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BLOGSPOT:
CANADA MILITARY NEWS- (Part 2) the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops.... A BIG READ if interested (PART 2)
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BLOGSPOT:
CANADA MILITARY NEWS- the horrific
betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and
Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged
torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian
troops.... A BIG READ if interested /PART 1
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2
1 COLONEL STEVEN NOONAN, SWORN:
2 EXAMINATION BY MR. CHAMP:
3
MR. CHAMP: Good afternoon, Colonel Noonan.
4 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon.
5 MR. CHAMP: Thanks for making yourself available
6
for us this afternoon.
7 MR. GRAHAM: Counsel, before we begin I have an
8
amendment to make with respect to the affidavit. If I
9
could ask you to turn to paragraph 54 on page 14? As of
10
the date of swearing of the affidavit that statement was
11
true. The Canadian Forces have
since detained persons.
12
They have since determined those persons are not a
13
security threat and they are in the process of being
14
released. That's all I can say on
that issue.
15
BY MR. CHAMP:
16
1. Q. Colonel Noonan, I understand that you were
17
commander of Task Force Afghanistan for about eight
18
months, nine months?
19 A. From August '05 to March '06.
20 2.
Q. Now you are commander of
CEFCOM?
21 A. No. I
am a staff officer, J3, head of the
22
operations branch for Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
23
or CEFCOM.
24
3. Q. Who is the commander of CEFCOM?
25 A. The commander is Lieutenant General Gauthier.
3
1
4. Q. Colonel Noonan, we're here today to talk a
2
little bit about detainees or individuals that the
3
Canadian Forces have detained in Afghanistan. The first
4
question I would like to ask you, sir, is about who are
5
the people the Canadian Forces are detaining. It's my
6
understanding from documents that I've seen that it's not
7
simply people who are engaged in combat but it's other
8
individuals, a wide spectrum of individuals that the
9
Canadian Forces may detain if for some reason they think
10
there are other reasons that they might be suspicious.
11 A. The people that we detain are those people
12
that we consider to be a threat to the local security at
13
the time.
14
5. Q. That would include some people who are not
15
engaged in combat?
16 A. That's correct.
17
6. Q. Sometimes people will just be in an area
where
18
Canadian Forces feel they shouldn't be or are suspicious
19
if there are any individuals in that area and stop them,
20
question them, and then just based on the questioning or
21
perhaps a search they think it's appropriate to detain
22
them?
23 A. They will have either committed an act or
24
indicated an intent or will have been acting suspicious
25
enough that we would want to ascertain why they're acting
4
1
in such a manner.
2
7. Q. Those would be people that you would detain?
3 A. They aren't detained at that particular
point.
4
They are asked questions to determine if they are a threat
5
at that particular point to confirm whether they are or
6
not.
7
8. Q. And searched?
8 A. If it is considered that the risk is such
that
9
it needs to be further
mitigated, they can be searched and
10
restrained if required.
11
9. Q. What are some of the reasons or grounds that
12
would lead them to be detained after a search?
13 A. Just to be clear, after a search?
14
10. Q. Following a search what would lead the
15
individual to be detained? What
are some examples?
16 A. Just to clarify some of the points perhaps in
17
the affidavit in terms of the process, when a person is in
18
circumstances under which there is suspicion that he or
19
she may be a threat to the security they are stopped and
20
if after questioning it is determined that there is
21
grounds on which that suspicion needs to be further
22
investigated, they will be searched.
As I said before, if
23
they are acting in such a manner that requires it, they
24
will be restrained and then they will further be handled
25
to determine whether they are considered to be a continued
5
1
threat. Some of the indications
can be location of where
2
they are.
3
11. Q. Colonel Noonan, you're aware of complaints to
4
the Military Police Complaints Commission concerning
5
handling of detainees?
6 A. Yes, I am.
7
12. Q. I'm handing you and your counsel a document
of
8
two witness statements that are documents in the
9
possession of the Military Police Complaints Commission in
10
connection with the Attaran complaint.
These witness
11
statements were disclosed to Professor Attaran pursuant to
12
the Access to Information and as I understand it they are
13
witness statements of the Canadian Forces personnel who
14
captured one of those
individuals.
15 Colonel Noonan, I'm just going
to ask you just the
16
format of that document, does the format of that document
17
look familiar to you?
18 A. Yes.
19
13. Q. It's Annex E to TSO or theatre standing
order,
20
I gather?
21 A. Yes.
22
14. Q. Can you just explain what the purpose of this
23
form is?
24 A. As part of the detainee process?
25
15. Q. Yes.
6
1 A. It is outlined in the affidavit. There are a
2
couple of procedures that we -- part of the process of
3
handling detainees in a manner that we can ascertain the
4
threat or can catalogue what actions we've taken with the
5
detainee throughout that process.
We use this particular
6
form as part of our cataloguing process of activities that
7
have been conducted.
8
16. Q. It's my understanding the purpose is to
9
catalogue the reasons or ground for the initial detention.
10 A. It could be and it is also used as what
11
actions were conducted during that process.
12
17. Q. Have you ever had an opportunity to see these
13
documents before?
