximately 4,728 airmen in March 2011. This total increased
by 1,239 personnel over the March 2010 strength of 3,389 personnel, a gain of
almost 40%.72
37.
The NTM-A realises that growth alone will not set the conditions for
irreversible transition. It has therefore set out its main priority for
2011 as training Afghan trainers and instructors. The development of
quality Afghan trainers and instructors, who are capable of leading and
training their force and eventually assuming responsibility for training are
the essential building block for institutional self reliance and eventual
transition. The development of a quality train-the-trainer system in
2011 will underpin efforts to create a self generating and self sustaining
ANSF.73
38.
The other four critical areas to be developed in 2011 are: accelerated leader
development, continued building of literacy and vocational skills,
inculcation of an ethos of stewardship and the development of enduring
institutions, systems and enablers. To rapidly overcome leadership
shortfalls in the ANA and ANP, and to create professional Non-Commissioned
Officers and Officers, new officer candidate schools will come on stream in
spring 2011 to train both ANSF branches’ new leaders. In literacy, the
NTM-A aims to have 100,000 ANSF in training by fall 2011 and the focus is now
on continuing literacy development and building of vocational skills such as
logistics, communications and engineering, amongst others. The
inculcation of good stewardship within the ANSF involves imbuing the
importance of responsibility, accountability and maintenance at all levels of
training and education. Finally, security institution capacity building
will underpin and support progress made within ANSF through developing
strategic planning, budgeting and resourcing, and improving the national
level systems necessary to sustain the Afghan security forces.74
39.
Attrition is probably the most fundamental obstacle to the NTM-A
mission. In July and August 2010, consistent with the seasonal violence
trends, attrition rates increased above the monthly average, to 3% and 2,4%,
respectively. As of May 2011 they were still too high, at 2,3%, or
about 30% a year.75 If the levels of attrition seen throughout the last
five months continue, it is assessed there is a ‘significant risk’ to the ANA
growth target for October 2011.76 Despite the initiatives outlined
above, progress is slow and attrition has not declined fast enough, but it
has trended downward of late. Attrition needs to be steady below 2% for
the ANA to reach its manpower targets. The ANP has an acceptable annual
attrition rate of 18% as of June 2011.77
40.
While careful attention is being paid to the ethnic composition of the ANA in
particular, success in recruiting southern Pashtuns has so far proved
elusive. Forty four per cent of the population of Afghanistan are
Pashtuns, a figure reflected in the composition of the army. However,
only 3% of soldiers are southern Pashtuns. With more targeted
recruitment and 2010’s gains in central Helmand, there have been some
improvements in the recruitment of southern Pashtuns, but more needs to be
done to ensure ethnic balance. Of note, in March 2011, 201 southern
Pashtuns were recruited into the ANA, a slight decrease from February, and
representing 80% of the monthly target.78 The ethnic make-up of the
ANSF has serious implications not only for its credibility across the whole
of Afghanistan, but also in determining where its loyalty lies.
Moreover, retirement schemes for senior officers have been introduced to help
enable more professional and less patriarchal army leaders to reach senior
positions.
41.
The long term sustainability of the NTM-A and the ANSF post-transition is
another concern. Currently, the NTM-A receives over US$1 billion per
month from the United States of America and US$400 million from the NATO
Alliance. However, when seen against total expenditure in Afghanistan
of over US$110 billion per annum, the NTM-A cost tag is relatively
small. Commander NTM-A also predicts that a full strength ANSF will
cost between US$6-8 billion per annum to sustain post transition. Given
the fact that Afghan annual GDP is estimated at US$15,51 billion,79 there are
obvious concerns about the ability of the Afghans to sustain the ANSF without
massive continued economic support from NATO member states post-transition.
VI. THE AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE INITIATIVE
42.
In September 2010 the Afghan Local Police Initiative replaced other various
indigenous local Afghan security programmes, most the Afghan Public
Protection Force.80 This had been a relatively successful trial
programme using local militias to provide security in Wardak province.
The ALP Initiative is a temporary (two to five year) village-focused
programme that complements COIN efforts and Village Stability Operations by
targeting selected areas with limited to no ANSF presence to shape conditions
for improved security, governance, and development. Thus, the ALP
supports ISAF efforts by further expanding and extending security and
stability through village stability operations in remote areas. The Afghan
Ministry of Interior subsequently identified 68 locations for ALP elements of
250-350 personnel and stood up the first eight sites in September 2010.81
43.
The ALP Initiative allows for transition of its eligible personnel to regular
ANSF or other forms of employment. Therefore, the Initiative does not
detract from ANSF growth, but helps close a gap in security coverage.
ALP personnel trained and organised into village watch teams and supported by
ISAF Special Operations Forces, will serve as an early warning and initial
village defence element against insurgent activity. The ALP does not
count toward approved ANP endstrength. As of April 2011, there were 34
validated/operational districts, 29 districts pending validation, and 14
pending approval for ALP elements. The projected total number of ALP is
foreseen to be in the region of 30,000.82
44.
At present, more time is needed to accurately assess the viability and
effectiveness of the ALP Initiative. NATO has stated that numerous
control measures will be implemented to mitigate Afghan Government concerns
that this effort does not reconstitute the warlords’ militias that once
terrorized Afghanistan, exacerbate tribal or ethnic imbalances, or undermine
the authority of the state. However, recent anecdotal evidence suggests
that this is indeed happening in the some areas where ALP forces have been
rolled out, and that locals often believe they are no better than the
Taliban.83 Ultimately, the Initiative’s reliance on a tribal strategy
can only succeed as part of a nation-wide Afghan ownership of security and it
must be seen in this context.84
VII. TARGETING THE ENEMY’S LEADERSHIP
45.
