Thursday, September 3, 2015

CANADA MILITARY NEWS-(Part 3) the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops....Amnesty Int/BCCL/betrayal- A BIG READ if interested /PART 3




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BLOGSPOT:

CANADA MILITARY NEWS- (Part 2) the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops.... A BIG READ if interested (PART 2)





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BLOGSPOT:
CANADA MILITARY NEWS- the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops.... A BIG READ if interested /PART 1



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                                                                 2
    1                 COLONEL STEVEN NOONAN, SWORN:
    2                 EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAMP:
    3                 MR. CHAMP:  Good afternoon, Colonel Noonan.
    4                 THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.
    5                 MR. CHAMP:  Thanks for making yourself available
    6         for us this afternoon.
    7                 MR. GRAHAM:  Counsel, before we begin I have an
    8         amendment to make with respect to the affidavit.  If I
    9         could ask you to turn to paragraph 54 on page 14?  As of
   10         the date of swearing of the affidavit that statement was
   11         true.  The Canadian Forces have since detained persons.
   12         They have since determined those persons are not a
   13         security threat and they are in the process of being
   14         released.  That's all I can say on that issue.
   15                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   16   1.            Q.  Colonel Noonan, I understand that you were
   17         commander of Task Force Afghanistan for about eight
   18         months, nine months?
   19                 A.  From August '05 to March '06.
   20   2.            Q.  Now you are commander of CEFCOM?
   21                 A.  No.  I am a staff officer, J3, head of the
   22         operations branch for Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
   23         or CEFCOM.
   24   3.            Q.  Who is the commander of CEFCOM?
   25                 A.  The commander is Lieutenant General Gauthier.

                                                             3
    1   4.            Q.  Colonel Noonan, we're here today to talk a
    2         little bit about detainees or individuals that the
    3         Canadian Forces have detained in Afghanistan.  The first
    4         question I would like to ask you, sir, is about who are
    5         the people the Canadian Forces are detaining.  It's my
    6         understanding from documents that I've seen that it's not
    7         simply people who are engaged in combat but it's other
    8         individuals, a wide spectrum of individuals that the
    9         Canadian Forces may detain if for some reason they think
   10         there are other reasons that they might be suspicious.
   11                 A.  The people that we detain are those people
   12         that we consider to be a threat to the local security at
   13         the time.
   14   5.            Q.  That would include some people who are not
   15         engaged in combat?
   16                 A.  That's correct.
   17   6.            Q.  Sometimes people will just be in an area where
   18         Canadian Forces feel they shouldn't be or are suspicious
   19         if there are any individuals in that area and stop them,
   20         question them, and then just based on the questioning or
   21         perhaps a search they think it's appropriate to detain
   22         them?
   23                 A.  They will have either committed an act or
   24         indicated an intent or will have been acting suspicious
   25         enough that we would want to ascertain why they're acting

                                                             4
    1         in such a manner.
    2   7.            Q.  Those would be people that you would detain?
    3                 A.  They aren't detained at that particular point.
    4         They are asked questions to determine if they are a threat
    5         at that particular point to confirm whether they are or
    6         not.
    7   8.            Q.  And searched?
    8                 A.  If it is considered that the risk is such that
    9         it needs to be further mitigated, they can be searched and
   10         restrained if required.
   11   9.            Q.  What are some of the reasons or grounds that
   12         would lead them to be detained after a search?
   13                 A.  Just to be clear, after a search?
   14   10.           Q.  Following a search what would lead the
   15         individual to be detained?  What are some examples?
   16                 A.  Just to clarify some of the points perhaps in
   17         the affidavit in terms of the process, when a person is in
   18         circumstances under which there is suspicion that he or
   19         she may be a threat to the security they are stopped and
   20         if after questioning it is determined that there is
   21         grounds on which that suspicion needs to be further
   22         investigated, they will be searched.  As I said before, if
   23         they are acting in such a manner that requires it, they
   24         will be restrained and then they will further be handled
   25         to determine whether they are considered to be a continued

