Thursday, September 3, 2015

CANADA MILITARY NEWS-(Part IV) the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops....Amnesty Int/BCCL/betrayal- A BIG READ if interested /PART IV






BLOGSPOT:

CANADA MILITARY NEWS-(Part 3) the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops....Amnesty Int/BCCL/betrayal- A BIG READ if interested /PART 3



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BLOGSPOT:

CANADA MILITARY NEWS- (Part 2) the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops.... A BIG READ if interested (PART 2)



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BLOGSPOT:
CANADA MILITARY NEWS- the horrific betrayal of Canadian troops whlst at war in Afghanistan- NDP/Green/Bloc - and Civil Liberties BC (who make $$$$millions off our tax dollars) - alleged torture of Afghan Terrorists transfered to Afghan authorities by Canadian troops.... A BIG READ if interested /PART 1



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PART IV

  1   45.           Q.  Operational control allows to assign tasks and
    2         operational command determines how the task is carried
    3         out?  Is that fair?
    4                 A.  I suppose an example is probably the best way
    5         of doing it and an example of Afghanistan.
    6   46.           Q.  Sure.
    7                 A.  Operational command is retained by national
    8         authorities and operational control is given to ISAF which
    9         is the formation through which NATO is exercising the
   10         conduct of the tasks in Afghanistan.  As we place our
   11         forces under operational control of NATO we have come to
   12         an agreement with NATO that the mission in Afghanistan is
   13         congruent with Canadian aims and that NATO can assign
   14         tasks to our forces in Afghanistan in the attainment of
   15         that mission, however, that national command overrides
   16         that and therefore the duties that are assigned to the
   17         Canadian Forces ISAF personnel in Afghanistan need to
   18         remain consistent with our direction, Canadian direction,
   19         so therefore we always hold the ability to say no to
   20         military  tasks.
   21   47.           Q.  From that I understand that Canadian Forces
   22         aren't bound by ISAF policy.  In other words, Canadian
   23         command could override ISAF policy?
   24                 A.  Once we've entered into an agreement with ISAF
   25         policy we are bound by that policy.  In the execution of


                                                            17
    1         mission, we'll act within that policy.
    2   48.           Q.  I take it we would have the right to give
    3         notice to ISAF that we're not following a particular
    4         policy any more?
    5                 A.  Yes, and then there would be a requirement to
    6         gain a convergence again so that operating within the
    7         coalition, both parties, both national interests and NATO
    8         interests converge again, so it's in agreement again.
    9   49.           Q.  With respect to the 96-hour detention policy
   10         of ISAF you would agree with me that it is possible for
   11         Canadian Forces to hold beyond 96 hours?  There are
   12         circumstances when we've done that?
   13                 A.  Could I just refresh myself where I said it's
   14         96 hours?
   15   50.           Q.  It's in paragraph 41.  At anytime, Colonel,
   16         take your time.  If you want to stop and review things,
   17         that's perfectly fine.
   18                 A.  The ISAF policy is one that is, just to give
   19         the framework within which is operates, the 96 hours is
   20         one that nations have agreed to as being a reasonable
   21         amount of time for us to be able to determine whether to
   22         release or to transfer.
   23   51.           Q.  But it is possible in certain circumstances
   24         for us to hold longer than 96 hours?
   25                 A. Yes, if the case is made that there is a


                                                            18
    1         requirement to do so.
    2   52.           Q.  That determination would be made by the
    3         commander of Task Force Afghanistan?
    4                 A.  In concert with commander ISAF.
    5   53.           Q.  You would advise ISAF but would not take
    6         orders from ISAF on that issue, would he?
    7                 A.  He would certainly take into account ISAF's
    8         point of view.  Just from historical purposes we have had
    9         detainees that were detained beyond the 96-hour time frame
   10         but for medical reasons.  One of the main determinants of
   11         when we hand over detainees to Afghan authorities is that
   12         they are in good enough physical condition that this
   13         transfer can be effected.
   14   54.           Q.  Do we have any reporting obligation to ISAF in
   15         those circumstances?
   16                 A.  We do do that reporting to ISAF through
   17         regional command south and to national authorities in
   18         CEFCOM.  I don't know if we have an obligation.  It is
   19         practised though that we do inform them that we are
   20         keeping beyond 96 for the following reasons, et cetera.
   21   55.           Q.  If I take you to Exhibit G of your affidavit,
   22         you call these detainee handling deck cards or something.
   23         They're ---
   24                 A.  The slide deck.
   25   56.           Q.  If you go to page 583, the top right corner,


                                                            19
    1         at the top there's a flow chart Detainee Handling Detainee
    2         Procedural Framework and I note that it flows down and in
    3         the middle if you decide to detain ANSF, Afghan National
    4         Security Force, is present on the object of a TFA.  If
    5         it's yes, there's a few things you do.  If it's no, then
    6         TFA, Task Force Afghanistan, notifies CEFCOM?
    7                 A.  Yes.
    8   57.           Q.  Then I note in the lower right-hand corner
    9         that when it comes time for us to transfer an individual
   10         to Afghan government custody following detention the
   11         Government of Canada notifies the ICRC.  I didn't see

   12         anything in there that says that we notify ISAF.
   13                 A.  It's not explicit there.  It's certainly
   14         practised though.
   15   58.           Q.  Incidently while we're on it I also note that
   16         if you go to the middle box where it's "detain" on its own
   17         and then the next box says "Our Afghan National Security
   18         Force is present on the objective with TFA."  That's if
   19         they're in the field with them, I gather?
   20                 A.  Yes.
   21   59.           Q.  If that's a yes then it goes to the next box
   22         where it says "Is the Afghan Security Force capable or
   23         willing to take immediate possession of individual in
   24         question?"  That would be like a battlefield transfer?
   25                 A.  That's one of the examples, yes.