There is growing evidence that the 2010 campaign waged across Afghanistan
against mid and top level insurgent commanders has largely been
successful. As these operations have been conducted by a combination of
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional ground forces, much data
remains classified. However, according to military commanders, 2010 has
been the insurgency’s worst year since 2001-2002. Enabled by good
intelligence, the tempo of SOF and ground force operations have been greatly
increased over the last year. In 2010, a tripling in the number of
raids resulted in the killing of more than 1,200 insurgents, including some
300 thought to hold leadership roles, according to ISAF.85 There were
1,600 ISAF SOF operations launched in the first three months of 2011, an
average of 18 a night, and almost 3,000 insurgents were captured or killed in
these raids.86 It appears these operations have had a significant
impact on insurgent capability. General Petraeus has stated that “the
momentum of the Taliban has been halted in much of the country and reversed
in some important areas.”87
46.
In southern Afghanistan, fighters have been eliminated in “industrial
numbers” convincing both ISAF and indigenous Afghan officials “that the
initiative has really shifted.”88 This increased focus on killing or
capturing mid-level insurgent commanders and degrading insurgent groups also
appears to have borne results in RC-Southwest and RC-East.89 Although
militarily confident, officials still caution that a failure in Afghan
governance could fracture these extensive gains. The biggest point of
potential failure is if the Kabul Government stunts governance at the
periphery. Thus, lack of credible local governance alternatives to the
insurgency is still hampering the reintegration programme in many areas.
47.
Keeping extended pressure on the insurgency is a key tenet of the COIN
strategy which seeks to separate reconcilable fighters from the
hardliners. In June 2010 a Peace Jirga gave President Karzai the
mandate to pursue peace negotiations to end the conflict.
Re-conciliation and re-integration efforts have been undertaken by the
Afghanistan Peace and ReIntegration Programme, steered by a
national-level High Peace Council. While there is some evidence to
suggest that these efforts have delivered local successes, to date there has
been only “modest” momentum in persuading insurgent fighters to quit and
re-integrate, according to General Petraeus.90
48.
The insurgency consists of a number of actors. The Haqqani Network is a
strong, triballybased group led by Sarajudin Haqqani in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and eastern Afghanistan. Traditionally
considered a client of Pakistan’s intelligence services, and host to
al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network is the most ideologically committed group
facing ISAF forces in Afghanistan. They also remain ideologically close
to al-Qaeda and therefore represent the largest insurgent group least open to
Kabul’s peace initiatives.91 The Haqqani network has developed
ties with the Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) federation of insurgent groups
that is aligned against the Pakistani government and its recent counter
insurgency efforts in FATA. The TTP are currently assessed to be
another of the “irreconcilables” by analysts.92 The same applies to the
originally Pakistani-sponsored LashkareTaibi (LeT), the group responsible for
the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, who also operate in the Afghanistan and
Pakistan region.93
49.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) is perhaps the least
significant of Afghanistan’s major insurgent groups.94 HiG has
previously had ties with the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI).95 Its main area of operation is in northeastern
Afghanistan, such as the provinces of Kunar, Laghman and Paktia. While
it is unlikely that Hekmatyar himself could ever serve in the Afghan
government, his organisation remains the insurgent group believed to be the
most open to eventual reconciliation with Kabul. This is supported by
evidence that Hekmatyar has previously issued statements conducive to
possible negotiations with the Afghan government,96 that he may have links
with Hizb-I-Islami Afghanistan (HiA) party members in the Kabul government97
and that some HiG members have already defected.98
50.
Criminal networks involved in drugs smuggling, kidnapping and illicit mining
also exist, as do “accidental guerrilla” local actors. In theory, both
these broad and disparate groups could be reconciled given the right
initiatives at local level. The same goes for the warlords and corrupt
officials whose primary goal is to maintain their localised power
bases. As outlined above, there are some prospects for reconciliation,
but these remain hampered by the lack of cohesion amongst the insurgents,
their differing ideological standpoints and their sponsors. As one
commentator has observed, the Afghans are “perfectly comfortable fighting
whilst talking”.99 Buoyed by the statement of a drawdown date beginning
in July, most groups appear to be content to sit on the fence for the
moment.100
51.
Drone strikes, both as ISAF missions within Afghanistan and as unilateral
missions in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions, have also caused significant
attrition to insurgent and terrorist cells operating in these areas.
According to one estimate, the number of CIA armed drone missions in
Pakistan’s tribal regions doubled between 2009 and 2010, to 100 combat
flights.101 Owing to the classified nature of data and different
metrics, exact numbers of insurgents killed and the ratio of insurgent kills
to civilian deaths remain hotly debated, but around a 65:35 ratio has been
suggested by experienced commentators.102 Strong anecdotal evidence
suggests that while there have been undoubtedly many collateral damage incidents,
these missions do have a direct impact on terrorist plots against NATO
members.103 While the role of drones in Afghanistan differs somewhat
due to the more conventional nature of fighting there, they have also been
successful in eliminating insurgent and terrorist commanders, with estimates
putting al-Qaeda numbers at only 50-100 in the country at present.104
VIII. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES
52.
In keeping with the Kabul government’s desire to reform both western and
indigenous private security companies (PSCs) operating in Afghanistan,
President Karzai stated he would be disbanding all private security
companies’ operations within four months of his August 2010 decree.105
Amidst the international clamour and uncertainty this created, not least due
to the vital role the 50,000 PSC guards play in maintaining Afghan security,
immediate disbandment was shelved in favour of an investigation into PSC
operations. This Afghan government probe accused 16 firms of violations
that include employing too many guards, failing to pay taxes for up to two
years, and keeping unregistered weapons and armoured vehicles.
53.
While NATO member states generally support Karzai's intentions, they depend
on private guards to perform tasks that would otherwise be given to military
units. Therefore, there has been an effort to negotiate concessions to
keep private guards at their embassies and military bases, as well as guard
foreign-funded development projects including roads and power plants.
Thus, the major concern has been over the pace and extent of disbandment
rather than the process itself.106
54.
In February 2011 the international community and the Government of
Afghanistan agreed a twelve month bridging strategy in relation to the reform
of PSC operations. This strategy allows for the continued use of PSCs
for one year, while concurrently developing the capabilities and capacity of
the Ministry of Interior’s Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) whilst
reducing, but not eliminating, the role of PSCs in providing Afghan
security.107 A training facility for the APPF intended to process 1,000
guards per month is currently under construction.108
55.