14 A. This particular one, no.
15
18. Q. Can you just review the documents for a
16
moment? In these two different
witness statements of the
17
same incident it's my understanding that it's an
18
individual who was in the wrong area.
He was stopped as
19
he appeared to be observing CF activity.
He was later
20
captured again and found to have a cell phone and a
21
mirror. From the details that are
in this document what
22
would your view be why the members in questions detained
23
this individual?
24 MR. GRAHAM: Don't answer that question. It calls
25
for speculation.
*O*
7
1 BY MR. CHAMP:
2
19. Q. As commander of Task Force Afghanistan you
3
would be providing direction and control to the soldiers
4
in the field?
5 A. When I was there, yes.
6
20. Q. They would be looking ultimately to your
7
command and direction with respect to detention and
8
capture of individuals?
9 A. I was part of that overall direction that was
10
provided to soldiers on the ground at that time, yes.
11
21. Q. You would be in discussions with your
12
subordinates about the reasons why individuals would be
13
detained?
14
A. Yes.
15
22. Q. In fact, Colonel Noonan, when there's a
16
determination about whether to release or to transfer
17
someone to Afghan authorities you were the responsible
18
officer to make that decision?
Isn't that so?
19 A. That's correct.
20
23. Q. You would look at documents like this, I
21
understand, to make that kind of determination?
22 A. That's correct.
23
24. Q. You would review the information that you had
24
on hand to then come to a conclusion whether the person
25
gave you personally a reasonable belief that he or she may
8
1
be a person who should be detained further and
2
transferred?
3 A. That's correct.
4
25. Q. In that capacity what are some of the things
5
in these documents that would lead you to believe this
6
person should be further detained?
7 MR. GRAHAM: I object.
Again this calls for
8
speculation. This witness has
said he hasn't seen the
9
documents before. He doesn't know
the facts of these
10
cases. You're asking him to
speculate as to whether or
11
not a case for release or further detention has been made
12
out.
*O*
13 BY MR. CHAMP:
14
26. Q. What are the sort of things that you look
for,
15
Colonel Noonan, to determine whether a case has been made
16
for detention or release? For
someone who hasn't been
17
involved in combat per se, what are some of the things
18
that you would look for in that role?
19 A. When I was there?
20
27. Q. Yes.
21 A. I think we need to be clear when I was there
22
we did not detain in the same context that we are
23
detaining right now. We are part
of a transition from
24
Kabul to Kandahar. The
circumstances under which
25
detention would occur under my command were different.
9
1
The process under which we were to process any potential
2
detainees was different.
3
28. Q. In what way?
4 A. The threat under which we were operating was
5
not characterised the same. The
chain of command and
6
force structure within which we operated was not the same.
7
29. Q. But you did sit in that position and did make
8
determinations a number of times about whether to detain
9
or transfer?
10 A. I didn't make determinations on detainees
11
except in three cases.
12
30. Q.
Colonel Noonan, I would like to ask you some
13
questions about a few Canadian Forces military documents.
14
They are documents in your affidavit.
They are documents
15
in the affidavit of Yavar Hameed.
The volume I would like
16
to take you to is Volume II. At
Exhibit R there is the
17
Canadian Forces Military Police Doctrine. Are you
18
familiar with that document? Have
you seen it before?
19 A. I have not read that particular document in
20
detail.
21
31. Q. I just want to take you to a passage
here. Go
22
to the table of contents and then it's about eight pages
23
in. It starts with "Chapter
Five, Detention Operations."
24
Paragraph 2 says the following,
25 "Defeating the enemy
without rounds fired,
10
1
injuries, or single death is the ultimate success a
2
commander can hope to achieve but this is unlikely. If
3
prisoners of war are treated in accordance with the Geneva
4
Conventions, they may find their living conditions
5
superior to those offered by their own units. Coalition
6
forces during the Gulf War of 1990 found enemy soldiers
7
were happy to be captured and to obtain the basic
8
necessities of life after extended periods of poor living
9
conditions. The end results were
favourable to the allies
10
in many ways, fewer casualties on both sides and the
11
garnering of excellent public opinion.
Mistreatment of
12
prisoners of war is militarily unwise, illegal, inhumane,
13
and immoral."
14 Colonel, I just want to ask
you a question about
15
the issue of the military wisdom of handling detainees
16
humanely. It's my understanding
from this that if
17
military units are capturing
prisoners and treat them in a
18
humane manner and it becomes known among the enemy that
19
this is going to happen, it may well reduce the risk
20
militarily of prolonged combat because people would be
21
more inclined to surrender in those circumstances. Would
22
you agree with that?
23 A. In the context of Afghanistan we use the term
24
prisoners of war to describe the level of treatment that
25
we would like to accord the detainees, the persons that we
11
1
detain. The people that we detain
in Afghanistan are not
2
prisoners of war.
3
32. Q. But there's a reason why, I understand, that
4
we treat them to the same standard of prisoners of war is
5
because we think that might be militarily wise in some way
6 among other reasons, that they might be
more inclined to
7
surrender if they know they're going to be treated to the
8
highest standard possible?