                                                            20
    1   60.           Q.  If it's yes then arrange his immediate
    2         transfer.  In those circumstances ICRC is not notified is
    3         my understanding.
    4                 A.  No, they are.  If we have detained them and we
    5         have handed them over to ANSF, ICRC is informed of that
    6         because it is a transfer of our detention to them.
    7   61.           Q.  The way I was reading it is that if it's in
    8         the field and it's so quickly after the battle there is no
    9         notification of the ICRC just because I don't see any
   10         arrow there to where we notify ICRC.  It's only if the
   11         ANSF is not willing to detain them in the field we then
   12         take them out and that's when we go through our more
   13         formal detainee processing chain.
   14                 A.  No.  If we have detained them as Canadian
   15         Forces detainees and we hand them over to the ANSF, even
   16         on the battlefield, we will complete the administrative
   17         process through what is called the Annex F which is the
   18         Notice of Transfer and ICRC will be informed .
   19   62.           Q.  Colonel Noonan, I read your affidavit.  Would
   20         you agree with me that the capacity for humane treatment
   21         and detention of prisoners is a necessary corollary of
   22         combat operations?
   23                 A.  I don't understand the question.
   24   63.           Q.  That being able to provide humane treatment to
   25         detainees is necessary if you're going to engage in combat


                                                            21
    1         operations?
    2                 A.  It's whatever has been agreed to as to the
    3         process.  We would have the necessary facilities to do
    4         that.
    5   64.           Q.  What I'm suggesting to you is it's a necessary
    6         part of the mission.  For example if you're going to send
    7         off a unit of 100 soldiers, you've got to have someone
    8         there who can cook and by the same token if 100 soldiers
    9         are going out on a combat operation where it's expected
   10         they may capture and detain an individual, it should be
   11         expected that we have the capacity to hold that individual
   12         in a humane manner?
   13                 A.  To process that individual.  We have to have
   14         the capacity to process that individual in whatever manner
   15         that that theatre of operations is mandated to do.
   16   65.           Q.  So you have to have some provision for long-
   17         term detention?
   18                 A.  No.  We have to have provision for the
   19         processing of detainees in whatever theatre that we go to.
   20         In Afghanistan the provision was that we would transfer
   21         our detainees to Afghan authorities within 96 hours or as
   22         soon as practical.
   23   66.           Q.  Let me put it another way.  Let's say that the
   24         Afghan authorities and the American authorities refused to
   25         take any detainees from Canadian soldiers for whatever


                                                            22
    1         reason.  Then we would no longer be able to engage in
    2         combat operations, I take it?
    3                 MR. GRAHAM:  This is a matter of speculation.        *O*
    4                 THE WITNESS:  That's the speculation part.  It
    5         would have an impact.
    6                 BY MR. CHAMP:
    7   67.           Q.  It's important?  Well, sir, let's go to your
    8         affidavit then.  Paragraph 29 of your affidavit says the
    9         following, "Detention is integral to the broad spectrum of
   10         CF operations including combat.  Not having the option to
   11         capture the enemy is not an acceptable or appropriate
   12         military solution."
   13                 A.  That's correct.
   14   68.           Q.  You swore to that and that's true?
   15                 A.  Yes.
   16   69.           Q.  In other words, if we do not have the option
   17         of capturing the enemy, we cannot engage in combat
   18         operations, correct?
   19                 A.  That's correct.
   20   70.           Q.  So if we do not have the capacity to hold
   21         someone then we cannot engage in military operations?
   22                 A.  It doesn't necessarily follow.
   23   71.           Q.  What would we do with them?
   24                 A.  Again it's speculation because in the theatre
   25         of operations that we have agreed to conduct operations in


                                                            23
    1         there is the ability to detain and a process by which we
    2         transfer these detainees to the Afghan government so we
    3         have set up the necessary facilities that is required to
    4         do that and assigned appropriate resources.
    5   72.           Q.  We've been in Afghanistan now for over five
    6         years, Colonel?
    7                 A.  Off and on.  We had an initial commitment
    8         under Operation Apollo.  That stopped.  That was 2002 and
    9         then we re-engaged in Afghanistan in 2003 under Operation
   10         Athena.
   11                 MR. GRAHAM:  There was a break of about three
   12         months or so.
   13                 THE WITNESS:  I can't remember the exact dates but
   14         there was a break.
   15                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   16   73.           Q.  Since January 2002 Canadian soldiers have been
   17         in Afghanistan almost the entire time with the exception
   18         of a few months?
   19                 A.  With that exception.
   20   74.           Q.  Throughout that time have we considered
   21         developing the capacity to hold detainees ourselves?
   22                 A.  We have not had to, no, because of the
   23         arrangements that have been made.
   24   75.           Q.  We've never considered the option?
   25                 A.  We've never had to consider the option.


                                                            24
    1   76.           Q.  We've never discussed it?
    2                 A.  I wouldn't be able to say that.
    3   77.           Q.  We do have plans for building long-term
    4         detention facilities, do we not, Colonel?
    5                 A.  A plan?
    6   78.           Q.  In Prisoner of War and Detainee Doctrine, the
    7         Canadian Forces, we have plans for building and staffing
    8         and managing a prisoner of war or detainee holding
    9         facility?
   10                 A.  It's not a plan.  It's an approach to
   11         establishing a prisoner of war camp.
   12   79.           Q.  It's plans if we wanted to establish one,
   13         correct?
   14                 A.  I suppose it can be characterised as a plan to
   15         establish a prisoner of war camp.
   16                 MR. GRAHAM:  Are you referring to a document in
   17         particular?
   18                 MR. CHAMP:  Yes.  If you go to Volume II of the
   19         affidavit of Yavar Hameed and you go to Exhibit Q, it's
   20         the ---
   21                 MR. GRAHAM:  I'm looking at a document entitled
   22         Prisoner of War Handling Detainees and Interrogation and
   23         Tactical Questioning.
   24                 MR. CHAMP:  In International Operations, Joint
   25         Doctrine Manual.