Reports suggest the agreement will allow embassy and base security to remain
a western PSC responsibility. Further, development projects will
continue to be allowed to contract for private guards and security services
indefinitely. Under the new plan, reconstruction projects will be
permitted to have 500 of their own guards, or up to 1,000 if they pay a one-off
fine. For contracts requiring greater numbers of guards, the companies
will be expected to recruit, train, arm and pay new APPF guards and will then
take control of the contract after 12 months. If the APPF proves unable
to discharge its responsibilities, the private company would remain in
control.109
IX. COUNTER-NARCOTIC EFFORTS
56.
ISAF counter-narcotic strategy has two main goals: “1) counter the link
between narcotics and the insurgency and significantly reduce the support the
insurgency receives from the narcotics industry; and 2) address the
narcotics-corruption-insurgency nexus and reinforce the government of
Afghanistan.”110 At the tactical level this strategy holds that ISAF,
partnered with ANSF forces, ignore poppy farmers and small suppliers and
target large scale traffickers. This is seen as a key tenet of the
population-centric COIN strategy currently being employed. In the
RCSouth and RCSouthwest, where poppy cultivation, trafficking and the
insurgency are strongest, ISAF focus has remained on military efforts.
57.
United Nations authorities are forecasting a slight reduction in overall
opium cultivation in Afghanistan for 2011, with a strong increase in the
north and northeast offset by decreases in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, which
have benefited from the Governor Led Eradication programme.111 Total
opium yield and opium produced figures actually fell by almost 50% in 2010,
but this decline resulted primarily from disease rather than decreases in
cultivation, and has actually driven prices up, leading to the increased
cultivation seen in the north and north eastern provinces.112
58.
An earlier United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) report also
found that “the statistical association between poor security and poppy cultivation
was strong. Almost all villages with very poor security and most
villages with poor security were cultivating poppies. In general,
villages in insecure areas had a high probability of cultivating poppies, and
villages in areas with good security were less likely to have poppy
cultivation. Security was of general concern in most areas in the
Southern region (Helmand, Uruzgan and Kandahar). In the Western region
Badghis, Nimroz and Farah provinces had also poor security conditions.113
59.
Afghan National Security Forces, with support from ISAF, seized over 49,000kg
of opium, heroin and morphine between September 2010 and March 2011.114
During this period, ISAF continued to expand its capacity and improve its
targeting support. It is fully operational and continues to provide
support for law enforcement investigations and military operations by
analyzing key trafficking networks. To disable the networks’
resiliency, ISAF targets network functions – safe havens, movement,
communications and finance – rather than only individuals. These
efforts are sorely needed. To put the above figures into perspective,
it was estimated that 750,000kg of wet, unrefined opium pitch left insurgent
controlled areas in 2008. As yet, ISAF has been unable to determine the
exact financial benefit of drug trafficking for the insurgency, but total
insurgent annual revenues from the narcotics trade are estimated to be in the
region of US$ 430 million.115
X. CONCLUSIONS
60.
Making a definitive assessment of a situation as complex as the ongoing
conflict in Afghanistan is extraordinarily difficult. The following
paragraphs will recapitulate what your Rapporteur sees as the most important
indicators of progress at this time.
61.
The advancement of the military campaign between early 2010 and mid 2011 was
clear: definite, visible tactical successes were achieved in the areas of
Afghanistan that ISAF and US forces have concentrated on, through intensive
military-civilian effort and a high expenditure of blood and treasure.
62.
For example, the central Helmand towns of Nawa, Garmsir, Lashkar Gar,
Nad-e-Ali and Marjah, benefiting from focused efforts, are now relatively
secure; governance and development efforts have also made progress in these
areas. Military success was also visible in the traditional heartland
of the Taliban, the Kandahar districts of Panjwai, Zhari and Arghandab, where
former insurgent areas have been cleared and held after heavy fighting,
handing the Taliban a string of tactical defeats.
63.
The insurgency has been defeated tactically and operationally where it has
fought ISAF ground forces, suffering severe losses. Importantly,
coalition special forces raids and drone attacks have reduced the ranks of
mid-level insurgent leaders.
64.
Equally significant is the fact that efforts to train and equip the Afghan
National Security Forces during this period have continued to bear fruit,
largely thanks to the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan.
Notwithstanding attrition, ANSF numbers are due to hit 305,000 in October
2011, and are to increase to a goal of 352,000. The quality of new
recruits is improving, especially in literacy, as is their equipment.
The Afghan Air Force has also continued to grow in capability. The
number of trainers in relation to Afghan forces has been vastly
increased. While Afghan forces are not yet self-sufficient, they are
more frequently leading effective responses to security incidents.
65.
Counter-narcotics efforts have continued, with poppy cultivation decreasing
marginally across Afghanistan in 2010 and in the first six months of
2011. Seizures of narcotics almost doubled between September 2010 and
March 2011, even if progress in developing Afghan counter-narcotic capability
continues to be a challenge.
66.
The progress achieved in the areas outlined above has been challenged on
several counts. Conventional battlefield successes against the
insurgency have pushed it towards new tactics, including attacks against
high-profile Afghan officials and symbols of the international
community. Progress in establishing zones of security has not been
sufficiently matched by the provision of services by Afghan officials to
local populations. Key elements of the insurgency continue to benefit
from safe havens that allow for planning and replenishment of its
efforts.
67.
On the home front, contributing nations are looking forward to an eventual
conclusion of the operation. Since the previous draft of this report,
several strategically significant announcements have been made about the
eventual withdrawal of national contingents from the Afghan campaign.