                                                             5
    1         threat.  Some of the indications can be location of where
    2         they are.
    3   11.           Q.  Colonel Noonan, you're aware of complaints to
    4         the Military Police Complaints Commission concerning
    5         handling of detainees?
    6                 A.  Yes, I am.
    7   12.           Q.  I'm handing you and your counsel a document of
    8         two witness statements that are documents in the
    9         possession of the Military Police Complaints Commission in
   10         connection with the Attaran complaint.  These witness
   11         statements were disclosed to Professor Attaran pursuant to
   12         the Access to Information and as I understand it they are
   13         witness statements of the Canadian Forces personnel who
   14         captured one of those individuals. 
   15                 Colonel Noonan, I'm just going to ask you just the
   16         format of that document, does the format of that document
   17         look familiar to you?
   18                 A.  Yes.
   19   13.           Q.  It's Annex E to TSO or theatre standing order,
   20         I gather?
   21                 A.  Yes.
   22   14.           Q.  Can you just explain what the purpose of this
   23         form is?
   24                 A.  As part of the detainee process?
   25   15.           Q.  Yes.

                                                             6
    1                 A.  It is outlined in the affidavit.  There are a
    2         couple of procedures that we -- part of the process of
    3         handling detainees in a manner that we can ascertain the
    4         threat or can catalogue what actions we've taken with the
    5         detainee throughout that process.  We use this particular
    6         form as part of our cataloguing process of activities that
    7         have been conducted.
    8   16.           Q.  It's my understanding the purpose is to
    9         catalogue the reasons or ground for the initial detention.
   10                 A.  It could be and it is also used as what
   11         actions were conducted during that process.
   12   17.           Q.  Have you ever had an opportunity to see these
   13         documents before?
   14                 A.  This particular one, no.
   15   18.           Q.  Can you just review the documents for a
   16         moment?  In these two different witness statements of the
   17         same incident it's my understanding that it's an
   18         individual who was in the wrong area.  He was stopped as
   19         he appeared to be observing CF activity.  He was later
   20         captured again and found to have a cell phone and a
   21         mirror.  From the details that are in this document what
   22         would your view be why the members in questions detained
   23         this individual?
   24                 MR. GRAHAM:  Don't answer that question.  It calls
   25         for speculation.                                             *O*

                                                             7
    1                 BY MR. CHAMP:
    2   19.           Q.  As commander of Task Force Afghanistan you
    3         would be providing direction and control to the soldiers
    4         in the field?
    5                 A.  When I was there, yes.
    6   20.           Q.  They would be looking ultimately to your
    7         command and direction with respect to detention and
    8         capture of individuals?
    9                 A.  I was part of that overall direction that was
   10         provided to soldiers on the ground at that time, yes.
   11   21.           Q.  You would be in discussions with your
   12         subordinates about the reasons why individuals would be
   13         detained?
   14                 A.  Yes.
   15   22.           Q.  In fact, Colonel Noonan, when there's a
   16         determination about whether to release or to transfer
   17         someone to Afghan authorities you were the responsible
   18         officer to make that decision?  Isn't that so?
   19                 A.  That's correct.
   20   23.           Q.  You would look at documents like this, I
   21         understand, to make that kind of determination?
   22                 A.  That's correct.
   23   24.           Q.  You would review the information that you had
   24         on hand to then come to a conclusion whether the person
   25         gave you personally a reasonable belief that he or she may

                                                             8
    1         be a person who should be detained further and
    2         transferred?
    3                 A.  That's correct.
    4   25.           Q.  In that capacity what are some of the things
    5         in these documents that would lead you to believe this
    6         person should be further detained?
    7                 MR. GRAHAM:  I object.  Again this calls for
    8         speculation.  This witness has said he hasn't seen the
    9         documents before.  He doesn't know the facts of these
   10         cases.  You're asking him to speculate as to whether or
   11         not a case for release or further detention has been made
   12         out.                                                         *O*
   13                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   14   26.           Q.  What are the sort of things that you look for,
   15         Colonel Noonan, to determine whether a case has been made
   16         for detention or release?  For someone who hasn't been
   17         involved in combat per se, what are some of the things
   18         that you would look for in that role?
   19                 A.  When I was there?
   20   27.           Q.  Yes.
   21                 A.  I think we need to be clear when I was there
   22         we did not detain in the same context that we are
   23         detaining right now.  We are part of a transition from
   24         Kabul to Kandahar.  The circumstances under which
   25         detention would occur under my command were different.