                                                            25
    1                 MR. GRAHAM:  Yes.
    2                 BY MR. CHAMP:
    3   80.           Q.  So you're familiar with that document, sir?
    4                 A.  Not in detail but I'm familiar with it.
    5   81.           Q.  If you go to page 3E6, it starts with a
    6         chapter about the prisoners of war camp, all the
    7         construction requirements set out in this annex for the PW
    8         holding area and the layout of the compounds enclosures of
    9         which it is made up also apply to the establishment of a
   10         PW camp.  The essential difference between the holding
   11         area and the camp is the permanence of the camp whereas
   12         the holding area is at best a semi-permanent facility.
   13         The camp is a long-term facility implying the provision of
   14         hutted accommodation, paved road, and paths and generally
   15         solid construction methods for perimeter, fences, guard
   16         towers, administrative offices. 
   17                 From that passage, Colonel Noonan, you would agree
   18         with me that the Canadian Forces do have plans for
   19         establishing long-term detention facilities if necessary?
   20                 A.  For prisoners of war.  Although we treat our
   21         detainees humanely or in terms of humanity, to the
   22         conditions of prisoners of war, they're not prisoners of
   23         war.
   24   82.           Q.  Treatment to the standard of prisoners of war
   25         except for living accommodations?


                                                            26
    1                 A.  No, that's not what I was saying.  There's no
    2         legal basis on which we take these detainees as prisoners
    3         of war.  The concept of prisoners of war is take
    4         combatants out until such time as the conflict is ceased
    5         and it is part of an international armed conflict.
    6         Detainees, we have been given permission by a recognised
    7         government to establish a security situation to assist
    8         them establishing a security situation that will allow
    9         reconstruction and development, and in conjunction with
   10         that government and in conjunction with our partners have
   11         entered into an agreement of how we are going to handle
   12         the capture of threat.
   13   83.           Q.  You're speaking about Afghanistan?
   14                 A.  Yes.
   15   84.           Q.  What I draw from your answer relative to my
   16         question is what you are saying is that Canada cannot
   17         establish a prisoner of war camp in Afghanistan because we
   18         have a different relationship with the Afghanistan
   19         government than if it were an international conflict?
   20         It's not an international conflict therefore we can't
   21         create a prisoner of war camp?  Is that what you're
   22         saying?
   23                 A.  No.  The nature of the conflict is such that
   24         although we apply some principles of the prisoners of war
   25         to the treatment levels of detainees, that they're not


                                                            27
    1         prisoners of war.  The plan that you're alluding to here
    2         is a bricks and mortar plan and doesn't provide any
    3         context as to why that facility would be established, to
    4         what level of security that that facility would have to be
    5         manned and under what mandate that it would be
    6         established.
    7   85.           Q.  Colonel Noonan, you may want some time to
    8         review this document because some of the things you're
    9         saying aren't consistent with what the document is saying.
   10         First of all it's not necessarily a bricks and mortar.
   11         There's a few different camps here.  They have ones for
   12         small if you want to hold I believe it's 20 men is the
   13         first one.  The next one is 200.  The next one is 500 and
   14         the next one 2,000.  They also have in there staffing, the
   15         staffing ratios that were required for the different sized
   16         of camps.  Are you telling me, Colonel, that you didn't
   17         have an opportunity to review this when you testified that
   18         Canada did not have the capacity to build a detainee
   19         facility in Afghanistan?
   20                 A.  No.  I'm aware of most of the contents of
   21         this.  These are plans that if we went into a conflict
   22         where prisoners of war were taken, these are the types of
   23         things that we could do.  It was a doctrinal basis on
   24         which we would prosecute prisoners of war in an armed
   25         conflict.  It identifies the resource requirement that


                                                            28
    1         could be used in a prisoner of war.
    2   86.           Q.  If we had to in an international conflict?
    3                 A.  If we had to hold prisoners of war, yes.
    4   87.           Q.  It's my understanding that soldiers and
    5         military police do get training in how to establish these
    6         facilities.  That's true?
    7                 A.  They do get training to some degree in that.
    8         I'm not the expert on to what level they get that
    9         training.
   10   88.           Q.  Colonel, it's likely that Canadian Forces will
   11         detain individuals in Afghanistan in the future?
   12                 A.  Under the current mission set, yes.
   13   89.           Q.  In the next six months how many detainees do
   14         you think we might capture in a ball park?
   15                 A.  That's speculative.  I don't have that number.
   16   90.           Q.  There's not operational plan or consideration
   17         of that issue of how many it might be?
   18                 A.  No.
   19   91.           Q.  Paragraph 52 of your affidavit you state that
   20         "Due to operational security I cannot release the numbers
   21         of detainees, however, I can confirm they are higher than
   22         that alleged in the applicants' affidavits."
   23                 A.  Right, which is in the past.
   24   92.           Q.  I think we suggested that it was at least 40
   25         up to April '07 and there's probably more since then and


                                                            29
    1         you're saying it's more than 40?  Is that right?
    2                 A.  I'm trying to be helpful here.  The numbers of
    3         detainees since we've been in Afghanistan is more than 40.
    4   93.           Q.  Is it less than 200?
    5                 MR. GRAHAM:  I object to the question.               *O*
    6                 MR. CHAMP:  He's already given an estimate, Mr.
    7         Graham.  I'm not asking for a specific number.
    8                 MR. GRAHAM:  I object.
    9                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   10   94.           Q.  Is it more than 1,000?
   11                 MR. GRAHAM:  He's given his evidence.  He can
   12         confirm they're higher than that alleged in your
   13         affidavits.
   14                 MR. CHAMP:  You can't put in a little bit and then
   15         claim privilege or national security.
   16                 MR. GRAHAM:  I am claiming privilege.  I am
   17         claiming national security with respect to those figures.    *O*
   18                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   19   95.           Q.  Colonel Noonan, your position at CEFCOM, you
   20         would get or see reports when people are detained?
   21                 A.  I will see reports of people that are detained
   22         if I ask for them or if they are flagged to me.
   23   96.           Q.  Colonel Noonan, there's no requirement or
   24         restriction in our agreements with Afghanistan that limits
   25         how long we can detain Afghanistan citizens?  Is that