In June 2011, President Obama outlined the phased withdrawal of the over
30,000 ‘surge’ of U.S troops he had ordered to Afghanistan, with 10,000
troops withdrawn by the end of 2011 and another 23,000 by September
2012. In 2010, the Netherlands ended its combat mission and withdrew
most of its 1,900 troops. Canada’s 3,000 troops ended their combat
mission in Kandahar in July, though many of these were reinvested into the training
mission. The German Parliament voted in January to begin withdrawing
its 4,900 soldiers by the end of 2011, marking the first time that ISAF’s
third largest contributor set a time frame for bringing its soldiers
home. Britain, which has the second-largest contingent with 9,500
troops, is withdrawing 450 troops by the end of 2011 and another 500 in
2012.116 The British have also stated that they will withdraw all
combat troops by 2015. France is withdrawing 1,000 of its 4,000 troops
by the end of 2012.117 Poland has stated it will bring its 2,600 troops
home by 2014. Belgium has said it will halve its 600 strong contingent
in Afghanistan in early 2012.118
68.
There is also legitimate concern about diminishing support amongst the local
Afghan population for the ISAF presence in Afghanistan, a dynamic made worse
by incidents of civilian casualties and events (such as the burning of the
Koran by a fundamentalist US pastor) that are skilfully exploited by the
Taliban for propaganda purposes.
69.
Clearly, those hoping that the ‘surge’ of troops that began over one year ago
would serve as a panacea for the problems of Afghanistan may consider
themselves disappointed. Indeed, even the advocates of the surge would
concede that what progress has been made is fragile and reversible.
70.
However, despite these challenges, the context of NATO’s engagement and the
overall gains made thus far should not be forgotten. To name only a
few, it is by any measure significant that a decade ago only 9% of Afghans
had access to basic medical care; today that figure is close to 85%.
Under the Taliban, one million children were in school; today this figure is
seven million, a third of whom are girls.119 Afghanistan also has
developed a vibrant and free media sector; and more than five million Afghan
refugees have returned home.
71.
The Alliance’s ongoing engagement is not only a major contributor to
Afghanistan’s past and future success but also a requirement for the security
of NATO’s member states. Indeed, the need to prevent Afghanistan from
ever again becoming a haven for international terrorism has not
diminished. This underlines the importance of ensuring that the
transition process unfolds based on assessment of the conditions on the
ground rather than the political imperatives in troop contributing
nations; even if the killing of Osama bin Laden allowed a senior US
official to see the strategic defeat of al-Qaeda “within reach”,120 the
relationship between the ability of the United States of America and its
allies to kill or capture senior al-Qaeda leaders on the one hand, and the
readiness of the Afghan domestic security situation for transition on the
other, remains ill defined.
72.
Looking forward, in President Karzai’s long-term vision, the Alliance’s
continued efforts are supporting his country’s transition towards a “stable,
prosperous and democratic Afghanistan” that will lift its “people from
poverty to prosperity and from insecurity to stability”.121 The
Afghanistan of the future could become a nexus of regional economic
cooperation, fully participating in the international community based on the
rights and obligations of a 21st century state.122
73.
Alliance members should ensure that the Afghan people are able to continue
building on the fragile but very real gains made in Afghanistan, through
steadfast partnership, including a deliberate, well-planned and commonly
executed conclusion to combat operations when appropriate. The
sacrifices we have endured collectively, and the progress these sacrifices
have achieved, demand no less.
_______________ 1 NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration (20 November 2010), Press Release, PR/CP(2010)0155. 2 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Participants, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan Communiqué (20 July 2010). 3 ISAF Strategic Transitions and Assessment Group, Situational Awareness Brief on Transition, given on NATO PA Visit to Afghanistan, 8 June 2011. 4 NATO, “NATO and Afghanistan Launch Transition and Embark on Long-Term Partnership,” NATO News, 20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68728.htm. 5 BBC, “Afghanistan: ‘Deadliest Six Months’ for Civilians,” BBC News, 14 July 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14149692. 6 The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, ANSO Quarterly Data Report Q1. 2011 (Kabul: The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2011), p.8. 7 Channel Four News, “Petraeus: No Change in Afghan Strategy,” Channel Four News, 2 July 2010, http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/asia_pacific/briton%2Bkilled%2Bin%2Bafghan%2Bsuicide%2Battack/3698417.html. 8 Reuters, “Afghan Violence in 2010 Kills Thousands: Government,” Reuters, 3 January 2011. 9 These efforts are occurring simultaneously across Afghanistan [ISAF, ISAF OPLAN 38302, Rev. 4 (2009)). 10 The JANIB is composed of Afghan ministries and the international community and is responsible for developing the criteria, metrics, and benchmarks to assess a province's readiness to begin transition. 11 NATO, “Secretary General’s Monthly Press Conference,” NATO News, 7 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70427.htm. 12 NATO, “Interview with General Petraeus, Commander ISAF for NATO TV,” NATO News, 9 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-00070168-FDEBFCED/natolive/opinions_70492.htm. 13 ISAF, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures (Kabul: ISAF, 6 June 2011), http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/Revised%206%20June%202011%20Placemat%20(Full).pdf. 14 CBS News, “Petraeus Outlines ‘Significant’ but ‘Fragile’ Progress in Afghan War,” CBS News’ Political Hotsheet, 15 March 2011. 15 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, April 2011), Report to US Congress, p. 56. 16 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Command East (2011), http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional-command-east. 17 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 58. 18 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, November 2010), Report to US Congress, p. 45-46. 19 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2010: A Survey of the Afghan People (San Francisco: The Asia Foundation, November 2010), p.18. 20 Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Leader Kidnaps 21 Afghan Tribal Leaders in Kunar,” The Long War Journal, 31 January 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/01/al_qaeda_leader_kidn.php. 21 Donna Miles, “NATO – Afghan Security Transition Represents Milestone,” American Forces Press Service, 26 July 2011. 22 Jake Lowary, “Halfway Through Afghanistan: While Frustrating, Tour Has High Points,” Leaf Chronicle (Clarksville), 23 January 2011. 23 Lowary, “Halfway Through Afghanistan: While Frustrating, Tour Has High Points.” 24 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Command South – Nimruz Province (2011), http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional-command-south-0#Nimruz. 