9 A. It is certainly my belief that the reason why
10 treatment of them to the same, the
detainees in
11
Afghanistan to the same levels of POWs is that it is one
12
of the recognised international standards to which we
13
should treat our detainees.
14
33. Q.
Would you agree with that military argument
15
that it is militarily wise to do so?
16 A. As in most things that are based on tactics,
17
tactics are about principles and there's a level of
18
agreement and a level of disagreement at any one point
19
that is in the commander's prerogative of how he wants to
20
prosecute any given action.
21
34. Q. As a general principle, Colonel, you would
22
agree that treating detainees to the highest standard is
23
militarily wise because it may lead them to surrender more
24
easily?
25 MR. GRAHAM: The witness has said that it's a
12
1
matter of discretion for the commander depending upon the
2
circumstances.
3 MR. CHAMP: I don't think he answered my question.
4
That's why I'm asking it again.
5
THE WITNESS: I would agree that it is one of the
6
factors on which you would base the determination of the
7
standard that you would provide them.
The overriding
8
factor is that as military commanders, they're still
9
humans and you treat detainees in a humane fashion as is
10
dictated by international law.
11 BY MR. CHAMP:
12
35. Q. That's ethical?
13 A. Right.
14
36. Q.
That's why this statement says "Mistreatment
15
of prisoners of war is militarily unwise, illegal,
16
inhumane, and immoral"?
There's a difference between
17
morality and legality obviously.
Canadians are proud of
18
our Canadian Forces without question.
We adhere to that
19
highest standard but there are other military pragmatic
20
reasons why it can be wise as well.
That's what I'm
21
suggesting to you.
22
A. And there are reasons why the optionality
23
needs to be there because it's about discretion at the
24
tactical level.
25
37. Q. Would you say that the converse is true, if a
13
1
military force abused or tortured a prisoner, that the
2
enemy on the other side may fight more fiercely?
3 A. Again it's not a speculation in the legal
4
sense. It depends on the
enemy. It's also speculation
5
because Canadian Forces soldiers wouldn't do that.
6
38. Q. Of course.
7 A. So I'm not understanding why we're ---
8
39. Q. I'm just asking you as military doctrine and
9
sort of general principles of warfare, things that you've
10
been trained in I imagine over the years.
11 A. I suppose we're probably getting into too
fine
12
a level of detail but if we bring it back to the
13
principles of use of minimum force and proportionality,
14
the optionality that is presented to us in any armed
15
conflict of capture, kill, or be kill is the three
16
outcomes that we have when we're engaged in armed
17
conflict. Optionality presented
to us of killing or
18
capturing provides us a modicum of possibility of success.
19
We need that optionality.
20
40. Q. The optionality to ---
21 A. Capture or kill.
22
41. Q. That's not the question I was asking
you. I
23
was asking you about military warfare principles in
24
general and I was suggesting to you that a military force
25
that mistreats detainees may encounter military problems
14
1
from doing so.
2 MR. GRAHAM: And the witness has said that the
3
Canadian Forces wouldn't do that so he couldn't speculate
4
on it.
5 MR. CHAMP: That's not the question I was asking
6
him. I was asking him based on
his training whether he
7
can speak to that.
8 THE WITNESS: As a proponent of someone that
9
agrees that you don't mistreat detainees -- I'm just
10
trying to answer your question in a fair manner ---
11 MR. CHAMP: I'm glad to hear that.
12 BY MR. CHAMP:
13
42. Q. Colonel Noonan, let's take it out of this
14
circumstance. If Taliban or
Al-Quaida combatants know
15
that if they are captured by Canadian Forces they are
16 going to be transferred to those who
will torture them,
17
that may cause those combatants to fight more fiercely.
18
Would you agree with that proposition?
19 A. I can't speculate on the Taliban except to
20
tell you how I can characterise what they would do. They
21
don't capture people. If they do,
it's not capture. It's
22
taking hostage. That is the
nature of the enemy that
23
we're combating. To what end they
fight, to what degree
24
they fight, it has -- they will only fight when they have
25
tactical advantage. To what
degree and what factors they
15
1 will assess in their own minds at any
given time would be
2
their subsequent treatment after capture would be one of
3
their factors which I believe answers both your questions.
4
43. Q. I'll take you now to your affidavit,
sir. At
5
paragraph 23 of your affidavit you speak to the command of
6
Canadian Forces and the control of Canadian Forces. Can
7
you describe the difference you mean between command and
8
control?
9 A. Operational control allows a superior
10
headquarters to assign tasks to a subordinate headquarters
11
or to a subordinate unit or formation but it does not
12
allow them to break up that subordinate force in any
13
discrete parts to do any discrete taskings. Operational
14
command allows for missions to be given to any subordinate
15
force and allows the break up of that force to achieve
16
discrete missions and tasks.
17
44. Q. So if I can paraphrase what you're saying,
18
operational control means assigning a task and operational
19
command is how you perform the task?
20 A. No. A mission
is executed in a sequence of
21
tasks so operational control allows the assignment of
22
tasks to certain formations. It
doesn't allow them to
23
change the mission. Operational
command, you can change
24
the mission and you can change
the force structure of that
25
subordinate command.
16
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