                                                            30
    1         true?
    2                 A.  I'm sorry.  I didn't understand.
    3   97.           Q.  There's nothing in any of the agreements that
    4         Canada has with Afghanistan that limits the duration of
    5         time that we hold Afghan citizens?
    6                 A.  The limitation that I'm aware of is the 96-
    7         hour ISAF construct.
    8   98.           Q.  I just want to ask you a bit about what you
    9         might know about detention by Afghan authorities.  In
   10         paragraph 53 of your affidavit you say that "From March
   11         2006 to the date of swearing this affidavit Canadian
   12         Forces transferred increasingly to the NDS," the National
   13         Directorate of Security, "as a result of increased
   14         confidence in the professionalism of that organisation."
   15                 It's my understanding that the majority of our
   16         detainees are now transferred to the NDS?
   17                 A.  That has been the tendency, yes.
   18   99.           Q.  How were the other branches of the Afghan
   19         National Security Forces regarded as less professional
   20         than NDS?
   21                 A.  Only on a case-by-case basis.  You'll see in
   22         the other parts of the affidavit where there's a couple of
   23         examples where some of the other ANS forces have shown
   24         instances where we weren't as comfortable and so over a
   25         period of time and by the conduct of, and this is again


                                                            31
    1         I've been informed by other members of the Canadian
    2         Forces, that over a period of time based on their
    3         impression of the conduct of the NDS personnel that they
    4         interact with they've grown comfortable that the NDS had
    5         the professionalism required to receive our transferred
    6         detainees.
    7   100.          Q.  Meaning there would be fewer instances with
    8         the NDS?
    9                 A.  No.  That would suppose that we knew that
   10         anything was happening.  Fewer, more, less, more chance
   11         of, less likelihood of, just that we were comfortable that
   12         this was an organisation that we were comfortable with.
   13   101.          Q.  You had indicated that some other forces had
   14         shown instances where you were not as comfortable but I
   15         gather then the NDS had fewer of such instances?
   16                 A.  No.  Good point.  The AMP, in one instance the
   17         local AMP demonstrated that they weren't -- this
   18         particular element of the local AMP were not to be
   19         trusted, that we would get a level of comfort that the
   20         prisoners would not be, the detainees would not be abused
   21         and therefore we took it back from that particular local
   22         AMP.  As a matter of efficiency, as a matter of common
   23         sense we developed a linkage with the NDS.
   24   102.          Q.  This incident with the AMP, is this the
   25         incident that you've described in paragraph 56 of your


                                                            32
    1         affidavit?
    2                 A.  That's correct.
    3   103.          Q.  When did that incident occur?
    4                 MR. GRAHAM:  We object to that question.             *O*
    5                 MR. CHAMP:  On what basis?
    6                 MR. GRAHAM:  On the basis of national security.
    7                 MR. CHAMP:  It threatens Canada's national
    8         security to know when the Canadian Forces observed local
    9         Afghan National Police beating a detainee that they
   10         transferred to that unit?
   11                 MR. GRAHAM:  We object to any questions on this
   12         incident generally.                                          *O*
   13                 MR. CHAMP:  But you can swear an affidavit over it
   14         but I can't ask any questions?  Is that your position,
   15         Counsel?
   16                 MR. GRAHAM:  It is.
   17                 MR. CHAMP:  I cannot ask any questions about this?
   18         You can swear an affidavit to it but I cannot ask any
   19         questions?
   20                 MR. GRAHAM:  You have asked in number six for
   21         documents and reports concerning that incident.  You're
   22         now asking for documents and reports concerning that
   23         example and my position is that we object.
   24                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   25   104.          Q.  Colonel Noonan, you learned of this incident


                                                            33
    1         from reports I gather?
    2                 A.  I did, yes.
    3   105.          Q.  That's the basis of your information and
    4         belief?
    5                 A.  That's correct.
    6   106.          Q.  Did you ever talk to any of the individual
    7         Canadian Forces soldiers involved in that incident?
    8                 A.  No, I did not.
    9   107.          Q.  What was the medical condition of the
   10         individual?
   11                 MR. GRAHAM:  Object.                                 *O*
   12                 MR. CHAMP:  On what basis?
   13                 MR. GRAHAM:  Same basis.  Security.
   14                 MR. CHAMP:  National security?
   15                 MR. GRAHAM:  You're trying to get indirectly,
   16         Counsel, what you can't get directly.
   17                 MR. CHAMP:  I'm just trying to appreciate what
   18         aspect of this, I guess, that if we knew the date that
   19         would be some indication of when a particular combat
   20         operation occurred, when we captured someone or something
   21         but right now I'm just asking what the medical condition
   22         of the individual.
   23                 MR. GRAHAM:  I'm not prepared to allow any
   24         questions concerning paragraphs 55 and 56 other than the
   25         information that's there.


                                                            34
    1                 BY MR. CHAMP: 
    2   108.          Q.  Colonel Noonan, there is a medical examination
    3         of all detainees before they are transferred, that's my
    4         understanding?
    5                 A.  That is the current practice, yes.
    6   109.          Q.  Would there have been a medical examination of
    7         this detainee before he was transferred?
    8                 A.  I don't know.
    9   110.          Q.  Were there any charges against the ANP police
   10         involved in this matter?
   11                 A.  I don't know.
   12   111.          Q.  In paragraph 55 you describe another incident.
   13         Is that the incident that was reported by CTV television
   14         or is that a different incident?
   15                 A.  I'm not sure.
   16   112.          Q.  Are there other incidents aside from these two
   17         that you're aware of?
   18                 A.  Incidents of?
   19   113.          Q.  Well, similar incidents where Canadian
   20         soldiers exercised their discretion to either not transfer
   21         or to take back a detainee because of concerns that the
   22         detainees were at risk?
   23                 A.  Those are the two that I am aware of.
   24   114.          Q.  At paragraph 58 you speak about "two detainees
   25         were transferred to the NDS and then we asked that they be