25 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 58. 26 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 47. 27 Miles Amoore, “NATO’s Fight for Highway One,” The Sunday Times, 3 October 2010. 28 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in, Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 58. 29 Carl Forsberg, “Counter-Insurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 Hamkari Campaign,” Afghanistan Report 7, Institute for the Study of War, December 2010. 30 ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand (6 December 2010), p. 12. 31 BBC News, “Kandahar Deputy Governor Killed in Suicide Attack,” BBC News, 29 January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12314646; and BBC News, “Deadly Taliban Attack on Kandahar Strikes Police HQ,” BBC News, 12 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12440178. 32 The Daily Telegraph, “Hamid Karzai’s Brother Killed in Afghanistan,” The Daily Telegraph, 12 July 2011; and Aryn Baker, “The Assassination of Ahmed Wali Karzai: Careful What You Wish For,” Time, 12 July 2011, http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/07/12/the-assassination-of-ahmed-wali-karzai-careful-what-you-wish-for/. 33 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Co, mmand South – Nimruz Province. 34 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Command South – Nimruz Province. 35 Reuters, Interview with Major General Richard Mills, Reuters, 14 February 2011. 36 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 58. 37 UK Ministry of Defence, “Afghan-led Operation Puts Insurgents under Pressure,” UK Ministry of Defence News, 19 January 2011; and Jeffrey Dressler, “Counter-Insurgency in Helmand: Progress and Remaining Challenges,” Afghanistan Report 8, Institute for the Study of War, January 2011. 38 Jim Michaels, “General: Heart of Afghanistan Insurgency Beaten,” USA Today, 15 February 2011. 39 Ben Anderson, “Someone Watched Us, Poised to Detonate a Daisy Chain of Bombs,” The Times, 25 January 2011; and BBC, “Return to Helmand’s Bomb Alley with US Marines,” BBC Panorama, 31 January 2011. 40 ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, p. 10-12. 41 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 59. 42 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Command West (2011), http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional-command-west. 43 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 59. 44 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 48. 45 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Command North (2011), http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional-command-north. 46 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 60. 47 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 49. 48 Laura King, “Afghanistan Suicide Bomber Kills District Governor, 6 Others,” Los Angeles Times, 11 February 2011. 49 Ben Farmer, “General Daud and At Least 2 German Soldiers Killed By Suicide Bomber,” The Daily Telegraph, 28 May 2011. 50 ISAF Joint Command, “Security and Development Are Key Issues in Bala Murghab Shura,” ISAF Joint Command Courtesy Story, 13 January 2011, http://www.dvidshub.net/news/63507/security-and-development-key-issues-bala-murghab-shura#.Tpa60N7lbUC. 51 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Command North (2011). 52 ABC News/BBC/ARD/Washington Post, Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, p. 10-12. 53 Karen Perrish, “Brigade Commanders Provide North Afghanistan Update,” American Forces Press Service, 8 February 2011. 54 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 59. 55 Institute for the Study of War, Regions: Regional Command Capital (2011), http://www.understandingwar.org/region/regional-command-capital. 56 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 59. 57 Julian Borger, “Afghan Government Under Threat After Second Assassination in a Week”, The Guardian, 18 July 2011. 58 The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, ANSO Quarterly Data Report Q1. 2011, p. 10. 59 See Col. Dan Williams’ quote in David Woods, “The Afghanistan War: Tactical Victories, Strategic Stalemate?,” Politics Daily, March 2011. 60 BBC News, “Afghanistan: Logar Hospital Blast Victims Buried,” BBC News, 26 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13919636; and Alissa J. Rubin, “Attack at Kabul Hotel Deflates Security Hopes in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 29 June 2011. 61 Data from Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN), CIDNE and ISAF CIVCAS Database, 2 October 2010, quoted in US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 53. 62 Remarks by Lt. Gen. William Caldwell at the Brookings Institution, 6 June 2011, http://www.c-span.org/Events/Brookings-Institution-Discussion-on-Afghanistan/10737422057-1/. 63 Tom Coghlan, “Soldiers Die in Fire at Helmand Base,” The Times, 15 February 2011. 64 The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, The ANSO Report: Issue 76 (Kabul: The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 16-30 June 2011). 65 Alyssa J. Rubin, “Afghan Civilian Deaths Set a Monthly Record, UN Says,” The New York Times, 11 June 2011. 66 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 13. 67 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 13 and p. 51; and NATO PA Mission Report of the Special Visit to Afghanistan, 8-11 June 2011 (2011), http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2499. 68 Regional Command Southwest, Press Release, 16 February 2011. 69 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 20. 70 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 20. 71 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 2526. 72 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 3233; and US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 29. 73 Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, Memorandum for NTM-A: Commander’s Vision for 2011,10 February 2011, http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/10/documents/Commander's%20Vision%20for%202011%20-%20Accelerating%20Progress.pdf. 74 Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, Memorandum for NTM-A: Commander’s Vision for 2011. 75 Remarks by Lt. Gen. William Caldwell at the Brookings Institution. 76 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 22. 77 Remarks by Lt. Gen. William Caldwell at the Brookings Institution. 78 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 25. 79 CIA, The World Factbook: Afghanistan (2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. 80 Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entou, “US, NATO Look to Use Local Police in Afghanistan,” The Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2010. 81 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 68. 82 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 62-63. 83 Joshua Partlow, “US Initiative to Arm Afghan Villagers Carries Some Risks,” The Washington Post, 6 February 2011; and Rod Nordland, “Some Police Recruits Impose ‘Islamic Tax’ On Afghans,” The New York Times, 12 June 2011. 84 Greg Bruno, Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (19 August 2010), Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistans-national-security-forces/p19122. 