                                                             9
    1         The process under which we were to process any potential
    2         detainees was different.
    3   28.           Q.  In what way?
    4                 A.  The threat under which we were operating was
    5         not characterised the same.  The chain of command and
    6         force structure within which we operated was not the same.
    7   29.           Q.  But you did sit in that position and did make
    8         determinations a number of times about whether to detain
    9         or transfer?
   10                 A.  I didn't make determinations on detainees
   11         except in three cases.
   12   30.           Q.  Colonel Noonan, I would like to ask you some
   13         questions about a few Canadian Forces military documents.
   14         They are documents in your affidavit.  They are documents
   15         in the affidavit of Yavar Hameed.  The volume I would like
   16         to take you to is Volume II.  At Exhibit R there is the
   17         Canadian Forces Military Police Doctrine.  Are you
   18         familiar with that document?  Have you seen it before?
   19                 A.  I have not read that particular document in
   20         detail.
   21   31.           Q.  I just want to take you to a passage here.  Go
   22         to the table of contents and then it's about eight pages
   23         in.  It starts with "Chapter Five, Detention Operations."
   24         Paragraph 2 says the following,
   25                 "Defeating the enemy without rounds fired,

                                                            10
    1         injuries, or single death is the ultimate success a
    2         commander can hope to achieve but this is unlikely.  If
    3         prisoners of war are treated in accordance with the Geneva
    4         Conventions, they may find their living conditions
    5         superior to those offered by their own units.  Coalition
    6         forces during the Gulf War of 1990 found enemy soldiers
    7         were happy to be captured and to obtain the basic
    8         necessities of life after extended periods of poor living
    9         conditions.  The end results were favourable to the allies
   10         in many ways, fewer casualties on both sides and the
   11         garnering of excellent public opinion.  Mistreatment of
   12         prisoners of war is militarily unwise, illegal, inhumane,
   13         and immoral."
   14                 Colonel, I just want to ask you a question about
   15         the issue of the military wisdom of handling detainees
   16         humanely.  It's my understanding from this that if
   17         military units are capturing prisoners and treat them in a
   18         humane manner and it becomes known among the enemy that
   19         this is going to happen, it may well reduce the risk
   20         militarily of prolonged combat because people would be
   21         more inclined to surrender in those circumstances.  Would
   22         you agree with that?
   23                 A.  In the context of Afghanistan we use the term
   24         prisoners of war to describe the level of treatment that
   25         we would like to accord the detainees, the persons that we

                                                            11
    1         detain.  The people that we detain in Afghanistan are not
    2         prisoners of war.
    3   32.           Q.  But there's a reason why, I understand, that
    4         we treat them to the same standard of prisoners of war is
    5         because we think that might be militarily wise in some way
    6         among other reasons, that they might be more inclined to
    7         surrender if they know they're going to be treated to the
    8         highest standard possible?
    9                 A.  It is certainly my belief that the reason why
   10         treatment of them to the same, the detainees in
   11         Afghanistan to the same levels of POWs is that it is one
   12         of the recognised international standards to which we
   13         should treat our detainees.
   14   33.           Q.  Would you agree with that military argument
   15         that it is militarily wise to do so?
   16                 A.  As in most things that are based on tactics,
   17         tactics are about principles and there's a level of
   18         agreement and a level of disagreement at any one point
   19         that is in the commander's prerogative of how he wants to
   20         prosecute any given action.
   21   34.           Q.  As a general principle, Colonel, you would
   22         agree that treating detainees to the highest standard is
   23         militarily wise because it may lead them to surrender more
   24         easily?
   25                 MR. GRAHAM:  The witness has said that it's a

                                                            12
    1         matter of discretion for the commander depending upon the
    2         circumstances.
    3                 MR. CHAMP:  I don't think he answered my question.
    4         That's why I'm asking it again.
    5                 THE WITNESS:  I would agree that it is one of the
    6         factors on which you would base the determination of the
    7         standard that you would provide them.  The overriding
    8         factor is that as military commanders, they're still
    9         humans and you treat detainees in a humane fashion as is
   10         dictated by international law.
   11                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   12   35.           Q.  That's ethical?
   13                 A.  Right.
   14   36.           Q.  That's why this statement says "Mistreatment
   15         of prisoners of war is militarily unwise, illegal,
   16         inhumane, and immoral"?  There's a difference between
   17         morality and legality obviously.  Canadians are proud of
   18         our Canadian Forces without question.  We adhere to that
   19         highest standard but there are other military pragmatic
   20         reasons why it can be wise as well.  That's what I'm
   21         suggesting to you.
   22                 A.  And there are reasons why the optionality
   23         needs to be there because it's about discretion at the
   24         tactical level.
   25   37.           Q.  Would you say that the converse is true, if a