                                                            35
    1         returned to us for further questioning."  Was that for the
    2         purposes of some kind of charges or something against
    3         those individuals?
    4                 A.  It was for the purposes of gaining further
    5         intelligence.
    6   115.          Q.  In paragraphs 62 and 63 of your affidavit you
    7         indicate that "Canadian Forces were not aware of any
    8         specific complaints regarding treatment of detainees
    9         transferred to Afghan authorities by Canada."  Are you
   10         aware of any general complaints?
   11                 MR. GRAHAM:  What do you mean by a "general
   12         complaint"?
   13                 BY MR. CHAMP:
   14   116.          Q.  Did individuals from either other armed forces
   15         or from organizations, international NGOs, or the Afghan
   16         Independant Human Rights Commission ever say to the
   17         Canadian Forces that Canadian detainees are being abused
   18         or tortured?
   19                 A.  There was -- in my understanding there was no
   20         specific allegations or complaints raised by any of those
   21         organizations to Canadian Forces.
   22   117.          Q.  I'm not speaking about specific individuals.
   23         Just like someone saying "That's going on" because when I
   24         read "specific complaints" it sounds to me like you're
   25         trying to limit it.


                                                            36
    1                 A.  No.  There was no attempt to try and limit it.
    2         As part of the overall look at Afghanistan what -- I might
    3         be outside of my lanes here so -- we didn't receive
    4         specific complaints and access to some of the reports, I'm
    5         not sure which ones, were never specific in their
    6         allegations.  We didn't have -- we've never had a
    7         complaint that had the specificity that allowed us to
    8         investigate any further.
    9   118.          Q.  Are you aware if Canadian detainees are being
   10         segregated in some way in Afghan detention facilities?
   11                 A.  I'm not aware.
   12   119.          Q.  In paragraph 69 you refer to a meeting between
   13         Brigadier General Tim Grant and the Afghan National
   14         Directorate of Security in Kandahar, and General Grant's
   15         role there was "to facilitate access by the Commission to
   16         NDS facilities"?
   17                 A.  That was one of his aims, yes, in that initial
   18         discussion on the 25th.
   19   120.          Q.  General Grant was successful in that, I
   20         understand?
   21                 A.  Because the following day, the 26th, he
   22         facilitated the meeting between the director of the local
   23         NDS and the AIHRC individual.
   24   121.          Q.  In his role there did General Grant find out
   25         how long the Commission had not had access to the NDS


                                                            37
    1         facilities?
    2                 A.  I don't know.
    3   122.          Q.  Colonel Noonan, do you know if Canadian
    4         detainees are in a number of different detention
    5         facilities across Afghanistan?
    6                 A.  I don't know.
    7   123.          Q.  We don't know?
    8                 A.  I don't know.
    9   124.          Q.  Colonel Noonan, you are aware that there is an
   10         investigation by the National Investigation Service into
   11         allegations of certain detainees being abused?
   12                 A.  I'm aware of one request by my commander to
   13         have an allegation or a potential allegation of potential
   14         Canadian Forces member -- inappropriate behaviour by a
   15         Canadian Forces member.
   16   125.          Q.  I don't need to ask you -- I'm talking about
   17         actually the investigation that came out of the Military
   18         Police Complaints Commission complaint and the issue I
   19         want to ask you about is the efforts by the National
   20         Investigation Service to locate those three detainees to
   21         ask them questions.  It's my understanding that the NIS
   22         have not been able to locate those detainees?
   23                 A.  I don't know.
   24   126.          Q.  You have no information about that?
   25                 A.  No.


                                                            38
    1   127.          Q.  You don't know if they've located the
    2         individuals?
    3                 A.  I don't.
    4   128.          Q.  You're aware that the NIS is looking for them?
    5                 A.  No, I was not.
    6   129.          Q.  I'd like to show Colonel Noonan the
    7         Supplementary Affidavit of Alex Neve.  It's in the Motion
    8         Record, if that's what you're -- Motion Record, Volume I.
    9                 MR. GRAHAM:  Here it is.
   10                 MR. CHAMP:  Exhibit A.
   11                 MR. GRAHAM:  Exhibit A.
   12                 BY MR. CHAMP: 
   13   130.          Q.  It's a newspaper article, "Canada Loses Track
   14         of Afghan Detainees.  Do you want to just take a look at
   15         it for a couple of minutes and tell me if you have any
   16         knowledge about the matter?
   17                 MR. GRAHAM:  Counsel, I've already objected to
   18         questions going to allegations of abuse by the forces.
   19         You're not asking about that?
   20                 MR. CHAMP:  I'm not asking about that.  Absolutely
   21         not.  Sorry about that, Colonel.  Just so you're clear,
   22         I'm asking questions about the issue that these three men
   23         have vanished in Afghan custody and unable to be located.
   24                 MR. GRAHAM:  I think the witness has already told
   25         you he has no idea whether these people have been located.


                                                            39
    1                 MR. CHAMP:  I was trying to refresh his memory
    2         once he took at that.  I thought that might help him. 
    3                 BY MR. CHAMP: 
    4   131.          Q.  You have no information about that at all?
    5                 A.  Not that I'm aware of, no.
    6   132.          Q.  That doesn't cause you any concern with
    7         respect to the transfer of detainees to Afghan
    8         authorities?
    9                 A.  I don't -- I don't take military actions based
   10         on media articles although unless it makes sense to do so.
   11   133.          Q.  But the National Investigation Service are
   12         saying that they can't find these men.
   13                 MR. GRAHAM:  Well, Counsel, you're giving evidence
   14         now.  This witness has said he doesn't know that and I
   15         suggest to you your question calls for speculation as to
   16         what he might do based upon a state of knowledge he
   17         doesn't have.                                                *O*
   18                 BY MR. CHAMP: 
   19   134.          Q.  So you're saying to me, sir, that in CEFCOM no
   20         one is aware of any of that information?
   21                 A.  No.
   22   135.          Q.  No one's heard of that?  No one's aware of any
   23         vanished detainees?
   24                 A.  No.  I'm not saying that. 
   25   136.          Q.  It hasn't come up?