85 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Clear, Hold, Handover: NATO’s Afghan Transition Plan,” Strategic Comments, vol. 17, comment 10, March 2011. 86 Carlotta Gall, “Petraeus Sees Military Progress in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 8 March 2011. 87 Gall, “Petraeus Sees Military Progress in Afghanistan.” 88 Anthony Loyd, “Taliban on Verge of Collapse Allies Insist,” The Times, 8 October 2010. 89 Forsberg, “Counter-Insurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 Hamkari Campaign;” Michaels “General: Heart of Afghanistan Insurgency Beaten;” and Lowary, “Halfway Through Afghanistan: While Frustrating, Tour Has High Points.” 90 Gall, “Petraeus Sees Military Progress in Afghanistan.” 91 Thomas Ruttig, “The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity,” in Decoding the New Taliban, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 92 Claudi Franco, “The Tehrik-E Taliban Pakistan,” in Decoding the New Taliban, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 280. 93 Ashley Tellis, Bad Company – Lashkar E-Tayyiba and the Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan, Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommitee on the Middle East and South Asia, 11 March 2010. 94 David W. Barno and Andrew Exum, Responsible Transition in Afghanistan: Securing American Interests (December 2010), Report for the Center for a New American Security, p.13. 95 Institute for the Study of War, Themes: Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) (2011), http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/hezb-e-islami-gulbuddin-hig. 96 Janullah Hashimzada, “Hekmatyar Offers Conditions for Talks,” Pajhwok Afghan News, 14 October 2008. 97 Institute for the Study of War, Themes: Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG). 98 Daily Times, “Hizb-e-Islami Militants Fight Taliban, Defect to Afghan Govt,” Daily Times, 8 March 2010. 99 Andrew Exum, “Smoke and Mirrors in Kabul,” Foreign Policy, 22 October 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/22/smoke_and_mirrors_in_kabul?page=0,0. 100 Rudra Chauduri and Theo Farrell, “Campaign Disconnect: Operational Progress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011,” International Affairs, vol. 87, no.2 (2011), p. 290-291. 101 Daily News, “Tribesmen Rally Against US Drones,” Daily News, 22 January 2011. 102 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedeman, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010 (24 February 2010), Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper for the New America Foundation; and David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” The New York Times, 16 May 2009. 103 Richard Norton-Taylor and Owen Bowcott, “‘Mumbai Style’ Terror Attack On UK, France and Germany Foiled,” The Guardian, 29 September 2010. 104 Reuters, “How Many Al Qaeda Can You Live With?,” Reuters, 15 September 2010, quoting then-CIA Director Leon Panetta based on CIA figures. 105 CNN Wire Staff, “Karzai issues decree disbanding private security firms,” CNN World, 17 August 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-17/world/afghanistan.security.firms_1_private-security-companies-security-contractors-security-challenge?_s=PM:WORLD. 106 CNN Wire Staff, “Karzai issues decree disbanding private security firms.” 107 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 63. 108 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 63. 109 Jon Boone, “Afghanistan Lets Blackwater Stay Despite Shakeup of Security Contractors,” The Guardian, 7 March 2011. 110 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. 83. 111 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Winter Rapid Assessment All Regions, Phases 1 and 2, (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, April 2011), p. 2. 112 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 99; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Winter Rapid Assessment All Regions, Phases 1 and 2, pp. 7-10. 113 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Winter Rapid Assessment for the Central, Eastern, Southern and Western Regions (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, January 2011), p. 2. 114 US Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, p. 99. 115 Gretchen Peters, “The Taliban and the Opium Trade,” in Decoding the New Taliban, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 19. 116 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Gates Faults U.S. Allies on Afghan War,” The New York Times, 11 March 2011; and Nick Hopkins, “Afghanistan Withdrawal: 500 Troops to Leave Next Year, Says David Cameron,” The Guardian, 6 July 2011. 117 Nadege Puljak, “France to Pull 1,000 Troops From Afghanistan: Sarkozy,” AFP, 11 July 2011. 118 AFP, “Belgium to Halve Afghan Troop Numbers From January,” AFP, 26 June 2011; and Agence Europe, “NATO/Afghanistan: Series of First Withdrawals,” Europe Diplomacy and Defence, no. 427, (28 June 2011). 119 Peter Bergen, “The Crossroads: Can We Win in Afghanistan?,” The New Republic, 26 May 2011, pp. 12-15. 120 Phil Stewart, “Leon Panetta Says Al Qaeda’s Defeat ‘Within Reach’,” Reuters, 9 July 2011. 121 Hamid Karzai, Statement by President Karzai at the International Kabul Conference, 20 July 2010, http://www.afghanistan-un.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/president-karzai-speech.pdf. 122 Hamid Karzai, Statement by President Karzai at the International Kabul Conference. |
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BLOGGED:
IDLE NO MORE CANADA- EUROP-E'S FACISM-Jun26-74%Germans
oppose NATO Bases/ is not because of Russia and ya all know it -OIL AND ENERGY
GREEDY NATIONS... United Nations what happend 2 u... what happened 2 Humanity
First -No Fracking Canada/NATO ur whites only is showing/Over 1 Million
innocent Muslims murdered by Heretic Muslims-no one cares BUT little Israel of
8 Million people amongst 2 billion Muslims is a monster? What happened 2
Humanity?- UPDATES- WORLD IS TIRING OF USA INTERFERENCE IN OTHER NATIONS
-------------------------
NATO AND PEACEKEEPING
Robert J. Jackson
Visiting Fellow Centre for International Studies and Clare Hall, University of
Cambridge
Final Report for NATO Fellowship, Due 30 June 1997.2
NATO AND PEACEKEEPING by Robert J. Jackson
Synopsis
Many serious observers, including very senior United Nations officials, have argued for several years
that NATO and peacekeeping were incompatible. One even asserted that NATO and peacekeeping go together
like "oil and water". This paper assesses the role that NATO has played in Bosnia-Herzegovina and concludes
that NATO has not only become a "new" organization but that, in successfully carrying out a peacekeeping
role, it has enhanced its importance as the most significant organization in the European security architecture.
Using "neo-institutional" definitions, the paper outlines how the "new" NATO has evolved, assesses the
concepts used in the analysis of peacekeeping, and examines in detail NATO's activities in the former
Yugoslavia since 1991. The paper finds that NATO has performed its role in managing IFOR and now SFOR
with dispatch and effectiveness, and concludes that if any criticisms are to be levelled at the international
community's activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina they are more rightly aimed at other international organizations
than at the Alliance. Any preparations for an "exit strategy" should bear these conclusions in mind.