                                                            13
    1         military force abused or tortured a prisoner, that the
    2         enemy on the other side may fight more fiercely?
    3                 A.  Again it's not a speculation in the legal
    4         sense.  It depends on the enemy.  It's also speculation
    5         because Canadian Forces soldiers wouldn't do that.
    6   38.           Q.  Of course.
    7                 A.  So I'm not understanding why we're ---
    8   39.           Q.  I'm just asking you as military doctrine and
    9         sort of general principles of warfare, things that you've
   10         been trained in I imagine over the years.
   11                 A.  I suppose we're probably getting into too fine
   12         a level of detail but if we bring it back to the
   13         principles of use of minimum force and proportionality,
   14         the optionality that is presented to us in any armed
   15         conflict of capture, kill, or be kill is the three
   16         outcomes that we have when we're engaged in armed
   17         conflict.  Optionality presented to us of killing or
   18         capturing provides us a modicum of possibility of success.
   19         We need that optionality.
   20   40.           Q.  The optionality to ---
   21                 A.  Capture or kill.
   22   41.           Q.  That's not the question I was asking you.  I
   23         was asking you about military warfare principles in
   24         general and I was suggesting to you that a military force
   25         that mistreats detainees may encounter military problems

                                                            14
    1         from doing so.
    2                 MR. GRAHAM:  And the witness has said that the
    3         Canadian Forces wouldn't do that so he couldn't speculate
    4         on it.
    5                 MR. CHAMP:  That's not the question I was asking
    6         him.  I was asking him based on his training whether he
    7         can speak to that.
    8                 THE WITNESS:  As a proponent of someone that
    9         agrees that you don't mistreat detainees -- I'm just
   10         trying to answer your question in a fair manner ---
   11                 MR. CHAMP:  I'm glad to hear that.
   12                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   13   42.           Q.  Colonel Noonan, let's take it out of this
   14         circumstance.  If Taliban or Al-Quaida combatants know
   15         that if they are captured by Canadian Forces they are
   16         going to be transferred to those who will torture them,
   17         that may cause those combatants to fight more fiercely.
   18         Would you agree with that proposition?
   19                 A.  I can't speculate on the Taliban except to
   20         tell you how I can characterise what they would do.  They
   21         don't capture people.  If they do, it's not capture.  It's
   22         taking hostage.  That is the nature of the enemy that
   23         we're combating.  To what end they fight, to what degree
   24         they fight, it has -- they will only fight when they have
   25         tactical advantage.  To what degree and what factors they

                                                            15
    1         will assess in their own minds at any given time would be
    2         their subsequent treatment after capture would be one of
    3         their factors which I believe answers both your questions.
    4   43.           Q.  I'll take you now to your affidavit, sir.  At
    5         paragraph 23 of your affidavit you speak to the command of
    6         Canadian Forces and the control of Canadian Forces.  Can
    7         you describe the difference you mean between command and
    8         control?
    9                 A.  Operational control allows a superior
   10         headquarters to assign tasks to a subordinate headquarters
   11         or to a subordinate unit or formation but it does not
   12         allow them to break up that subordinate force in any
   13         discrete parts to do any discrete taskings.  Operational
   14         command allows for missions to be given to any subordinate
   15         force and allows the break up of that force to achieve
   16         discrete missions and tasks.
   17   44.           Q.  So if I can paraphrase what you're saying,
   18         operational control means assigning a task and operational
   19         command is how you perform the task?
   20                 A.  No.  A mission is executed in a sequence of
   21         tasks so operational control allows the assignment of
   22         tasks to certain formations.  It doesn't allow them to
   23         change the mission.  Operational command, you can change
   24         the mission and you can change the force structure of that
   25         subordinate command.

                                                            16
 

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