                                                            40
    1                 A.  No.  I am not saying that.
    2   137.          Q.  What are you saying then?
    3                 A.  What I'm saying is I'm not -- in my affidavit
    4         I'm trying to give you an idea of what I know.  I don't
    5         know the circumstances surrounding that except that
    6         someone is investigating it as you've just told me, so
    7         that's why we have an investigating service to do that for
    8         us.
    9   138.          Q.  No issues have been raised about the
   10         preliminary findings of that investigation with CEFCOM?
   11                 A.  Not that I have had to take for action.  I'm
   12         just not in the loop in that particular regard.
   13                 MR. CHAMP:  I think I'm done, Counsel.  I'm just
   14         going to take a break for two minutes or maybe five
   15         minutes.  Is that okay?
   16                 MR. GRAHAM:  Sure.
   17                 MR. CHAMP:  I should be done.
   18                               (SHORT RECESS)
   19                 THE WITNESS:  In my eagerness to provide you an
   20         answer, the article that has been presented ---
   21                 MR. GRAHAM:  This is Exhibit A to the
   22         Supplementary Affidavit of Alex Neve.
   23                 THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Right.  After having taken a
   24         look at the headline, I had thought it was talking about
   25         Canadians losing track of Afghan detainees in the process


                                                            41
    1         of it.
    2                 MR. CHAMP:  Sorry about that.
    3                 THE WITNESS:  Okay, so it's my -- well, my fault.
    4         I didn't read the entire thing.  I am aware of the
    5         incident in question on the 8th of April that's alluded to
    6         in the media.  I am not aware of the NDS -- sorry the NIS
    7         investigations that are surrounding that, so if that
    8         alters your line of questioning, I am aware of that.
    9                 MR. CHAMP:  No.  That's more what I was focusing
   10         on.
   11                 THE WITNESS:  Yes
   12                 MR. CHAMP:  That other issue has nothing to do
   13         with us as far as I'm concerned.
   14                 THE WITNESS:  Right.
   15                 MR. CHAMP:  What it is about here is the concern
   16         is that if they're transferred to the Afghan authorities
   17         and then we go asking from the Afghan authorities just
   18         tell us, we have no idea where they are any more, can't
   19         say if they were released or not or whatever, that that
   20         would be an issue of concern to us.
   21                 THE WITNESS:  So that's the clarification on that
   22         one.
   23                 BY MR. CHAMP: 
   24   139.          Q.  You would agree that is an issue of concern
   25         that if someone goes missing and they can't say what


                                                            42
    1         happened to them one way or the other, that would be an
    2         issue of concern to us?
    3                 A.  I suppose it is.  I suppose it is.
    4   140.          Q.  I don't think it's a difficult proposition.
    5                 A.  Right, yes.  It's something that we're looking
    6         at, I guess.
    7   141.          Q.  I was just looking for the portion of your
    8         affidavit -- okay.  Can I take you to paragraph 37 of your
    9         affidavit?  Paragraph 37 you say, "The Canadian Forces do
   10         not presently have the capacity or capability to establish
   11         and manage a long-term detention facility in a deployed
   12         theatre of operations." 
   13                 Are you prepared to clarify that statement in
   14         light of the doctrine now that I showed you with the
   15         plans?
   16                 A.  Sure, yes.  The doctrine gives us a feel for
   17         the prisoner of -- sorry -- a plan if we had to do a
   18         prisoner of war holding area, what it would look like.
   19         That doesn't mean that we actually have that capacity in
   20         terms of people or capability in terms of skill set and in
   21         fact we don't.
   22   142.          Q.  But you had indicated to me that people do get
   23         training to do that?
   24                 A.  They are made aware of it and they -- even in
   25         my training we have seen them -- they are made aware of


                                                            43
    1         it.  They practice it sometimes but very to small degrees,
    2         trying to maintain some kind of understanding of what it
    3         would take.
    4   143.          Q.  Do you know how long it would take to build
    5         one of those kinds of facilities?
    6                 A.  The facilities, I'm not sure.  Again I didn't
    7         want to talk about bricks and mortar.  It's about the
    8         building of the capability and capacity for us to do it.
    9         Historically, in terms of building capacity and capability
   10         within a Canadian Forces, it's measured in months and
   11         years to go from zero to -- or even the residual doctrinal
   12         basis on which we have prisoner of war camps to actual
   13         deployment of that capacity.
   14   144.          Q.  When you say "historically", what historical
   15         experience are you speaking of there?
   16                 A.  One of my previous jobs was in the force
   17         development world within the army and as we looked at
   18         trying to develop new capabilities or ensure that we don't
   19         have certain capabilities go to a point where they are no
   20         longer useful.  So if we identified a capability gap which
   21         is always the case in any kind of organization and if you
   22         needed to close that gap, that's measured in terms of --
   23         once you've identified that gap and then go towards
   24         closing that gap, it's been my experience that it's been
   25         months and years before you can actually get to that


                                                            44
    1         capability.
    2   145.          Q.  When you say "new capability" that's just in
    3         general, not with respect to detention facilities
    4         specifically?
    5                 A.  Right.  That's right.  That's a general
    6         comment.
    7   146.          Q.  So as a general comment the development of new
    8         capability to do anything can often take years?
    9                 A.  Yes.
   10   147.          Q.  That would be starting from zero to
   11         developing, you know, early interim policies, interim
   12         doctrines to ---
   13                 A.  How to integrate it in wherever you want to
   14         put it to, the skill sets that are associated with the
   15         human resources, the dollars that are allocated for that
   16         kind of activity.
   17   148.          Q.  I accept your statement on that but that
   18         doesn't necessarily apply to long-term detention
   19         facilities.  If I look at -- let's go back to the
   20         document.  It's in Hameed's affidavit, Volume II, Exhibit
   21         Q.
   22                 A.  What page?
   23   149.          Q.  Start at page 3E6.  You've gone past it.  It's
   24         at the bottom, 3E.
   25                 A.  I've got a 3E3.