******************
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantlement of the USSR, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) has undergone such a profound transformation that it has, for all intents and purposes,
become a new organization. NATO has not merely adjusted to its new circumstances; it has gone through a
complete process of metamorphosis.
One can conceive of an institution in two ways. A purposive definition would be something such as:
an institution is a social structure organized to achieve some specified goal or goals. But institutions also arise,
grow and develop in much less purposive ways. In this latter case they can be thought of as "congealed tastes"
or conventions about values that are condensed into organizations or institutions. The former definition is
often useful for understanding the origin of new institutions, while the latter may be more accurate of
institutions which emerge, grow and develop over time. Moreover, many institutions originate out of such a
confused set of competing ideas and desires that their precise purposes or objectives are not at all clear.
Moreover, many institutions are devoted to such diffuse idealistic and romantic goals that the relation between3
their activities and goals is tenuous, to say the least.1
1
See Robert J. Jackson and Doreen Jackson, Comparative Government (Toronto: Prentice Hall,
1997). For detailed summaries of the "neo-institutional" approach see James March and Johan Olsen, "The
New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life", APSR (vol.78 (1984); Walter W. Powell and
Paul J. Dimaggio, eds.,The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991); R. Kurt Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? (Washington: The
Brookings Institute, 1993).
The New NATO: Structure, Purpose and Membership
An institution or an organization is characterized by three factors - its structure, purpose or goals and
membership. These three factors together describe what the organization is. Scholars cannot describe an
organization by its declared intention - otherwise, according to its constitution, the USSR would have been
known as one of the most just and honourable countries on earth and Canada today would be ruled by Queen
Elizabeth II. Whatever its declared intentions, NATO has acted in such a way that we can say that a new
organization has emerged. Of course, the declared intent expressed most clearly in article 5 (and not revoked)
is the collective defense of its members. But by its action NATO has moved closer to a collective security
organization for Europe and possibly beyond. It has indicated this most clearly with its first actions "out of
area", in the former Yugoslavia. As in any organization, though perhaps unwittingly, NATO leaders have
analyzed their institution's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats and made a strategic leap to a
novel arrangement of structure, purpose and membership.
First, NATO's "organization" began to change following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This
happened through a unique process of adjustment and compromise on the part of the major players - the USA,4
Britain, France and Germany. The changed position of these four countries, and perhaps others, was no doubt
induced by the end of the Soviet threat and the emergence of democratic leadership in Russia. But it was also
affected by issues of western financial constraint, events in the Gulf and the former Yugoslavia, and the
political configurations of the major NATO partners. The 1996 Berlin Communique is probably the clearest
illustration of this commitment to a new structure.
The Berlin Communique gave credence to idea of establishing a European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI) inside NATO. As well, it further developed the concept of the Combined Joint Tasks Forces
(CJTFs), and its new "mood" has led to increased flexibility for more cooperative arrangements with France
and Partnership for Peace countries.2
2
North Atlantic Council Communique, Berlin 3 June 1996 in NATO Review (July 1996),pp.30-
35.For details see S.N. Drew,"From Berlin to Bosnia: NATO in Transition, 1989-1994" in C.
Berry(ed)Reforging the Transatlantic Relationship(Washington: NDU Press, 1996).
Second, NATO's "purpose, or "objective" began to change with its first-ever violent use of air and
naval forces to back up UN peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its first-ever ground force operation in IFOR
and now SFOR, and its first-ever joint operation with Partnership for Peace and other non-NATO countries.
As an existentialist might say, an institution's philosophy or purpose is shown not by what it says but by what
it does.
Third, NATO's membership is on the verge of shifting eastward to include countries of central and
eastern Europe. I will come back to this debate, but my contention in these opening remarks is only to argue
that this extension of membership will put the final touches on the new NATO. It will complete the
transformation.
Alliances5
Classical international relations specialists and many journalists spend far too much energy
examining the declared intentions of leaders of international organizations and even their formal, legalistic
charters. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the argument put forward by some commentators today that
since NATO is an "alliance" it must be aimed at a particular threat or common enemy - namely, Russia. On the
contrary, it is not such efforts at conceptual clarity that provide the energy for a metamorphosis from one type
of institution to the next but the internal and external dynamics of institutions. An organization should be
understood in the context of the way it acts.
Such scholars would do far better to assess what organizations actually do and how they evolve if
they wish to understand institutions such as NATO. Obviously such reasoning about the need for a precise
threat is conditioned more by the logic of "creationism" than it is by "Darwinian evolution". Out of something
venerable and old, and with little understanding by its participants, can come something new. We might even
say that because of its fundamental transformation NATO should have a new name -- it would be a rose by any
other name, so to speak. A 'new' NATO will have emerged from the one whose purpose was to defend the
West against the Soviet Union.
Eventually it could even adopt a new name but that is several years ahead of us.
NATO and Peacekeeping
Military force and statecraft have always been intertwined in foreign policy, but never have the
principles for their choice or use been so much in debate as today. Our project here is to describe and analyze a
central issue in the debate about the new NATO - policy-making toward issues concerning peacekeeping,
peacemaking and peace enforcement in the former Yugoslavia. But this should not deter us from carefully
examining the other issues of organizational structure and enlargement which also are central to the new
NATO.
The post-Cold War has seen the emergence of a multiplicity of security organizations with
overlapping jurisdictions and imprecisely defined mandates. Among these, NATO has stood out. The UN and
OSCE may have greater legitimacy and the wider mandates, but only NATO has military forces at its6
command with control, communications structures, intelligence, lift capability, strategic plans and the ability
to act in a crisis. Even at the conceptual level, where the United Nations became entangled and confused over
peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement, NATO has shown that concepts and ideas should not just
be bandied about but need to be relate to action on the ground.
Institutional Structure.