                                                            45
    1   150.          Q.  You might have 3E13 ---
    2                 A.  I see.  Got it.
    3   151.          Q.  The military pagination has kind of got me
    4         nuts as well.  Colonel Noonan is smirking at both counsel.
    5         So if I could take you to 3E1-1, just the next page over?
    6         So if you just look on the left side there, example of a
    7         layout of a basic collecting point.  You're an engineer,
    8         right, sir?
    9                 A.  I am, yes.
   10   152.          Q.  How long do you think it would take to build a
   11         facility like that?
   12                 A.  To build this in terms of bricks and mortar?
   13   153.          Q.  Well, in terms of what they're saying.  Like
   14         if I read it, there's a fence, barbed wire, post metal
   15         fence, driver, picket, gloves, wiring, tape cut reel,
   16         barbed wire ---
   17                 MR. GRAHAM:  Counsel, do you mean actual
   18         construction or ---
   19                 BY MR. CHAMP: 
   20   154.          Q.  Yes.  Yes.  Construction.  The trench, so
   21         forth, latrine, the cat wire fence.
   22                 A.  Right.  No, understood.  I'm going to frame my
   23         answer in the fact that it's irrelevant but it would not
   24         take long.
   25   155.          Q.  Why do you say it's irrelevant?


                                                            46
    1                 A.  Because the permission to build that, the
    2         skill set to man it, the underpinning legal authority to
    3         do so would take much longer than it would take to
    4         actually construct it.
    5   156.          Q.  What is the skill set to do so?  What's
    6         required there?
    7                 A.  The skill set is one not just of security but
    8         understanding the rules under which you are manning that
    9         holding facility, understanding the rules of engagement
   10         that you would be operating under, in other words when,
   11         if, how, to apply force, the ability to -- so that's the
   12         people themselves that are actually doing that holding and
   13         then putting within a command of control structure that
   14         people need to understand again under which they can order
   15         the application of force, under which they are being asked
   16         to detain long-term, under what provisions they would do
   17         so.
   18   157.          Q.  Colonel Noonan, there is a temporary detention
   19         facility operated by Canadian Forces at Kandahar air
   20         field?
   21                 A.  No.  That's a transfer facility.
   22   158.          Q.  It's a facility that's used to detain and hold
   23         detainees for up to three days?  There's four tents,
   24         they're guarded ---
   25                 A.  It's a facility where we hold the detainees


                                                            47
    1         prior to transfer, yes.
    2   159.          Q.  Up to three days?
    3                 A.  The 96 hours so that's what?  Three days or
    4         four days?
    5   160.          Q.  Four days.  Pardon me.  Four days.
    6                 A.  Yes.
    7   161.          Q.  It's a temporary detention facility?
    8                 A.  No.  It's a transfer facility.
    9   162.          Q.  So the individuals who are there, they're
   10         guarded, I gather?
   11                 A.  Yes, they are.
   12   163.          Q.  Those guards would be training about when and
   13         if to apply force to those individuals?
   14                 A.  That's correct, yes.
   15   164.          Q.  There would be a command and control structure
   16         that deals with the orders to those individuals, the
   17         guards of when and if to apply force?
   18                 A.  In its present construct, that's correct, yes.
   19   165.          Q.  How is that different from a long-term
   20         facility, sir?
   21                 A.  We would have to go through that process to
   22         determine that difference in exact detail.
   23   166.          Q.  That would take years to do that?
   24                 A.  Not the determination of the difference.
   25   167.          Q.  Weeks?


                                                            48
    1                 A.  I'm not sure how long it would take to do the
    2         determination of the difference but it would not be the
    3         critical path to the solution set if we have to go down
    4         there.  The critical path would be gaining international
    5         concurrence to operate in this manner.
    6   168.          Q.  Taking away the legal authority, I'm just
    7         talking about the operational capability for the moment.
    8                 A.  And again, once we've identified gaps,
    9         providing solution sets that go to closing those gaps from
   10         the operational capability would be training of personnel,
   11         supplemental training ---
   12   169.          Q.  How would it be different than the training
   13         those individuals already have?  They're guarding them.
   14         They have to determine when and if to apply force.  How
   15         would the training be different?
   16                 A.  They need to -- when and if to apply force, we
   17         would either have to determine whether we would take those
   18         personnel that -- because of the likelihood of increased
   19         inhabitants of this and the time frame involved with it,
   20         we'd have to determine where we would get these people
   21         from, whether it would be in-theatre which takes away from
   22         the job that they're currently doing or whether we would
   23         have to build new capacity which -- sorry, yes, a new
   24         capacity within which to generate these people, the
   25         funding that's associated with it, the training that's


                                                            49
    1         associated with it, the equipping that's associated with
    2         it.
    3   170.          Q.  What do you mean by "equipping"?
    4                 A.  More people, more guns, more whatever types of
    5         materials that are required, personnel.
    6   171.          Q.  I understand that there is the concern about
    7         redirecting personnel from other activities to manning a
    8         detention facility for a longer period or with larger
    9         numbers would be a concern.  Is that the main concern?
   10                 A.  That's one of the concerns.  The other concern
   11         that we do have is that without the proper training,
   12         without experience in it, the execution of that may go
   13         wrong as has been evidenced in my understanding of -- of
   14         for example the Abu Ghraib situation. 
   15                 Our folks have not been exposed to, historically,
   16         nor have been for at least my generation to the holding of
   17         detainees or prisoners of war, either one, in our
   18         generation.  We don't know the risk -- the lack of
   19         knowledge that we have in the actual conduct of it is
   20         significant.
   21   172.          Q.  Because the Afghanistan mission is the first
   22         true combat mission for the Canadian military since the
   23         Korean world war?
   24                 A.  That we've got to this level?  Yes.
   25   173.          Q.  I gather that the Canadian Forces have been


                                                            50
    1         developing a lot of new capacities and skills over the
    2         last two years in the course of their deployment?
    3                 A.  We have been integrating some capabilities
    4         that we have not deployed recently.  But in terms of
    5         brand-new skills?  No.  We've got infantry.  We've got
    6         armour.  We've got competent engineers.  Our ability to
    7         deploy them better trained from lessons learned is there.
    8         Our ability to integrate a new weapons system such as --
    9         not a new weapons system but the tank, we've been able to
   10         do that but it's not an old -- it's not a new capability
   11         that we've integrated into that force.
   12   174.          Q.  Colonel, on page 3E2-1, I think it's just a
   13         page over.  There you go.  That's a map or a layout of a
   14         central collecting point for 200 prisoners of war?
   15                 A.  Yes.
   16   175.          Q.  How long do you think it would take to build a
   17         facility like that?
   18                 A.  A collecting point is after the conduct of an
   19         operation, those that were detained or taken prisoner of
   20         war are collected there with the intent to move them on,
   21         back to the prisoner of war cage, back to potentially
   22         long-term detention facilities.
   23   176.          Q.  How long would it take to build it?
   24                 A.  This one here again not a long time to build,
   25         no, from an infrastructure perspective.


                                                            51
    1   177.          Q.  The other one took I think they said an hour
    2         and a quarter.
    3                 A.  Yes.
    4   178.          Q.  This one a day?  A day, maybe?
    5                 A.  Yes, sure.  It depends on how many people you
    6         have assigned to the task.
    7   179.          Q.  At 3E3-1, example of a 500 prisoner of war
    8         holding area compound.  How long do you think it would
    9         take to build that?
   10                 A.  This is temporary again, tented accommodation,
   11         some of them have latrines and ablutions.  Again depending
   12         on how many people you can assign to the job and how
   13         quickly you can assemble the stores, once you've got that
   14         altogether, you know, a week, maybe less.  I don't know
   15         what it says in the book.
   16   180.          Q.  Actually I don't think it says exactly.  It
   17         doesn't say.  At page 3F1-1 ---
   18                 A.  Which is Appendix 1, I guess?  3F1-1, okay.
   19   181.          Q.  It's Appendix 1, Outline Establishment for
   20         Administrative Staff for Prisoners of War Holding Areas
   21         and Camps?
   22                 A.  Yes.
   23   182.          Q.  It shows the list of different personnel
   24         required to operate the 500 prisoner of war camp?
   25                 A.  Yes.  In theory that's what we think it will


                                                            52
    1         take.
    2   183.          Q.  I counted something, it's about 55 or so?
    3                 A.  Sure.
    4   184.          Q.  It doesn't have a list in here about how many
    5         people it would take for the 200 prisoner -- pardon me --
    6         the 200-person prisoner of war facility.  How many staff
    7         do you think it would take to operate that one?
    8                 A.  I have no idea.  This is all theory.  This is
    9         doctrine.  This is what we think it would take if we had
   10         all of the bells and whistles and the authorities and all
   11         of that kind of good stuff, that's what we think it would
   12         take.
   13   185.          Q.  So assuming that, all the bells and whistles
   14         and so forth, how many people do you think it would take
   15         to operate the 200-person prisoner of war holding camp?
   16                 A.  I have no idea.  That's not my area of
   17         expertise.  I look at this and it sounds reasonable.  I
   18         look at the bricks and mortar part because I am an
   19         engineer.  I can give you a better answer to that.  So,
   20         you know, looking at it that sounds reasonable in theory
   21         of operating what could be a prisoner of war holding area
   22         and camp.
   23                 MR. CHAMP:  Colonel Noonan, thank you very much.
   24         Those are all the questions I have for you.
   25                 THE WITNESS:  Thanks.

                                                            53
    1                 MR. CHAMP:  I want to thank you again very much.
    2         --- THE EXAMINATION ADJOURNED AT THE HOUR OF 4:37 IN THE
    3         AFTERNOON.
    4
    5                 WE HEREBY CERTIFY THAT the foregoing was
    6                 transcribed to the best of our skill and ability,
    7                 from taped and monitored proceedings.
    8
    9                 ................................................
   10                             G R S / B L / S P

1   Examination No. 07-0465.2                  Court File No. T-324-07
    2
    3                              FEDERAL COURT
    4   B E T W E E N:
    5                    AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CANADA and
    6              BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION
    7
    8                                                           Applicants
    9
   10                                 - and -
   11
   12
   13                       CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF
   14                        FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES,
   15                      MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
   16                     and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
   17
   18                                                          Respondents
   19
   20
   21                         **********************
   22         CROSS-EXAMINATION OF COLONEL STEVEN NOONAN ON AFFIDAVIT
   23         sworn May 1, 2007, pursuant to an appointment made on
   24         consent of the parties, to be reported by Gillespie
   25         Reporting Services, on May 2, 2007, commencing at the hour
   26         of 2:50 in the afternoon.
   27                         ***********************
   28
   29   APPEARANCES: 
   30   Paul Champ,                                     for the Applicants
   31   J. Sanderson Graham,                           for the Respondents
   32   This Examination was monitored by Gillespie Reporting Services at
   33   Ottawa, Ontario, having been duly appointed for the purpose.

1                                   (i)
    2
    3                                  INDEX
    4
    5
    6   NAME OF WITNESS:  COLONEL STEVEN NOONAN
    7
    8   EXAMINATION BY:   MR. CHAMP
    9
   10   NUMBER OF PAGES:  2 THROUGH 53 INCLUSIVE
   11
   12
   13
   14
   15
   16                 ADVISEMENTS, OBJECTIONS & UNDERTAKINGS
   17
   18
   19   *O* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8, 22, 29, 32, 33, 39
   20
   21
   22
   23
   24
   25                                EXHIBITS
   26
   27                             (NONE ENTERED)
   28
   29
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   47   DATE TRANSCRIPT ORDERED:    02 MAY 2007
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   49   DATE TRANSCRIPT COMPLETED:  02 MAY 2007
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