Background: NATO's institutional history is complex and recent organizational changes must be put in the
context of the evolution of NATO from the 1991 Rome Summit and the development of the "New Strategic
Concept". The move to more structural flexibility and a broader approach to security helped to make other
policies more possible, especially involvement in the former Yugoslavia. This early evolution also facilitated
the activities and successes of NACC and the Partnership for Peace, and made possible a multinational force
of both east and west in IFOR and SFOR. Eventually, the IFOR/SFOR experience will lead to even greater
cooperation been NATO members and partnership countries and enhance NATO-Russian dialogue.
- The 1996 NATO Communique: The 1996 Berlin Communique gives expression to what has been
developing inside NATO since it began to act in the former Yugoslavia. It gives credence to NATO's
adaptability. A new NATO structure is emerging. At the June 1996 Berlin meeting the idea of establishing the
European Security and Defence Identity(ESDI) was accepted. The most concrete result has been the further
development of the Combined Joint Tasks Forces (CJTFs), but the increased flexibility has also led to more
cooperative arrangements with France and Partnership for Peace countries.3
The processes or at least attitudinal shifts that are leading to new structural arrangement can be
summarized as follows:
- The United States: agrees to the development of a degree of European "identity" inside NATO. While this
does not constitute acceptance of an unrestrained two-pillar concept (or dumbbell, as Canadians call it) it does
3
North Atlantic Council Communique, Berlin 3 June 1996 in NATO Review (July 1996), pp. 30-35.
For details see Partnership in Crisis: United States, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO (London: Cassells,
1997) by Paul Cornish, and S.N. Drew,"From Berlin to Bosnia: NATO in Transition, 1989-1994" in C. Berry
(ed) Reforging the Transatlantic Relationship (Washington: NDU Press, 1996).7
appear to be a shift in US foreign policy thinking.
- The United Kingdom: agrees that the development of a European "identity" inside NATO does not
compromise Atlanticism or Britain's strong commitment to the importance of American and Canadian
significance inside the Alliance.
- France: while there have been some setbacks lately (especially over France's recent demand that a European
share command of the southern region based in Naples) French leaders appear more and more ready to rejoin
NATO. President Chirac made the first move by announcing in December 1995 that France would reintegrate
completely with NATO if it became sufficiently "Europeanized" and was shaping its policies for the period
after the Cold War. Since then, France has given dramatic signs of informal cooperation and indicated that it is
prepared to act as a full participant, and not simply as an observer, in the military committee. In all, France
appears to have dropped its zero-sum view of NATO versus the WEU. It also appears to wish to avoid being
assimilated inside a uniquely European military alliance as envisaged by "assimilationist" proponents of a
European Union model of foreign and defense policy-making.4
Following the debates about the European
Union one might say that its view has been more"inter-governmental" than integrationist or federalist.
4
Background: General de Gaulle pulled France out of the NATO integrated military command in
1966; American officers automatically hold NATO's Supreme military command as well as the naval
commands of the Atlantic and Mediterranean. The southern command's most important asset is the US Sixth
Fleet and American aircraft based in Italy. There is no possibility that the USA will give up command of these
assets. Europeans hold the position of Deputy Supreme Commander. ....CONTINUED
AND..
It should be remembered that the United Nations Charter does not actually authorize any of the forms
of what is today called “peacekeeping”. The first so-called peacekeeping operation can, however, be traced to
the UN Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine in June 1948. Today’s form of peacekeeping was first
witnessed in the Middle East when a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was established to replace British, French
and Israeli forces in the Canal Zone and Sinai after the so-called Suez fiasco in 1956. This face-saving strategy
proved to be the first time an armed peacekeeping force was deployed with blue helmets.7
While NATO took no actions as such in these or any of the large number of UN peacekeeping
operations which followed over the next four decades, many members of the organization were instrumental in
developing the concepts, methods, operations and outcomes of these operations. Although some of these
“peacekeeping” operations came only weakly under chapter VII of the UN Charter which allowed "Action with
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression", no specific changes to the
Charter were made to accommodate to this new form of UN behaviour. While the fathers of the UN had in
mind interstate threats to the peace when they drafted Chapter VII, the UN interpretation seems more and more
to be about using the clause for peacekeeping and even peace enforcement for weak or failed states, or even
internal wars and succession movements.8
7
See Anthony Parsons, From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1994 (London: Michael
Joseph, 1995).
8
See Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996).
Peacekeeping, therefore, has come to mean many different kinds of operations as it is associated with
peace within states and peace among states. Conceptual confusion reigns. The early understanding of the principles was that peacekeeping should 1) not be confused with enforcement actions; 2) be acceptable to the
belligerents (ie. consent was required); 3) be impartial; 4) and be temporary in nature. In Bosnia the United
Nations violated all of these principles, teetering between the various forms of peacekeeping and often
appearing uncertain about what action to take.
Among those interested in clarifying the terminological confusion, "traditional" peacekeeping came to
mean UN actions in creating the conditions for diplomacy to work. This included monitoring ceasefires and
controlling zones of separation between belligerents. (Cyprus provides the classic example). But what has
been called "wider" peacekeeping includes actions which follow a peace settlement by expanding the work of
the UN troops to include demobilizing troops, the cantonment of weapons, training militaries and police,
providing humanitarian relief (and using military intervention to ensure it) monitoring human rights, and
conducting elections (Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia provide recent examples of this wider use of
peacemakers). But peacekeeping is also used for even more specific actions which should probably be called
"peace enforcement", or the forcible action of the UN to separate warring factions and to restore peace with or
without their consent (an example was Somalia, 1992 which was authorized by the UN but kept the military
under national command).
The wars of f the former Yugoslavia required the UN and finally NATO to be involved in all these
types of actions. With little attention to principle, the UN shifted its position on “peacekeeping” depending on
the current events from one form of peacekeeping to the next and NATO eventually was involved in all of
them. Against the traditional principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries
the UN has begun acting inside divided, weak and failed states. Examples include the UN's creation of a no-fly
zone over Iraq and eventually Bosnia, as well as so-called "safe-zones” for civilians in Bosnia and a
"preventive" force in Macedonia.
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